| 4:45 p.m. | Registration | |
| 5:00 | Introduction: | Danielle Pletka, AEI |
| Remarks: | Shafeeq Ghabra, Kuwait Information Office and Kuwait University | |
| 6:30 | Adjournment | |
October 2002
Democracy for the Arab World
On October 21, 2002, Shafeeq Ghabra, professor of political science and the director of the Center for Strategic and Future Studies at Kuwait University, addressed the debate surrounding the prospects for democratization in the Arab world, including how regime change in Iraq could affect regional dynamics in the Middle East. Ghabra argued against the notion that democracy and Islam are fundamentally incompatible.
In order to address the prospect of democracy for the Middle East, it is necessary to look at six historic and modern aspects of the region: the regional potential, the lost potential, governance and accountability, the nature of opposition movements, the restrictive impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the idea of challenging the status quo.
Regional Potential. The Arab world (including Iran) holds 61 percent of the world's oil reserves and 21 percent of gas reserves. Historically important to all three major religions, the Middle East is ethnically diverse. By 2025 its population will grow to 500 million from the current figure of 270 million. The people are highly educated, and many have been educated in the United States. With such resources, this region could be a natural ally of globalization. There is a vast spectrum of behavior and lifestyles in the Arab world, which can alternately be repressive (especially for women) or somewhat liberal. There are democratic dynamics at work in Kuwait and Bahrain. Lebanon and Qatar are attempting reforms.
Lost Potential. The twenty-two Arab states lag behind the rest of the world in every category, including freedom, democracy, human development, research fields, and GDP per capita. The energies, education, and entrepreneurial spirit of the people are wasted. The United Nations Development Program's Arab Human Development Report (2002) was as shocking to many Arabs as it was to the West. Over 60 percent of the illiterate are women. This figured has increased in the last twenty years, which raises questions about the priorities of the states and their respect for human rights. However, with 70 percent of the population of the Arab world under the age of twenty-five, rapid change is possible if the young so desire. But at the moment, the institutions needed for reform simply do not exist.
Governance and Accountability. Without good governance, the Arab world will continue to retreat from reform. There are five areas where reform is needed. First, the government must restrain itself from interfering in the legal process. Second, the legislative process, based on elected officials, needs to be developed in order to separate the powers of the state and increase transparency. Freedom of the press is dependent on the legislative branch, and a crucial element of a healthy opposition. Some aspects of reformed legislatures and freedom of the press exist in Kuwait and Lebanon, but not in most of the heavyweight Arab states.
Third, the bureaucracy must be restructured and decentralized so that it does not continue to drain economic resources and undermine the private sector. Fourth, new leaders have to be cultivated. The long periods of "reform" in the Middle East during which no change has actually occurred have weakened the states and led to a centralization of power and a fear of taking risks; this system does not provide for the development and emergence of new leadership. People must be allowed to fail and be protected by a system of laws in order for the new generation to learn how to lead effectively.
Finally, the role of the school and the role of the mosque in the Arab world must be redefined. The mosque has become the primary institution of education and religion, while the schools have been marginalized and do not teach critical thinking or good citizenship. Education reform has been neglected by the governments and the current curriculae are bereft of social sciences. The mosque has filled this vacuum, which has helped to promote the radicalization of Islam.
The Nature of the Opposition. For a long time opposition to the government was illegal; this meant that most true opposition groups operated in exile outside of the state. Because of their minimal interactions with the ruling regime, they tend not to be trained in compromise. This has resulted in the political polarization of the region where people are forced to embrace either one extreme or the other with very little room for alternate views in between (for example, there is either the regime or bin Ladenism, but nothing else). This has undermined legitimate opposition efforts and contributed to a lack of critical thinking on important issues.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Since Israel's victory in 1967, it has slowly turned from the secular Israel of Ben Gurion and embraced fundamentalism and religion in both the government and the schools. The same thing has happened in the Arab world. The defeat of Arab nationalism in 1967 was also the defeat of the Arab secular movement. Since 1967, Islam has been highly politicized, and the interpretation of the religion has become harsher. The Arab-Israel conflict has reinforced the problems of governance: The constant struggle with Israel has allowed the governments to maintain control, restrict progress, and radicalize the Arab world.
Challenging the Status Quo. The current political and cultural situation in the Arab world is not permanent; forty years ago Islam was more open and more tolerant. In recent decades, religious differences have become far more delineated in the Middle East. In the aftermath of September 11, the United States has challenged the Arab states to eliminate terrorist groups, support regime change in Iraq, stop Palestinian terror campaigns, and end extremism. In short, the Islamists have been challenged to reevaluate their opinions, just as public opinion is undergoing a shift. As Arabs begin to feel the need for readmittance into the world order again, the potential for change is created. The debate over Iraq has led to greater self-examination--even among Islamic movements--and revealed the flaws in the system. If the radicals shift their thinking, it is possible that a dialogue could be created.
In the current era, no ideology can claim that it has won in the Middle East. The idea of a secular Arab state has failed; the idea of a pure Islamic state has failed. Because of these failures, an entire generation is close to being lost. Democracy could be a competitive ideology in the region as the value of tolerance begins to be understood. If democracy and tolerance do not take hold, the cycle will begin again, only the outcome will be more disastrous than before. If we do not address these issues today, then the accumulation of evil could be hard to undo.
Discussion
Many people have raised the question of why there is no democracy in the Arab world, but it is very difficult to answer completely. Arab tribal culture has a serious problem concerning relations with the state. In Egypt and Morocco, there is some tradition of statehood, but elsewhere there are politically complicated relationships between majority and minority, tribe and state, and the various factions. A strong leader was needed to create order and prevent the continual overthrow of the government. Populations become accustomed to this order and have allowed leaders like Saddam to stay in power. Too much order for too long can lead to stagnation.
There are also economic factors to consider: Arab states have not faced up to the challenges that free markets present, and many nations use oil money to mask the structural problems of the government. However, there are aspects of Arab culture that also reinforce democratic values. The outcome is largely dependent on the leader and the desire for reform. Current Arab leaders have managed to use the anger generated from the Arab-Israeli conflict to their advantage. Substantial self-examination is required to overcome the historical problems.
The United States has failed to commit to democracy in the region because it is worried about failed states and vacuums of power that could be filled by radicalism. For regime change in Iraq to succeed, there would have to be serious American engagement in the region afterward. Many Arab states realize that regime change in Iraq would bring a regime friendly not only to the United States but to the region as well, and if the United States manages to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the state, the pragmatic school in Arab politics (which was dominant during the cold war) will gain more influence. If regime change in Iraq succeeds, large groups of Islamists will reconsider their views.
For example, the recent killing of an American soldier in Kuwait has brought about the first serious debates about the role of Islam in education in years. The government issued a statement saying that the incident is a reflection of the need to reexamine school curriculae, separate religion from culture in education, and reevaluate the role of both mosques and schools. The future of the Arab world will be closely linked to the ability to channel excess energy from extremism into productive societal elements and the economy.
Nation-building in Iraq will depend on the Iraqis and how much they are able to work through their defeat and emerge from the other side with a new cultural identity. There will be wide support in the Persian Gulf for the reconstruction of Iraq, as it is in the Gulf states' interests to have a stable state as a neighbor. Arab states have also come to accept the idea of democracy in Iraq, even if they await it with a critical eye.
AEI research assistant Molly McKew prepared this summary.


