A little more than five years ago, in the first of these letters, I wrote that "U.S.-Latin American relations are better today than they have been at any other point since World War II. Never have our products and lifestyles been more sought after, our political system more respected, our economic culture more anxiously emulated." Latin Americans "want what they call a privileged relationship with the United States. To prove it, they have bent their policies as far as possible to accommodate our interests and goals--many of which they now view as their interests and their goals as well."

If a week is a long time in politics, five years is an eternity. What has happened since those words were written? Congress ratified the free trade agreement with Mexico but has so far refused fast-track authorization to make possible a similar agreement with Chile. Drug certification has poisoned our relations with half a dozen countries and has led to a virtual break in relations with Colombia. Immigration issues in the United States have produced a venomous backlash throughout Latin America. Quarrels over nontariff barriers to Latin American products--and discrimination against American companies that bid for Latin assets--have undermined the general mood of business confidence. But, despite it all, a closer economic, political, and cultural relationship with the United States remains a permanent Latin goal.

Free Trade Problems

Two years ago this month, President Clinton signed an agreement at the Miami summit to work for the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, which would come into existence no later than the year 2005. At this writing, however, the president cannot move forward because he lacks fast-track authority (that is, the right to negotiate an agreement that would be subject only to an up-or-down congressional vote). As a result, Chile, which was the logical next candidate for inclusion in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), has been forced to wait indefinitely. Other Latin American countries find this somewhat difficult to understand, since Chile meets or exceeds all the requirements established by the United States and Canada. "If Chile can't get in," many Latin countries seem to be saying, "who can?"

The reason for the delay is largely political. President Clinton's own party is deeply divided over expanding NAFTA to other countries, and the race for the Democratic presidential nomination in the year 2000 is already shaping up between advocates of free trade (read: Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.) and partisans of protectionism (read: House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt). As is characteristic of his political style generally, the president is reluctant to make costly choices, particularly any that might endanger his relations with the Democratic minority in the House. A bruising fight with Gephardt and his followers over fast track could haunt Clinton on other issues for the remaining three years of his term.

For their part, the Latins cannot understand why Clinton made commitments that he seems unwilling to fulfill. They are even more puzzled at the delay in Congress, since they assume that the FTAA project is widely desired by the U.S. public and its political class. What the Latins fail to see is that the American public is extremely ambivalent about free trade and about relations with Latin America generally, particularly since the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. In the absence of strong leadership from the White House, the undecideds on fast track will continue to account for much as 20 percent in many public opinion surveys.

Understandably, most Latins are not fully cognizant of the provincial agendas that drive so much of our foreign policy. But they have no trouble perceiving that something is wrong. A vague sense of resentment is building, driven by the notion that the United States has gone back on its word. As one Latin diplomat recently put it to an American friend, "We were offered membership in the club, but when we showed up for our first meeting, we were told our credentials weren't in order."

The apparent indefinite postponement of trade negotiations with Chile has led many Latin countries to explore alternatives. There is much talk these days about an agreement with the European Union or the creation of a Brazilian-Spanish American axis or a South American Free Trade Area. Diversification of commercial relations is the order of the day, with missions going out to nontraditional areas such as the Far East, South Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Trade between Latin American countries has likewise increased. Such diversification in and of itself may be a good thing for Latin America but is unlikely to replace a huge hemispheric economic space that includes the United States.

In the end, however, such a grand alliance may prove unnecessary. Even now, in the absence of free trade agreements, unprecedented amounts of American investment are pouring into countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Latin exports to the United States are still growing. And the case of Mexico demonstrates that a free trade accord does not automatically resolve all problems; at present, Mexicans are complaining that arbitrary nontariff barriers are being raised by the United States to prevent the entry of their avocados, tomatoes, and beef.

Certification and Immigration

Mexicans are bracing themselves for another round of certification hearings that will decide whether their government is doing all that it can to help the United States fight drug trafficking. They are not alone in this, as the case of Colombia, which was decertified last year, clearly demonstrates. While the United States is unlikely to decertify Mexico, we might as well: the existing procedure virtually ensures that each year some members of Congress--posturing for domestic consumption--inflict as much damage on our bilateral relations as if we had.

The certification question touches on a number of complex and sensitive points that cannot be adequately addressed in this space. But a few are worthy of mention. First, the United States, not Latin America, accounts for roughly 50 percent of the consumption of illegal drugs world-wide. Second, with the best will in the world, no Latin American government is in a position to suppress this traffic fully, thanks to a dificult geography and poorly paid and poorly trained security forces, as well as the countervailing forces of the marketplace. Third, it is highly questionable that the certification procedure has yielded--at best--more than marginal improvement in interdiction, against which must be balanced the high political costs of the procedure itself. As long as we persist in the present practice, certification will be a permanent open sore in inter-American relations.

If the United States has been unreasonable on the drug issue, the Latins have been equally so on immigration. Since the passage of Proposition 187 in California (which calls for the denial of educational and other public services to illegal immigrants or their children), followed by similar efforts by Congress, a wave of hysteria has swept over the entire region. Latin Americans of all classes and conditions seem to believe that immigration to the United States is a permanent option that no authority in this country has the right to foreclose. The distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, which many critics in the United States have been at pains to reinforce, has been utterly lost in the Latin America media. In Mexico--a case of the pot calling the kettle black--we have even be accused of xenophobia!

For some countries--notably Mexico, but also Nicaragua and El Salvador--immigrant communities in the United States constitute an essential (if sometimes invisible) social safety net in the form of remittances. For others, the existence of family or friends in the United States provides an insurance policy against untoward political and economic developments. For still others, the refusal of the United States to permit uninhibited entry of undocumented aliens is a sign of cultural and racial rejection. In a way, the resentment over U. S. immigration policies is a backhanded compliment: so strong is the draw of the American way of life that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Latin Americans would rather experience it firsthand than wait for it to trickle down their way.

At the present, the United States has no coherent and consistent immigration policy. Until it does, the vast number of anomalous cases will encourage people to attempt illegal entry and will lead to periodic sweeps and forcible expulsions. These latter are widely reported in the Latin American media and help to reinforce the notion of the United States as basically cruel and unfeeling. The purpose of policy, of course, whether on immigration or anything else, is to serve the national interest, not to convince others that one is sensitive, warm, and cuddly. Conversely, until and unless we grasp the nettle of immigration reform, it will be difficult for Latin Americans (among others) to see why one exception should not justify another.

Other Points of Conflict

A host of minor issues fuels anti-Yankee sentiment. The U.S. position on Cuba, embodied in the Helms-Burton law, is publicly resented in Latin America, particularly in Mexico and Panama, two countries that have cultivated important economic relations with dictator Fidel Castro. Although sanctions under Helms-Burton cover only those who traffic in confiscated U.S. property, the Latin American media constantly misrepresent this legislation as an attempt to tell the area with whom to trade. Conversely, much of this vitriol may be for public consumption only. President Clinton's senior adviser on Latin American affairs, Thomas C. McLarty, recently told a gathering of academic and policy analysts in Washington that they would "be surprised at how seldom the subject of Cuba comes up in our private discussions with Latin American leaders."

The decision by the Clinton administration to lift the ban on the sale of high-tech weaponry and to permit its export on a case-by-case basis has ruffled a few feathers in southern South America. Chile, which has plenty of money, is updating its fleet of warplanes. Argentina, whose armed forces are on extremely short rations, cannot possibly entertain a similar purchase. By way of consolation, Washington granted Argentina a special status as a non-NATO ally, a distinction shared by Israel, Egypt, Australia, and Japan. Both moves irritated the Brazilians, who regard the entire subregion as their archdiocese.

There has been much hand wringing--and even more uninformed reporting in the American press--over the White House decision to lift the arms embargo. The United States could have avoided this minor diplomatic quarrel only by recusing itself from the bidding process, that is, by sustaining the existing policy. In that case, Chile would have replenished its fleet from France, the same source from which it obtained it a decade and a half ago when the embargo was first put in place. Until the countries of southern South America have a common arms-purchasing policy (which, by the way, we are constantly told will eventually happen when MERCOSUR comes into the fullness of its political expression), the United States can be excused for treating each as an individual consumer.

One final problem that besets the Clinton administration is the absence of ambassadors in many key posts. This is related, apparently, to the current investigation of campaign fund-raising; as one wit put it, each of our nearly two hundred embassies around the world was probably sold five times over during the runup to the last presidential election. However that may be, it is incredible that we have no ambassador in Mexico, since our mission there is the largest anywhere. (Many believe that former Massachusetts governor William Weld was proposed with no real intention to see him through confirmation. While this may not be true, the spectacle of the Clinton administration's hanging him out to dry was not edifying to Mexicans, who have historically chosen some of their best people for their embassy in the United States.) Nor is it easy to understand why Argentina remains vacant.

These lacunae may not matter much in Washington, but they have a deep impact on the tone and quality of our relations, and not just in the countries immediately affected. President Clinton would be well counseled to appoint senior career people to both Mexico and Argentina or outstanding political appointees with a firm command of Spanish and a solid record of experience in the region.

Building on Advantages

No honeymoon lasts forever, and the euphoria that accompanied the U.S.-Latin American relationship during the Bush years could not have been sustained in any case. What is remarkable about the state of affairs today is that, despite the contentious issues discussed above, the Latin countries are still fundamentally well disposed to the United States and anxious to get on with our common agenda. Anti-Americanism no longer wins votes. Even those forces historically associated with it now claim that they aspire to a normal and mature relationship with the United States.

There are many more opportunities than problems even now. With the Santiago summit of U.S., Canadian, Latin American, and Caribbean leaders less than six months off, both the administration and Congress would be well advised to build on the persistent advantages that remain for us within the region.

Mark Falcoff is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.