Conflict in Georgia Reveals Russia's Strategic Aims, Who's in Charge at the Kremlin

WASHINGTON, AUGUST 14, 2008--The Russo-Georgian conflict has shed substantial light on Moscow's military capabilities and future intentions in the Caucasus, military analysts and regional observers said at an AEI event on August 13. AEI scholars Frederick W. Kagan, Leon Aron, and Thomas Donnelly were joined by Lt. Col. Ralph Peters (U.S. Army, retired) and Lt. Col. Bob Hamilton (U.S. Army) to discuss and clarify the strategic, operational, and tactical military aspects of the recent conflict. The panel also provided an initial assessment of the political implications--for the United States and its allies in the region--of Russia's invasion of Georgia.

Having recently conducted significant military exercises in preparation for a potential contingency in Abkhazia, the Russian military was poised to mount a rapid mobilization in response to the hostilities in South Ossetia. Tanks surged south across the border from North Ossetia; a flotilla of the Black Sea fleet blockaded Georgia's coastline; and the Russian Air Force conducted an extensive bombing campaign against Georgian army targets throughout the country--"an operation that the Russians undertook for the strategic purpose of doing as much damage to the Georgian military as a whole as it possibly could," Kagan explained.

Yet, by failing repeatedly to strike strategic targets such as oil pipelines and radio towers, the Russian military also demonstrated that it "is still a blunt instrument," Peters argued. Regardless of these shortfalls, Russia's military success allowed it to engineer a ceasefire agreement in its favor.

"[The] peace agreement which is being offered as a compromise . . . is in no in any way a return to the status quo ante in military terms. The military balance in this area has been decisively shifted . . . and I suspect that probably most of the work that the U.S. has done over the years to increase the capacity of the Georgian forces has been destroyed," Kagan said.

Recently returned from a tour as the chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation in the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, Hamilton explained that the American capacity-building program in Georgia has been focused on developing the skills necessary for conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions--not for prosecuting a "full-spectrum, maneuver war." An inexperienced senior leadership corps, limited command and control capabilities, and a severe numerical disadvantage against Russia further hindered the Georgian military. The small republic's armed forces were no match for those of their northern neighbor. "This was not a fair fight, and it was never going to be a fair fight," Hamilton said.

Perhaps more disconcerting than the rapid deployment of Russia's coercive capabilities, however, was its leaders' justification for employing them--and the alarming precedents they have sought to establish. According to Kagan, Russian leaders have implicitly and explicitly suggested that in order to protect the "dignity and lives of Russian citizens," Russia has the right to respond to conflicts in Georgia's separatist territories by attacking Georgia proper; that Russian Federation law protects all Russian citizens, regardless of where they might be located; that Russian Federation law can be used to bring charges against non-Russian citizens who are not residents in Russia for crimes not committed on Russian territory if their actions are "against the interests of the Russian Federation"; and that Russian military forces can take preemptive action, including ground occupation, to protect themselves from the possibility of danger posed by foreign forces on foreign soil.

The crisis in Georgia also confirmed what many suspected about the structure and character of Russia's political leadership: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, not President Dmitry Medvedev, maintains a tight grip on the reins of power and remains the country's chief strategic architect. As Aron said, Putin's public leadership in the course of the Georgian conflict reveals that "the [2008 Russian presidential] elections were a sham . . . the constitution is a sham," and the "whiff of liberalization" that some perceived in Medvedev's early statements was deceptive. Any hopes of liberal reforms in the Kremlin, he said, are "buried under the rubble of Gori."

Peters said that Putin is "the most effective leader in the world today"--if only for his ruthlessness, decisiveness, and consequent ability to pursue strategic goals with little regard for the resistance he might receive. Indeed, though the conflict in the Caucasus was a long time coming, as Kagan and others have noted, Russia's incursion into Georgia caught the West flat-footed and has left it unprepared and fumbling for a response. Peters put it succinctly: Russia "invades a U.S. ally, and our president goes to a basketball game. This is not an effective diplomatic response."

As the United States and its allies in Western Europe craft their policies in response to Russia's recent aggression, they would be wise to understand the gravity and extent of Russian objectives in Georgia. "I don't think that this is over," concluded Kagan. "The Russians are going to try very hard to engineer [Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili's] removal from power, and we need to make it very clear that that is unacceptable."

--TIM SULLIVAN

For video, audio, and more event information, visit www.aei.org/event1769/.

• President Saakashvili spoke at AEI in July 2006 on his country's economic, legal, and security progress since the "Rose Revolution" in which he was elected. The speech is available here.
• Kagan has been tracking the situation in the Caucasus here.
• In the Wall Street Journal, Mauro De Lorenzo and Gary J. Schmitt explore how the West can confront Russia.
• Aron's Russian Outlook series explores the nature of Putin's regime in Moscow.

For media inquiries, contact Véronique Rodman at 202.862.4870 or vrodman@aei.org.

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