Republicans in the House of Representatives recently reached an intra-party compromise that will slightly ease the prohibitions against U.S. trade with Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Iran and Syria.

This development comes shortly after the full House agreed to Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China, over the objections of many who believed that China's repression of religious freedom, its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology and other factors disqualified it from this much-prized status.

Combined with the Clinton administration's persistent efforts to eliminate or weaken economic sanctions against rogue states -- and the near total collapse of the international sanctions regime against Iraq -- there is a real question whether sanctions have any future as a viable foreign policy tool.

Under the recent House compromise (brokered by Republican leaders between Cuban American and farm-state Republicans), sales of foods and medicines would be allowed, but only in exchange for hard cash (no credit arrangements, governmental or private, are permitted). Barter or exports to pay for the imported goods are prohibited, and the U.S. government must license commercial firms (although not charitable organizations).

The congressional future of the compromise is uncertain, but strong, bipartisan pressure from farm state members favors passage during this session, at least with respect to Cuba. Whether the other rogue states will be included in the final legislation is much less clear. Neither President Clinton nor congressional Republicans will consider more-sweeping changes in Cuba sanctions before November's presidential elections.

Economic sanctions have had a long history of controversy in the United States, where their deployment is much more common than in other industrialized democracies. Since Woodrow Wilson first championed economic pressure as preferable to the use of military force, however, opponents have argued that they are ineffective, counterproductive, and distract from real efforts to address important international problems.

Particularly when sanctions are imposed only by the United States, rather than through a broad multilateral arrangement, opponents argue that the United States is often as disadvantaged as the target regime, because U.S. trading opponents are able to grab commercial opportunities denied to American firms. In recent years, opponents have also claimed that Congress is imposing sanctions wholesale, thereby rendering them collectively far more burdensome on U.S. business interests.

Sanctions proponents, by contrast, assert that a policy option between mere diplomatic words and military force enhances the United States' international flexibility, and demonstrates the seriousness of American objections to the sanctioned regimes. Most proponents agree that multilateral sanctions are preferable (as with the anti-apartheid sanctions against South Africa), although there are also compelling reasons for unilateral sanctions where the United States has especially strong interests (as with Cuba). Moreover, even where sanctions alone may not prevail against a transgressor, their usage may help build a political consensus for the eventual use of force (as with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait).

Even before the Cuba compromise, sanctions opponents seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Although the earlier House vote on PNTR was not on sanctions as such, it represented a victory for those asserting the sole primacy of trade benefits for the United States, rather than the more objectionable aspects of Chinese policy. Overwhelming House Republican support for PNTR for China, though, emboldened those chafing under the Cuba sanctions, and put the House Republican leadership in the embarrassing and inconsistent position of arguing for sanctions against Cuba but not against China.

Moreover, the Clinton administration had already substantially lessened sanctions against North Korea following the recent summit of the two Korean leaders; it had made an unprecedented apology to Iran for past American covert activities, leading to possibly easing sanctions dating back to the Tehran hostage crisis; it has assured Syria that progress in its negotiations with Israel would lead to lifting sanctions imposed because of Syria's past terrorist activities; it accepted Libya's decision to turn over two defendants accused of destroying Pan Am 103 as sufficient to justify lifting modest U.N. sanctions; and it said recently, for no apparent reason, it would support lifting U.N. sanctions against the murderous regime in Sudan.

Even more seriously, the Clinton administration's failure to oust Saddam Hussein, let alone contain him within the post-Gulf War constraints of economic sanctions and U.N. weapons inspections, has further demonstrated its unwillingness or inability to use sanctions effectively.

Taken together, these actions have proven to rogue states around the world that simple persistence alone can wear down American resolve, and allow them to escape form the sanctions trap. (Indeed, the Clinton administration has now even abandoned the term "rogue states" so as not to offend these countries or their supporters.) Whether the United States will continue to employ economic sanctions is thus very much in doubt, and may well be the subject of debate during the fall presidential election campaign.

John R. Bolton is the senior vice president of AEI.