June 2003
North Korea: Thinking the Unthinkable

The president’s "axis of evil" speech marked a shift in American policy. It extended America’s war on terrorism to countries like North Korea. The Bush administration’s strong comments resemble calls for war, but going to war with North Korea is too dangerous. The administration is aware of the danger and is thus turning to economic strangulation as a tactic to prevent North Korea from continuing its nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s neighbors are not cooperating with this U.S. strangulation strategy. Economic strangulation will only provoke North Korea and increase the likelihood of war.

Pressure without negotiations is counterproductive. A negotiated outcome could allow Bush to obtain victory through freezing and dismantling the North Korean weapons program. Negotiation would also open the chance for regime change. Refusing to deal with the problem only accelerates the North Korean program, but talking without offers is of no use.

Administration hardliners thought the war in Iraq would easily persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, but the lesson North Korea learned from Iraq was the opposite. It learned that the United States would attack a country regardless of inspections and disarmament. Consequently, North Korea became paranoid and returned to considering the military its lifeline.

The Bush administration sees that North Korea is determined to obtain nuclear power and thus considers negotiations pointless. It views the 1994 Agreed Framework as a Clintonian mistake, and it believes that negotiating is yielding to blackmail. This is not true. Negotiations may seem harmful to some, but they could yield results.

Now is not the time to give up on a diplomatic solution to the crisis with North Korea. The fact is that diplomacy in North Korea has not yet been tried. During the October 2002 and April 2003 meetings, the United States did not allow Assistant Secretary James Kelly to probe for negotiation.

North Korea desires a recognized sovereignty, a United States that will not interfere with its economy, and the signing of a U.S.-North Korea nonaggression agreement. These are not vague requirements and they could have been accommodated. The administration was encouraged to negotiate, but it chose the opposite-to pressure North Korea into dropping its nuclear program.

Responding to pressure, North Korea escalated its program. It restarted its nuclear reactors and abandoned the 1994 Agreed Framework. It put hoods over cameras and exiled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. When Pyongyang knew that the United States would not negotiate, it reached for plutonium. A pause in its production occurred in March, and North Korea now is not moving with speed, but is processing at a level that is too hard to fully detect.

The People’s Republic of China has applied pressure and its March intervention has been a major step. High-level Chinese officials flew to see Kim Jong Il, cautioned the regime, and encouraged the April meeting. The April meeting, however, offered little progress towards a solution. There is talk of a five-party meeting between Japan, China, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea. A sixth party would include Russia. But the United States will not negotiate as long as North Korea continues its threats. This is the wrong policy. Another step is North Korea’s declaration that it has become a nuclear power. It is not a secret. Its nuclear power has created a significant change in the negotiating game.We must talk, negotiate, and make an effort. Alternatives could be a war of millions killed-beyond anything we have seen in recent years. We must think the thinkable and see the basis for negotiated settlement.

It is not too late for diplomacy to work in North Korea. After all, making weapons requires time, North Korea has not yet had a test explosion, and there is no certainty of its ability to surpass technical problems that are involved in missile development.

During James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang, he confronted the nuclear weapons program. North Korea offered to accelerate its schedule to ship out uranium rods, which marked the emergence of a serious attitude toward negotiations.

America must now insist that uranium be subject to inspection and sent out of the country. North Korea must stop proliferation. The price for these demands, however, is high: large-scale food aid and energy aid for irrigation. The cost is $500 million to $800 million.

The Bush administration will not negotiate bilaterally. Multilateral approaches would work, and a six-nation denuclearization pact would be historic for President George W. Bush. We need a dramatic move now, but the self-defeating American attitude is that North Korea needs America more than America needs it.

While the United States is divided on how to solve the problem, North Korea is unified. The only struggle in North Korea exists between hardliners and pragmatists who are ready for economic assistance from the United States. The American no-talk policy is strengthening the hardliners and impeding economic reform.

A negotiated settlement would avoid war and secure U.S. objectives. Unfortunately, skepticism exists about the potential for such a solution. This skepticism derives from North Korea’s intentions. In the early 1990s, North Korea’s intentions were probed, and they have been probed multiple times since then. Its intentions were to gain nuclear power, and the United States certainly did not and does not wish to accommodate these intentions.

There are practical difficulties in negotiating with North Korea. In the history of agreements with the country, violations have been far too common. Who would sign a U.S.-North Korea negotiation? Their current leader? Remember that Kim Jong Il himself ordered the violations of the Agreed Framework. Negotiations with him and with North Korea do not present a hopeful chance for peace.

The principles of pressure and containment depend on whether you believe that North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear weapons programs. If so, then negotiation is logical. If not, then negotiation means accepting failure.

A bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea would not succeed. While a multilateral agreement involving China would work, an agreement involving the entire region would signal a greater likelihood that North Korea would not have a weapons program.

Pressures or sanctions do not mean a rejection of diplomatic solutions. We must remember that pressure was integral even to the 1994 sanctions that led to a diplomatic deal. The notion that pressure is not useful is wrong. To North Korea, pressure is tantamount to war, but it is not to America. It is still a means of diplomacy.

The current administration is on a dual-track plan, with a multilateral approach coupled with American pressure on the regime. Cutting off funds from drug flow and weaponry are not sanctions; they are crackdowns on illegal activities.

The current crisis, though it bears similarities of the 1994 crisis, differs because it no longer includes Kim Il Song as a moderating force. There is no moderating influence now, and a nonaggression treaty would be a worthless piece of paper. A North Korean political demand to end U.S. hostility would include a number of U.S. actions-deployments on the Korean Peninsula, the axis of evil comment, the aid not provided after the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the list would go on. It would not be feasible.

As of late, the North Korean regime has decided to issue bonds. These bonds have no yield; they are only marks of patriotism. The only other time that bonds of this sort have been issued was during the Korean War. Clearly, this is a war bond.

It is wrong not to enter discussions. The hostility in refusing to discuss matters with North Korea has empowered the North Korean belief that the United States is the true source of the crisis. America’s approach should be to maintain contact.

The nature of North Korea is one of uncertainty. The quality of available information is low, and America has only a vague understanding of North Korea’s military program and regime objectives.

Critics now lump alternative coercive military options together as leading to war. There are alternative means, however, such as intensified observation flights and photo interpretations. Another option is to enter a mode of quarantine-to inspect all North Korean vessels venturing to the Middle East, to ensure that nuclear material is not being proliferated. The deployment of American weaponry to shield against artillery attacks would easily take North Korean artillery pressure off the table. There are ways to prevent military action to take away North Korea’s ability to proliferate.

The North Korean million-man army is significantly different than the armies encountered in Iraq. Because the North Korean regime may already possess nuclear weapons, the threat of terrorism and unthinkable nuclear consequences is prevalent.

Bombing a nuclear site in North Korea would have radiological effects similar to or worse than those of Chernobyl. It would cause deaths in Japan and South Korea and would result in the onset to cancer and numerous genetic defects.

The chance to rid North Korea of a nuclear bomb was lost in 1987. No amount of blackmail will persuade North Korea to give up its goal of becoming a nuclear power. If America is to isolate North Korea, then it should provide aid to China. If North Korea is to implode, then America should provide assistance in the aftermath.

AEI research assistant Laurie Burkitt prepared this summary.