In recent weeks, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and NATO commander General James Jones have suggested that, once the war in Iraq is over, the United States should "realign" its forces stationed in Europe and particularly in Germany. In light of the split between the United States and Germany over Iraq and the clear animosity between President Bush and German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, these trial balloons have been cast in part as a punitive measure. But a strong strategic rationale argues for relocating the network of U.S. overseas military installations and reconfiguring forward-deployed units-this has little to do with the current spat over Iraq and everything to do with transforming U.S. military posture to better meet current and future missions.

While the world has changed beyond imagination in the past fifteen years, the overseas deployments of American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines reflect the strategic realities of the cold war. It is a testament to their ingenuity that they have largely overcome these handicaps in the many missions that we have asked them to perform in recent years--and they are about to overcome them again in Iraq--but the time has surely come for American policymakers to make their tasks less burdensome.

The "American Perimeter"

This essay is intended to offer a general framework for thinking about these new missions, many of which lie along what might be regarded as the global "American security perimeter" that has expanded so dramatically since the end of the cold war. In Europe, the "front line" is no longer on the central German plain but has advanced eastward and, most significantly, southward. The threats are no longer from Soviet tank armies but continued Balkan instability and where the violent politics of the greater Middle East begin to seep into Europe--along the shores of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, on Turkey's eastern borders. This is also the heartland of what Secretary Rumsfeld has called the "New Europe," the newly liberated and democratic states of the former Soviet empire. They are not just candidates to join NATO and the European Union; they aspire to, finally and permanently, join "the West." To these nations, this means participation in a liberal international order led by the United States; they recognize America both as sole global power and as the only reliable guarantor of their independence and security. It is no surprise that, on issues ranging from the International Criminal Court to Iraq, these are the Europeans most willing to nail their colors to an American mast. As the Europeans with the most recent experience of tyranny, they are most willing to pay the price of liberty.

If the American security perimeter has expanded in Europe, it has expanded even more in the greater Middle East, particularly since September 11. In the Persian Gulf, we have moved from security partnerships with a variety of local powers--Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia--to policies of "dual containment" in the 1990s, and now we are on the verge of "dual containment plus rollback," that is, containing the dangers of revolutionary Iran and Saudi Wahhabism while removing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Whatever the outcome of the current Iraq crisis and the success of Iraqi democrats in setting up a more decent and representative government in Baghdad, U.S. interests in the gulf will endure and will continue to encompass much more than Iraq. Nor will the centrality of gulf energy resources to the world economy be lessened.

Moreover, since September 11 the very definition of the Middle East "theater of war" has grown significantly, to include the Caucasus, Central Asia, and much of South Asia. The war in Afghanistan also finds U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and occasionally in hot pursuit into Pakistan. We must regard this as a semi-permanent mission, part of our basic force planning, not pretend these are temporary "contingency" operations as we did in Bosnia or in the Iraq no-fly zones. The American security perimeter in East Asia has likewise expanded. In addition to enduring concerns about North Korea, the rise of Chinese power, and the influence of radical Islam in Southeast Asia--and indeed the confluence of these concerns, particularly in regard to weapons proliferation--must be regarded as central security interests of the United States for the next century.

Patrolling the Perimeter

This expanded global security perimeter has yet to be fully factored into U.S. military planning. Even as American troops find themselves deployed to more than forty countries outside the United States, our long-term basing patterns have been little altered since the cold war. We are actively patrolling the new perimeter, but still treat these new missions as the exception rather than the new rules.

We would better account for these new strategic realities if we regarded our forces abroad as the twenty-first-century version of the cavalry of the Old West--providing reconnaissance and security for the settlers as they move into potentially hostile territory. Like the cavalry, these units must be mobile and self-sufficient. They must be able to shape their situation, receive larger reinforcements, and pass the battle on to them. And they need a network of frontier forts and posts from which to operate.

In Europe the security perimeter has moved a long way from the Fulda Gap, which marked the cold-war frontier between East and West. The prospect of large-scale war has all but passed into European history, and even the Balkans are slowly but surely becoming stabilized. Since 1991, the primary combat mission of U.S. forces in Europe has been "out of area," in the Middle East. And we see the difficulties they have today in constant rotations from Germany to the Balkans--the Bosnia "Stabilization Force" is now into its twelfth rotation--and in transferring units and their equipment to the gulf. Even in recent weeks deployments have been interrupted by the reluctance of the Austrian government to make its rail net available to American forces heading for the Middle East. In short, the dense web of casernes and bases in central Germany that served so well during the cold war is now a handicap to newer missions.

In many ways, the first of these new missions resulted in the longest leap for U.S. forces in Europe. The "Northern Watch" no-fly zone not only reversed a drawdown of American forces at Incirlik Air Base in south-central Turkey, but the "permanent party" at Incirlik has expanded by hundreds. It has been several years since I have visited Incirlik, but the large tent city within the air base fence was a constant presence throughout the 1990s. Plans were drawn up to rehabilitate and reoccupy abandoned housing units, but even if they have been fully implemented they would not have accommodated the need. One can only imagine how crowded Incirlik now is as forces are built up for war against Iraq.

The distance of old bases from new wars hampers even the remarkable mobility and sustained striking power of U.S. air forces. The 1999 Kosovo war was a testament to planners' ingenuity in the face of inadequate air fields in southern and eastern Europe, but the result was that tactical-range aircraft such as F-16s often required multiple refuelings to fly even the briefest missions over the "box" in Kosovo. The melodrama of the army's Task Force Hawk at the Tirana airport is an apt image of America's high-technology advantages stuck in the mud in Albania. Had the war continued longer than seventy-eight days, bases in eastern Turkey would have come into play.

The Kosovo mission also gave birth to Camp Bondsteel. Although, as in Bosnia, the official line has been and remains that the facility is a temporary one that can be closed down on short order, the massive camp bristles with antennae; multiple gymnasiums, chow halls, and even fasts-food outlets; buildings are wood-frame structures built on concrete pads-they are nicer and more permanent than the many World War II barracks that still can be seen on installations in the United States. Operations in the Balkans have also resulted in a tremendous expansion of U.S. Air Force facilities in Italy, notably at Aviano Air Base.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan further underscored the need for a new posture in Europe. Perhaps the largest European contribution made in the war's initial phases was the access to airfields provided by Bulgaria, which allowed U.S. tanker and other aircraft to support missions over Afghanistan. The Bulgarian government and people strongly supported the presence of U.S. forces. "We've been looking forward to this for a long time," said Deputy Defense Minister Petko Graganov when the basing arrangement was announced in December 2001.

The current deployment to the region around Iraq would not have been possible without air bases in Europe to act as "lilypads" for flights originating in the United States or without a secure sea-line of communication through the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal and to Turkey. And in addition to the heavy ground forces coming from the United States and Europe, last week the decision to deploy the Southern European Task Force--a light unit based in Vicenza, Italy--was announced. These paratroopers will add significantly to the ability of U.S. forces to strike quickly in the event of an attack into Iraq.

In retrospect it is clear that U.S. forces in Europe have been moving ever southward and eastward over the past decade; the time has come to recognize that this is not a temporary but a permanent shift and to adjust our basing and planning accordingly. Whether providing forces for operations in Europe or beyond, facilitating deployments to the Middle East, or establishing important strategic and military ties to the "new Europe," the missions of our garrison in Europe have changed dramatically from the dig-in-and-die mission of the cold war in Germany. We must restructure and relocate our Europe-based units to make it easier for them to do the jobs they are being asked to do. With U.S. forces increasingly stretched toward their breaking point to meet the many global missions they are assigned, we can no longer afford the luxury of an inefficient and ineffective European garrison.

Toward a New Posture in Europe

That said, it is equally clear that a dramatic further reduction in the aggregate size of the U.S. presence in Europe--the cold-war garrison has been reduced from 325,000 to less than 100,000--would be a mistake. First of all, we still have important security interests in Europe; to paraphrase Lord Chalfont, we no longer have to worry about keeping the Russians out or the Germans down, but Americans have plenty of reason to stay in. First and foremost is the job of preserving and indeed enhancing the strategic partnership between Europe and the United States. The current rift within NATO or between the United States and France and Germany should not--cannot--be allowed to disrupt the common bond between America and its closest democratic allies. As President Bush has said, "There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish without the sustained cooperation of its allied and friends . . . in Europe."

Let's be clear: We need boots on the ground in Europe; presence matters, and rotational troops cannot do all the jobs that need to be done. A mix of rotational and permanent basing is conceivable, but should be considered with caution. Indeed, rotating troops in and out may fuel the feeling that our most important alliance is an alliance of convenience, not an enduring strategic partnership. Although there is a pressing need to restructure our presence in Europe, we must be careful that, in doing so, we both address new strategic realities while preserving past strategic strengths. Calls for a complete withdrawal from Germany are a sure way to deepen that crisis, perhaps beyond the point of repair. Whatever our current problems may be, our long-term interest is not to create a permanent division between Old and New Europe.

Beyond the geopolitical imperative to maintain alliance partnership, the United States continues to have essential military tasks to complete in Europe. One is the incomplete mission in the Balkans; it has been clear from the early 1990s that the problems in that region cannot be solved without American involvement and military participation, even as the force levels continue to shrink. Another is the task of integrating the states of Eastern Europe in to the western alliance. And finally, we should never discount the institutional and training factor that makes NATO--and NATO military practices--the standard for any and all "coalitions of the willing" that are to be effective in battle. If this institutional NATO did not exist, we would want to invent it.

So what, then, should a more effective European garrison look like? Begin with air forces. A RAND study has concluded that the U.S. Air Force in Europe is reasonably well structured for a variety of missions with one squadron of A-10 ground attack aircraft, two squadrons of F-15C fighters, two squadrons of specialized F-16CJ air defense suppression fighters, and four squadrons of multirole F-16s and F-15Es. In addition, there is a full complement of tanker, lift, and other support aircraft. Reconnaissance, electronic surveillance and other special aircraft are considered national assets. Yet these aircraft are spread throughout the continent, from England to Germany to Italy and Turkey. The most modern and capable airfields, in England and Germany, also tend to be those farthest from the obvious areas of operation; conversely, the bases at Aviano and Incirlik are limited in size, ramp space, and other requirements. Both bases are also cheek-by-jowl with the local towns, making them difficult to defend against truck-bombers and other terrorist attacks. Housing for personnel and families is limited, as are training ranges and opportunities. And, in the wake of the controversy over Iraq, it is reasonable to ask what future German policy-or even English policy but for Prime Minister Tony Blair-toward redeployment of U.S. and NATO forces to Middle East crises would be.

Therefore it would be wise to investigate the prospects for basing some U.S. aircraft in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania or even elsewhere in eastern Europe and perhaps expanding operations in Turkey. These countries are ready for a closer partnership. Poland recently announced the purchase of the F-16 as its new front-line fighter and is well positioned to provide a link in any "airbridge" running eastward from the United States. Bulgaria and Romania have made their major air bases (and Black Sea ports) available for past U.S. and NATO operations and have hosted training events. Incirlik has been the hub of northern no-fly-zone operations for a decade and other airbases in Turkey were made available during the Kosovo war.

Let me conclude the discussion of potential future air bases with a sketch of the Bulgarian airfield at Graf Ignatievo, used during the Afghan war. I visited the base last September as part of a study funded by NATO and the German Marshall Fund, and it gave me a good idea of the opportunities and the challenges inherent in a restructuring of U.S. Air Force Europe. Graf Ignatievo is near the city of Plovdiv, second largest in Bulgaria and about two hours' drive from Sofia. The surrounding valley is open farmland, sparsely populated but clearly fertile land. The base itself is home to a wing of MiG-29s and a boneyard for rusting MiG-21s, but even the newer fighters have seen better days--spare parts and training resources are at a minimum; hangars and maintenance facilities are clean, but not well lit. The pilots themselves have great esprit and professionalism, but junior enlisted personnel live in dilapidated barracks and laundry is hung out the windows to dry. The local power grid is occasionally unreliable.

At the same time, the Bulgarians have invested precious funds into bringing Graf Ignatievo up to NATO standards, lengthening the runways and expanding the parking aprons and taxiways. Soon the air traffic control system will be capable of twenty-four-hour operations and be linked into a nation- and indeed region-wide system including Romania. British Jaguar units have deployed to Graf Ignatievo for training successfully, and bombing and air combat ranges are said to have few restrictions. Ample surrounding land is available to expand the base, which has a railhead running to it. The local populace seemingly would like nothing better than to host an American or NATO permanent installation.

In short, a facility like Graf Ignatievo will require significant investment to make it fully useful to American or modern NATO air forces. However, that initial investment would probably soon be offset by lower operating costs--and it is impossible to calculate the improvement in operational effectiveness either in the near or extended term. Indeed, I would argue that the only way to assess the question of the location of U.S. forces in Europe is to consider operational matters above matters of immediate cost--the cheapest solution is not likely to be the best solution in this case. If the matter of U.S. posture in Europe becomes mired in a budget-driven version of the 2005 base closure process, we are likely to make decisions that are penny wise and pound foolish.

What is true for Europe-based air units is also the case for ground forces and army units in particular. The problems of Balkans operations and Middle East deployments have bedeviled U.S. Army Europe, diminishing their unit cohesion and combat effectiveness since the mid-1990s. The army has long considered redesigning its forces to make them lighter and more tactically, operationally, and strategically mobile and plans to station one of its future Interim Brigade Combat Teams in Europe. Relocating army units to eastern or southeastern Europe would increase the desirability of such changes. That is not to say that there is no further need for heavy ground combat forces in Europe, simply that the premium on slug-it-out armored power should be balanced against the demand for mobility.

The question of European basing cannot be considered in isolation from the worldwide posture of American forces. Decisions about the European garrison obviously have a direct effect on the United States' ability to deploy force to the greater Middle East--and the requirements of that region are in great flux and will be even more so in the aftermath of any war with Iraq. The future of America's military posture in Europe must be harmonized with the likelihood of a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia as well as Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Likewise, U.S. forces in East Asia must not only be capable of deterring a North Korean attack or a Chinese lunge across the Taiwan Strait, they must support the war on Islamic fundamentalist terror in Southeast and South Asia while retaining the ability to reinforce in the gulf.

Finally, the links between those forces that patrol the American security perimeter and the forces stationed in the continental United States-those larger forces that will provide the decisive difference in the case of a regional war--must be shortened. The recent decision to base three additional attack submarines in Guam is a good example of what is needed to shorten reaction times and increase U.S. global military presence. Since the end of the cold war we have constantly asked our troops to "do more with less." If that is not to be a recipe for defeat or retreat--in either case, hopes for an enduring Pax Americana will be dashed--we must make it easier for American servicemen and women to execute the many missions demanded of them.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI. A longer version of this essay was presented in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 26, 2003.