In Search of an Historic Yeltsin: The Man and His Era
About This Event

Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first democratically elected leader in the federation’s thousand-year history, died on April 23, 2007. During his presidency, Yeltsin institutionalized the vital liberties that Mikhail Gorbachev had granted only provisionally and often by default: freedom from government censorship of speech and of the press; free elections; freedom of political opposition; a largely privatized economy; demilitarization of state and society; decentralization of the traditionally unitary Russian state; increasingly assertive and independent courts; and a stronger civil society.

Despite these notable advances, the Russia that Yeltsin left behind also reflected the contradictions of its democratic founding father. While striving to diminish authoritarian coercion and embrace competition for power arbitrated by popular vote, Russia under Yeltsin remained a semi-authoritarian polity, corrupt and mistrusted by its people. For many Russians, Yeltsin will be remembered as the leader who initiated notorious “shock therapy” reforms, employed force to suppress the armed rebellion in support of the lawfully elected parliament he dissolved, created a class of extravagant “oligarchs,” and launched a bloody war in Chechnya.

How will history judge Yeltsin? Will the current “restoration” under Russian president Vladimir Putin reverse all the gains of the Yeltsin era? On May 8, a panel of prominent Russia scholars will gather to remember Boris Yeltsin and to assess the impact of the revolutions he presided over and shaped in three areas: the country’s politics, its economic system, and the post-imperial Russian state.

Agenda
1:45 p.m.
Registration
2:00
Panelists:
Anders Åslund, Institute for International Economics
Andrei Kortunov, New Eurasia Foundation
Andrew Kuchins, Center for Strategic International Studies
Moderator:
Leon Aron, AEI
4:30
Adjournment
Event Summary

May 2007

In Search of an Historic Yeltsin: The Man and His Era

Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first democratically elected leader in the federation’s thousand-year history, died on April 23, 2007. During his presidency, Yeltsin institutionalized the vital liberties that Mikhail Gorbachev had granted only provisionally and often by default: freedom from government censorship of speech and of the press; free elections; freedom of political opposition; a largely privatized economy; demilitarization of state and society; decentralization of the traditionally unitary Russian state; increasingly assertive and independent courts; and a stronger civil society.

Despite these notable advances, the Russia that Yeltsin left behind also reflected the contradictions of its democratic founding father. While striving to diminish authoritarian coercion and embrace competition for power arbitrated by popular vote, Russia under Yeltsin remained a semi-authoritarian polity, corrupt and mistrusted by its people. For many Russians, Yeltsin will be remembered as the leader who initiated notorious “shock therapy” reforms, employed force to suppress the armed rebellion in support of the lawfully elected parliament he dissolved, created a class of extravagant “oligarchs,” and launched a bloody war in Chechnya.

How will history judge Yeltsin? Will the current “restoration” under Russian president Vladimir Putin reverse all the gains of the Yeltsin era? On May 8, a panel of prominent Russia scholars gathered to remember Boris Yeltsin and assessed the impact of the revolutions he presided over and shaped in three areas: the country’s politics, its economic system, and the post-imperial Russian state.

Anders Aslund
Peterson Institute for International Economics

Boris Yeltsin was a great man, dynamic and intelligent, but also manic--and, subsequently, dangerously depressive. Yeltsin’s three major achievements included the securing of Russia’s borders, achieving the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet empire, pushing for the rapid transition to a market economy, and facilitating the breakthrough of democracy.

Of course, alongside the successes, are his failures. The first was the inability to achieve macroeconomic stabilization, a policy failure exacerbated by the lack of Western support. The second was effectively ceding the control of the central bank to the parliament. Lastly, Yeltsin’s great mistake was tolerance of Soviet-era enterprise managers.

In conclusion, Yeltsin was a great hero and a man who managed crises well, but one found ordinary governance difficult.
 
Andrei Kortunov
New Eurasia Foundation

There are several views of Russia’s foreign policy under Yeltsin which should be described: defeatist, opportunistic, unconsolidated, and primarily driven by institutional interests, while not focusing on a broader “national interest.” None of these accusations, however, are truly equitable. When making foreign policy, Yeltsin faced several fundamental dilemmas. These dilemmas included the question of Russian identity under Yeltsin: whether the new Russian state was to be a successor to the policies and governance of the Soviet Union, or whether it would become an entirely new state in which all policy must be designed from scratch.

Under Yeltsin, Russian foreign relations with the West, with the former Soviet satellites, and with the client states of the Soviet Union were fraught with complications. Yeltsin had been unhappy with the country’s international standing after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but he understood the need to differentiate himself and the new Russian state from the policies of the former Soviet leaders.

Under President Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin’s foreign policy legacy has been almost entirely dismantled. Despite the erosion of foreign policy advances under Yeltsin, however, Russia today is an open nation with relatively porous borders, more open to the West than ever before--a legacy of the Yeltsin era that is a permanent reality. Also, despite the persistence of contentious issues with former Soviet states, there are no territorial disputes or claims. Post-Soviet borders have been permanently established. Finally, Yeltsin’s legacy is evident in the emergence of a new generation of Russians that are profoundly pro-Western. Despite a rise in nationalism and a shift in foreign policy, they view themselves as Europeans.  

Andrew Kuchins
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Yeltsin’s legacy is both colossal and complex, like the man himself. One issue of importance is Yeltsin’s mixed democratic scorecard, including the lapse of Russian democracy and the precedent of transferring power to a chosen successor. When Putin is compared to Yeltsin, one major difference is apparent: Yeltsin was a revolutionary, while Putin is the opposite.  

It is interesting to compare the policies of the respective eight-year periods during which each has presided. Some interesting contrasts include the devolution of the 1990s versus the recentralization of the current administration, the economic shift from a laissez-faire approach under Yeltsin to the “state-directed” capitalism of today, and Yeltsin’s Russia’s foreign policy role as a quasi-supplicant versus its role today as a self-anointed energy superpower. The character contrast of each leader is also extremely important: Yeltsin was warm and voluble, with an almost volcanically emotional personality, a stark contrast to the cool and controlled Putin. The relevance of Yeltsin’s legacy lies in the reality that Russia currently stands on the precipice of a new succession and that the policies of the next leader of Russia may be just as unpredictable.

AEI intern Amanda Nelson-Duac prepared this summary.

View complete summary.
AEI Participants

 

Leon
Aron
  • Leon Aron is Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author of three books and over 300 articles and essays. Since 1999, he has written Russian Outlook, a quarterly essay on economic, political, social and cultural aspects of Russia’s post-Soviet transition, published by the Institute. He is the author of the first full-scale scholarly biography of Boris Yeltsin, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (St. Martin’s Press, 2000); and Russia’s Revolution: Essays 1989-2006 (AEI Press,2007); Roads to the Temple: Memory, Truth, Ideals and Ideas in the Making ofthe Russian Revolution, 1987-1991 (Yale University Press, Spring 2012).


    Dr. Aron earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University, has taught a graduate seminar at Georgetown University, and was awarded the Peace Fellowship at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has co-edited and contributed the opening chapter to The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy, published by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1994 and contributed an opening chapter to The New Russian Foreign Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).


    Dr. Aron has contributed numerous essays and articles to newspapers andmagazines, including the Washington Post, the New York Times, theWall Street Journal Foreign Policy, The NewRepublic, Weekly Standard, Commentary, New York Times Book Review, the TimesLiterary Supplement. A frequent guest of television and radio talkshows, he has commented on Russian affairs for, among others, 60 Minutes,The Newshour with Jim Lehrer, Charlie Rose, CNN International,C-Span, and National Public Radio’s “All Things Considered” and “Talk of theNation.”


    From 1990 to 2004, he was a permanent discussant at the Voice of America’s radio and television show Gliadya iz Ameriki (“Looking from America”), which was broadcast to Russia every week.

  • Phone: 202-862-5898
    Email: laron@aei.org
  • Assistant Info

    Name: Daniel Vajdic
    Phone: 202-862-5942
    Email: daniel.vajdic@aei.org
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