In 1995, the Pentagon’s U.S. Security Strategy for sub-Saharan Africa stated that America has little strategic interest in the continent. This statement accurately reflects U.S. thinking during and after the Cold War. But today, because of the so-called war on terrorism, the United States can no longer afford to ignore sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past year, the Bush administration has deployed troops to Djibouti and established America’s first semipermanent sub-Saharan military base there, known as the Combined Joint Task Force Horn Of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The primary mission of CJTF-HOA is to combat terrorism in the region. This development may prove to be just the start of a broader shift in defense policy toward Africa, as the United States moves beyond the trauma of Somalia and begins to treat Africa as a "normal" continent.

Africa, particularly West Africa, is proving to be an important energy supplier to the United States. On average, more than 15 percent of U.S. petroleum imports come from Africa. By 2010, the National Intelligence Council estimates that this number will grow to approximately 20 percent. Many of these reserves are located in deep water. Still in the early stages of development, West African oil has a high discovery ratio. The continent’s oil is also attractive because of benign weather conditions in the Gulf of Guinea, unlike in the North Sea, which allows oil companies to drill on vessels instead of on platforms. In addition, Africa is 50 percent closer to the U.S. market than is the Middle East.

More than $2 billion, most of which comes from the United States, are invested in offshore, deep water drilling in Africa. This investment is likely to grow to $3 billion by 2005. Angola and Nigeria, the two largest petroleum exporters in Africa, stand to gain the largest share of this new wealth.

In addition to oil, Africa is also likely to be a significant source of natural gas for the United States. By 2010, one third of America’s liquid natural gas will come from that continent.

Since 1970, the economic performance of post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa has been disastrous, and the worst is yet to come. This problem is due in part to Africa’s demography, the continent’s increasing irrelevance to the global economy, the steady decrease in Africa’s share of world trade, the decline of direct private investments in Africa, and its growing dependency on foreign aid. According to the World Bank, per capita output in Africa is lower today than it was in 1970. Twenty-first century economies depend on human resources, which are in dire condition in Africa. UNESCO statistics show that out of approximately twenty sub-Saharan countries, ten have a lower number of enrollments in primary education than they did even a decade ago.

Compounding these problems is the spread of HIV/AIDS. According to the UN, one in nine adult Africans is HIV positive. In some countries, 20 percent of adults are infected. In Botswana, an unimaginable 38 percent of adults are infected. Estimated life expectancy in Africa is lower today than in 1980.

In response to the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa, President Bush has pledged $15 billion. Although overall this aid is an extremely positive development that speaks well of the president’s compassion for the African victims of AIDS, one problem with this generous grant is the cost-benefit analysis of anti-retroviral therapy. Funds spent on the treatment of HIV might ultimately save more lives were they spent on any number of other public health initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa, such as vaccination.

Several countries in Latin America and East Asia have grown increasingly wealthy by exploiting the comparative advantages of their economies. Why not Africa? One reason why African economies are weak is the lack of foreign investment, causing economic development to stall. Although Africa has a competitive advantage in its agricultural products, demand for them in the industrialized world is low because of protective trade policies. This is particularly true in the European Union because of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EU imposes heavy tariffs and taxes on agricultural imports and provides subsidies to domestic growers.

Nor are these domestic producers small farms; rather they tend to be large agricultural monopolies. U.S. and EU subsidies are so extensive that Sweden and Oregon compete with Kenya in the sugar trade. The CAP also guarantees that African products cannot be sold competitively in the EU because of huge import tariffs. Without these tariffs, some African agricultural products would dominate first world markets. According to the Institute for Economic Affairs, EU subsidies are responsible for cutting potential African dairy exports by 90 percent, meat exports by 60 percent, non-grain exports by 50 percent, and grain exports by 40 percent.