May 2004

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

General Jasim Salih's triumphant march through the streets of Fallujah seemed eerily reminiscent of Saddam-era Iraq, casting a shadow over Coalition Provisional Authority efforts to prepare for the transfer of sovereignty on June 30. Meanwhile, responsible Shiite leaders have expressed concern about the intentions of UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and his past silence about Saddam Hussein's abuse of Iraq's Kurdish and Shia population. As a careful balance between Shia, Sunni, and Kurd is sought, has the need for a new generation of Iraqi leaders been forgotten? What do current tensions bode for the transition in June? At a May 14th AEI conference, Iraq experts Bathsheba Crocker, Hassan Mniemneh, Entifadh Qanbar, and Danielle Pletka discussed the challenge of developing a democratic political culture in Iraq in the coming months.

Entifadh Qanbar
Iraqi National Congress

The momentary appointment of General Salih and the ceasefire agreement in Fallujah have sparked a new set of security concerns: Baath party members, including former special republican guards, intelligence officers, and security officers, have begun to gather there and view it as a safe haven. The Baathists are being politically reborn within the city, and they have begun to operate as an autonomous state. But it is important to understand that this is not a Sunni war, but a gathering of Baath Party forces with a well-planned strategy. It is likely that terrorists are headquartered in Fallujah, as well. 

Before the war, a small group of Iraqi forces was trained in Hungary to assist in the war, but this plan fell far short of the original goals. This removed the Iraqi element from the liberation of Iraq and was a significant strategic mistake on the part of the Coalition forces. Coupled with the perception that the CPA views any Iraqi role in governance as a threat, this mistake has complicated efforts to rebuild Iraq and confer legitimacy to either the occupation forces or the new Iraq government.

The Iraqi people must lead the transition to the new sovereign government and design a new political process for Iraq. Iraq needs leaders, not technocrats. The Coalition must not fear to hand power to the Iraqis: even with Ayatollah Sistani's growing influence, a Shia-dominated government will not mean an Islamist-dominated one. 

Bathsheba Crocker
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Recent polls show little trust for the CPA or its military forces, and even less trust in the Governing Council, to pick the interim body.  And yet this body must be able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people somehow.  This lack of legitimacy is partly due to the absence of pro-democracy media.

The period between June 30 and the elections will be vital for the development of new Iraqi political talent.  The United States has focused on a top-down method of democracy building, but local governments will be far more important to fostering long-term democratic values. New political leadership will also emerge from the local council structure.  The UN elections team needs eight months to establish the infrastructure for free and fair elections, but the lack of electoral law and independent electoral commission must be put into place. And elections will never be able to occur without better security.

June 30 has been defined as a break-point, but what will come after remains undefined. Neither the American people nor the Iraqis have a clear idea of what will happen in the period between June 30 and the elections.  The CPA's constant policy reversals have fostered this confusion and led to an even greater lack of clarity. The Coalition handed the insurgents in Fallujah a de facto victory.  Additionally, despite proclaiming that al-Sadr would be removed from Najaf, the United States has backed away from doing so.  The CPA has begun to undermine its own policies in order to satisfy short-term security goals, but the long-term consequences for democracy building are being ignored.

Hassan Mneimneh
Iraq Foundation

The optimism visible among the Iraqi people after the liberation has retreated.  Newspapers are more critical of promises made by the CPA and have resorted to the tradition Middle Eastern practice of reporting conspiracy theories as substantive news. As the transition approaches, it is important to understand how and why the tide of pro-American fervor has turned. Failures in public diplomacy, policy, and principle have led to the troubles in Iraq.

The public diplomacy failure is significant: the right message has not been communicated to Iraqi society. There remains a distinct lack of pro-democracy, liberal media in Iraq while other media outlets, whether Islamist, neo-Baathist, or anti-American, flourish.  The efforts at American public diplomacy have been clumsy, and the Iraqis are no longer patient enough to listen. Al-Hurra appears "slick," but viewers snicker at the content.  People accuse it of being inadequate, unapologetic, and shallow. 

The policy failure, on the other hand, stems not only from the Coalition's failure to deliver on its promises to the Iraqis, but also its failure to make visible progress on many of its stated goals. The Coalition implied that democracy, basic services, and a brighter future were coming, but they still have not seemed to arrive.  The CPA continues to publicly insist that the whole project is a success, exposing its efforts to far more criticism than it would otherwise receive.

Principles are also called into question. De-Baathification goes far beyond the removal of people involved with the Baath party or fighting an ideology: it means restoring to Iraqi society the notion that a political party is supposed to be a part of civil society--not part of the state, and not an instrument of control.  But there seems to be great willingness to compromise this process for the sake of "stability." Despite the positive influence the UN can have, the moment we abdicate leadership to the UN, we shift away from our goals of democracy to the UN's focus on stability.  A dictator was not overthrown just to gain stability.  Iraqi should have a democracy.  There needs to be better leadership from both Washington and Baghdad on rebuilding Iraq.

Danielle Pletka
AEI

As Ambassador Negroponte's 3,000-man embassy in the green zone takes over for the CPA on June 30, it could send the wrong message to Iraqis that the power is just changing hands from the CPA to the embassy. At the end of the day, the only people capable of conferring legitimacy are the Iraqi people. The United States needs to pick a representative group and establish the structures of democracy, finally accepting that the system, not individuals, drives democracy. 

This summary was written by AEI intern Shrayes Ramesh with research program manager Molly McKew.