Taking It to the Next Level
Transforming the U.S.-Japanese Alliance
About This Event

After a half-century of commitment to Japan’s territorial defense, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance has begun to evolve. The Japan Self-Defense Forces deployed to Iraq and continue to make vital contributions to operations in the global war on terror. Increasingly, American security planning in Asia centers on bilateral cooperation with Japan. Listen to Audio


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With growth, there have also been strains on the relationship over a variety of problems, including North Korea, Tokyo’s defense spending, and U.S. bases in Japan. The regional strategic imperative requires that Japan and the United States develop a common agenda for security cooperation. What role will the alliance play in enhancing existing Asian economic and security institutions and in developing new ones? How can the United States and Japan effectively address shared concerns over terrorism and nuclear proliferation, among others? On March 7, leading scholars and policymakers will address these and other questions about the next steps in U.S.-Japanese alliance transformation.

Agenda
9:45 a.m.
Registration
10:00
Panel I: The Alliance and Regional Institutions
Panelists:
Dan Blumenthal, AEI
Kent Calder, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced
International Studies
Satoshi Morimoto, Takushoku University
Moderator:
Christopher Griffin, AEI
11:30
Luncheon
Keynote Remarks:
Paul Wolfowitz, AEI
12:30
Panel II: U.S.-Japanese Capabilities and Constraints
Panelists:
Paul Giarra, Hicks & Associates
Makoto Iokibe, National Defense Academy
Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
Moderator:
Michael Auslin, AEI
2:00
Adjournment
Event Summary

March 2008

Taking It to the Next Level: Transforming the U.S.-Japanese Alliance

After a half-century of commitment to Japan's territorial defense, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance has begun to evolve. The Japan Self-Defense Forces deployed to Iraq and continue to make vital contributions to operations in the global war on terror. Increasingly, American security planning in Asia centers on bilateral cooperation with Japan. With growth, there have also been strains on the relationship over a variety of problems, including North Korea, Tokyo's defense spending, and U.S. bases in Japan. The regional strategic imperative requires that Japan and the United States develop a common agenda for security cooperation. What role will the alliance play in enhancing existing Asian economic and security institutions and in developing new ones? How can the United States and Japan effectively address shared concerns over terrorism and nuclear proliferation, among others? On March 7, 2007, leading scholars and policymakers addressed these and other questions about the next steps in U.S.-Japanese alliance transformation.

Panel I--The Alliance and Regional Institutions

Dan Blumenthal
AEI

In 2002, under the leadership of President George Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee was launched with the purpose of strengthening the alliance between the two countries and moving beyond traditional realms of bilateral cooperation. Through this process, Japan and the United States now cooperate on some of their common goals, including winning the war on terror, ensuring a prosperous Asia-Pacific region, supporting free market principles, realizing the peaceful reunification of Korea, and establishing cooperative relations with China, among others.

With the rise of China, Japan's role within the U.S.-Japanese alliance will be of great importance to the mutual security interests of the two countries. In recent years, however, the United States has not been supportive of Japan's regional initiatives, such as the quadrilateral talks between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. U.S. reluctance in backing Japan's proposals only undermines Japan's influence in the region. Therefore, the United States should assist Japan in becoming a stabilizing element in the region.

Historically, the emergence of regionalism in Asia is often marked by rivalry between great powers. The reinforcement of U.S.-Japanese ties in promoting common objectives, whether engaging China or consolidating democracy in the region, is essential.


Satoshi Morimoto
Takushoku University

The changing of the security environment in Asia has compelled Japan and the United States to redefine responsibilities under their partnership. The six-party talks and the rise of China's military power are particular concerns for Japan.

North Korea is not likely to abandon its nuclear program. Although Kim Jong Il's regime has agreed to dismantle its nuclear facility, much uncertainty remains about future nuclear developments. North Korea's continued testing of ballistic missiles is of particular concern to Japan, as Japan seems a likely target for those missiles in the event of an attack. Because of its close proximity, Japan is deeply concerned about the threat emanating from the Korean Peninsula. The United States needs to be considerate of Japan's interests when engaging in the six-party talks.

China's military modernization, specifically its aspiration of building a blue-water navy, is alarming for Japan. Its power projection will not be confined within the Taiwan Strait, and by 2010, the military balance in Asia is predicted to drastically shift in China's favor. In a reaction to this development, Japan is seeking to build a better relationship with China, though the two nations continue to disagree on several issues. The United States, working jointly with Japan, will need to strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance and consider crafting a multilateral security framework between nations with common values in order to maintain a stable region.

Kent Calder
Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies

Although the United States and Japan are separated by the Pacific Ocean, Japan has been an important strategic partner for the United States both militarily and economically. This alliance involves a tradeoff in which the United States provides security projection in the Asia-Pacific and Japan finances much of America's presence in Asia. The bilateral ties, however, will face multidimensional changes as the political-economic environment in East Asia evolves and as domestic concerns and elections affect the foreign policies of both Japan and the United States.

The United States has a large economic interest in Asia, but the economic situation in the region is rapidly changing as developing countries begin to make more impact on regional markets. Regional institutions--such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and others--have developed to serve the interests of East Asian nations, coalescing them into an economic bloc. Though the United States does not participate in some of these economic institutions, Japan has been able to articulate a stance that encompasses U.S. interests. This signals an evolution of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, with Japan playing a larger regional role on behalf of alliance goals.

The United States should develop a more complex regional strategy, one that depends as much on its own diplomatic initiatives as those of Japan. Further, it is important that the United States not ignore the importance of Japan in its effort to engage China or regional institutions. Japan has unique diplomatic ties to these institutions that the United States should utilize.

Paul Wolfowitz
AEI

The history of the U.S.-Japanese alliance has been remarkable, partly because of the circumstances of its creation and partly because of the success of its economic and political transformation. Today, this bilateral relationship is more significant than ever and remains an important aspect of American interest in East Asia.

It would be a great mistake to underestimate the importance of Japan, as Americans have done in the past. In the 1980s, Japan was seen as an emerging rival. In the 1990s, it was treated as weak. And today, it is seen as subordinate to a rising China. These views distort the enormous potential of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which, among other things, has allowed the United States to persuade G7 nations to place intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe and has been a major factor in facilitating constructive relations with other powers in East Asia.

There are several reasons Japan will be important in the future. First, the U.S.-Japanese alliance is an important and tested source of stability and balance against emerging powers, deep divisions, and complex threats in East Asia. Second, no other Asian country has commercial, geostrategic, and political interests so close to those of the United States. Finally, Japan's success is a model and inspiration for the development of other free societies in East Asia,.

The U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship is built on a solid foundation of permanent, shared interests and can last well into the next century.

Panel II--U.S.-Japanese Capabilities and Constraints

Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

The U.S.-Japanese alliance should develop capabilities that draw on the strengths of each alliance partner and also meet the changing needs of the twenty-first century international environment. The alliance must be able to undertake counterproliferation and counterterrorism operations, as well as humanitarian, peacekeeping, and reconstruction missions. Great advances have been made in the last three areas in the past decade, as seen by the efforts of the alliance partners in Iraq, the areas affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the areas affected by the earthquake in Pakistan.

Japan's military capability allows it to make real contributions to global challenges faced by both partners of the alliance. For example, Japan has twice as many P3C maritime patrol aircraft as the United States, and it is second only to the United States in number of heavy-lift helicopters. However, Japan still needs help from the United States in many security areas. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces has limited projection capabilities because of its history as a policing unit, the entrenched public opposition to offensive military operations, and constitutional and legislative barriers to the use of force. The United States can help Japan by increasing coordination in the case of ballistic missile attack and by providing additional strike power during contingency situations.

The good news is that recent years have seen an expansion in the definition of core missions that the Self-Defense Forces can undertake. New military commands have also been established to focus on reinforcement and humanitarian missions. These organizations may expand Japanese military readiness and willingness to take on greater roles abroad.

Makoto Iokibe
National Defense Academy

The National Defense Academy (NDA) integrates the Japanese military's three branches: army, navy, and air force. The NDA emerged as a counter to Japan's negative military legacies, which included an army-navy rivalry that went beyond a rational level, excessive propaganda and indoctrination that emphasized racist and quasireligious thinking, and lack of holistic development that prevented veterans from functioning in a postwar civilian society.

The NDA curriculum emphasizes learning in the natural sciences, as well as exposure to international relations theory. Students also participate in civilian events and assist in disaster relief to ensure that they are sympathetic to the democratic citizens they serve.

At the end of the Cold War, Japan faced new challenges and launched a campaign to improve military self-sufficiency; foster closer cooperation with the United States; and, especially after September 11, increase participation in international humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The NDA is launching its own reforms in response to the challenges of a post-9/11 world. The academy is also expanding its graduate courses, research, and scholarship aid, as well as encouraging greater international exchange.

Paul Giarra
Hicks & Associates

American security depends on maintaining the U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship. Currently, the alliance seems to be in retrenchment, with active military cooperation but insufficient dialogue. It is important to fight smarter--not necessarily harder--together.

Changes in the international situation make this effort difficult. Contradictions within the alliance must be addressed, including Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which forswears war as a sovereign right; Japanese dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Middle Eastern oil; and disparities between trade and political interests.

Most importantly, self-imposed constraints on the way members of the alliance think are destabilizing. Strategic planning must be rehashed, even in the face of complicated bilateral consultation problems. Bilateral relations must be made more intimate. Both the United States and Japan must take another look at the meaning and reality of national and alliance power. The concept of national power must be extended to include soft power.

There is no more impressive combination of national capabilities than the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Both sides must embrace a new concept of national power to achieve increased stability and effective deterrence in the region.

AEI interns Tom Chou and John O'Trakoun prepared this summary.

View complete summary.
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AEI Participants

 

Michael
Auslin

 

Dan
Blumenthal
  • Dan Blumenthal is a current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. Previously, he was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs and practiced law in New York prior to his government service. At AEI, in addition to his work on the national security implications of U.S.-Sino relations, he coordinates the Tocqueville on China project, which examines the underlying civic culture of post-Mao China. Mr. Blumenthal also contributes to AEI's Asian Outlook series and is a research associate with the National Asia Research Program.
  • Phone: 202-862-5861
    Email: dblumenthal@aei.org
  • Assistant Info

    Name: Lara Crouch
    Phone: 202-862-7160
    Email: lara.crouch@aei.org

 

Paul
Wolfowitz
  • Paul Wolfowitz spent more than three decades in public service and higher education. Most recently, he served as president of the World Bank and deputy secretary of defense. As ambassador to Indonesia, Mr. Wolfowitz became known for his advocacy of reform and political openness and for his interest in development issues, which dates back to his doctoral dissertation on water desalination in the Middle East. At AEI, Mr. Wolfowitz works on development issues.
  • Assistant Info

    Name: Julissa Milligan
    Phone: 202-862-5905
    Email: julissa.milligan@aei.org
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