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Graduate Studies:

Ph.D. (Economics), Harvard University, 2008, thesis: "Essays in Taxation and International Relations"

A.M. (Economics), Harvard University, 2007

Undergraduate Studies:

B.A. in Mathematics and Economics, Wellesley College, *summa cum laude*, 2003. Honors in Mathematics, thesis title: "*Stochastic Processes Occurring in the Theory of Markov Chains and their Applications*" Honors in Economics, thesis title: "*The Incidence of Corporate Tax in an Open Economy under Imperfect Competition*"

References:

David Cutler
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Martin Feldstein
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Silvia Ardagna (Teaching Reference)
Harvard University
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Fields: Health, Public Economics, Development Economics, International Political Economy, International Economics

Research topics: Children's health, economic sanctions, tax evasion, entrepreneurship

Teaching Experience:

2005-2007 Social Analysis 10 Principles of Economics, Harvard University, Teaching Fellow for Professor Gregory Mankiw, Professor Silvia Ardagna and Professor David Johnson

2000-2002 MATH 101 Reasoning with Data Elementary Applied Statistics, MATH 115 Calculus I, MATH 116 Calculus II, MATH 120 Calculus IIA, MATH 205 Multivariable Calculus, Wellesley College, Teaching Assistant, various professors

2000-2002 ECON 101 Principles of Microeconomics and ECON 102 Principles of Macroeconomics, Wellesley College, Tutor, various professors

2000-2001 ITAS 101-102 Elementary Italian, Wellesley College, Tutor, Professor
Flavia Laviosa

Teaching Awards and Certifications:

2007 Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University
2000 Tutor Certification, College Reading and Learning Association

Research Experience:

2008-present Postdoctoral fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Professional Activities

Conference and seminar presentations:

2010 AEA Annual Meeting - upcoming
2009 Southern Economics Association Annual Meeting- upcoming
International Atlantic Economics Meetings
NBER Summer Institute (discussant)
Global Studies Association conference on human rights
University of Michigan conference on taxation and the role of firms
Public Choice Society Meeting
Peterson Institute for International Economics
American Enterprise Institute
AEA Annual Meeting
2008 National Tax Association Annual Meeting (discussant)
Peterson Institute for International Economics
2007 NBER Summer Institute
Harvard Political Economy Seminar
Harvard Public Economics Seminar
Harvard Theory Graduate Student Workshop
Harvard Macroeconomics Seminar
Harvard Labor Graduate Student Workshop –fall
NBER Economics of National Security Workshop
Harvard Labor Graduate Student Workshop –spring
2006 Harvard Labor Graduate Student Workshop
NBER Economics of National Security Workshop

Professional Affiliations:

Member, American Economic Association
Member, National Tax Association
Member, APPAM

Other Professional Activities:

Referee for National Tax Journal

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2005-2008 Starr Fellowship for Economics of National Security
2003-2005 Rita Ricardo-Campbell Fellowship in Economics
2003-2004 Horton-Hallowell Fellowship
2003 Natalie Bolton Faculty Prize in Economics, Best Empirical Paper in

	Economics, for “Executive Compensation in Fortune 500 Companies: The Role of Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Company Structure, and Performance” (with Tabinda Khan and Ayesha Sattar)
2003	Martha Davenport Head Department Prize, Outstanding Mathematics Student
2003	Phi Beta Kappa
2003	Sigma Xi (science honor society)
2003	Omicron Delta Epsilon (economics honor society)
2002	Schiff Fellowship for outstanding honor thesis
2001	Parents Internship Program summer award
2000	First Year Academic Distinction

Research Papers:

"The Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions" (Job Market Paper)

There is a heated debate on what should be the balance between achieving foreign policy goals using economic sanctions and the adverse effects of sanctions on human rights. In order to find such a balance, one needs to know under what circumstances such negative effects occur and what is the magnitude of these effects. In this study, I attempt to answer these questions by estimating the impact of in utero exposure to sanctions episodes on infant weight, child height, and child mortality. Using repeated cross-sections from 69 developing countries from the Demographic and Health Surveys, I compile a large micro level data set of approximately 800,000 children. I combine the child level data with economic sanctions data and calculate the number of months each child was exposed to sanctions in utero. I use this new data set to estimate the effects of this exposure measure on infant weight z-scores, child height z-scores, and on the probability that the child will die before his third birthday. I find that infants exposed to economic sanctions in utero weigh less than the ones that were not. Children exposed to the first two years of sanctions are more likely to die before their third birthdays than the ones not exposed to the first two years of the sanction. Children who survive particularly deadly types of sanctions still suffer long run negative effects. These children are shorter than the children who were not exposed to sanctions. These results provide important guidelines for the formulation and implementation of future economic sanctions.

"Income Taxation and Self-Employment: The Impact of Progressivity in Countries with Tax Evasion"

Recently several developing and transitional countries changed their personal income tax from fairly progressive to flat in an effort to improve efficiency. This raises the question of how do taxes affect incentives when people tax evade and pay bribes. In this paper, I address this question by focusing on the effects of personal income tax progressivity on the decision to become self-employed. I develop a theoretical model of tax evading self-employed individuals who pay bribes to tax authorities. The model predicts that progressivity affects the decision to become self-employed even if people tax evade. I then test this prediction empirically using three strategies. First, I construct a dataset of income tax schedules for 76 countries over 12 years and I estimate the effects of progressivity on number of micro enterprises at aggregate level. Second, I use Russian longitudinal data and estimate the effects of progressivity on the individual decision to become self-employed. Third, I use Living Standards Measurement Surveys from 8 developing countries to estimate how much people are evading and what the effect of progressivity is on the amount that is not evaded. I find that increases in progressivity decrease the number of micro enterprises and decrease the probability of choosing self-employment. I also find that in countries with high tax

evasion and frequent bribes, self-employment is less responsive to taxes than in the US.

“Rethinking Economic Sanction Success: Sanctions as Deterrents”

Economic sanctions are one of the most common foreign policy tools. Despite their widespread use, there is little empirical evidence and much debate about how sanctions affect countries' behavior. In this study, I investigate whether sanctions affect future military behavior. I look at the effects of sanctioning a country involved in a militarized dispute on the probability that the sanctioned country or any other country involved in the dispute will be involved in a militarized dispute in the future. I also look at the effects of the sanction on the probability that countries similar to the ones in the sanctioned dispute will participate in another dispute in the future. I use the Correlates of War data on militarized interstate disputes and Hufbauer et al.'s data on economic sanctions. I find that countries involved in a dispute and countries similar to the ones involved in the dispute are less likely to participate in another dispute in the future if one of the countries involved in the original dispute was sanctioned.

“Financial Sector Quality and Tax Revenue: Panel Evidence”

In this study, I explore the relationship between the quality of the financial system and the amount of tax revenue the government can collect from its taxpayers. I argue that in countries with high quality financial sectors, more people use financial intermediaries for transactions, making hiding income more difficult. I test this view by using panel data from 71 countries and 14 years. I construct a financial indicator that encompasses measures of banking, stock market, institutions, monetary policy and insurance markets quality. I find that an increase in the quality of financial intermediaries increases total tax revenue, income tax revenue and international trade tax revenue as shares of GDP. I also find that the quality of the financial sector doesn't affect the revenue collected from sales, property or gift taxes.