July 2005

Uzbekistan and the Bush Doctrine: U.S. Policy after Andijon

Jennifer Leonard
International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group, an international conflict resolution organization, has been working in Uzbekistan since 2000, and we have produced more than a dozen reports on the country. Our staff in Central Asia has interviewed hundreds of people in the country and carried out extensive research on key issues in the region. Our most recent regional reporting includes our May 25, 2005, briefing on the background of the Andijon massacre. From our research and that of other organizations with considerable experience in the region, we believe that the response by the Uzbek security forces was completely disproportionate to any crimes that had been committed; excessive force was used against people who were not involved in any criminal activity.

The Uzbek government has responded to international concern about the massacre with what can only be characterized as contempt: rejecting calls for an international investigation, severely limiting access to Andijon, refusing to meet a delegation of U.S. senators, strong-arming Kyrgyzstan to turn over refugees, threatening witnesses, and intimidating citizens. These are just the latest steps by an uncooperative government that firmly rejects the values of democracy, human rights, and economic freedom.

The United States must develop and adopt a comprehensive strategy to address the deteriorating situation in Uzbekistan--one that leverages diverse U.S. assets to promote a stable, freer Uzbekistan and that is sustainable over time. This policy must be accompanied by concrete actions that demonstrate our resolve to safeguard U.S. security while upholding democratic values.  The United States can and should integrate its military posture in the region, its diplomatic activity (multilateral as well as bilateral), public diplomacy and communications strategy, its economic engagement, and its democracy assistance efforts.

Since 2001, the United States has stepped up efforts to encourage reforms and greater openness in Uzbekistan, offering considerable assistance and signing an agreement under which Uzbekistan agreed to press ahead with reforms.  Karimov has rebuffed U.S. support and become more repressive and more resistant to any outside engagement. Events in Andijon show that the United States cannot wait to come up with effective policies to stabilize Central Asia. But the time has clearly come for an even stronger demonstration of concern, one that goes beyond condemnations.

The government of Uzbekistan needs to receive a clear and unambiguous message that following the Andijon massacre we cannot and will not return to business as usual. The United States must find ways to ensure that change comes peacefully to Uzbekistan, that any possible violence in Uzbekistan does not become the spark that sets off a regional conflagration, and that its young people do not become a lost generation, without hope and drawn to extremism.

Martha Brill Olcott
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The United States failed to capitalize on an enormous opportunity to influence policymaking in Central Asia after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In fact, US influence in the region peaked well before the Andijon events. Improved relations between the United States and Uzbekistan never reached the threshold that both states wanted, as the United States was not able to offer a viable relationship to Uzbekistan--i.e., one that included sufficient financial contribution for security concerns in the region.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has thus emerged as a powerful alternative to the United States in the region. The government of Uzbekistan, much like those of the other states within the SCO, has grown increasingly concerned over the “color revolutions” in Eurasia, which are perceived as funded by the United States and the West. The SCO’s two most prominent members, Russia and China, did not blame the Karimov government for the Andijon events--in fact, both nations have indicated that the Uzbek government faced a credible insurgency threat and dealt with the situation in an appropriate manner. However, without an international investigation, to which the Karimov government has regrettably failed to sign on to, the sides will continue to talk past each other.

Islam in Uzbekistan adds greater complexity to the situation. It is a mistake to perceive Islam in Uzbekistan as “state-managed,” although religious groups are required to be registered by the state. There are tensions between the main establishment and the religious authorities that have emerged as a serious point of contestation. Religion has made an important comeback after 1998, as it is now included in the educational curriculum.

The anti-regime, pro-democracy forces in Uzbekistan are weak, and they have not had the experience to mobilize the population, as in Ukraine or Georgia. However, there are certain groups within the government that would like to see change. The United States should engage these groups in order to prevent a shift toward the SCO states. If we fully isolate the ruling elite, the process of democratic reform will become more difficult. We must put Central Asian states in a position to make unequivocal choices.

Chris Seiple
Institute for Global Engagement

The Bush Doctrine is not exceptional, just the latest iteration of exceptionalism in American history. If universal values are truly so, they can only take a local form and are often founded on religious norms. While the Uzbek government has repressed pious Muslims--ironically enhancing the opportunity for radical Islam--the United States has not sought to engage the Muslim culture of Uzbekistan. The result in both cases is an ineffective strategy in the war against the terrorists as the United States threatens its own long-term access to Central Asia by its continued association with an unjust regime. Geo-political logic, however, suggests that President Karimov must find a way to mend fences with the United States.

Uzbekistan is an oasis society, which means that it possesses a horizontally strong community (as seen in its neighborhoods, or mahallas) overseen by a vertically strong leadership and bound together by a traditionally moderate Islam. To engage Uzbekistan, then, America must reach out to these facets. Unfortunately, the United States has tended to eschew such an approach in favor of a cookie-cutter method that all too often equates the increase of non-governmental organizations with the growth of democracy.

During the 1990s, President Clinton focused almost entirely on civil society, ignoring the concerns of the Uzbek government about a potential rise in Islamic extremism. After 9/11, George W. Bush switched the regional emphasis to strengthening America's geo-strategic position, at the same time ignoring the requirements of Uzbek culture. This has led to a situation where the Uzbek leadership tells the United States what it wants to hear and then does what it wants to do.

In terms of more specifically regional concerns, America should oppose the idea of the SCO becoming an anti-U.S. bloc, as in a broad sense America shares the concerns of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states over terrorism and threats to regional stability. Finally, it is likely that Karimov will maintain his ties with America because he needs it to balance Russia and China. For this reason, in the future he will call for some form of investigation into the Andijon events and will find a way to get rid of the hardliner Almatov.

S. Frederick Starr
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies

There has been a great amount of uninformed and sensationalist coverage of the Andijon events. Beyond the bare facts that there were a large number of individuals killed during the attack, everything else is surrounded by controversy--a fact, however, which has not stopped the press and various human rights groups from widely speculating about the numbers as well as the causes of the attack. While Uzbekistan has rejected calls for an international investigation involving the United States and the EU, it has organized its own commission, which includes eight countries, consisting of SCO members China and Russia and other Central Asian states.

Uzbekistan’s reluctance for a Western-led fact-finding commission can be somewhat explained by a recent incident from a year ago in which an Uzbek citizen--thirty-five-year-old Andrei Shelkovenko--who had been imprisoned for Islamic extremism, died while in police custody. Human-rights organizations immediately disseminated categorical reports asserting that he had died under torture. Most Western papers carried these reports. When an international group on the ground in Uzbekistan proposed to the government to establish a nonpartisan commission of international experts to look into the charges, the Uzbeks accepted. A commission was formed but found absolutely no evidence to support the claim that Shelkovenko had died under torture and a great deal of evidence that he had long suffered from a life-threatening medical condition. Yet not one major Western paper that had carried the earlier story published an update or revision.

There is a general lack of understanding of Uzbekistan’s internal politics as well. President Karimov does not completely control the government. In fact, five years ago, President Karimov was due to appoint an important power broker in the country as deputy prime minister. However, due to pressure from other groups that brought him to power during Soviet times, Karimov was forced to withdraw the nomination. There are factions that either oppose Karimov or heavily influence the decision-making process, including within the parliament, where parties have started to take root and play an increasingly influential role in shaping policy. Karimov is also more keenly aware of the electoral base than generally perceived, as evidenced by a recent switch in party loyalty.

In conclusion, there is a pressing need for the media as well as the government officials to first do the analysis and weigh the evidence, and then make policy based on the conclusions. In addition, the United States needs to take seriously the earlier US-Uzbekistan strategic partnership agreement that was signed in 2001. In fact, the Uzbeks insisted on adding a chapter on democratization, which the United States reluctantly accepted, but was never followed through on because of its own lack of interest. Rather than dealing with Uzbekistan on its own, the U.S. administration needs to formulate a comprehensive Central Asian regional policy that integrates security, social and economic development, and democratization provisions.

William Kristol
The Weekly Standard

The situation in Uzbekistan is indicative of the broader “war on terror.” As part of the Bush Doctrine, “war on terror” also means “war on tyranny.” The United States needs to put increased pressure on regimes such as Karimov’s. Contrary to some of the other opinions expressed at this panel, the Bush Doctrine has not gone far enough with regard to Uzbekistan.  As we have seen in the past, dictatorships tend to sponsor terrorist organizations and, in effect, help make these organizations more powerful. We have paid a great price for letting dictators go unchecked, be it in the Balkans, Rwanda, or Sudan. The regime in Saudi Arabia, for example, has had the opportunity to radicalize Islam (Wahhabism) and export it around the world. 

The question here is not whether there are too many NGOs or whether they are too interventionist or stringently adhere to local cultural norms.  Democracy may not necessarily be the answer, but the Bush administration has taken the right approach toward confronting these regimes. Unfortunately, not enough has been done. May 13 in Andijon was an important event, as it presented an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate to other dictators in the region that such crackdowns are not acceptable.

In addition, concepts such as an “illiberal democracy” have had a paralyzing effect on our perception of spreading democratic values and act as an excuse for us not to confront these regimes. Ultimately, we must not focus on problems created by “mirror imaging,” but center our attention on fundamental issues of freedom and liberty. U.S. leadership in this process is necessary, regardless of the support from the United Nations.

AEI research assistant Igor Khrestin prepared this summary.