February 2006

Airport Security: Time for a New Model

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Congress ordered all but five commercial airports to switch from privately employed passenger screeners to a federal workforce operating under the auspices of the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Four years after the federal takeover, the TSA has been inundated with complaints and has been the subject of unfavorable evaluations by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A recent GAO study found, for the first time, statistically significant evidence that private passenger screeners perform better than their federal counterparts. In light of this new finding--and the TSA’s record of poor performance--Robert Poole, director of transportation at the Reason Foundation, has developed a new model for addressing the failing airport security apparatus. At a February 15 panel discussion, Mr. Poole presented his model, and a panel of experts discussed his new approach.

Robert Poole
Reason Foundation

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) model that Congress adopted after 9/11 needs improvement. There are three underlying flaws in this model: First, the TSA has an inherent conflict of interest by being both the regulator and the provider of the screening services. This results in a lack of accountability because the TSA is essentially regulating itself. Secondly, there is gross over-centralization within the organization. The TSA has used a one-size-fits-all model that is simply not appropriate when considering the significant variation that exists among airports today. Not only are airports organized quite differently, but passenger traffic can be very volatile, depending on the season. For example, in 2003, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, had a 76 percent change in the number of passengers traveling through the airport from February to March, yet, the number of screeners during this time period remained constant. And finally, there is a lack of a risk-based approach. Instead, we operate under the assumption that every passenger and every bag has the same potential to be dangerous.

The Reason Foundation released a report last month that contains specific reform suggestions. The first is to separate the policymaking and service providing functions that currently exist within the TSA by devolving the screening service to the airports (the airports are already responsible for all other security responsibilities).

Another suggestion is that we shift to a risk-based approach where we allocate resources to what is most critical and then use those resources as efficiently as possible. For example, the TSA should oversee the adoption of automatic inline screening systems for checked bags, which would dramatically reduce the long-run expenses required to screen bags. In fact, we actually concluded that the extra cost of investing in these units would be recovered in one to two years and would save millions of dollars in the future.

We could also adopt a universal system in which flyers willing to submit themselves to rigorous background checks would be able to receive clearance to bypass the traditional screening lines and go through a much quicker line with less intrusive security. The TSA has already permitted a private company to perform a pilot program similar to this in Orlando, which has been an overwhelming success.

An overall approach that focuses on decentralization provides incentives for logical capital investments, and uses a risk-based approach would increase the effectiveness of airport security while minimizing the total waste of resources.

Amos Guiora
Case Western Reserve University

In contrast to Israel, there is basically not a risk-based approach to security at airports within the United States. This means that there is no differentiation among passengers. The result is we all wait in very long lines, and the bad guys become familiar with the system.

The TSA often cites that there have not been any plane hijackings since 9/11. But I would be confident in saying that the next terrorist attacks will not occur through hijacking planes, so we need to start protecting ourselves in a much broader sense. Prototyping is a good first step. It is important to emphasize that this does not mean profiling. Prototyping is drawing a synthesis of who a potential terrorist is and who a potential terrorist is not and constantly tweaking this synthesis as new information about the characteristics of a potential terrorist are discovered. A proper risk-based approach saves not only time, but money as well because you are not requiring the same inefficient screening procedures for all individuals.

We also need well-trained personnel at the TSA that observe people’s characteristics-- such as body language--from the moment that they walk into an airport. I am very skeptical about the hiring process, the training process, and the retraining process that is currently being executed at the TSA. The lack of sufficiently trained individuals is a major reason why we are left with the equal risk approach, since this approach does not require a very specialized skill set.

There are not only systematic problems at the TSA, but at the airlines as well. Under various conditions, an airline will transport a person’s bag on an airplane that he or she is not even traveling on, which is a major security threat. The TSA has responded that there is nothing that they can do because people are under the responsibility of the airports until they reach the TSA screening booths. This highlights another major problem, which is the lack of centralization at airports. The drop-off area is patrolled by police, the airport lobby is monitored by the airport, and the screening process is the responsibility of the TSA.

Therefore, I suggest not only a sophisticated risk assessment model, but also the establishment of a single organization that is responsible for the entire operation of airport security.

Jerry Ellig
Mercatus Center at George Mason University

The information that Mr. Poole presented suggests that when it comes to screening, we are really not much safer than before 9/11 even though we are spending so much more now. This suggests a lot of waste in the system. Mr. Poole finds about a billion dollars. However, if you consider that we are spending about $3.4 billion in 2005 compared to about $320 million in the year before 9/11, then it is reasonable to assume that there is actually about $3 billion worth of waste. In addition, there are deadweight losses that include the additional fees on the airline tickets and the cost of sacrificed time (for the people who are deterred from flying at all). Another cost of the post-9/11 airport security measures is the substitution of less safe modes of transportation, mainly driving automobiles.

Solutions to help solve these problems would include the devolution of responsibilities to airports and use of a risk-based security approach. Devolution would solve both the centralization and the conflict of interest problem. Regarding cost effectiveness, we need to start looking at the marginal cost per unit of risk reduction, instead of the total cost. This is because we ultimately want to know what it is costing to reduce each additional unit of risk in a specific area of security. This will ensure that we are not spending too much money in one area when we could get better overall security by spending some if it in another area.

AEI intern Paul Stewart prepared this summary.