August 2004

Sudan: Genocide, Terrorism, and America's National Interest

Thomas Donnelly
AEI

The level of interest in this panel reflects the gravity of its topic and the growing recognition inside the Beltway that the situation in Sudan cannot be ignored.  The conflict in Darfur is rightly described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.  Through the courageous work of nongovernmental organizations like the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, American leaders cannot profess ignorance about what is happening there. But the problem of Darfur is at root not just a humanitarian problem but a political problem--a subset of the many problems of Sudan, which is to say a subset of the problems of the Middle East.

Since the September 11 attacks, there has been a great deal of talk about the strategic imperative of standing up for the cause of freedom in the greater Muslim world. But if the United States is serious about speaking out in favor of free speech in Saudi Arabia and human rights in Egypt, it must be equally if not more serious about the murder of 30,000 Muslims in Sudan.

More troubling still is the level of support for Sudan in the rest of the world--even among the so-called "great powers."  France, Russia and China--the Security Council's "axis of veto"--again pose major roadblocks to gaining any useful UN resolution.  Beijing's alliance with Khartoum, spurred by China's growing need for oil and Sudan's desire for weapons, is especially worrisome. 

Already, the struggle for the future of the greater Middle East is the centerpiece of American strategy.   Yet a palpable "Iraq fatigue" and the looming presidential election raise a question as to whether the United States itself has the willpower necessary to push for effective action in Darfur.

John Prendergast
International Crisis Group

There is a clear nexus between the support for terrorism and the genocidal activities of the Sudanese regime in Darfur. Together, these two instruments represent the regime's principal tools of survival over its bloody fifteen-year tenure. The trajectory of these two instruments reveals a great deal about the nature of the Sudanese regime as well as international political will. Sudan's support for terrorism has diminished over the last six or seven years because the United States cared enough to act, not just talk. Conversely, Sudan's engagement in genocidal activities has increased brazenly because while the international community makes fine speeches against atrocities, it has yet to act.

Beginning in 1992 and spanning three administrations, Washington began to ratchet up a continuum of pressure against Sudan's support for international terrorist organizations. The United States placed Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism, worked assiduously against Khartoum in the UN Security Council, and imposed unilateral sanctions. All of this was aimed at isolating Sudan in the international community in order to induce behavioral changes. America acted forcefully, if often alone, and consequently achieved its objectives.

The record, however, is much bleaker when it comes to atrocities. In this regard, the U.S. approach to Sudan has been a conflict-resolution mentality rather than a human-rights mentality. The United States has pursued a constructive engagement strategy aimed at resolving the war between the government and rebels, which is meaningful in its own right but has not addressed the genocide in Darfur. If there is no identifiable cost to the regime to carry out genocidal activities, they will continue. If there is a cost, they will stop.

There are four areas in which the United States and the international community can take meaningful action to address the situation in Darfur. The first is humanitarian. Aid groups are reaching only a third of the people at risk of starvation. The Sudanese government has removed most of the obstacles it had initially put in place to block humanitarian aid, but this has exposed the extent to which UN and other international groups are unprepared to serve the needs of the Sudanese people. The UN humanitarian mission is only 40 percent funded.

The second area is civilian protection. The Sudanese government has failed to protect its own population from atrocities in Darfur, and there is a growing acceptance of the international community's obligation to step in. American troops on the ground are unnecessary. The African Union has pledged to send at least 2,000 soldiers, and the United States can finance the deployment of that force. The French, after being stung by criticism over their lackadaisical response to Darfur, have also deployed 200 paratroopers to the Chad-Sudan border.

The third area is accountability. There are Sudanese regime officials on the boards of oil, import/export, construction, and financial services companies. The United States can punish these companies, freeze their assets, stop these individuals from traveling, and make them international pariahs. Second, the United States should begin to prepare for prosecutions for war crimes in Sudan, pushing in the UN Security Council for an international commission of inquiry. This would serve as an effective warning shot to Khartoum, making it clear to the regime that continued atrocities in Darfur will result in severe consequences.

The fourth area is peacemaking. The Bush administration has made an assiduous effort to engage in the necessary diplomacy to end the twenty-one year-old war in the south. However, as soon as Khartoum realized that American attention would shift to Darfur after a peace deal was finalized in the south, the Sudanese government understood it was not in its interest to sign that deal. The United States must therefore begin to coordinate international efforts in the south with international efforts in Darfur.

Ronald Sandee
Ministry of Defense of The Netherlands

Mr. Sandee spoke at AEI in his capacity as a private citizen and not as a formal representative of the Dutch Ministry of Defense.

Jihadism and terrorism were introduced to Sudan in the early 1990s when Osama Bin Laden and his followers came to the country and established an extensive training camp infrastructure as well as a business and finance network. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards also had camps in Sudan, while Khartoum itself created its own Popular Defence Forces (PDF). The PDF had camps throughout the country where young volunteers were drilled to be members of this pro-government militia. The PDF was used to fight for the regime in Khartoum, whether against the SPLA rebels in the south or against the Nuer people in the Nuba Mountains.

The Sudanese government provided a safe haven and support for members of several international terrorist groups operating in Sudan. The regime also permitted Tehran to use its territory as a transit and meeting place for Iranian-backed extremist groups.

Bin Laden first came to Sudan at the invitation of Hasan al-Turabi, the leading Islamist in Sudan. There Bin Laden received special privileges and tax exemptions, running a complex network of seventy to eighty businesses and charities. He also built twenty-three terrorist training camps for his followers.

During the early 1990s, Sudan also facilitated discussions between Bin Laden, Turabi, and representatives of Iran. Once Turabi defined the theological compromise between Sunni Qutubism and Shia Khomeiniism, the road was open for close and genuine cooperation between Iran and al Qaeda. Turabi and Sheikh Muhammad Said Nou'mani, an adviser to the Iranian minister of culture, "preacher of Khomeiniism in the Horn of Africa," went to Bin Laden together in Khartoum and concluded that such an alliance was possible. Both had a clear interest in putting their hostility toward the United States and Israel before intra-Islamic quarrels.

Sudan has again assumed a role as a training center for al Qaeda and Mujahedin fighters. Sudan today contains several training camps where Muslim extremists and jihadists from Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are trained in techniques of guerilla warfare. These fighters then turn up in sub-Saharan countries, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, where they fight against coalition forces. It is interesting to note that during the latest prisoner swap between Israel and Hezbollah, in January 2004, three Sudanese citizens were included.

Foreign fighters have also been used by the Sudanese government against the people of Darfur. After these "exercises," some of the mujahedin were sent back to the southern Sahel countries or other African states like Nigeria, Cameroon, Togo and Benin.

Recently, training camps were established in remote areas of Sudan, such as the Jebel Kurush Mountains north of Port Sudan, for Saudi radicals. In June 2003 nineteen Al Qaeda suspects with Salafi roots were captured and deported to Saudi Arabia. In August 2003 a Syrian national and two Sudanese were convicted of running a terrorist training camp in western Sudan for Palestinians and Saudis.

William Kristol
The Weekly Standard

Darfur is not primarily a humanitarian problem, but a political problem, caused by political actors either sponsored or tolerated by the government in Khartoum. That does not imply regime change necessarily. It may be possible to pressure the Sudanese government to change its behavior. However, even in the case of terrorism, it is questionable to what extent Sudan has really reformed.

Too much of the commentary on the Sudanese atrocities in Darfur has framed the crisis as strictly humanitarian, rather than exploring its broader strategic implications for the global war on terrorism and the threat of radical Islam. What the international community is confronting in Sudan is very much part of this struggle, rather than a one-shot, isolated problem.

President Bush deserves a great deal of credit for his efforts in resolving the conflict in southern Sudan, but obviously the United States is now engaged in another front of that same war. Washington has staked a certain amount of credibility on the resolution of the crisis in Darfur. A failure to act or a willingness to abide by misrepresentations and false promises from Khartoum would have concrete implications for other nations' views of how seriously to take U.S. threats.

Some have suggested that the upcoming presidential election or "Iraq fatigue" will constrain the United States from acting in Sudan. In fact, however, this is an argument for the urgency of addressing Darfur. It would be extremely dangerous to let governments around the world and in the region think that they can have a free ride until November 2. Likewise, to permit the perception that the United States cannot act because it is paralyzed in Iraq is extremely dangerous to national security. The United States should be more hawkish on Sudan given the difficulties in Iraq and given the fact that this is an election year, than in other circumstances.

Lastly, the United States should not rule out the possibility of sending in ground troops. It was a huge mistake to have done so in the Balkans. Here, too, the ultimate threat is necessary to stand behind the diplomatic pressure.

The Honorable Frank Wolf (R-Va.)
U.S. House of Representatives

Osama Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996. The individuals who attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak came out of Sudan. Up until a year ago, a human slave trade took place in Sudan--a practice that has stopped only recently because of pressure from the Bush administration.

What is happening in Darfur today is genocide, and it is important that the U.S. government recognize it publicly as such. The Bush administration has done a good job thus far, but they need to do more.

This is what is happening: Sudanese planes and helicopters strafe the villages, followed by the government-sponsored janjaweed militias, which ride in, killing men and raping women. The villages are then burned, forcing the women to walk with their children, often for days, to IDP camps. Some camps are well run, but most are not. Most camps are squalid, with outbreaks of measles, malaria, and cholera in some places. The janjaweed militias surround these camps, attacking the women who must venture outside in order to forage for firewood and food.

Estimations are that 30,000 to 50,000 people have died. Andrew Natsios of USAID has indicated that as many as 300,000 might die in the months ahead. The U.S. Holocaust Museum considers this genocide, and the U.S. Congress does, as well. If this were taking place in Europe, the world would mobilize to stop it. But the people of Darfur have the same value as human beings anywhere.

AEI research associate Vance Serchuk and AEI intern James Kirchick prepared this summary.