September 2004

Terrorism in Russia: The Beslan Tragedy and Russia's Response

What measures should the Kremlin take to stabilize Chechnya, strengthen its counterterrorism policies, and reform its overall security strategy for the North Caucasus? What can the United States and Europe do to help combat Islamic fundamentalism in Russia, and how does Russia's struggle intersect with the global, U.S.-led war on terror? What will be the impact of Putin's proposals on participatory politics and civil society in Russia? Experts on Russian affairs discussed these and other questions at a September 21 AEI conference.

Leon Aron
AEI

The recent terror attacks in Russia are part of a broader war by Islamic fundamentalists against Moscow. The United States must try to convince the Kremlin to change its policies in Chechnya, but at the same time, it must also provide assistance to Russia in the war on terrorism. But after two dirty wars and countless deaths in Chechnya, Russia has very little credibility for any genuine pacification campaign there. More of the same from Moscow is simply not going to work. It is important to recognize that there are no good policy options on Chechnya. Russia cannot simply walk away from the war there, since this would deliver Chechnya into Somalia-like chaos, destabilizing the North Caucasus.  Moreover, Russia cannot begin bilateral negotiations with Chechen leaders such as Shamil Basayev, who is no more interested in creating a democratic, peaceful Chechnya than Osama Bin Laden was interested in creating a democratic, peaceful Afghanistan.

Nikolas Gvosdev
Nixon Center

There are a number of similarities and continuities between the conflict in Chechnya today and the Russian empire's struggle to pacify the mountains of the Caucasus as far back as the mid-eighteenth century. Even in the 1780s, there were reports to Saint Petersburg about Muslim preachers from overseas rallying the indigenous tribes to revolt. In the mid-eighteenth century, the North Caucasus was the scene of a proxy war between missionaries of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires, in which each tried to win over regional elites through religious conversion. The choices that the various ethnic groups of the Caucasus made then have helped determined their geopolitical alliances down to this day. For example, the Ossetians converted to Orthodox Christianity and became pro-Russian, whereas the Chechens and the Ingush fell into the orbit of Sunni Islam propagated by the Ottomans.

After 1859, however, there was a cessation of hostilities between the Chechens and the Russians after the Chechen elites reached an understanding with the imperial authorities in Saint Petersburg wherein their region received wide-ranging, internal autonomy. In contemporary Moscow as well, there is a search to find regional elites in Chechnya who are prepared to accept autonomy within the Russian Federation and control radical elements in their midst.

The Russian empire was also able to succeed in pacifying the North Caucasus in the nineteenth century because other ethnic groups looked to Moscow for protection. In much the same way, the elites of the ethnic republics surrounding Chechnya are among the most determined to ensure that it remains part of Russia. They are fearful of the instability and violence that they believe an independent Chechnya will cause throughout the region.

Radek Sikorski
NAI

In Europe, there was an enormous outpouring of sympathy for the victims of the Beslan terrorist attacks. Approximately 150,000 people in Rome, for instance, marched from the coliseum to the capitol to express their outrage. Unfortunately, the moment of solidarity with the victims did not last long, due largely to Putin's September 13 speech. In Europe, in general, the war in Chechnya is viewed less as an ideological struggle and more as territorial dispute.

It is important to put the Chechen conflict in the context of policies implemented under the Soviet leadership and the refusal of Russians to relinquish vestiges of their lost empire. In 1944, the entire Chechen nation was gathered at gunpoint and deported to the wastes of Kazakhstan, where half of them died. If the Russians felt remorse for that genocide, they would not be in the current war.

Recent instances of Russia's autocratic behavior are reminiscent of Soviet policy toward its captive nations. For example, journalists were arrested, jailed, or even poisoned to prevent them from traveling to Chechnya. In order to learn anything about what was happening in Beslan, Russians had to rely on foreign broadcasts. Similarly, Putin's government reforms seem to be a return to Andropov's policy of "tightening."  Similarly, Russia's preemptive strike doctrine and inability to conform to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) humanitarian guidelines is fostering fear of Russia in the international community. Although it may be possible to use former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov to broker a peace deal in Chechnya, Putin's proposed reforms work against long-term stability by any method other than those previously implemented by Soviet premiers.

Vladimir Socor
Jamestown Foundation       

Recently, a paramilitary exercise that bore all the hallmarks of a transnational terrorist operation took place in South Ossetia in Georgia, wherein volunteers from Transdniester, Kuban Cossacks, and Abkhaz crossed through Russian territory to train for military operations jointly with South Ossetian forces. This operation was eerily reminiscent of the exercises conducted by Shamil Basayev and Russian forces against Georgian forces during the brutal 1994 campaign of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia.

The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia today is not quite as perilous as it was in 1994, but it has the potential to degenerate quickly if the Russians push for their annexation. The Abkhaz and South Ossetian secessionists do not have a traditional nationalist agenda focused on issues like language, education, or independent statehood, but rather desire integration into the Russian Federation. They are likewise uninterested in any arrangement that preserves their inclusion in Georgia. Both groups expressed self-confidence, bordering on smugness, based on Russia's recent muscle flexing in the region. The West did not factor in their calculus at all.

Russia would like to incorporate Abkhazia and South Ossetia because of their strategic value vis-à-vis the energy resources of the Caspian region and their strategic military value. In order to accomplish this, the Russians have begun a policy of de facto annexation through political and economic intimidation. Russia is not in a hurry to formalize this annexation, however, because it does not wish to confront Western governments or institutions such as the OSCE and NATO.

The West, however, should be more aware of the problems that a fragmented Georgia would create. Georgia is an important corridor for both oil resources and a member of the international counterterrorism coalition. The United States should therefore work to help the Georgian military and security services in order to blunt this threat.

Fiona Hill
Brookings Institution

First, it is crucial to recognize that North and South Caucasus is an artificial demarcation. In fact, the two regions are closely linked together, and historically, it has always been necessary to pacify the South Caucasus before the North Caucasus can be brought under control.

The recent tragedy in Beslan underscores the increasing sense of economic, social, and political despair in the entire Caucasus region-far beyond Chechnya. Beslan also revealed deficiencies in the Russian government's counterterrorism capabilities. There is a clear vacuum of ideas about how to address these problems. Russia's internal security services are in disarray; the M.V.D. is the most corrupt institution in the country, outside the education services. The F.S.B. does not have the capacity to gather intelligence or infiltrate terrorist groups.

Putin's announced changes to the structure of the Russian government appear to be less a response to the Beslan attack than a plan he had previously devised, and it does not exactly relate to the terrorist problem he is facing. Putin has also revived a moribund Nationalities Ministry, which he had only just terminated in his government reshuffle in March.

Revenge attacks are highly likely in the North Caucasus after the forty-day mourning period ends. More than one hundred people died in the Ossetian-Ingush fighting in the early 1990s, and Beslan was clearly an attempt to reignite this conflict. Putin has stressed the international dimensions of Beslan in part to quell ethnic tensions in the region.

In his recent meeting with reporters and academics in Moscow, President Putin actually indicated that he would be willing to offer maximum autonomy to Chechnya, even to the point of violating the Russian constitution. He also spent a surprising amount of time praising the Chechens for their loyalty to the state and acknowledging Russia's responsibility for the past injustices visited upon them, including their deportation by Stalin. He confessed that the origins of the war in Chechnya lie within Russia itself. Of course, he then did emphasize that it was exploited by international terrorists in the mid-1990s.

The greatest danger now is that there is a public call in many influential circles for what is being called an "Israeli solution," in the aftermath of Beslan-that is, walling the Chechens in. If terrorist attacks continue, the political environment in Russia will harden further.

In the aftermath of Putin's announced overhaul of the Russian political system, many observers have remarked that the Kremlin appears to be trying to rebuild a patrimonial state on the tsarist or Soviet model. However, we must recognize that Putin's reforms indicate weakness more than strength. His governmental changes may increase his personal influence over the Russian state, yet that personal influence is directly constrained by the small number of people whom he can trust to govern effectively. 

AEI intern Neal Kumar and AEI research associate Vance Serchuk prepared this summary.