July 2005

AEI Briefing on "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China"

Dan Blumenthal
AEI

This year’s Pentagon report has generated great confusion. The Los Angeles Times has reported that China has extended its military reach, the New York Times has said that China has not yet built the necessary military power in order to have full confidence in its objectives regarding Taiwan, and the Washington Post has alarmingly cited China as a threat to the region. Why all the different headlines and conclusions? The report deliberately tried to strike a careful diplomatic balance, but at the same time factually laid out sobering capabilities.

The report notably discussed Chinese capabilities which could be used for aspirations beyond Taiwan. For example, the Pentagon cited the development of nuclear and diesel submarines, medium-and short-range missiles, improved command and control communications, and reconnaissance systems as necessary for China to further its interests in the Sea of Japan and protect its energy resources. Furthermore, China has updated its intercontinental missile in addition to its nuclear arsenal. A Chinese general most recently created grave consternation by announcing that American cities would be obliterated in the event of a conflict with Taiwan.

We should also be increasingly concerned by China’s defense budget. China’s open budget does not account for foreign weapons procurement, the funding of the People’s paramilitary police force, or for nuclear stockpile and missile service. China is spending more than $90 billion dollars on its defense, more than 4 percent of China’s GDP. Furthermore, defense spending may be growing at a rate faster than that of China’s GDP.

The Pentagon report claims that China’s defense strategy is shrouded in secrecy. Although China does practice a strategy of denial and deception, China is practicing a clear military strategy once we analyze its various pieces. China’s main goal is to bring Taiwan to heel by first, deterring American intervention, and second, sending the message that the costs of intervention will be too high. Beijing strives to bar U.S. intervention by developing a new class of destroyers, complete with anti-ship cruise missiles with the ability to defeat America’s Aegis system and disable carriers. China has also conducted extensive research on America’s blockading operations, particularly looking at the Cuban Missile Crisis to analyze American strategy. China’s increasing naval capabilities have not gone unnoticed--in fact, the United States Navy is extremely concerned about the threat posed by the Chinese to the carrier battle group.

China’s changing military intends not only to pose a threat to Taiwan. In fact, how much capability do you need to devote to an abstraction such as independence? This leads us to conclude that there are alternative motives for China’s military buildup. Chinese naval journals have expressed China’s interests in nuclear submarines and the development of a blue water navy. These developments, added to an Air Force modernization, paints a clearer picture. China will not have to compete force-on-force with the United States, but merely must cast out the ability of the United States to provide the region with security. Chinese development of missiles and a more credible nuclear capability strives to effectively achieve this goal.

Roy Kamphausen
National Bureau of Asian Research

The report places most of its emphasis on China’s hardware acquisitions, such as planes, submarines, and missiles. Although hardware is necessary, it is not sufficient in itself. If a weapon is not orchestrated to fit into a system of systems, it is not as effective as one would expect. Doctrine and forestructures, on the other hand, increase the effectiveness of hardware.

China’s development of software has been overlooked. For example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone efforts to develop an ROTC program so as to take advantage of talented students at Chinese civilian universities. Chinese military officers have been commissioned from civilian universities from at least 1991, but until about 1999, recruitment was conducted on an ad-hoc basis. Many of these officers were selected because of their computer and technical majors, in addition to their foreign language skills. In 1999, however, the PLA realized that it needed to undergo dramatic reforms. In order to replace the Soviet-style military academy, the Chinese decided to create a “Leading Edge” program as a way to recruit talent in a cost effective manner. In order to develop this program, the Chinese examined the U.S. ROTC program and implemented the more successful aspects of this program.

The PLA’s recruitment program has been extremely successful for several reasons. First, the PLA will pay for students to go to top universities, selecting these individuals by forcing them to undergo a rigorous and formalized process. Second, upon graduation, the cadet will serve in his sponsoring unit rather than integrating within the larger system. Third, these officers are assigned leadership and command positions.

This program has swelled to include participation from ninety-five universities, and these numbers will continue to grow. We can expect that the China will recruit as many as 10,000 officers a year. (To put this number in perspective, the United States commissions about 4,000 officers a year.) The PLA navy has stated that it hopes to draw more than 40 percent of its officers from civilian universities. We must not underestimate the effects of this program, for any capability improvements made in China will be accentuated by the swelling numbers of recruits.

This recruiting program is an integral and growing component of the Chinese national defense mobilization effort. First, the Chinese use civilian universities to train officers, thereby recruiting the best and most talented of civilian society and using it for defense purposes in the time of crisis. Second, the program is part of a broader national defense education effort, intended to strengthen the citizenry’s national defense concept and patriotism. Third, the Chinese are motivated to remember and avoid humiliation at the hands of foreign invaders, remembering experiences such as the Boxer Protocol in 1905 and the Mukden Incident in 1931. All three of these issues must remind us that we must pay attention to both software developments and technical improvements.

Thomas Donnelly
AEI

The original intent of this report was to give an overall net assessment of the rise of China’s military power. To do so, we must compare the intents and capabilities of China against those of America and her allies. War is not simply a calculation of fire- and manpower, but also involves relational analysis. The report, however, refrains from coming to a broad assessment of Chinese strategy and evaluating Chinese investments in leadership and technology.

Where do we stand against China, both regionally and globally? China already plays a powerful global role, particularly in nations such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. As we turn to the situation in East Asia and across the Taiwan Strait, we can conclude that Chinese capability signals an important message. Not only is the PLA serious about creating military operations for reuniting Taiwan with the motherland, but the PLA also understands that regional capabilities, particularly in the Sea of Japan and along China’s coast, will contribute to its military victory.

What would the United States do in the event of a crisis? So much of the ability of the United States to respond in a timely fashion depends on our naval posture in the western Pacific. As a global power, the United States has military forces flung around the globe. At the same time, however, military commitments in the Persian Gulf have pulled forces away from the Pacific, compromising American ability to effectively respond to a crisis. The Navy has recognized this weakness and has developed a reposturing plan, determined to increase station naval capacity in the region while also forward deploying submarines to Guam. We must understand that in a potential crisis, hours and days are crucial. The ability of China to strike effectively and sustain these strikes during an American absence is of great tactical and operational benefit to the PLA. Thus, our position in the Pacific greatly influences the Chinese strategic and political situation vis-à-vis Taiwan and the rest of the region. The initiative tactically and strategically lies on the Chinese side of the strait. This report, although delineating force capability and structure, has failed to examine what an actual military campaign would look like within the framework of political contingencies. It fails to put the pieces together in a coherent way for the American public and the members of Congress who are interested in the bottom line.

AEI research assistant Melissa Wisner prepared this summary.