Dear friend: You write to ask a hundred things about America these days. About this November’s election to the war in Iraq, about the future of Iraq, and about how Europe is seen from America.

Jewett Scholar Michael Novak

Let me begin with the election. The last five Senate races to be decided on election night were quite close in the polls in the final days and even for much of election night’s counting. If any of the five had gone to the Republicans, the Republicans would have continued to run the Senate as the majority party. Against all probabilities, the Democrats won all five. That leaves the Democrats with a one-vote majority in the Senate, 51-49.

Last week, one of the kindest, most solid, and well-liked Democratic senators, a conservative democrat from South Dakota, was stricken by a congenital brain condition that required immediate brain surgery. All are still praying for his recovery, which now seems on course, after successful surgery.

The mere thought of the Democrats losing one seat, however, caused sudden panic. In that case, the count would become 50-50, and the deciding vote would be cast by Vice President Cheney. The Republicans would regain control of the Senate. (In South Dakota, a Democratic senator could be replaced by a Republican because in South Dakota, in case of a vacant Senate seat, the governor has the power to appoint a successor immediately, and in South Dakota the governor is a Republican.)

Supposing that the stricken Democrat returns to health, still, in the normal course of things, a certain number of Democrats will vote with the Republicans on some important matters, and the reverse. So the close balance in the Senate will not unduly tie the hands of President Bush. But it is the majority--now the Democrats--who set the agenda and command the calendar.

The switch of power in the House was more drastic, and yet such a switch is fairly normal in off-year elections (that is, when there is no presidential election that year), especially in the sixth year of a two-term presidency. The change is almost always in the direction of the party opposite to the president’s. This year’s switch was in the middle range, historically. In 1994, during Bill Clinton’s term, the Republicans in the House won a really huge 54 seats. That is considerably more than the Democrats won this year (32).

Moreover, in a clever move, the Democrat managers chose about a dozen conservative Democrats to run--and most of them did win, often by surprising their opponents through coming at them from the right, not the left. The result may be that the conservative/liberal distribution in the House may not be as tilted toward the left as some now think.

One reason for the Democratic victory was the presidential unpopularity of President Bush. Like other presidents, President Bush has made compromises with the other party that are resented by his own party (e.g., a new, expensive governmental entitlement to pay the cost of pharmaceuticals for the elderly). The manner and style of President Bush--western, informal, wisecracking--annoys many in the urban East and California. On what Americans call “the Left coast” (California, Oregon, and Washington states), the least religious part of the nation, the president’s religious expressions and actions seem discordant with their reality.

A major reason for defeat was also the war in Iraq. Despite the fact that our European and Asian critics like to deride America as “imperialist,” in actual fact once U.S. armies engage an enemy outside our national boundaries, political pressure starts to build for “an exit strategy.” In America, substantial minorities are always anti-war, at least if Americans are involved for American interests (as distinct from mainly humanitarian ventures, like Bosnia).

In the second week of the invasion of Iraq, when the U.S. forces racing northward were stalled for two or three days, leftward journalists began comparing Iraq to Vietnam as a “quagmire.”

At the end of the third week, when Saddam’s regime had vanished, Baghdad was free, and the statue of Saddam was toppled, more and more Americans started organizing to call the troops home.

Military action overseas is almost always resisted by Americans, and wars overseas are rarely supported with long-suffering patience. Democracies do not like wars, because popular opinion usually does not want them. That is why democratic governance is good for peace, and why President Bush sees the critical source of instability and violence in the Middle East in the lack of democratic regimes and traditions. The same democracy that he would like to see begin to grow in the Middle East also constrains him at home.

Another factor: the conduct of the war in Iraq, at times brilliant, was much too often badly flawed. Clear field leadership was lacking. This fault almost certainly emanates from Mr. Bush and his cabinet. Once the regime of Saddam was deposed, most of the military leaders concentrated on training Iraqi forces--so Americans could leave as soon as possible--and were not concentrating on bringing security to Baghdad and several other major cities (especially in the Sunni areas). There were not enough troops for that task. Our military leaders tended to think that was a civilian duty--“nation building”--not the role of armed forces.

The result was that no one was fighting for victory, but only to get out as soon as possible. A further result has been great restlessness in the American public. Polls show that as many as 72 percent have at times been dissatisfied with the conduct of the war. Yet only some of these dissatisfied want withdrawal soon (a form of surrender); while others are dissatisfied because they want more troops sent in, with a strategy for victory, not for a quick exit. For such persons, victory would probably be defined as bringing security to the major cities, so that civil society can prosper and grow. (Already the Iraqi economy is surprisingly dynamic, as Newsweek, not usually friendly to the war, has just reported.)

How do Americans look at Europe? Europe’s irreligiousness, or non-religiousness, puzzles them. So does the demographic decline staring most Europeans right in the face. For that decline means the promises of the welfare state cannot possibly be met in the near future, since these benefits depend on there being ever more young people to pay for the care needed by the longer-living elderly. Demographic decline is also a severe sign of loss of self-confidence.

Most worrisome of all, Americans tend to think that Europeans do not take seriously enough the threat of Iran, Syria, and other supporters of violent, exceedingly ambitious and extremist “Islamists.” (By this term, we distinguish the secular, political, hate-filled jihadists from ordinary Muslims, whose practices comport better with worship of “Allah the Compassionate,” with respect for reason, and with good will toward others.)

Some here fear that by the year 2030 significant stretches of Europe will be living under Sharia law, through having made one small surrender after another. And then, through having been demographically overwhelmed.

A few Americans recall that within one generation after the death of Manuel II Palaeologus, its Emperor for nearly 35 years, Constantinople went from being the greatest Christian city in the world to being emptied of Christians by a horrid bloodbath, while virtually every Christian church was razed or turned into a mosque. Byzantium became a Muslim fortress.

The sad fate of Constantinople in those days may be one of the morals buried in Pope Benedict XVI’s thoughtful and probing Regensburg address, as he draws our attention to the life and times of Manuel II Palaeologus: Great cities sometimes fall quite suddenly, within a single generation.

At the beginning of the seventh year of this new millennium, both Europeans and Americans have huge decisions to make. On these decisions may rest the fate of millions yet unborn.

Michael Novak is the George Frederick Jewett Scholar in Religion, Philosophy, and Public Policy.