March 2008

What Now for Russia? The Regime and Opposition after the Presidential "Election"

On March 2, 2008, Russians voted for their next president. Although there were four candidates, the victory of Vladimir Putin's designated successor, Dmitri Medvedev, was never in doubt. The remaining contenders represented political parties best known for rubberstamping the Kremlin's agenda (Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party) or are, like Andrei Bogdanov's Democratic Party of Russia, unabashed puppet creations of the Kremlin. At the same time, the Central Election Commission, entirely subservient to the Kremlin, has employed bureaucratic dirty tricks to "disqualify" the genuine liberal opposition candidates and to harass pro-democracy activists. Often denied the freedom to rent spaces for meetings, to advertise, and to collect nominating signatures, and subjected to blatantly biased court rulings, opposition campaigns were totally barred from the election.

In the aftermath of this electoral manipulation, what is the future of political opposition in Russia? Is the Kremlin's ownership of Russian politics absolute, or is the regime's fear of public opposition a sign of inherent weakness? Can liberal opposition be sustained through existing political structures, or will the movement turn to street protests and Soviet-style underground dissidence? On March 10, 2008, AEI hosted those who are best qualified to answer these questions: the leading members of Russia's liberal pro-democracy opposition.

Boris Nemtsov
Former first deputy prime minister
Cofounder of Union of Right Forces

The perceived achievements of Putin's presidency have been largely skewed by the effectiveness of state propaganda due to Kremlin control over all major mass media sources in Russia. The result of such power over information has been a general lack of knowledge about a crumbling infrastructure, a greatly diminished military, a worsening demographic crisis, and rampant corruption at all levels of government. Most Russians recognize that Medvedev's election was predetermined due to a combination of the state propaganda machine, massive voter fraud, and an absence of any viable opposition candidate. The removal of legitimate applicants from the ballot demonstrates that the "inevitability" of Kremlin forces has been overstated.

The situation in Moscow today is pivotal. There is little evidence to support the claim that Medvedev is nothing more than a puppet. In shredding the Russian constitution and building power around the presidency, Putin created a large opportunity for Medvedev to consolidate power independent of Putin's mandate. The situation could result either in Putin stepping down and placing the reigns of power completely in Medvedev's hands, or it might dematerialize into destructive infighting between Kremlin factions. The greatest challenge faced by the liberal opposition is that its fractured, disunited state prevents it from gaining credibility with popular opinion and cripples its ability to disseminate information to refute state propaganda.

Vladimir Kara-Murza
Former presidential campaign manager for Vladimir Bukovsky
Federal political council member, Union of Right Forces

Searching for Medvedev's liberalizing tendencies is a futile undertaking. The current regime has shown that it is moving in an increasingly undemocratic direction. These steps were, at first, largely symbolic but have begun to become more substantial: the nationalization of powerful, independent media and businesses; the purge of democratic forces out of the Duma; and the destruction of federal separation of powers on both the national and local levels. The latest move has been to drop any pretense of competitive elections. Putin's nearly universal positive media coverage is bolstered by the near impossibility of nominating liberal candidates and the high degree of difficulty of running a serious opposition campaign.

The ill-fated campaign of Vladimir Bukovsky and the Kremlin's exhaustive, and eventually successful, efforts to end his presidential bid are instructive examples of the ruthless political atmosphere in Moscow. Despite harsh restrictions on public displays of dissent, the protest movement is growing, as is Kremlin concern over the issue. The increase in incidents of street activism calls to mind the "color revolutions" in such countries as Georgia and Ukraine. Consolidation of oppositionist movements is also beginning. Though still in its infancy, such consolidation is essential to the liberalization effort in Russia.

Oleg Buklemishev
Adviser to former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, People's Democratic Union

Western observers have been quick to applaud Putin for not changing the constitution in order to retain office. This transfer of power to Medvedev is actually deceiving, as it creates an illusion of legitimacy. It is doubtful that Medvedev will be able to retain the level of popularity achieved by Putin. This is due to the fact that Putin's standing with the public is, in large part, based on propaganda; such approval is difficult to sustain, much less pass on to a successor.

If Russians had had a viable successor in the previous election, the outcome would have been completely different. The changes to election law that followed the terrorist attacks in Beslan, however, made mounting a serious political campaign without the consent of the Kremlin all but impossible. Russia is in desperate need of economic and political reform. The myth of Putin as the "modernizing tsar" is simply the result of promulgation of the regime's propaganda. The only way to secure political legitimacy is to institute free, transparent single mandate district elections to the Duma, much like those seen in the United States.

Vladimir Ryzhkov
Former Duma deputy
Cochair, Republican Party of Russia

Despite hopeful projections from the West, this new regime shows little promise of liberalization. With vote falsification at 15-20 percent, Medvedev's election was even less legitimate than the December Duma elections.  Further, expanding foreign policy battles over Kosovan independence, NATO expansion, missile defense, and energy indicates a widening rift with the West as opposed to a restoration of good relations.

The answer to Russia's political problems does not lie in the unification of liberal oppositionist forces, and such amalgamation may not even be possible. There is a need for new parties with a younger, fresher leadership that can regain credibility with the people. In addition to the fractured, often opposing, strategies of liberal opposition parties, the total lack of political infrastructure eliminates any possibility for a competitive party system.

Michael McFaul
Hoover Institution

The comparison of Russia to Pakistan is highly unfair to the comparatively thriving democracy in the latter nation. A better comparative point would be the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran and Russia are petrol states with similar per-capita GDP and populations with comparable levels of education. The liberal opposition in Iran also faces a similar dilemma of whether it should attempt reform from within government institutions or pull out of the government altogether and work from without. Unfortunately, Iran has a much stronger, better organized opposition that Russia, and it functions under more repressive conditions.

There are several bad pieces of news for the immediate prospects for democracy in Russia. First, there is need for a significant challenge to regime legitimacy, such as economic mismanagement. Second, there must be splits between rival factions within the regime. Finally, democracy must be a means to deal with problems such as an economic crisis or mismanaged war; democracy for its own sake does not constitute an ideology of opposition. None of these prospects, however, seem likely in the immediate future.

AEI intern Kevin Thomas prepared this summary.