July 2003
Liberia: The Bush Doctrine Comes to Africa

The United States should follow two guiding principles when deploying its forces overseas. First, the United States military should not be used for social work, but rather to protect America’s essential national security interests. Second, U.S. policy should be guided by the law of finitude: every deployment should come with an exit strategy. Although the United States is the world’s only superpower, it is not omnipotent. Because Liberia does not have any genuine strategic importance, it is difficult to justify a military intervention there. At the very least, if the Bush administration does bow to international pressure and intervenes in Liberia, the nations in Europe that opposed the war against Saddam Hussein should help the U.S. military in stabilizing Iraq.

Liberia is a failed state. It has never sustained any functioning institutions except for the church, and it never received the benefits of colonialism, which established infrastructure, civil society, and traditions of governance in other parts of Africa. As of 1980, Liberia was run like a "social club," with the descendents of freed American slaves-a small minority-dominating the rest of the country. In 1990, Charles Taylor led a guerrilla force, armed in Libya and trained in Burkina Faso, and besieged the Liberian capital, Monrovia. At the time, the State Department proposed to airlift then-president Samuel Doe to Togo, allowing a peaceful transition of power. This initiative was blocked by the National Security Council, however, because it was feared that Liberia would become a U.S. dependency. The ensuing civil war in Liberia ultimately led to a West African intervention, mainly from Nigeria. Unfortunately, these West African militaries became part of the problem in Liberia since many soldiers pursued criminal activities instead of peacekeeping. In 1997, there was a brief hope for peace in Liberia after Charles Taylor struck a deal with the Nigerian government, allowing for his "election." After Taylor’s victory, however, the dictator immediately started to destabilize the countries around Liberia, specifically Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte D’Ivoire. The United States has spent over $100 million on humanitarian aid to Liberia since 1990, although a modest intervention thirteen years ago could have prevented this bloodshed.

Liberia, like other failed states, does pose a strategic risk to the United States as a potential base and breeding ground for terrorists. The central bank of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, has become a key transit point in international money laundering, used to fund narcotic trafficking and terrorism. For this reason, the United States cannot afford to ignore the situation in Liberia.

In addition, the United States cannot leave the resolution of the Liberian crisis to the surrounding states. Because of recent instability in West Africa, the neighboring countries simply are not capable of mounting an effective intervention. The United States, on the other hand, can deploy troops to Liberia without the risk of a repetition of the 1993 Somalia disaster, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed on the streets of Mogadishu. This is because most Liberians would welcome an American intervention, unlike the Somalis, who did not. After the United States reestablishes order in Liberia, the United Nations should create a trusteeship there, which would develop the institutions that Liberia needs to function, much as the United Nations did in Namibia and East Timor after they became independent.

There are several reasons why the United States should use its military capabilities to restore civil order and democracy in Liberia. First, there is a moral imperative for U.S. intervention in order to end the suffering, death, and destruction that are taking place there. Second, a U.S. intervention that puts an end to the civil war in Liberia would serve the broader purpose of stabilizing the region, which Charles Taylor has systematically ravaged. Liberia could ultimately prove to be a strategic partner for the United States in West Africa in the years to come-a tantalizing possibility, given the increasing geopolitical importance of the region. Third, the United States would be welcomed by all parties to this conflict: by the Liberian rebels, the United Nations, Europe, West Africa, and even Taylor himself. An intervention in Africa would also prove a turning point in U.S. policy toward the continent. During previous administrations, little emphasis was placed on Africa. By stabilizing Liberia, the Bush administration would both demonstrate its newfound commitment to Africa and strike a blow in the war on terrorism by preventing the failure of a state that could spawn terrorism. In this regard, an intervention in Liberia is wholly consistent with President Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released in September 2002. The NSS recognizes that there is a nexus of America’s strategic and moral interests in exporting democratic values and ending failed states like Liberia.

How should a military intervention in Liberia be structured? Large armored or infantry divisions, as visible in Iraq, are not necessary. Instead, a small number of Special Forces units and a Marine amphibious strike force could deal with insurgents far more effectively than a bulkier force. Above all else, the United States should establish a powerful presence in Liberia, like the British did in their intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, by seizing and controlling the capital city of Monrovia, the airport, and the sea lanes. The Pentagon could also deploy Special Forces to link up and demobilize the LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) and the MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) rebels. Another vital aspect in stabilizing the country would be the delivery of humanitarian aid and the restoration of basic services, which could be accomplished by civil affairs units. After achieving these goals, the situation would then be suitable for the United Nations to assume responsibility in Liberia.

* Major Carstens spoke at AEI as a private citizen and not in any official capacity.

The United States has several compelling reasons to secure the removal of Charles Taylor from Liberia. In the 1980s, Charles Taylor was in a Massachusetts jail, awaiting extradition back to Africa. Instead he broke out of the prison and made his way to Libya, where Libyan strongman Mohammar Qaddafi trained and armed him. On Christmas Eve, 1989, Taylor’s rebels invaded Liberia, sparking off a war that has engulfed West Africa and caused between 100,000 and 200,000 fatalities.

A U.S. intervention in Liberia would not be social work. Rather, it would serve U.S. strategic interests. Liberia and other failed states are breeding grounds for terrorist groups like al Qaeda and Hezbollah. Taylor has run Liberia as a criminal enterprise, and Latin American drug lords and Ukrainian mobsters have all used the country as a safe house. According to the nongovernmental organization Global Witness, al Qaeda struck a deal with Taylor to buy up diamonds before the September 11, 2001, attacks. A U.S. deployment in Liberia would also serve as a psychological victory against terrorists, by dispelling the impression that the United States is afraid, post-Somalia, to commit troops in Africa. The United States also has a historic responsibility to Liberia. Not only was Liberia founded by freed American slaves, but during the Cold War it was a loyal U.S. ally in the region. The model for U.S. intervention in Liberia is thus not Somalia or Rwanda, but the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, which was highly successful.

AEI intern Nicholas Rodman prepared this summary.