March 2005

Will China Be a Coherent Strategic Actor in Asia?

Stephen J. Flanagan
National Defense University

The question of China’s rising influence in Asia is a very timely and critically important topic, as the Chinese National People’s Congress adoption of an “Anti-Secession Law” reminds us.  National Defense University (NDU) is delighted to work with AEI to launch this series.  NDU has had an active research program on Chinese military affairs over the past fifteen years and is involved in official military-to-military relations between the United States and China as well as Taiwan, but we hope that this program will be especially successful because it will integrate both security and economic expertise in analyzing China’s growing influence in Asia and the world.

Daniel Blumenthal
AEI

This question of China’s strategic coherence is particularly difficult to assess because the economic and security situation in Asia is so fluid that when conventional wisdom on China’s strategy is settled, events tend to intervene and point to countervailing trends.  China’s enactment of the Anti-Secession Law and recent statements towards the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia alliances indicate that we may be witnessing another period of strategic reassessment in Asia.

Phil Saunders
National Defense University

Our inspiration for this seminar series was the recognition that when you speak with Asian specialists in the United States or abroad, there is a clear parting of views between political scientists and economists on the implications of China’s rise in Asia.  But on this issue, it is critical to gain a clear understanding of the interaction between economics and security in determining China’s future role in Asia.  This series will try to accomplish this by looking at China’s strategy in Asia, the sources of strength and weakness in China’s position, and how other Asian countries are responding to China’s growing influence.

David Shambaugh
Brookings Institution and George Washington University

China is changing the Asian regional order dominated by the United States for the past fifty years. China’s engagement with East Asia and emergence as a dynamic actor in the Pacific Rim are important topics that are underappreciated in Washington and in the U.S. policy community. A senior Asian diplomat recently noted that although the United States still holds the balance of power in the region, it has essentially lost the balance of influence to China.

China’s activities in Asia are serving, reinforcing and complementing goals rather than forming a coherent grand strategy. The elements of China’s policy are to: 1) maintain territorial unity and sovereignty; 2) keep the Communist Party of China in power; 3) build wealth and power; 4) use foreign policy to serve the first three goals; and 5) develop relations with its periphery as a subcomponent of the fourth goal.

Since 1998 China’s engagement with its periphery has seen profound changes in the economic, military, diplomatic, and the multilateral/institutional arenas. Only a few years ago, China was seen as a rising hegemonic power and a threat; had border disputes with almost all its neighbors; was outside most regional organizations; and did not have formal diplomatic relations with South Korea, Vietnam, and Singapore until the early 1990s. China’s moderate behavior, effective diplomacy, and willingness to endorse regional norms such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation have changed China’s image to that of a good neighbor and non-threatening regional power. China called for the end of U.S. alliances with Asian countries in 1997 but abandoned this effort in the face of negative responses. The positive view of China is not universal--Japan and Taiwan are notable exceptions--but this is the predominant regional view. Most Asian governments are “semi-bandwagoning” with China rather than balancing against it. They are making efforts to enmesh China in regional organizations, deepen ties, build sub-state relations, and enhance confidence building measures.

China has been engaging the region multilaterally and bilaterally. China has undergone a rapid conversion to embrace regional multilateralism. China initially regarded regional organizations with suspicion, seeing them as tools of U.S. policy and influence. Yet as the Chinese began participating, they found that regional organizations were not U.S. tools and that the United States did not even take these institutions seriously, dismissing them as “talk shops.” Beijing is now confident of its ability to operate in multilateral organizations.

The Chinese have also been very successful in bilateral relations. The professionalism and community involvement of Chinese diplomats have greatly improved, as have the frequency of travel by senior Chinese officials, and even party-to-party ties, as illustrated by Beijing’s hosting of the Third International Conference of Asian Political Parties in September 2004. There are also increasing exchanges of students and tourists between China and Asian countries. China’s economic activities, from trade to foreign direct investment and official development assistance, have been the most noteworthy aspect of its increasing regional engagement.

China has also been engaging the region in the security sphere. The unilateral aspect of Chinese policy includes a worrisome build-up of Chinese military assets opposite Taiwan, but this reflects a specific agenda rather than a broader build-up of power projection capabilities. China has initiated a series of bilateral exercises, security dialogues, and educational exchanges with other Asian militaries. Multilaterally, China has improved military transparency to the level of other Asian countries and increased its involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

China’s rise in power and regional influence does not necessarily come at the expense of the United States. The U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance architecture is still dominant, conducive to regional stability, and beneficial to the whole region, including China. The United States is involved in almost all regional security issues, and U.S. and Chinese interests converge on most issues. U.S. and Chinese cooperation in the region is substantial and is increasing, not decreasing. The integration of China into the regional order has been a longstanding goal of virtually all Asian countries and the United States. Now that it is occurring, it should be welcomed and rather than opposed by the United States. A major challenge ahead is to lock China into this positive regional role.

Ashley Tellis
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Shambaugh’s assessment of how China is engaging the region is correct, but he fails to explain the motivations of China’s engagement and its implications for the United States.

China has invested considerable resources in engaging countries on its periphery; this reflects an effort to achieve great-power status and minimize potential costs of global engagement. China’s engagement has three major goals: 1) reaping the economic benefits of interdependence, which will help consolidate domestic power and provide a fast track to great-power status; 2) preventing the rise of balancing coalitions by engaging and reassuring other countries in the region; and 3) paving the way for China to gradually and peacefully supplant the United States as the primary provider of security in the region.

We should not confuse interim goals and instruments with long-term objectives when evaluating China’s interests and strategies. Shambaugh’s analysis of China’s near-term goals and capabilities produced inferences about long-term goals and capabilities that might not last once China achieves great-power status. He noted that China’s geographic position as a continental power might make the development of U.S.-style power projection capabilities unnecessary. Evidence for China’s conversion to multilateralism is inconclusive; China continues to see U.S. alliances in the region as constraining its own behavior and influence. The region is more concerned about China than Shambaugh acknowledges; countries are hedging symbolically to avoid being forced to choose between China and the United States, but circumstances may force a choice.

If China acquires great-power status, it is likely to mirror the behavior of past great powers. A Sino-centric order might require Asian countries to defer to Beijing, to take Chinese interests into account when making decisions, and to weaken their links with the United States. China would likely acquire military instruments to pursue these objectives. China’s rise has important strategic implications for the United States. Historically, rising powers often conflict with established powers; Beijing’s efforts to promote a “peaceful rise” reflect an awareness of this history. As China grows, it will have more resources to engage in alliance-making and alliance-breaking strategies of its own. Economic interdependence complicates strategic choices but does not eliminate the need for strategic clarity. The United States should engage China but must keep its existing and prospective alliances in good repair. The United States should also make efforts to widen the gap between U.S. and Chinese power by getting its economic house in order and improving the quality of the U.S. educational system.

Questions

In response to a question about the role of the European Union, Shambaugh noted that European concerns about China’s internal stability and efforts to improve China’s state capacity matched Asian views that a stable China translates into a stable region. The United States tends to look at China through a hard security lens and neglect these issues. Tellis agreed that state capacity and internal stability are important but argued that the United States needs to think about China’s hard power because it has alliance commitments it must fulfill. EU efforts to lift the arms embargo create real problems and put the United States on a collision course with the EU.

In response to a question about whether U.S. neglect of Southeast Asia in the mid-1990s provided an opportunity for China to expand its influence, both agreed that U.S. distraction was not a principal cause. Shambaugh argued that China’s engagement reflected a gradual process of learning and a decision in 1999 that China needed to be more proactive in the region.

In response to a question about China’s use of arms sales and proliferation as sources of influence, Shambaugh noted that Chinese arms sales have declined to about $400 million dollars a year, with half going to Burma, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Saunders observed that there is not much interest in low-tech Chinese arms but that China has recently offered to co-produce arms with other countries in the region. Tellis mentioned that Pakistan has been the principal recipient of Chinese proliferation of nuclear equipment and technology. China views the security environment from the perspective of a continental power, hence its interest in access to ports in Pakistan and Burma. If we tie these activities to China’s energy demands, we may discover China’s strategic logic.

National Defense University research assistant Tamara Shie prepared this summary.