May 2003
The Future of Iran: Mullahcracy, Democracy, and the War on Terror

The dramatic changes in Iraq and Afghanistan are putting new pressures on Iran’s mullahcracy at a time when 70 percent of Iran’s population is already openly opposed to the clerical regime. A May 9 event addressed the future of Iran and what steps the United States can take to promote democratization and regime change in Iran.

Two great fears have been expressed since the beginning of the mission to bring freedom, and in the long run democracy, to Iraq: the fear that it will not work, and a stronger fear, that it will. Iran, in many ways Iraq’s most important neighbor both because of its proximity to Iraq and the many links between the two countries, has good reason to fear Iraqi democracy.

Shiism is the dominant religion in Iran. The overwhelming mass of the Islamic population supports it and it is explicitly represented and invoked by the current theocracy. The majority of the population in Iraq is also Shiite, but it has not had control of the government. The term that best describes the situation in Iraq is Sunni ascendancy with a dominant minority controlling and oppressing the majority.

The Shia connection between Iran and Iraq is rendered more important because the two most holy sites of Shiite Islam are located in Iraq. During Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship however, contact between the divines of Iraq and Iran was very limited. It is now more open and this provides either an opportunity or a danger for Iran. In assessing the danger, one must first consider this point: The regime in Iran, established with high hopes in 1979, has turned out to be a tragic disappointment. It is detested by an overwhelming majority of its people. The 1979 revolution was a real change with a genuine ideological basis that caused a massive shift in social, economic, and political power. Its impact compares to both the French and Russian revolutions. The American presence immediately next door in Iraq, however, is a dangerous threat to the regime. Iranians are fairly happy to see Saddam go, but the next government may turn out to be more dangerous for Iran, for it is now susceptible to the contamination of democratic ideals from a new Iraq. The regime naturally feels it must do something to counter the threat and questions how to deal with both America and the threat of its democratic ideals.

Iran has a choice: It can be helpful or threatening. Unfortunately, the second option is more likely. The Iranian clerical regime wants democracy to fail so miserably that the Americans will not be a presence in the region.

As a young foreign correspondent stationed in Tehran in 1979 to cover the transition from monarchy to theocracy, I remember the great joy with which Iranians celebrated what was considered to be the birth of Iranian democracy and marveled at the widespread excitement about the progressive developments the revolution would bring. The lack of secret ballots and the watchful eye of the clergy at voting stations however left me skeptical. The coalition of the left and the Islamists, which was so crucial to Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, became cognizant of the fact that their enduring respect for Khomeini was not reciprocated. Khomeini turned on them. Their newspapers were shut down; many were killed or imprisoned; few managed to flee. Anti-Americanism grew and the frustrations of the slow-paced revolutionary progress led to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran later that year. Many, however, remained faithful to the Ayatollah and the hope he represented. A generation later, the situation has altered drastically. This present reality is the subject of the first panel.

Dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan alone will not destroy terrorism and tyranny in the Middle East. In discounting the regimes of Tehran and Damascus, the recent American victory in war quickly becomes political failure. America’s recent diplomatic efforts in Iran and Syria translate into weakness and confusion in the political language of the Middle East. The United States is still engaged in old diplomacy and that policy sends the wrong message. The United States betrays those who seek freedom, those who are our true allies. This is the case in Iran today. The United States is Iran’s greatest hope and America must realize that change in Iran is the greatest opportunity to fundamentally transform and liberate the Middle East.

Uri Lubrani
Israeli Ministry of Defense

Watching the events in Iraq unfold, it is clear that there are similar, troublesome signs in Iran. The ayatollahs want to take charge of the Shia community in Iraq , which constitutes the majority of the population. They know they must control it to ensure that they have room to advance both ideology and policy. They fear the influence of American culture, do not want American military bases in the vicinity, and will go to great lengths to avoid Iraq’s fate. On the other hand, the mullahs correctly perceive the susceptibility of American public opinion in the face of U.S. casualties and can therefore strike the center of political decisionmaking in the United States.

The fear bloodshed within Iran is a reality faced by the ayatollahs and the general public alike. No matter the width and breadth of the demonstration, nor the oppressive measures taken to impede it, the fear pervades that mass bloodshed on either end is the fuse for an explosion much larger and far-reaching.

Despite the passion of the people, the majority of the Iranian public has concluded that there is no hope for them under the rule of the ayatollahs. They are struggling financially; their freedoms are suppressed. Few people outside Iran realize the extent of human rights abuses. President Bush’s axis of evil speech was a dramatic, powerful development, but its spirit must be sustained and even hastened. The ayatollahs do not want the United States to be in Iraq or to succeed in Afghanistan. They do not want the infiltration of western culture. Yet, the Iranian people need America to proceed with conviction. The Iranian people deserve this.

There is a confused picture of what is going on in Iran today. From America’s standpoint it appears that the reform movement is stagnant; one mullah is like all the rest; and the people of Iran are just waiting to remove their regime. Although there is some truth to these views, there are misconceptions as well. Noteworthy changes are taking place in Iran today. The economy is opening up. Two Eurobonds were issued last year. There is now one exchange rate as opposed to the many that existed a year ago. The rial has appreciated some against the U.S. dollar. Due to economic reform in the last few years, as a foreigner, one can invest in the Tehran stock market. In fact, a German company recently completed the first takeover of an Iranian company through the Tehran stock market. The oil stabilization fund under President Mohammad Khatami has also been quite successful. Over ten billion dollars have been channeled away from secret accounts into a special fund, thereby fostering greater transparency. The reforms seen in the Tehran stock market are a reflection of how the administration under Khatami is attempting to make the shift from a statist economy to one with more private enterprise, transparency, and accountability. Although this has not been an overwhelming success, much progress is still being made.

The problems of the economy as a whole, however, are also reflected by the stock market. To list a few: lax accounting procedures, short-term gain investments, and failure to properly handle the process of privatization. The country suffers from other major problems, including soaring unemployment and extensive social problems such as abuse of women, drug use, and inadequate housing. Despite all of Iran’s problems, democratization and reform continues in Iran. If the United States hopes to influence this process, it should be more aware of what is actually happening. Khatami is respected and even worshipped, but he is constrained by a lack of authority and by the powerful people around him. Either the protests will take a long time to bear fruit or something will snap. Many people sincerely want change, but not bloodshed, not another revolution. They want change from within.

While some in the West and the Islamic Republic itself purport that the Islamic revolution was deeply rooted in the culture and religion of Iran, analysis of these factors with regard to the current debate on the form of democracy in Iran indicates to me that the people of Iran seek not an Islamic democracy but a secular one.

Iran’s return to Islamic governance was made possible only by way of modern revolution. The Islamic revolution cannot be interpreted as an outcome of Shiism. Rather, the revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini was an innovator of religious affairs. His policies of terror, administrative purges, cultural revolution, and the accommodating attitude towards the Soviet Union point more to Stalin and Mao than to the word of the Prophet Muhammad or the Imam Ali.

The fall of the Soviet bloc has discredited this revolutionary ideology and created a major crisis of legitimacy within the Islamic regime. To analyze this crisis, the ideologues of the regime do not refer to Iranian history or to the canonical religious and political texts of Islam. Instead, resolution is sought by examining the Soviet and Chinese experiences. The regime thus overlooks its own history and tries to uncover its own political identity by referring to the literature and ideas of the modern West.

Akbar Gangi is emblematic of the young generation of Islamists. In his study of the writings of the major Shiite jurist council, he highlights the discrepancy between its traditional worldview and the experience of the Islamic Republic. Eventually he refers to the fascist ideology espoused by Benito Mussolini to explain Iran’s political system. The modern Islamic revolution is an outcome of the meshing of two factors: the modern revolutionary left and the far right European revolutionary movement. The Islamic Republic then does not have its root in Iran’s culture, religion, or tradition but rather is nothing more than a variation on the modern totalitarian regime.

Since the 1979 revolution, the people of Iran have questioned their choice of totalitarianism over the option of liberal democracy offered to them by the last prime minister of the Shah’s monarchy, Mr. Baktiar. In these twenty-plus years the revolutionary idea of the negation of the individual has come full circle. Evidenced by the writings of Gangi and Reza Pahlavi, heir to the monarchy of pre-revolution days, the ideas of human rights and secularism now hold prominence in the intellectual elite of Iran. Both call for democracy and the notion of consent of the governed.

The attitudes of Gangi, Pahlavi, and the intellectual elite are not lost on the people of Iran. Students, too, now see that there can be no democracy where authority is in the hands of a single absolute power. A strong indication of the attitude of the public can be seen by a poll on Kabil University’s website that asks respondents to choose whether or not they wish to have a national referendum on the reestablishment of relations with the United States, the reform of electoral laws, and on the very nature of the political regime itself. Eighty-five percent of the voters favor referendum on the nature of the regime.

Totalitarian regimes survive by creating and propagating false versions of reality. The communism of the Soviets survived under this strategy and the West’s ideological naiveté. For many years the West has denied the relevance of the prodemocracy activists both inside and outside of Iran. To help the people of Iran recognize their democratization goals, the West should recognize their desire for political change and challenge the official propaganda of the Islamic republic that denies this movement’s authenticity.

The looming question regarding policy toward Iran is whether the United States should blink in the face of Iran’s nuclear weaponry development. It is a fairly well known fact that for the last ten years, the Iranian nuclear program has been moving along at a good rate. The timeline for developing nuclear weapons has dropped to under two years, which renders a potentially serious predicament for the United States. It is not likely that the regime will fall apart quickly. If it does, it will be the effect of a series of unpredicted events, a sort of spontaneous combustion, and not the result of a determined endeavor. The regime has been rather adroit at handling a good amount of opposition and it is not likely that will change over the next twenty-four months. There is no doubt that the United States should strive to find a means of support for the Iranian opposition, but it may be difficult due to the fact that the primary institutions responsible for covert action have been historically opposed to it.

The United States then has to confront the issue of what to do about nuclear program. Clerics and liberals alike in Iran have persuasive arguments in favor of nuclear weaponry, thus the program will move forward regardless of any change in the government. The result for the U.S. is a two-faceted calculation: strategic and terrorist.

The strategic approach, although potentially complex is a strategically manageable one. The United States should do everything possible, perhaps even militarily, to impede Iran’s development of weapons of mass destruction. This may be difficult because the Iranians posses a dual system of underground development: gas centrifuge and heavy water. It remains possible that the United States might not possess the intelligence necessary to take out these facilities. Either way, the Iranians will rebuild. For Iran, the question of whether to turn to terrorism is a utilitarian one because there is no debate in Iran about the inherent good or bad involved.

There are five factors to keep in mind for the next year in Iran. First, Khatami is not actually in charge. Second, Iran is becoming a nuclear threat. Third, Iran supports worldwide terror. Fourth, Iran is undermining U.S. policy in Iraq. (Subsequently, the dissidents in Iran are a force that should be encouraged.) Finally, regime change in Iran ought to be a crucial aim for this country.

The Bush administration will be preoccupied until the November 2004 elections, thereby rendering it difficult to confront Iran, especially after having just taken on Iraq. Consequently, it is conceivable that Iran policy over the next year will be focused on tactical decisions rather than on bold moves.

The State Department’s role will be decisive in influencing policy given the distraction of the White House. The secretary of state demonstrates an attitude of feeble aggression in showing tyrants and dictators that the United States will do business with them. A plausible explanation for this attitude is the principles under which the State Department trains and operates-process, politeness, and accommodation. It instructs its officers to not make waves.

Congress, more action-oriented by nature, clearly maintains influence on policy. However, State Department officials hold congressmen in contempt as nonexperts in these matters. Senator Brownback,on the other hand, due to his focus on moral principles rather than pragmatism, has a good chance of getting his initiatives passed. His resolution for support for democracy in Iran has a number of cosponsors in both parties and will only need more public attention and support.

Whether in Congress, the State Department, or the White House, this issue needs to be kept at the forefront due to the time-sensitive nature of the Iranian nuclear program.

Iran’s great paradox centers on the fact that for the last twenty-five years it has been the center of instability in the region, while remaining the only country upon which the future stability of the Middle East can be trusted. The future of Iran is not necessarily freedom from an Islamic republic and it is not specifically a problem between tradition and modernity. A very complex situation is at play today in Iran. At the heart of it are three major forces-nationalism, political Islam, and science-and the need to balance these forces in order to build a new Iran.

Unlike Turkey or any Arab states, Iran has twenty-five years of experience with political Islam. It does not, however, have the tools it needs to defend its independence if threatened, mainly the conventional weapons and the standing army that was eager to fight for Islam as in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran knows that without a strong science and technology industry, it cannot have an effective, independent army. This fact is widely accepted within Iran today, regardless of political stance, and is a key incentive for developing nuclear weaponry, whether it be in two years or ten.

The people ruling Iran find themselves caught between external and internal forces: American troops on the outside and youth and dissidents within. Even among the rulers it is important to note the divide between the old, modern, and political Islamic elite. The old Islamic elite took power with the clerics and mullahs just after the revolution of 1979. They are fifty to sixty years of age and hold number two and number three positions in the various government ministries. They are tenured and do not want reform. Although they hold political power and have money, their ideology is not firm and they know that their authority is slipping. The modern Islamic elite came with Rafsanjani and later Khatami, and their ideals are those of democracy, liberty, and independence. Some are in positions of power; others are in jail. Although they do a fairly good job of managing the country despite the plethora of problems, they know the last twenty-five years are marked with failure and they want to make a transition. They experienced the revolution of 1979 and can therefore comprehend the costs and benefits. Despite their image of modernism, however, the general population mistrusts them and they are not the solution of the future. The new political elite consists of the younger generation. The members of this generation are intelligent, action-oriented, able to work in and out of the system, and are fully prepared to do what it takes to make change happen.

The situation in Iran requires more serious debate. None of the three aforementioned forces translate into straightforward policy options on how to get rid of the mullahs. The Iranian people do not want another revolution or more bloodshed; they want to find their own way and they want to do it soon. The regime is aware of this and knows it must compromise in order to survive-to find the balance of power between nationalism, Islam, and science.

The people of Iran want liberty. The United States is a symbol of hope for Iranians because of its freedom, economic opportunity, and just law. In aiding aspirations of nationalism and modernity in Iran, the United States has two issues to address: first, the nuclear weapons program and, second, regime change.

American policymakers must face the challenges of hastening regime change, filling the void of leadership in Iran, and showing the Iranian people a clear alternative . Once President Bush is on board, there will be a revolution in Iran.

The most important consequence of regime change in Iran would be the failure of Islam as a form of governance. The war against terror translates into fighting militant Islam and the implications of a change in Iran would be a comprehensive testimony for the region. Other implications are economic and political. Iran, by location, is the gateway to the Persian Gulf, the Caspian region, and the rest of the world and can easily serve as a trade corridor for goods, services, and energy. The final implication of regime change would be the potential impact it could have on three very serious issues the United States faces: terrorism, nuclear development and proliferation, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

AEI staff assistant Lauren Di Cecio prepared this summary.