The deterioration of relations between the United States and Russia should not be ascribed to conspiracies or anyone's malice. The process is rooted in how the regimes in Moscow and Washington implement their strategic agendas on the basis of their chosen ideologies.

Washington's New Course

Resident Scholar Leon Aron

Washington's current ideology has two sources: 9/11 and the neo-conservatism of the US Administration. If there are any postulates of a "neo-conservative ideology" in foreign policy, then the principal one may be formulated in the following manner: interests and security of America are easier promoted in a world where political freedom reigns supreme. As far as neo-conservators are concerned, a connection between how states behave domestically and in international affairs is vital.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's evolution is quite interesting to behold from this point of view. Rice was a protege of General Brent Scowkroft, Washington's number one "realist" and national security advisor to George Bush. Scowkroft was an embodiment of the view on stability as the radical value and objective of the American foreign policy. Rice began teaching Texas Governor George W. Bush the art of foreign policy in 1998. Judging by his speeches in the presidential race and in the first nine months of his first term, "realism" clearly prevailed in Rice's views then. Who cares what kind of state these Russians have--a Soviet totalitarian state or a new democratic state. How many ICBMs with nuclear warheads they have is the only thing that matters.

But 9/11 demolished the axioms of realism. Maintenance of the status quo became an unacceptable risk. President Bush and his national security advisor became neo-conservators--much to their own surprise. September 11 brought America crashing down from its Olympian heights. Scared and bleeding in many places, it began looking around in search of friends. Friends and not business partners like Saudi Arabia that had produced 15 terrorists out of 19.

Russia promptly moved into the foreground--as though it had been waiting for the moment. Vladimir Putin's call to Bush; Moscow's consent for the use of the Russian airspace and establishment of military bases in Central Asia; cooperation between secret services... All this--boldly, generously, and without bargaining.

When the essence of the regime and their ideologies became important all of a sudden for the newly hatched neo-conservators in the White House, the state of affairs in Russia became important too while important of calculation of missiles noticeably faded. It turned out that Russia 2001 was not China at all, that there were political freedoms, freedom of conscience, bona fide opposition, and free press in it. And that the Kremlin seemed to mean business in the matter of liberal reforms in the economic sphere that were under way.

Moscow's New Course

And yet, the seeds of the fiasco could be found in the triumph itself--paradoxical as it may appear. When the Russian regime changed priorities in its domestic and foreign policies, the neo-conservative dominance in definition of American national interests, the one that had resulted in the unprecedented rapprochement once, became a brake for the bilateral relations. What had been an asset became a liability.

It became more and more clear beginning with the second half of 2003 that Putin's regime was not a correction "flaws" of the 1990s with simultaneous continuation of Boris Yeltsin's strategic policy. On the contrary, the dominating ideology concentrated on the feelings of shame for the "chaos" of the 1990's that had left the country weakened. From these standpoint, the domestic and foreign policies were perceived as a result of some sort of conspiracy, a product of cunning political technologies "ordered and paid for" by oligarchs and not as a corollary of the Russians' own deliberate and free choice.

Traditional postulates carried the day again: what is good for the state is automatically good for the country; strengthening of statehood is strengthening of society, etc. The Kremlin decided that decentralization of politics and economy in the 1990s had been inadequate and even harmful. Let us therefore reanimate the role of the state, occupy "commanding heights" in economy again, repossess the "jewels" in the "economy's crown," and put the executive branch of the government above all the other branches, permanently.

Changes in the foreign policy that followed were similar to these. Pro-Western policy of the previous regime was examined and found ideologically unsound. Disintegration of the Soviet Union was branded as the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Hence the new imperatives in the Russian policy: no more "sacrifices" to the West, and no more facilitation of the westward drift. Restoration and advancement contacts on the former Soviet territory wherever and whenever possible. The new states that are helpful will be rewarded, the ones that are not punished.

No, it is not a return to the policy of the late Soviet era. Russia's foreign policy nowadays is undeniably pragmatic, it is clearly a policy aspiring for the status of bona fide Realpolitik. Maneuvering instead of having the hands tied with abstract principles ("Western civilization," "human rights," "freedom"). Making an emphasis on bilateral relations instead of joining "ideological" alliances. Long-term results are less important than establishment of contacts and the dividends they bring right here and now. Russia is using the tactic known in the business community as asset leveraging (a best efficient placement of assets). An emphasis is being made on the spheres of "comparative advantages" be it nuclear technologies, conventional military hardware, or power industry.

Moscow's "new course" is particularly visible in the situation with Iran. It is this situation that soured Moscow's relations with Washington worse than anything else had. This situation around Iran is being used to promote the same mega-objective, namely a return to the international arena in the capacity of a world power and key player. Hence Russia's tactic in the talks: stall for time delaying "the moment of truth" and defending the status quo to up the price of the "goods" (Russian support).

It may have been all right by Washington were it not for the specific time and circumstances (after all, it got used to France's diplomacy). As things stand, however, it is certainly not all right. The United States is bent on promotion of freedom and democracy as central components of national security and on "advancing democracy" as a key instrument of its maintenance. Russia is obsessed with post-Soviet and post-Imperial restoration that comes down to economic and political recentralization and Realpolitik in foreign affairs. The values are so different that Russia and America are drifting in opposite directions.

Leon Aron is a resident scholar at AEI.