February 2005

U.S. Policy toward Putin's Russia: Time for a Change?

Leon Aron
AEI

The upcoming meeting in Slovakia between President George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin is likely to be the most somber U.S.-Russian summit in the past fifteen years. Since 1987, there has been a perception in Washington that the Kremlin was moving the country in the right direction. Today, however, this is no longer the case. Local self-government has been restricted, and badly needed economic reforms have been postponed or abandoned. In the YUKOS affair, both the letter and the spirit of Russia’s criminal procedural code have been violated, and a mockery has been made of judicial independence. Putin’s policies are increasingly a dangerous mix of incompetence, unpopularity, and ineffectiveness.

Unlike during the Soviet Union, however, the Kremlin is not the only player in Russia today. The 1991 Russian revolution and the 1996 presidential election were momentous democratic achievements, and even after five years of Putin, private groups and networks remain; Christians, Muslims, and Jews pray freely and unmolested; Russians can demonstrate against local and federal authorities; independent public opinion polls proliferate; candidates for office, at least until recently, could canvas freely; newspapers openly criticize the Kremlin; and every one of twenty-three parties that participated in the 2003 elections was given hours of free television time on three national networks, as were the five opposition party presidential candidates. With the exception of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the key opponents of the Putin regime remain in Russia, free to speak, publish, and meet with the public.

Fiona Hill
Brookings Institution

There is a great deal of criticism of Putin in Russia today but also a lack of mechanisms for popular feedback. Consequently, Russia is no longer the pluralist system it once was.

At the same time, however, there is chronic amnesia in Washington today regarding Russia. In 1994 and 1995, there were a series of crises in the relationship between Moscow and the West. Russia’s foreign minister announced that hardliners were back in the Kremlin, pushing for aggression in the near-abroad. There was also the matter of Yeltsin’s confrontation with the Russian parliament, which was hardly resolved democratically, and the outbreak of the first Chechen war in 1995. But because Yeltsin was perceived as in a life-or-death struggle with communism, the West tended to deemphasize these events. More importantly, Washington was focused on Russia’s economy during this period, and liberal reformers like Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais were firmly fixed in the Kremlin. Consistent with this past prioritization of economics over politics, it was the YUKOS debacle more than the rollbacks in civil society or the media that awoke the West to Putin’s authoritarianism.

The state of the Russian economy today is not good. Partly as a consequence of the YUKOS affair, which has damaged Russia’s ability to expand its oil production, Russian growth is tapering off. Russia is also highly vulnerable to any slowdown in the Chinese economy, which is fueling growth with its insatiable demand for resource and commodity exports. With oil prices extremely high, the pressure for structural reforms in Russia has been diminished.

The West does not have the leverage it used to enjoy under Yeltsin in pushing Putin to address these problems. This makes the need for a common transatlantic approach to Russia all the more important.

Michael McFaul
Hoover Institution

Four or five years ago, there was a debate about whether Putin was a democrat. That debate is now over. The question today concerns the nature and extent of Putin’s authoritarianism. There is also a debate about whether Putin’s regime is the inevitable consequence of the nature of political power in Russia throughout history.

Granted, Yeltsin’s regime helped to create the permissive conditions that made possible Putin’s regime. Yeltsin was a revolutionary, and revolutions inevitably provoke backlashes in which people demand stability. In addition, Yeltsin’s 1993 constitution did not provide sufficient checks on presidential power. Nonetheless, under Putin, there is still more discontinuity than continuity with the 1990s.

The present political situation in Russia is relatively stable; the conditions that made possible the liberal revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine largely do not exist in Russia. Putin is much less popular than previously, but he remains a far more popular figure than Slobodan Milosevic or Leonid Kuchma before their respective downfalls. There is no clear opposition in Russia, in part because Putin has destroyed it, and the levers of power and pockets of pluralism are significantly constrained by the Kremlin.

There are positive signs for regime change and democratization in Russia. There are splits within the elites, which did not exist three years ago. There have also been a series of policy failures that have undermined Putin’s standing, including the YUKOS affair, the Beslan massacre, the Ukrainian election, and the social welfare reforms.

Still, it is important to recognize that instability in the Putin regime does not necessarily signal democratization. It is possible that the successor regime to Putin is even less liberal and more autocratic. It is also possible that the electoral process breaks down and that Putin’s government is replaced by a nationalist-populist-socialist alternative. In fact, it is this group, rather than the liberal democrats, which has been the most active in recent protests against Putin.

U.S. Russia policy is usually framed as a struggle between hawkish isolationists, who talk about principles, and dovish advocates of engagement, who talk about interests. This is a false dichotomy. President Bush needs to speak about democracy in his meeting with Putin, but he can simultaneously pursue U.S. objectives on nonproliferation and the war on terror. The most successful presidents have followed precisely such dual track diplomacy vis-à-vis regimes like Putin’s.

Eugene B. Rumer
National Defense University

Nothing in Russia’s international behavior or its domestic politics warrants a fundamental shift in U.S. policy at this time. U.S. interests in Russia have remained remarkably stable since the time of perestroika. Washington has an interest in a stable and secure Russia with some form of representative government that is a reliable and predictable partner in the international system and with an economy that is open to U.S. investment. Within that framework, Washington has prioritized Russia’s cooperation in the war on terror, its export of hydrocarbons, the security of its nuclear stockpile and other nonproliferation concerns, and Russia’s constructive role in European security and around its periphery.

In response to these interests, the United States has pursued a consistent policy toward Russia, engaging wherever possible, focusing on Russian deeds rather than Russian rhetoric, and trying to pull Russia into institutional international arrangements such as the G8 and NATO. It has recognized that, regardless of Washington’s own strong preferences, Russia’s domestic political arrangements are its own to determine. At the same time, it has recognized that the U.S. ability to engage with Russia is contingent on Moscow’s own ability to reform internally.

This policy has paid handsome dividends. There have been two rounds of NATO enlargement, with the prospect of Ukrainian membership in the near future, and robust security relationships with countries around Russia’s periphery, including a long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russia’s attempts to reconsolidate its influence in the post-Soviet space have led to a series of humiliations and setbacks rather than any concrete set of deliverables.

Much as the United States would like to see Russia adopt a representative form of government, this is a choice for the people of Russia. U.S. assistance in Russia’s democratic development is not welcome. Any attempt at neo-containment is likely to backfire badly against American interests.

Nikolai Zlobin
Center for Defense Information

Putin’s policies are determined by an all-encompassing dogma that it is concerned with Russia’s place in the world. Everything Putin does--from the attack on YUKOS to the elimination of regional elections--is guided by his desire to strengthen Russia’s global standing. Putin’s policies are also guided by his deeply felt belief in Russia’s exclusivity; there is no country in the world that is capable of helping Russia other than Russia itself, in his view. This approach is entirely distinct from Yeltsin’s emphasis on engagement with the world community. Putin is also concerned about the territorial integrity of the country. The Kremlin genuinely fears that Russia could collapse into several smaller states like the Soviet Union did. In addition, Putin would like to keep his relationship with the West ambiguous--neither too confrontational nor too friendly. He believes this will give Russia the necessary room to maneuver.

Washington has had two different policies toward Russia over the past decade. During the Clinton administration, the United States became deeply involved in Russia’s internal affairs, attempting to help Moscow move toward liberal democracy and capitalism. This approach failed. During the first term of the Bush administration, consequently, the United States tried to ignore Russia’s internal affairs--but this approach also failed. Russia is now a less reliable, less democratic partner than four years ago. No new strategy has yet emerged to fill this vacuum.

Russia wishes to maintain its political monopoly over the territory of the former Soviet Union. Washington has typically preferred to prioritize its relations with Russia over its relations with countries surrounding it, but this may no longer be a tenable position, as Russia plays an increasingly unconstructive role in the frozen conflicts.

AEI research associate Vance Serchuk prepared this summary.