Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review
AEI–Brookings Joint Center 2003 Distinguished Lecture

Judicial review of decisions of regulatory agencies, and of statutory enactments with important economic content, presents unique and persistent problems. Sound economic policy requires a balancing of costs and benefits and of demand and supply, and the decisions of regulatory agencies are often technical and complex. Judicial review is usually performed by nonspecialists who often seek to provide clear rules and predictability, not case-by-case economic balancing of their own. Judicial deference is not a complete solution to the tensions between economic reasoning and judicial review, because regulatory decisions and economic legislation often produce results sharply at odds with their formal, official purposes. Justice Stephen Breyer will discuss these dilemmas in the context of recent Supreme Court decisions and offer suggestions for addressing them.

About the Author

 

Christopher
DeMuth
  • Christopher DeMuth was president of AEI from December 1986 through December 2008. Previously, he was administrator for information and regulatory affairs in the Office of Management and Budget and executive director of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief in the Reagan administration; taught economics, law, and regulatory policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; practiced regulatory, antitrust, and general corporate law; and worked on urban and environmental policy in the Nixon White House.

     

  • Phone: 2028625895
    Email: cdemuth@aei.org
  • Assistant Info

    Name: Keriann Hopkins
    Phone: 2028625897
    Email: keriann.hopkins@aei.org
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