October 2006

Dissent and Reform in the Arab World: Empowering Democrats

Democracy promotion in the Middle East may be a goal of the Bush presidency, but calls for reform predate the administration. Throughout the region, dissidents and activists seek to promote freedom of speech, freedom of association, women’s enfranchisement, and the rule of law. This third installment in AEI’s Dissent and Reform in the Arab World series, held on November 2, featured participants from Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Bahrain who shared their documentation of impediments to democracy within their own countries and laid out their prescriptions for change.

Danielle Pletka
AEI

Democracy in the Arab world must rest on the backs of activists within the region. While American efforts may help to encourage reform in the Middle East, at the end of the day, change can only arise from domestic forces within each country. It is only by supporting these groups--nurturing their ideas, publicizing their views, and promoting dialogue and debate--that America can effectively ensure a rich and successful democratic transition.

Those who call for change in the Muslim world, such as the participants taking part in today’s panels, do so at great risk to themselves and those around them. In a region dominated by authoritarianism and despotism, the cause of democracy is an unwelcome transformation. Democracy entails political and economic reform, in addition to the rule of law and civil, religious, and gender equality. There are those who question whether change in the Middle East is the proper prescription. Recent developments in Iraq and the Palestinian territories challenge the notion that democracy is preferable to the status quo. Nonetheless, a lasting stability in the Arab world can only be built on the foundation of democratic institutions and individual liberties. It is only through these mechanisms--popular participation, a constituency for change, and civil and religious rights--that the root causes of fundamentalism and extremism can be addressed and neutralized.

Panel 1: Challenges to Reform in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon
 
Emad Omar
Search for Common Ground
Jordan

There are three facets of the reform movement in Jordan: religious, political, and economic. Of these, economic reforms have taken priority. Such reform has been conducted in cooperation with the international community and has included increased investment in Jordan and increased purchases of Jordanian exports. Jordanian citizens still lack equal access to economic opportunities in the kingdom, and many still live under the poverty line.

Following the 1989 riots in southern Jordan, a series of political reform measures were also instituted. There are a number of achievements that can be pointed to in this regard, such as the legalization of political parties, annulment of Jordan’s “emergency laws,” and the facilitation of civil society reforms. Even so, there have been a number of setbacks impeding the full implementation of democracy in Jordan. Status quo forces continue to resist reform and advocate for an exclusive political system. Moreover, the rhetoric of the monarchy--especially in the reforms discussed in the National Agenda and the We Are All Jordan document--has not matched its actions. While King Abdullah has been quick to identify reform priorities, there is still a gap between principle and practice.

Despite having a hypothetical democratic vision, Jordan lacks the tools necessary to carry out its aspirations. The difficulty is how to balance political reform and political stability. Jordan has experienced a significant amount of political stability, but has been slow to implement popular reforms. Jordan can serve as a model of a stable democracy for the region. In order to do so, the country must translate democratic initiatives and aspirations into tangible actions. The most important steps include public administration, education, and judicial reform. The United States can assist in this effort by linking political reform to economic incentives.

Ayat Abul-Futtouh
Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies
Egypt

Egypt is very controversial when it comes to democracy. During the past few years, Egypt has experienced a number of significant movements calling for democratic reform. The United States continues to provide Egypt with unwavering moral and financial support, despite the country’s poor track record in human rights. The regime has used this support to maintain a suffocating grip on political dissent. Similarly, the Egyptian government consistently manipulates the fear of an Islamic takeover to maintain its hold on power. Thus, the specter of Islamism is raised anytime reform is mentioned, and this threat is also used to stifle Egyptian civil society.

The challenge is to open the system to all sources of opposition. The alternatives are thought to be either the status quo or the theocrats. Every day that the regime remains unopposed, liberal forces in Egypt are losing ground. If the system remains closed, those who support liberal democracy will lose the necessary strength to advocate for reform. Whether to include Islamists into the political process has been central to any debate concerning reform in Egypt. No group, however, should be excluded from the political process, so long as they do not espouse violence and do not violate the rights of others. These reforms can be achieved in two ways. First, the constitution should be amended to prevent sharia from being the sole source of legislation. Second, the United States should enforce compliance with the conditionality clauses--linking monetary assistance with political reform--already built into American aid packages.

Jad Al-Akhaoui
Cedar Revolution activist
Lebanon
 
It is premature to talk about economic reform in Lebanon until political reforms have been implemented. There are two major obstacles to such reform--Syrian influence and Hezbollah’s hold over southern Lebanon. During thirty years of Syrian rule, corruption permeated all levels of Lebanese government. Such corruption is still endemic in Lebanon, even after the expulsion of Syrian forces in 2005. Today, Syria must recognize Lebanon as an independent state; embassies must be established in both countries to reinforce national sovereignty.

The Lebanese people want democracy, as shown during the Cedar Revolution in March 2005. Nonetheless, Hezbollah representatives still serve in parliament, and the organization essentially remains a state within a state. Lebanon and its neighbors must be resolute in disarming Hezbollah. The democratic reformation of Lebanon will continue to be hampered as long as Hezbollah remains loyal to Syria and Iran, rather than dedicated to the Lebanese state.

The recent war between Israel and Hezbollah has been a major setback to democratic reform. The country has been cast back down into the debt that haunted it for the past thirty years. Economic reforms have essentially been put on hold, as have educational and political developments.

Panel 2: Challenges to Reform in Iraq and Bahrain

Omran Salman
Arab Reformist Project: AAFAQ (Horizons)
Bahrain

Media reform is central to democratic change in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Breaking the media monopoly is a fundamental step in changing Bahrain’s status quo. While the private sector owns most newspapers and publications, the government retains control over publishing policies and the appointment of editors and managing staff. There are a set of forbidden subjects--including the constitution and political reform--that the press cannot address. Editors risk dismissal if they do not abide by the government’s press laws, creating an atmosphere of strong internal censorship.

Despite the fact that Shiite Muslims constitute the Bahraini majority, Sunni Islam is the predominant sect in the government, military, and civil sectors. After Bahrain’s recent political succession, reforms were implemented which released certain political prisoners and allowed some exiles to return. Similarly, the press was granted greater freedom to criticize particular ministries. Even so, the relationship between the government and the press remained the same; red lines that newspapers cannot cross persist. Members of the royal family are still beyond criticism, as are the neighboring regimes of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan.

The rise of the Internet in Bahrain has given greater freedom to the people of Bahrain. Each town and village maintains its own online networks, and opposition leaders have used the internet to publish many of their papers online. Nonetheless, the government continues to block websites and shut down opposition networks on the Internet. State insistence on centralized control extends to all facets of the media. The press could serve as a check on abuse of power, but state censorship does not allow it to do so. Reforming the press in Bahrain can only occur once the government relinquishes control of the media.

Haider Saeed
Iraqi Cultural Forum
Iraq
(paper presented by Hassan Mneimneh of the Iraq Memory Foundation)

There has been a core shift from the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), established by the Coalition Provisional Authority, to the 2005 constitution. Today, identity consolidation and community demarcation pose the greatest threats to democratic reform in Iraq. The current structure in Iraq has diluted the consociational model, in favor of the majoritarian and authoritarian model. The rejection of Iraq’s constitution stems from the belief that one group within the state will monopolize power, and that, therefore, the state’s political process will be dominated by one majoritarian group. This is a perceived dominance issue. The 2005 constitution attempts to prevent the reemergence of an autocracy that denies groups in Iraqi society the right of power-sharing. In addition to the consociational arrangement, there is an Islamist component implicit in the constitution--a sort of mitigated theocracy. The constitution calls for the establishment of a state not ruled by clerics, but guided by them. It also allows for the full preservation of religious communities, and emphasizes the fact that the Iraq’s national character is Islamic. Most importantly, the constitution fails to give legal legitimacy to any possible social phenomenon that contradicts sharia. This dichotomy within the current constitutional arrangement--liberty and reform on one hand, sectarian division on the other--has provided for a majoritarian trend that signals a retreat from the consociational model. This is a slippery slope that can easily allow Iraq to become an autocratic state. By doing away with reciprocal vetoing and by changing the expression of political will from a supermajority to a simple majority, sectarianism has become ingrained in the constitutional system of Iraq.

AEI intern Benjamin Kramer prepared this summary.