A new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggests that the West may be running out of time to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. According to the IAEA, Iran has now produced enough low-enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon. Although Iran would have to further
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purify its nuclear material and fit it into a warhead to make a viable weapon, this latest revelation is yet more evidence of Iran's aggressive intentions and raises important questions about what we know--and what we do not know--about its nuclear capabilities. What is Iran's nuclear timeline? Is a nuclear Iran now a fait accompli, or can the West still prevent Iran from producing the world’s most dangerous weapons? Sanctions have thus far proven ineffective, but will Iran's fiscal troubles create enough leverage for renewed economic measures to work? Does the West have the political will to redouble its efforts? Will China and Russia join in?
Discussing these and other questions will be AEI senior fellow and former U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations John R. Bolton and Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Danielle Pletka, vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at AEI, will moderate.
| 10:45 a.m. | Registration | |
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| 11:00 | Panelists: | John R. Bolton, AEI |
| | | Gary Milhollin, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control |
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| | Moderator: | Danielle Pletka, AEI |
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| 12:15 p.m. | Adjournment | |
Iran Moves Closer to Nuclear Finish Line, Experts Say
WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 3, 2008--"Iran is going to get nuclear weapons," AEI senior fellow John R. Bolton said at an AEI panel discussion on December 2. "We have lost this race." Even though it has repeatedly called a nuclear Iran "unacceptable," the Bush administration is preparing to leave office next month having done little to halt Iran's nuclear program. Diplomacy has been rendered ineffectual, Bolton added, because Europe is unwilling to sacrifice trade with the Islamic Republic. As a result, diplomacy has afforded Iran time to move closer to the nuclear finish line rather than preventing Iran from building a weapon.
Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, was slightly more sanguine about the prospects for diplomacy, noting that political, technological, cultural, and economic isolation can doom recalcitrant regimes. As he put it, "you cannot eat bombs." The precipitous fall in world oil prices coupled with Iran's deep economic problems makes it particularly susceptible to strong sanctions. But, like Bolton, he noted that Europe and the United States would have to accept the costs associated with an effective set of sanctions without what he calls "cost avoidance"--something that has yet to happen.
The failure of diplomacy leaves only the possibility, apart from doing nothing, of a missile strike against Iran's nuclear program. But there are two seemingly implacable obstacles to this: First, as Bolton argued, neither George W. Bush nor, after he is inaugurated, Barack Obama is likely to call for a strike. And although Israel is most directly threatened by a nuclear Iran, its domestic political standoff complicates matters. Second, there is no guarantee a military strike would be successful--and, likely, no mechanism of verifying it had been successful. Additionally, as Milhollin noted, destroying nuclear facilities by targeted strikes has a mixed record.
Milhollin cautioned time is running out. He estimates Iran will have enough low-enriched uranium for three nuclear weapons by the end of 2009. Soon thereafter, he expects Iran to have the capability to assemble several weapons quickly. While additional technological obstacles--such as building an implosion device and fitting a warhead to a missile--remain, Iran will probably be able to navigate around them given the progress it has made thus far on more difficult tasks.
According to Bolton, all this means there is "essentially nothing standing between Iran and a nuclear weapon." Consequently, he argues the United States should begin devoting serious thought to how to deal with a nuclear Iran: Can Iran be contained and deterred? How can the United States minimize Iran's leverage? And can it dissuade other regional powers from pursuing nuclear weapons in response? As the final chapter of the Bush administration and the opening chapters of the Obama administration are written, these are the questions that should be foremost in the minds of decision-makers.
--PHIL ALITO
For video, audio, and more information about this event, visit www.aei.org/event1850/.
AEI tracks global investment and business dealings with Iran at www.aei.org/IranInteractive/.
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