October 2004

The Permanent North Korean Crisis: What Should the Next Administration Do?

Michael O'Hanlon
Brookings Institution

There are several positive aspects to the current status quo: there is no war, the humanitarian crisis in North Korea (DRPK) is not as bad as it was in the late 1990s, and the DRPK has not yet sold nuclear weapons to third countries. This being said, the situation is rather grim. The main policy failure is that North Korea has already been allowed to produce seven or eight nuclear weapons. However, a rigid focus on nuclear weapons will lead to a stalemate in any future negotiation.

Bush's opinion that paying twice for the same weapons would be regime appeasement and a step back in negotiations is completely correct.  On the other hand, it is logically sound that in the absence of clear incentives and credible threats, North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons program.  Preemption as a means to regime change is clearly out of the question, as South Korea (ROK) is likely to veto such an operation, and the burden of huge human casualties on both sides makes this option equally infeasible. 
What the next administration should do is test Kim Jong Il's willingness to reform within a Communist Party system as Vietnam and China have.  Under the six-party-talks framework, the United States could provide the sticks, and South Korea, China, and Japan could provide the carrots. This would be a beneficial position for the United States, because it will be able to maintain a firm position of resolve on the nuclear question, while also offering North Korea a broader negotiating plan. The substantive issue within the six-party talks should be setting an agenda that could be feasibly proposed and that has the best chance of eliminating North Korea's nuclear arsenal.

The United States should undertake decisive measures to avoid "buying the same horse twice": 1) The DPRK should be required to perform a structural reform on their economy. 2) They should cut their military spending, which currently consumes about 25 percent of their GDP. 3) North Korea should eliminate their chemical weapons and release Japanese kidnap victims. 4) All the reforms should be verifiable. 5) The United States could show flexibility with regards to numbers and scheduling of the reduction of long-range and short-range conventional missiles. 6) In return, the international community could begin to lift trade sanctions, and increase humanitarian aid-but not cash.

If the North Korean government is not willing to accept reform in this larger framework, the United States cannot afford to accept the current status quo, which would lead to an indefinite increase in the DPRK's arsenal.  If engagement does not work, the United States, albeit reluctantly, may have to resort to harsher measures, including economic sanctions, to induce the collapse of the regime.

Nicholas Eberstadt
AEI

The North Korean problem has gotten worse during the last two administrations. Success in resolving the crisis depends on the proper diagnosis of the problem. A lot can be understood by construing statements made by the North Korean government, as they reveal consistent patterns of thought and behavior.

North Korea is a revisionist government in opposition to modern democratization and globalization. North Korea sees these two trends as threats to its survival. It wants to avoid the Pax Americana, which has secured the peace in that part of the world for half a century, and integration into international trade. Assimilation of South Korea into its territory is a non-negotiable North Korean demand. The DRPK also admits to seeing fundamental internal reform as suicidal.

Although it is always best to see peaceful diplomacy as a first step to solving a problem, this approach is a highly unrealistic in the present case. There are several main problems associated with the North Korean crisis:

The DPRK's nuclear intentions. Starting with the 1991 joint declaration on Korean peninsular denuclearization, North Korea has broken every agreement it ever signed in that field. There is no apparent reason for North Korea to change this behavioral pattern.

Implications related to possible agreements and benefits revision vis-à-vis other potential nuclear powers. If an agreement for renewed benefits is used twice to solve the same problem, this would create a precedent and send the wrong message to other would-be proliferators, such as Iran, which has been closely following the developments around North Korea.

Trustworthy personnel. There is nobody credible to negotiate with on the other side of the table in North Korea. 

It is crucial that the six-party talks set guidelines for defining failure. Clarity is necessary in order to establish that diplomacy has failed and to be able to proceed to the next stage.

A more effective policy would presuppose additional and more intense negotiations with the help of U.S. allies and possible collaborators, particularly China and the ROK. Any sort of coordinated policy dealing with the DPRK is going to be vastly improved by a stronger U.S.-ROK bond, and there is a big role for enhanced U.S. diplomacy with China. Regime change is not unthinkable if it would not end in a tragedy.

Thomas Donnelly
AEI

Why couldn't the North Korean crisis be one of these situations where the best thing to do would be to accept the status quo? I agree that the ultimate solution would be a regime change, and I think it is helpful to think about the necessary steps after North Korea disappears. However, it is more important to solve the existing problem first. What are alternative ways to resolve the North Korean crisis, the additional sticks and carrots we could offer, in order to avoid the risks of regime change?

Michael O'Hanlon
Brookings Institution

The rule-of-thumb would be to not resort to regime change before it is absolutely necessary. This may require keeping the short-run damage to a minimum and hoping that the crisis will resolve itself in the long run. The last couple of years have not been as horrific for the North Koreans as the early 1990s were, and the arms exports problem has not been that serious in the sense that it has not substantially aided international terrorism.

Some additional carrots and sticks may include convincing China and South Korea to join inspections of ships for contraband to and from North Korea and for weapons-related technology in their territorial waters. Continued humanitarian aid could be allowed into the DPRK to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean people. There are not many tools beyond that. At the end of the day, we may have no alternative to brinkmanship.

Nicholas Eberstadt
AEI

No current modus operandi seems sustainable. Clearly there is a nuclear buildup of nuclear arsenal taking place in the DPRK. Clearly, any attempts to press North Korea have not worked. Clearly, North Korea's undeclared exports are rising. As long as these are the fundamentals of the situation, the current status quo is unacceptable.

AEI research assistant Assia Dosseva prepared this summary.