Is Sarbanes-Oxley Impairing Corporate Risk-Taking?

Online registration for this event is closed. Walk-in registrations will be accepted.

Most of the controversy surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley has focused on its direct, tangible costs, especially the cost of creating, installing, and auditing internal controls under section 404. But there are many intangible ways in which this legislation could be even more harmful to the U.S. economy. In this conference, participants will consider a paper by Kenneth Lehn and colleagues of the University of Pittsburgh on whether Sarbanes-Oxley is impairing corporate risk-taking.

About the Author

 

Charles W.
Calomiris
  • Charles W. Calomiris, who codirected AEI's Financial Deregulation Project until 2007, is concurrently the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions at Columbia Business School. He is also a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, a member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee and the Financial Economists Roundtable, and the coordinator of the "Bank Performance and the Economy" program at the Center for Financial Research at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. His research at AEI spans several areas, from banking and corporate finance to financial history and monetary economics. Mr. Calomiris also served on the 2000 International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Known as the Meltzer Commission, this congressionally mandated group recommended specific reforms of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the World Trade Organization to the U.S. government.
  • Phone: 2128548748
    Email: ccalomiris@aei.org

 

Peter J.
Wallison

 

R. Richard
Geddes

 

Kenneth
Lehn
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