

**KEYNOTE SPEAKER**  
**GENERAL CHARLES WALD, DEPUTY COMMANDER**  
**U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

MR. DE MUTH: [In progress.] --to have a four-star general of his distinction being with us all day has been a great honor for AEI, and I'm very grateful to him both for his advice and that of his staff in putting together this affair, and for being willing to stay here all day and to give this keynote address.

General Wald is an F-15 pilot, with an immensely distinguished career. He has over 3,200 flying hours and 450 combat hours over Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Iraq and Bosnia, and he has also been one of the most forward-thinking strategic officers in the United States Air Force. He is, as I think we all know, currently Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart.

Before assuming that position, among his important posts in the U.S. military, was Commander of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Force Base in Italy. He was Commander of the 9th Air Force and U.S. Central Command Air Forces at Shaw Air Force Base.

He is, as I mentioned, a veteran of many important military campaigns. He has also served as Director of Strategic Policy and Planning at U.S. Air Force Headquarters and was on the Joint Staff, as the Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy.

In his current position, he is, of course, particularly interested in and responsible for developments in Africa. There could be no better man to be with us today or to deliver this keynote address.

Would you please give a warm welcome to General Charles Wald.

[Applause.]

GENERAL WALD: Thank you, Chris and Tom. Thank you for doing a great job today and having us here and actually being somewhat objective. That's a good thing. It's too bad Danielle had to leave, but I appreciated her being here. I think General Fulford is still here. I appreciate that, too. But it's a good group, and I'll tell you I was impressed all day. I've been to a lot of these activities in my career in different jobs, and this is, without a doubt, the best group of presenters I have ever seen at any of these things. And it's kind of unfortunate because I think most everybody here probably agrees with the general strategic direction I think the United States, at least we see, we're going in Africa, and definitely most people here do.

But I think there's a lot of other people in the United States, and even in our government, for that matter, but internationally that would really benefit from hearing some of this. So part of our job is to proselytize. I couldn't do that when I was in the Middle East. It was against the Saudi rules, but we're doing it here.

So what I thought we'd do is, first of all, I'd like to tell my wife, this is the first time she's ever been to one of these events, that I'm glad she's here, and she's been taking copious notes. For those that don't know, in the military, you get two-for-one, so half her pay is mine.

[Laughter.]

GENERAL WALD: But she goes to Africa with us periodically, and the spouses in the United States military do a great job and have a great sacrifice for what we all do, and I appreciate that. As a matter of fact, I'll talk about it just a little bit here, one of the things the United States military does are things that you wouldn't traditionally think they do.

For example, in Africa, the European Command has opened up 30 AIDS clinics, 24 orphanages, and we provide, every time we do a trip down there, through donations and contributions, clothes to orphanages, et cetera, and the spouses travel to those organizations and spend time there as

kind of I guess a freebie from the standpoint of international relations and winning of hearts and minds. So I appreciate that.

Ambassador Lloyd Hand is here, as well as Dr. Jackie Davis, from EUCOM's Strategic Advisory Group. We're glad they're here and really particularly pleased with that.

So what I thought we'd do is spend a little time talking about how we see European Command's strategic way ahead for the Continent of Africa, particularly, but generally how we got to where we are in the European Command and why we're doing what we think we're doing is right and what we're doing. And by the way, all of the presentations we had today, as I said earlier, are tremendously supportive of what we think we're doing in EUCOM and how we're going ahead.

You've got to put things in a strategic context for us. You all know this, but I'll tell you how we've kind of gone through the rationalization for our strategic approach for Africa in EUCOM.

One is, after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I will tell you that there were a lot of people that thought they knew the strategic way ahead at the time. I will contend, as you look backwards, none of us knew what we were doing very well, and we didn't have a very good plan. It kind of evolved over time.

As a matter of fact, as was mentioned earlier, Africa was never really a big part of the strategic plan for European Command or the United States of America. It was always there, but it wasn't a strategic "there," and so we really didn't recognize it. We kind of moved along down the road.

As things changed in the Soviet Union, we focused on the new Warsaw Pact or the previous Warsaw Pact countries that were evolving into democracies and spent a lot of time on that.

As a matter of fact European Command, as well as NATO, and General Jones, who is the Commander of both of those organizations, spent a lot of time--NATO did--on nurturing the former Warsaw Pact countries to become more democratic through Partnership for Peace programs and things like that. That actually was a pretty good idea at the time. As a matter of fact, it was brilliant, but we didn't spend a lot of time looking South, and we didn't really think we needed to from a strategic standpoint. There were a lot of humanitarian issues going on, but the strategic value had not evolved yet. And, once again, NATO spent a lot of its time--the European Command, in this case, as the United States part of NATO--working on three new countries that came into NATO in 1999--Czech, Poland and Hungary--and then moving into actually expanding off toward the Soviet Union or the former Soviet Union, Russia.

And then on September 11th all of a sudden we all had the wake-up call. We know this, but it's worth probably looking back on what changed. And you know there's been a lot of discussion and debate in Washington, over the last few weeks, particularly, of what is 9/11 all about? What should we have known? When should we have known it? What does it really mean?

And to European Command, it meant that our life changed, as far as what was important in European Command. It changed as far as what our new strategic environment was. And, in fact, it was there, and we just didn't recognize it, to tell you the truth, in the European Command, and I think General Fulford, my predecessor, would admit the same thing. It's easy, in hindsight, to go back and say, "Why didn't we understand this better?" But the fact of the matter is it wasn't really clear yet, but it was evolving.

And, in fact, I spent--as was mentioned in the introduction--a couple of years working in the Middle East as the Central Air Forces' Commander, and spent 24 months in that job, traveled to the Middle East 24 times, and really spent a lot of time thinking about the Middle East. I will tell you I thought nothing about Africa at the time, and I thought nothing whatsoever about the Caucasus region.

At the time, I thought about the Middle East and all of the important issues there, whether it had been the Palestinian-Israeli issue or just the Middle East in general, the Iraqi issue, and that was our center of gravity. That was our world. That's what we thought about. And, in fact, it still is extremely important, but the fact of the matter is there's these peripheral wings that I'm going to talk about that were evolving that none of us really recognized at that time.

And one of the things that I found out in this job so far, besides the fact that I like it, and I've got a great boss in General Jones who lets me do my thing, is that there are a lot of people, as we start talking about Africa and our interests in Africa, in European Command that actually resent the fact that we're doing it.

In fact, I think there's actually an appreciation for most of it, but there's a little bit of resentment, to say, "Where have you been for the last 50 years? How come all of a sudden you're interested in Africa now?" And people kind of look at you like, you know, "Give me a break. You know, this is a little late to come here."

But, in fact, it has changed, and the importance has changed not just from the standpoint of it was always there because it really wasn't always there. And you heard Mr. Hale speak and some other folks a minute ago about the evolving economic importance of Africa, but there are other importances, as well strategically, that we'll talk about.

Once again, what's happening to European Command is an expansion of NATO. On the 2nd of April this year, we had another 7 countries come into NATO--26 countries--moving to the East. So the focus in Europe has really been kind of an East-West, you know, kind of a horizontal look. And during that period of time things have been happening in Africa that really haven't necessarily hit the hit parade from a strategic standpoint, but they are for us, and I'll tell you why in just a minute.

We have a big area in European Command. This is Russia here, obviously. It goes all the way to Greenland, down to the Southern tip of Africa. This is Central Command. This is actually, as you know, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, et cetera. The reason we put Central Command on there, there has been some discussion--and I think General Fulford answered the question very well earlier. I couldn't agree more--about why is Africa not a separate command, and by the way, why are these 10 countries here not part of European Command?

I am not going to belabor that. As a matter of fact, I thought General Fulford answered it brilliantly, but the fact of the matter is, I will also add here that, although on the map you see a line here, you see lines here, and those are euphemistically called "seams." The implication is that the United States military people can't work with each other, and they have a "rice bowl" issue in mind. And the fact is that General Abizaid, in Central Command, would not let us do anything here, and we wouldn't let him do anything over here.

I am here to report to you that is totally false. We work with Central Command on a daily basis, habitually, through video teleconferences, particularly in the Horn of Africa, through the JTF Horn of Africa, routinely about issues that are of common interest to both of us, particularly from a terrorism standpoint, in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and other areas. And these seams really aren't there. What they are is a manifestation of people that want to have problems or cause problems. They are people that really don't understand how the United States today is addressing the strategic issues. It's not a problem, I will tell you here today.

The other issue was should there be a separate command for Africa? The answer is no, no, no, no, no, no. And the reason is we can't set up a new headquarters. We already have a headquarters at European Command that does all of these countries here. That's fine. We can handle it. We're big boys.

But if we were to set up a separate command for Africa, we'd do just exactly what people don't want to have happen, and that's cause a seam right here, potentially, between commands. In fact, this is the way the world needs to be looking right now--is up and down instead of this way. Because of all of those people in Africa--because of demographics and other issue--are going to go right there into Europe.

Now, the fact of the matter is, if we had a separate command, it wouldn't do any good.

Number two is, in this day and age, we need less headquarters. We don't need to build a new one. It takes a lot of effort, at a headquarters level, to do this type of activity with 43 countries in Africa. So the fact of the matter is it doesn't make any sense. As a matter of fact, General Jones lets me do my thing down there on a daily basis. It's not a problem.

We break it up into regions because it's so big. The United States European Command is a misnomer. One of the things we're working on is trying to figure out what should the name of the command be because this is not Europe, I'll guarantee you. So the fact is we always say to ourselves shouldn't we be called Eastern Command or something like that? I don't know what the answer is, but it's definitely not just European Command. European Command is a big misnomer because we have Russia, as I said earlier, and then 43 countries in Africa. So we're looking at that.

But we do treat Russia somewhat separately. It's a huge country, very important, and you have to ask yourself, why is Russia even a part of this topic today. And the answer is all of the things happening down here cannot be done just by the United States. We need other countries to help us, multinational countries that have an interest in those areas, not only there, but in the Caucasus Region, as well as the Middle East.

Russia was a separate country up until 2 years ago. As a matter of fact, when General Fulford was the Deputy Commander, most of the time Russia reported to the Joint Staff, the United States JCS as a separate issue because of its importance as a bipolar issue with the United States.

Two years ago, they were placed into, under the Unified Command Plan, the UCP, European Command. That was kind of a catharsis for Russia. They didn't like this because they thought it was demeaning, the fact that they would be part of a geographical commander's area of responsibility.

I am here to report, over the last few months, Russia and the United States European Command have developed a relationship. We're actually moving forward now, and it's because they see the benefit of this on common interests around the world, particularly terrorism. It's a huge issue. To me, it will be one of the major strategic issues over the next 5 years for the United States, as our relationship with Russia and the evolution of that relationship, based on President Bush and President Putin's relationship, frankly, and the importance that will play in our efforts around the world on terrorism.

If you look at the Caucasus Region, there's only three countries: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Very important. Some of our petroleum friends have left for the day, but I will tell you that in the Caspian Sea, if you think the Gulf of Guinea is important--which I do, by the way. I'm going to talk about it--the Caspian Sea is important as well. And British Petroleum has a consortium of 20 different countries and agencies that are developing the oil in the Caspian Sea, \$20 billion over the next 5 years, which is the diversification issue that was talked about by Jim Burkhard, by the way--very important.

We think that's an important area. As a matter of fact, we have a lot of initiatives going on in the Caucasus Region that was actually started before I ever got to EUCOM. And I think

the initiatives--one is called the Caspian Guard, which is a security initiative over the Caspian Sea, that will include Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. It's funded by DITRA and is a counterproliferation issue by the United States of America. It's one of the most brilliant strategic issues that the United States has pulled off in the last 20 years, a brilliant program. We're well behind it.

We also are training the military in Georgia, under our Georgia Train and Equip Program. That has also paid big dividends during the "Rose Revolution" recently, when Shevardnadze was taken out of power, the soldiers that we trained--and General Fulford alluded to the training just a little bit ago--were actually a part of the fact that they would not rise up in support of Shevardnadze during that period and showed their support for democracy and civil leadership, a very important program.

Central and Eastern Europe. We just talked about some of the countries that just came into NATO, hugely important on the war on terrorism. As a matter of fact, out of the 33 countries in Iraq today, 27 of them come out of European Command. That's pretty important, I think.

And the fact of the matter is those are a lot of those countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact are actually in Iraq today supporting the Coalition effort there--countries like Bulgaria. As a matter of fact, Azerbaijan has offered up 400 more troops for Iraq recently, which we'll help them train to do that. Now, where do you think that would have ever happened 10, 12 years ago before the Berlin Wall fell? It never would have happened.

Western Europe and NATO. Good place. We consider those countries enablers. We don't think we need to do anything for Western Europe and NATO or Western Europe, particularly. NATO, yes, but not Western Europe, from the standpoint of training, and equipping or anything else. They are capable countries. They need to help us with the rest of the problems in the world. So we consider those important partner enabler countries, that they should help now instead of have us actually provide the security for their economies that we have for the last 50 years. It's time for them to step up and help the United States, as far as I'm concerned.

North Africa and the Middle East, hugely important. It was talked about earlier by a couple of the speakers this seam here. Now, if you look at North Africa, it's Arabic countries--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, particularly. It kind of fits into this area here. The problem is, in our area, it's in Africa. In the State Department, it goes this way, and then you've got sub-Saharan Africa. So there's a little bit of a seam there and, in fact, somewhat problematic.

But I will tell you that sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa have huge connecting tissue. Two weeks ago, in European Command, we had the first meeting ever between Chiefs of Defense from the North African states and the Sahel states, and they came to the European Command at Stuttgart, nine of them, from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisian, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger. And we spent time talking about this area here and this problem here from the standpoint of ungoverned areas and terrorism.

I'll talk about this later, but the Chief of Defense from Niger met the Chief of Defense from Chad, and that's the first time they'd ever talked to each other in their lives. They're next-door neighbors. As a matter of fact, they coordinated operations against a guy named al-Para, which you probably read about, and I'm going to talk about a little bit later, with us sitting there in the room together in this meeting, real time together, and actually helped each other on attacking this GSPC leader.

As a matter of fact, the CHoD from Mali was there and also went up into my office and actually called back to Mali to start up coordinating operations. But that's the type of thing we need

to do. Nontraditional, who'd ever think it before. We've got to do different things. We're in a new environment.

This is what some people have referred to as "Old Europe," but it's not meant to be pejorative. It's the original Europe, and it's very stable right now. If you look at the Marshall Plan and what happened after the 50 years of the World War II, the biggest economy in the world today, all of you know this because you're all knowledgeable about this, but the United States has 25 percent of the world's GNP today. The European Union has 23 percent. Europe, that's what happened after the Marshall Plan. The United States put in originally over a million people. Up until 1989, we had 315,000 troops in Europe mainly securing Europe so they could have a better, stable life, their economies could grow. That's happened.

NATO, General Jones' major thrust today for NATO is to transform NATO. "Transformation" is a buzz word that people sometimes overuse, but it's a fact. In NATO, after 2 April, they have 2.7 million, not counting the United States, 2.7 million men and women under arms--2.7 million. If you add the United States, it's over 4 million. The 2.7 million men and women in NATO, they can mobilize and move 3 percent of those folks--3 percent. The United States military, I would venture to say, could probably get up to about 85 percent, at least, mobilized.

Europe needs to change their military. They need to be more out of region. They need to be more mobile. General Jones is doing that via what's called the NATO Response Force--very important. They need to start moving out into these regions here, this ark of instability, that we, the United States, see as a strategic security issue for not only the United States, but Europe and the world.

I talked about Caspian Guard. If you look here, this is the Mediterranean, for example. As we talked about earlier, out of the North Arabian Gulf comes, what? A lot of oil, through the Straits of Hormuz, a very dangerous line of communication, a lock here, down through the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal, through the Mediterranean and out through the Strait of Gibraltar. Right there is seven miles across, very difficult, very difficult security issue for those oil ships that are coming out through the North Arabian Gulf.

During the latest Gulf War, most of the ships actually passed through Europe--that had both arms and soldiers on it for Iraq--and through the Suez Canal. We've had 350 ships go through the Suez Canal in support of the war in Iraq. That cost us \$80 million to go through there. That's what it cost the United States of America just to go through the Suez Canal, not counting, if they had closed that Suez Canal by shipping one ship, it would have stopped the whole thing, and we would have had to go South. It would have cost a couple of weeks, a lot of money, and it wouldn't have made it.

This is a very huge important area right here that this NATO Maritime Intercept Ops that I've talked about here is a NATO mission that's securing what I consider the most important line of communication in the world.

Now, if you look down here in the Gulf of Guinea that was talked about by Mr. Kirkland, and Mr. Burkhard and others, that in the next 10 years, we'll get 30 percent of our oil from that area. For example--now, this is not the only issue in Africa, but it's a huge issue. As a matter of fact, we get more oil from Western Africa today than we do the Middle East. It's a huge, important area.

As a matter of fact, the Caspian Sea, another issue that Mr. Burkhard talked about was the diversification of hydrocarbons, and Mr. Burkhard talked about the fact that the United States is going to become very dependent upon natural gas from the Western part of Africa.

Three weeks ago, the Russians turned off the natural gas to Belarus. I don't know if many of you read this, but it's pretty important. Today, Europe gets 90 percent of its natural gas from

Russia. Russia is the largest exporter of oil in the world. When they turned that natural gas off to Belarus because Lukashenko and the Belarussian Russians weren't paying for their gas properly--they were tapping off--that shut off the gas to Europe, by the way, for a day. And everybody in Europe had a stiff upper lip. They wanted to make sure, that's no big deal. Let me tell you what. If that gas had stayed off for any length of time, it would have been hugely important. As a matter of fact, when they turned it back on, it would have blown half the pipes out. But they did turn it back on. What it really showed you was the geostrategic importance of the Russian gas coming into Europe and the dependency they have on Russia, for example, on natural gas. That issue, when you talk about the Caspian Sea, they're going to have a pipeline come out of there that's going to go direct through Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and through Turkey in the next year. Actually, the hydrocarbon, the actual oil pipeline will open up next spring in June, and then a year later, they'll open up a gas pipeline. That gas will go down in into, directly into Europe.

As you know, gas going through pipes is not fungible. It's going to go wherever it ends up, unlike oil tankers with fuel that could be sold and paid for a thousand times before it ever gets to the final destination. Natural gas has to go where it's going to go and be paid for. That becomes a strategic issue for Europe, by the way. That's a strategic issue for us as well. The European Union economy helps drive the United States economy.

In Germany, in Stuttgart, where we are, we're in a state called Baden-Wurtemberg. There are 16 states in Germany. Baden-Wurtemberg is where Stuttgart, Germany, is. Baden-Wurtemberg has 250,000 Germans working in the United States today. It's a \$38-billion economic impact on the United States. And the reason I say that is we're connected. We're connected with Europe economically. We all have the same interests. Whether we like it or not, we're interconnected. The United States has 50,000 people working in Germany, Baden-Wurtemberg, the state I'm in. It's an \$8-billion impact economically on the state we're in. These things are all connected.

We think NATO and Europe needs to get out here and start protecting some of its interests. There's a political issue with Russia, valid. They're concerned about the buffer zone along their border.

We feel, and we've worked with the Russians on this over the last few weeks, and we'll continue to, that we have a common interest in that area, and the common interest is security in the Caspian area in the Caucasus area.

The Middle East, as you all know, in the Istanbul Summit, the United States, with the rest of the NATO countries, are going to talk about Middle East security, the Mediterranean Dialogue, better known as the Barcelona Initiative in the European Union, and the Greater Middle East Initiative that's been proposed by the President of the United States. That's important.

And the reason I talk about this is those two areas are still on our scope. But what hasn't been probably publicly talked a lot about is the instability, and the resourcing, and all of the other issues in Africa that we'll talk about in just a second. In the European Command, we consider this the belt of instability that we have to look at, and it's all connected.

Africa is big. I think General Fulford said, you know, a lot of people in America look at Africa, and they say, "Boy, that's a big country," and, in fact, it's a big continent. And 53 countries later, of which we have 43 of them, if you talk about from our headquarters in Stuttgart to the tip of Africa, Capetown, it's 5,800 miles, the same distance to Los Angeles from Stuttgart. That's big.

This area here, this halfway line, this is a strategic airlift, unrefueled distance from Stuttgart to here or, a matter of fact, it's the same distance from here, this is from New York to Stuttgart, right here, that distance, huge areas. You can see the United States on here. This border

here, Niger, Chad or Niger, Mali and Algeria up to Morocco is the same distance as from Tampa, Florida, to Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

Those are huge areas there, and they're ungoverned. If you have never flown over here before, which I have a lot, it looks like Saudi Arabia. There's nothing there but sand and basically hardly anything to define the territory. It's open spaces. As a matter of fact, this whole area here we'll talk about a little bit later is definitely a belt of ungoverned space. It's going to take a lot of effort, and we'll talk about some of the things we're doing to control that space. But big, big long distances, huge areas, huge expanses.

Some of the challenges we see in the European Command, and you could go on forever on this. One is migration. It was talked about earlier, the demographics in Europe, for example. Europe is losing population. You know, I think it's pretty interesting. If you look at immigration, which is an important aspect of security for the future, the United States today has more immigration than all of the other countries of the world put together. Now, that's pretty interesting. The United States of America has more immigrants today than all of the other immigrants of all of the other countries going to all of the countries in the world put together, and that's important, demographically.

Demographics are what runs economies. Europe's demographics are going south. Their growth rate is going down. As a matter of fact, in Russia, because of various reasons, over the next 20 to 30 years, if nothing is done, the population of Russia will go from 145 million to 75 million people. Think about it. It's going to be half unless something is changed. Some of it has to do with health issues. A lot of it has to do with just basically birth rate.

In Europe, as we talked about, their demographics are going to go South. Right now the European Union has 23 percent of the economy of the world. Unless they do something about demographics, they are not going to maintain that stature. They've got to have people in the work force. And where is it going to come from? A lot of it's going to come from here. That's a good thing.

The problem in Europe is they've got a thing in the European Union called the Schengen Rule. And the Schengen Rule says that if you're in the European Union, you don't have a border. If you're a part of the European Union, you can travel back and forth between countries without a passport, without a visa, it doesn't matter, and you can get jobs wherever you want. It's the ultimate NAFTA, really.

The problem with that is, once you get in Europe, there aren't borders in the 10 countries. You can travel freely. And right now my contention is Europe is basically a safe haven logistics area for a lot of terrorists. They like it there. They can live there. They can grow there. They can recruit there. They can go to the mosque there. They can have logistics, you name it. And that's going to be more and more of an issue.

So the question is, is that 800 million people in Africa today or 1.3 billion 20 years from now, is that going to be a curse or is that going to be a benefit for Europe? And I think it probably could be a benefit, but it's got to be handled right. But it's a huge issue here. And not only that, a lot of the oil or gas, actually, the other 10 percent of the natural gas in Europe comes from Algeria and other places under pipeline, so this is a huge security issue for not just the United States, but particularly Europe.

And we're trying to work with our European partners to go ahead and do a multinational approach to Africa from the standpoint of where are we putting our effort, where are we putting our resources.

On May 22nd, we're going to have what's called a Caucasus--actually, it's the 12th of May--a Caucasus African Clearinghouse meeting in Luxembourg. The Luxembourgers are going to

actually host it, and we're going to bring all comers from Europe and other places that are interested in going ahead and pooling resources in Africa to make sure that we actually have a synergy and focus of effort.

There's a lot of things going on in Africa, and one of the major issues we've talked about today, particularly, is we're resource limited. We don't think Africa right now, from a military perspective and a crisis standpoint, competes with Iraq. It shouldn't. Iraq is a huge issue for the United States. We're going to win in Iraq because it's the most important thing we're doing militarily. We will win in Iraq.

On the other hand, there are other issues going on as well. And we, as a global GCC or a Geographic Combatant Command headquarters, are doing our part to make sure that the future is in a preventive maintenance standpoint. And I'll talk about what we think we're going to do to prevent problems in the future in Africa.

Our theme in the United States European Command is help Africans help themselves. That's what we want to do. As a matter of fact, in Liberia last year, the ECOWAS countries, the Economic Community of West-African States, that was alluded to a little bit earlier, 15 countries, that is the model, as far as I'm concerned, for the way Africa ought to go in the future. Fifteen countries actually went into Liberia and did a fantastic job of taking care of problems that Africans took care of themselves.

In 1996, when they had a problem when Charles Taylor first took over in Liberia, the Nigerians went into Liberia as part of a peacekeeping force, and weren't paid. And a lot of people in here know what happened. The Nigerians didn't perform very well. They looted, they pillaged, they plundered, and they caused a giant problem which basically they're paying for today from the standpoint of sanctions.

This time, in Liberia, the ECOWAS countries went in, led by two battalions from Nigeria, led by a Nigerian general that was trained via what used to be called ACRI, now today, ACOTA, as you've heard about earlier--the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program--and went in and did a fantastic job. They took care of themselves.

And led by people from, like Seth Obeng from Ghana, who is a three-star general and one of the best leaders I've ever met in my life, actually did a great job taking care of a problem in a regional area that Africa can do for itself. There's a lot of benefits to that.

Number one, we didn't have to go in there. Although we had a Marine amphib ship, the Iwo Jima, off the coast of Liberia during that point, with 2,600 Marines on there assuring the security of the ECOWAS team, they actually went in there themselves, the ECOWAS folks, and did this job. To me, that's what we need to do in the future.

As you know, Secretary Rumsfeld has a program for global peacekeeping initiative, where we're going to train other countries to help take care of themselves. And, to me, the ECOWAS example is a classic of how we could do it in the future, where we could start taking countries that actually want to do things for themselves because it's just the way countries are. There's a lot of pride. The fact is they want to take care of their own problems. They just need to be trained properly, and that's one of the things we'll do.

If you look at this area, uncontrolled spaces, basically, whether you like it or not, Afghanistan is a huge success. I mean, Afghanistan, for 30 years prior to October 7th, 2001, when we started attacking Afghanistan, was a total basket-case country. As a matter of fact, there probably wasn't any worse country in the world from the standpoint of taking care of their people or governance than Afghanistan.

Today, Afghanistan has a shot at becoming a democracy. You can say what you want to, all of the critics out there, I'll tell you this, the United States has done a hell of a job in Afghanistan, is doing a great job of actually bringing a country back from what was just a terrible situation to what, in the future, will probably potentially be a democracy. That's a good thing.

The real good thing about that is al Qaeda doesn't have a place to live in Afghanistan any more. They have to go other places. There's still a few terrorists running around there, and they'll get them, but the fact of the matter is we think that al Qaeda trains somewhere between 30- and 50,000 terrorists in Afghanistan during the time they were there. That's not hyperbole or overexaggeration, 30- to 50,000. They're all over the place, and the fact is they don't have a place like that they can train with impunity.

When we started bombing Afghanistan on October 7th of 2001, there were three major--at least three major--terrorist training camps that were huge in the middle of Afghanistan that could have been Fort Bragg. It could have been someplace like that in the United States. It wasn't quite that sophisticated, but it was huge. And that country now is a place where that isn't occurring. It's not a safe haven. The problem is they've got to go someplace else.

Iraq had a little bit of a problem with that, but necessarily not so big, but they're starting to go through the Caucasus or down through the Horn of Africa. We've talked about the JTF Horn of Africa and the fact that European Command is coordinating with CENTCOM on that problem, and we know these areas are a place for them to want to travel, and where do they want to go? Right into Europe.

Now, the Europeans have a problem, and they're recognizing it. The European Union the other day appointed an antiterrorism czar, a guy named de Vries from the Netherlands, that now is going to start focusing the corporate and the cumulative efforts of Europe on terrorism. It's an issue. They're in Europe, I will guarantee you, and they're coming through this area.

The other part is all of this semi-permanent conflict that goes on. Actually, if you look at Africa, it's a near, mid and long-term issue, and there's a multifaceted approach to the problems there. It isn't one thing or the other. I guarantee you it's not just the military. Africa's problems are not going to be solved by the United States military. They can't be.

Africa's problems are going to be solved by a unique different, creative, visionary approach to a continent that needs a lot of help. And if you talk about it, it goes all the way from humanitarian assistance, and we'll talk about HIV/AIDS in just a little bit, from a strategic standpoint, to multinational corporation assistance, to multinational government assistance, to military assistance, to all of those things that are going to have to all be coordinated for this problem to be resolved. And if it doesn't happen, I will guarantee you that we're going to be looking back at this place 10 years from now and saying how in the heck did we get here? It's going to be a problem.

So, anyway, you look at all of these issues here. We're worried about all of them. That 800 million people, curse or benefit? We think it should be a benefit. If we don't do something about it, it's going to be a problem.

The irony of all ironies is that Moammar Qadhafi, at the African Union meeting in Tripoli, about a month ago or so, recommended a 1-million-person standing army in Africa. Now, I think that's a crazy idea, don't get me wrong. A 1-million-person standing army in Africa probably isn't the answer. But what it did do is it forced the African Union and African countries to say we have got to have a more regional approach. This is ECOWAS right here, the Economic Community of West-African States. It started out as an economic community, political, and built into a military community. It's a great thing.

The United States military, the European Command in this case, before ECOWAS deployed into Liberia sent six special operations teams into some of these countries--nine of them to be exact--and actually did an assessment of those countries' abilities to send troops into Liberia. The assessment included equipment, training, and, oh, by the way, whether they had had the ACOTA training or not, and the fact is they had to have it to go into Liberia, and they did, and they went in and did a great job.

Now, there is a center in Accra, Ghana, called the Kofi Annan Center, and there's a building there built by the Germans, opened by Chancellor Schroeder, in January, with the CEO from DaimlerChrysler was with him, a man named Schrempp, which I think is an interesting approach.

Now, first of all, the Germans, I think, and I'll tell them publicly, could do a lot more with us in Africa, for example. But they are, in fact, protecting our bases in Europe today, as we speak, with 2,000 German soldier, as our folks are in Iraq. That's a good thing.

But the fact of the matter is this, ECOWAS program in Ghana is a brilliant, I think, example of what we ought to do in the future, and they've got an operational-level school in Accra, Ghana, called the Kofi Annan Center, where they take African leadership from the ECOWAS countries primarily and train them at the operational level on the art of war in Accra, Ghana. They also have a tactical-level in school in Bamako, Mali, and they have a strategic-level school in Abuja, Nigeria. That is a good thing, and we want to emulate that and encourage more of that in Africa. Now, the African Union has said they're going to have five regional areas of security cooperation, based primarily on existing organizations in Africa, and those five different security organizations will have a 3,000-person-standing brigade, that's ready to go to respond to regional problems anywhere in that particular security region. That's a great thing. We need to help encourage that. We need to help train with that.

As a matter of fact, we talked about CMAC with Gabon, for example, President Bongo, and they're willing to take the lead for the Central African Countries, called CMAC, in setting up this security organization. We're going to help them with intellectual capital. Intellectual capital costs nothing. Now, somebody was here earlier, I think it was one of the lawyers, Tom, is actually a--not, Tom, I'm sorry. Where is he? There he is, right there, Tony. He's an intellectual capital lawyer. I read that today. You know what? That's important. It really is. And we're not just talking about stealing CVs here. We're talking about minds.

And you know what Africa needs more than anything is intellectual capital and help and help from people like us that know how to do this. It's not that they're bad people or dumb people. You know, the United States military got this way through ten decades, hundreds of years of actual training, particularly since the Vietnam War. We worked our tail off to get the best military in the world. It didn't come easy. And I'll tell you one thing, a lot of people with smart brains kind of figured out how we finally got here, and we need to share that with Africans.

Now, they're never going to be like the United States military, and they shouldn't be. Somebody mentioned earlier they don't need all of the high-tech capacity, and I agree with that. But they certainly can learn from our ethos from the standpoint of how we do operations. And I can tell you right now, at the low end of the spectrum, the United States military is as good as they come fighting those kind of wars. We're going to help Africans with that.

Because you have to have some kind of a context to put things in, and so far we're doing pretty good. Now, some may say, Is this naive or what? And the answer is, no, it's not. In South Africa, as somebody mentioned earlier--I think General Fulford, actually, the South Africans did not want to participate militarily with the United States for various reasons--a lot of history there. President Bush made a visit to Africa last year, visited with President Mbeki, and after that all of a

sudden the relationship started to become better. It thawed. We've been to South Africa three times. They've been to my headquarters once in the last 6 months. We've made an agreement. We're going to start working together. We've done special operations training together. We're helping them train themselves.

Now, personally, South Africa made a big mistake about 1996 in what they invested in. They're investing in high-tech fighters. They're investing in submarines and some coastal frigate ships. The frigates are good. They need coastal defense. South Africa does not need fighters and doesn't need submarines. Unfortunately, that's where they are.

What they do need is medium airlift and basically an ability to go out and do peacekeeping in the Southern Region of Africa. Now, the interesting part is a couple of weeks ago, at an institution that I can't say publicly because I know it's swearing in public over here--

[Laughter.]

GENERAL WALD: But they had another conference. And I was there, and the Angolans were there. The Angolan Finance Minister was there on the panel. The Angolan Ambassador to the United Nations was there, and the Angolan Ambassador to the United States was there, amongst a whole bunch of other people.

And afterwards I told them, you know, I'd been to Luanda, Angola, not too long ago. And Luanda, I'd never been there. I was very interested. As a matter of fact, ironically, I did my master's thesis for my master's degree in 1982 on the conflict between Angola and South Africa. I thought I was brilliant. I wasn't. It turned out all different than I thought.

[Laughter.]

GENERAL WALD: But I did learn a lot about the importance of the area there from a resource standpoint. And one of the things I was always interested in was Angola, you know, the Cuban connection, the Russian connection. So we landed in Angola to get some gas.

Now, I will tell you that I was in Lagos, Nigeria--Marilyn was with me--the day before. We had to divert in there. We were going to Abidjan. We couldn't get in for weather. If you haven't been to Lagos before, it's unbelievably breathtaking. Seventeen million people in destitute poverty. It's unbelievable. Can't believe it.

Nigeria, 130 million people, has the second or third, depending on how you want to look at it, gross national product in Africa, right after probably South Africa and Algeria. It's got wealth. It's got a terrible governance. The wealth distribution in Nigeria, 5 percent of the people have 95 percent of the wealth. They have a military that's pretty good size. Now, I'll tell you, on the ground side, they did a good job in Liberia.

But I told you earlier in one of the questions, I saw their Air Force. They have one C-130 that works. When we took them into Liberia, frankly, the United States of America had to pay for the airlift. We did. Through the State Department, bless their hearts, brilliant move on State's part. The United States paid for the airlift of ECOWAS to go to Liberia. Now, there is no reason for that to be that way. There is no reason. So they had one C-130, out of nine of them, that worked. The next day we went out, after we stayed overnight, to leave, and they said they were going to fly the 130. It broke. So they don't have any.

Then, I landed at Luanda, Angola, and we could not taxi on the ramp. There were so many airplanes there. They had 8 IL-76s, 12A and 12 Cox, 8 Hip-8 helicopters, and 7 HI 24 Hind helicopters. That was the military part that was just on that one base. There must have been 30 U.N. aircraft flying there. It looked like Chicago O'Hare field.

And you've got to ask yourself, okay, let's get with the world here. South Africa, Africa, in general, has similar problems. So I asked the Angolan Ambassadors, both of them, and the Finance Minister: What do you think of South Africa kind of joining up with you; you do the airlift, they provide the troops?

That's a good idea. We like it. I asked the South Africans. They said, yeah, we like it too.

You know what? I'll bet you there's not one person in this room, if you said, what about South Africa and Angola joining up together, you would vote they would do it. You know why? Because we think we know everything. You go ask the "goddang" people that are doing it, and they say, "I'll do it. I'll do it." And you know what that's a manifestation of? Old think. The world has changed, and we've got to change with it. All of us in here need to start thinking in those terms. Great stuff, great opportunity. The South Africans want to help in Africa.

I'll tell you another thing. I was sitting with one of the individuals, one of the colleagues over here earlier today talk about Rwanda. I met Kagame three days before his last election in Rwanda, and I know General Fulford met him as well.

We had dinner with the Chief of Defense from Rwanda the night after I saw President Kagame, and we were talking about Liberia. It was right in the middle of when Liberia was starting to bubble up, and the Chief of Defense for Rwanda, named Kabarebe, was telling me about the Rwanda military. Now, Rwanda has got a history. They've got some problems in East Congo. We know about that.

But the fact of the matter is he said, "Hey, Chuck--General Wald--you know what? We'll offer some troops for Liberia." We were out looking for them. You know, we had a tin-cup thing going on looking for troops. He offered a thousand. Kabarebe offered a thousand troops on the spot to go to Liberia.

And I said, "What do you need from us for help? Do you need anything?"

He said, "We don't need anything." We marched 120 clicks into the Congo and fought without resting. We'll get over there.

I said, "But do you need some weapons?"

"We don't need anything. We'll do it for free." What he did say, though, is, "We want one thing. We want the South Africans to go with us because we want the top cover. We believe in the South Africans."

Now, that tells you something. You know what? Our paradigm is not their paradigm. What America thinks is not what South Africa thinks or Africa. They've got it different than we do. And I think most of us in here kind of have predetermined notions about Africa, et cetera. They've got it. We don't. It's time for us to start listening.

This is what we think could happen in Africa. This would be the five brigades, where they would be potentially, and we think that's probably where they're going to go. Now, once again, it's up to Africa if they want to do this. I think it's a brilliant idea. I think it's the way ahead in Africa. I think it's the only thing we can do.

We can't afford to send troops to Africa, the United States can't, any more than we had before. It's too big. We've got too many things going on in the world. And, by the way, NATO and the rest of the world needs to help with this problem because it's all connected, and these resources that we've been talking about today are all going to benefit everybody sitting in here, some day, some time. So it's in our best interests to go ahead and promote this type of activity.

We're not here to talk about Europe, but I want to give you an example of some things we're doing in Europe at our European Command, a little bit I guess unique, out of the box. Now, once again, most of what we're doing in Africa today does not cost a lot of resource. It doesn't cost a lot of troops, it isn't very expensive, it doesn't take a lot of deployment time. It's mostly intellectual capital, and advocacy, and proponentcy as far as participation and cooperation.

This program, started by General George Joulwan, when he was the SAC European Command, in 1993, called the State Partnership Program. It is one of the smartest things I've ever seen. And the idea is to match up states in the United States with countries in Europe, with the Air National Guard and Reserve forces. For those Air National Guard and Reserve--or not Air National--the National Guard, excuse me. I almost defaulted to my Air Force thing there.

The Guard, the National Guard and Reserve forces in those states actually traveled to those countries and developed relationships with them from the standpoint of interoperability, common standard practices, et cetera. In fact, if you look at these, some of them are kind of interesting. Like Poland, for example, is with Illinois. As you know, a large Polish population in Chicago, for example. Georgia is with Georgia. Fancy that.

[Laughter.]

GENERAL WALD: But the fact of the matter is these countries get out there, and eventually the governors and other people come. As a matter of fact, the economies started growing together. And there's some fantastic relationships that have spawned.

We're starting to do that, there are actually 21 different countries involved in Africa now, 37 worldwide. It was started in Europe. It is becoming a worldwide program. I was in South Africa last year when New York showed up, a two-star general from New York, and actually signed a relationship with South Africa. Now, New York is a state partner with South Africa.

The good news for us is the Guard, in this case, the Air Guard from New York, has C-5 aircraft. It's the only Guard unit in the United States, the only state that has actual strategic lift. All of the rest of the actual strategic lift is in the active duty. They also have tankers in New York. They have fighters. They have ground guys. They've got the whole thing. As a matter of fact, New York has a full military.

Our point is they're going to go down to South Africa and start a relationship with them, and they're going to help South Africa train to be better at what they're doing. It's a great think. I'll bet you Governor Pataki is down there in the not-too-distant future, and he'll meet with Mbeki, and you know what will happen? They'll start doing an economic relationship.

It's a brilliant idea. It's a great way to do things. The Guard and Reserve have to train. Now, granted, they're busy right now with Iraq. But generally speaking, when we aren't as tied down as we are in Iraq with the Guard and Reserve, they have to do training days. They have to practice. Why not practice doing something useful like this, like training people in Africa, for example? So we'll see how that works out.

As a matter of fact, the other country we already have is Morocco is a partner with Utah. And during the latest earthquake in Morocco, the Utah Guard filled up an aircraft with humanitarian medical supplies and flew them into Morocco, into Rabat. The Moroccans thought, well, this is really unbelievably nice. That made an impression. It was a good thing.

So now we're trying to get Ghana, Tunisia and Senegal state partners, and that'll happen. And they're very interested. And by the way, this is at the behest of the Ambassadors in those countries. They love the idea. It's working like a Champ. And what this is, is a unique way to go

ahead and influence a continent where we don't have to spend a lot of resources, and we can make a huge difference.

Al-Para. This guy here, al-Para, named "a parachutist," is a former Algerian parachute SOF, Special Operations Forces, guy. And earlier today the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, the GSPC, was talked about in an earlier discussion.

The GSPC is actually Algerian based. It was a former splinter group off the GIA and has been in Algeria trying to overthrow the secular government in Algeria for the last 10 years and have killed, so far, or are responsible for the deaths of over 120,000 Algerians. That's not hyperbole. You can print it in the paper. You can check wherever you want. The fact of the matter is 120,000 Algerians have been killed because of this terrorist group. Now, some people would say it's an internal insurgency. You name it what you want to do. I call them terrorists. As a matter of fact, the Algerians have done a fantastic job of getting rid of most of them.

But last February, al-Para and his group of merry men kidnapped 32 Europeans in Southern Algeria. They were out there doing what's called extreme tourism or adventure tourism, riding around on motorcycles out in the wild territories of Algeria, which is a wonderful thing. It's a huge tourism issue in Algeria.

Unfortunately, this guy is smart enough to know that. And he needed money, and he needed financing and support. So he kidnapped 32 of them, and then a few months later, they basically they were ransomed off for 5 million euro. And, actually, all of them turned back in, out of the 32, as a matter of fact, 31 made it back. One died in captivity, unfortunately, a European female, 42 years old.

But this guy then had 5 million euros to roam around in this area here, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad and recruit and buy arms. That was his purpose. Now, 5 million euro in Africa is like 50 million at least, maybe more than that, maybe 100 million in Europe, I'll guarantee you. That's a huge amount of money in Africa.

So this guy had a lot of money. As a matter of fact, we know that he gave out a lot of it to his lieutenants, and they've been out recruiting. He recruited over the last year about 200 jihadists, at least, and he's been roaming around this area for about a year.

As a matter of fact, went from here, down through this area. And here, as many of you have heard of, the Paris to Dakar Road Rally went on last year. As a matter of fact, he was in the vicinity there, and actually they had to stop the road rally for 2 days of the leg and actually fly the cars past this guy to the other part of the road rally because of the threat.

He's actually robbed two other groups since that time--one German, one French, one in Niger--and he's out recruiting and picking up arms and trying to get surface-to-air missiles, et cetera.

So we've been tracking him. We've actually helped the Algerians, the Mauritians, the Malians, the Chad, the Niger Ljaw in Chad, militaries go after this guy--nontraditional.

Somebody talked about intel earlier. There's been a lot of criticism about the United States not having enough intel in Africa. Well, I'll tell you right now we don't have enough, but I'll tell you we're doing a lot about it. I told you what we had with those Chiefs of Defense in this area not-too-long-ago meeting, and we've discussed with them how we can share intelligence. Our intelligence is basically from the information standpoint, and we're helping those governments actually try to find these guys.

Al-Para then slipped into Niger. The Niger military went after al-Para. This area here, from here to here, is about 1,400 kilometers, which is about a thousand miles almost. I mean, you can do math probably as good as I do, but it's a little less, it's about 900. The Niger military chased al-

Para and his folks all the way across Niger, a thousand miles. They killed a couple of them on the way, and eventually al-Para got into Chad.

Now, the reason I'm telling you this, this is a real terrorist threat. And part of his group that eventually got attacked by the Chadian military a couple weeks ago, and actually 43 of them were killed, 18 captured, some got away, were made up of Nigerians, Niger Ljaw, Chadians, Malians and some Algerians. And by the way, this GSPC group, Libya is terrified of. They hate them. This is a bad group of people.

I read yesterday a transcript of an interview with the new leader of the GSPC, a guy named Abraham Moustafa, and they've declared allegiance to al Qaeda. He wants to be part of al Qaeda. He believes in the jihad. Now, whether al Qaeda has agreed for them to join up, I don't know. But the fact of the matter is they have the same intentions as al Qaeda. They have the same manifesto. They have the same purpose. Their main purpose is to overthrow the government of Algeria, but number two is to go after any Westerner, the United States included.

Now, are they al Qaeda? No. But are they a problem? Yes. Do we have to do something about it? Well, I'll tell you one thing, I think the United States learned a lesson in Afghanistan. You don't let things go. You can't let it happen. So we're working with these countries to go ahead and try to have some capability for their militaries to do a better job of solving the problem of ungoverned spaces in that area. They're very dangerous.

This has been beaten to death, but we believe it in strongly. If you look at the Gulf of Guinea, for example, and the oil revenues, and the hydrocarbons that are going to come out of there over the next 10, 12 years, it's going to be more than we get out of the Middle East. Now, that's fine. I don't need to belabor what Mr. Kirkland or Mr. Burkhard or anybody else talked about earlier.

But the nice thing about, first of all, there's a lot of good things about it. It's good for this area. It's good for the continent. It's good for the countries that are going to get the oil. Hopefully, they'll have good governance and make sure the oil is distributed properly and the wealth is distributed properly in their governments--that would be a good thing--in their populations.

But if you look at this right here, and they talked about deep-water drilling, Mr. Kirkland did, deep-water drilling is a new technology that's allowed now the ability for oil companies to dig right now through the seabed and pump the oil right straight into a ship that's sitting off the coast. You don't have to put it into a refinery. You don't have to put it into a pumping station. You pump it right to the ship.

And what else do you do here? You go like this "pffft." There's no Straits of Hormuz, there's no Red Sea, there's no Suez Canal, there's no Tunisia, Sicily, there's no Straits of Gibraltar. There's just this. You go that way. That's a good thing because it's easier and more secure.

Number two is this crude oil that's coming out of here is called sweet crude. It costs one-half the amount of money to refine that oil that it does out of the Middle East. This is a hugely important issue for the United States and the rest of Europe. This is going to take security. We're going to try to help with that from the standpoint of advice. They're going to have enough money in those areas to provide their own security. That's why CMAC and these regional groups are going to be very important for Africa itself, and Europe and the United States.

And so what we're going to do is recommend to them--intellectual capital is free--how to set up a better security capability for themselves in the Gulf of Guinea. It's important to the United States and Europe. By the way, this isn't just the United States. This is hugely important for Europe. And all of these mineral reserves, by the way, that we talked about earlier are all important to not just the United States, but the rest of the world. So there's a security issue there as well.

HIV/AIDS. Who would have thought a military person was going to talk about this? But I'll tell you, first of all, we all know it's a humanitarian issue. Don't get me wrong, it is. But it's a strategic issue to European Command, particularly, from the standpoint of what's it going to do to those militaries, first of all; number two, what's it going to do to demographics; and three is, when you have a major crisis on your hand internationally, whether we like it or not, we're going to have to respond in some way.

If you look at the numbers, they are kind of daunting. Thirteen percent of the world population lives in Africa, 800 million people. They've got 70 percent of the AIDS. Somebody in here mentioned Botswana as a great example of a good democracy that's emerged based on good leadership. I couldn't agree more.

You know what the bad news for Botswana is? Their life expectancy is going to go from 70 years old today, in the next 10 to 12 years, to 33 years old. Sixty percent of the people in Botswana have AIDS, estimated. You can say what you want to about it. Botswana has a great democracy, which I agree is a good example. It's a great example. Their great economy is going to be devastated by this problem.

Now, here is an anchor country in Africa that we think would be a great example for Southern Africa to show stability, and they're not going to have the wherewithal to do that because their population is going to be devastated by AIDS.

The South African military has 75,000 men, mostly, and some women in it, and they can deploy 3,000 people at one time because they publicly admit 20- to 25-percent incidence of AIDS in their military and probably, privately, probably have up to 30 percent in their military.

In the U.N. missions, by the way, if you are HIV-positive, you cannot deploy on a mission, which is a good thing because they spread it like crazy.

By the way, if you think it's only an Africa problem, it's not. The Ukraine, Russia and Belarus have a huge HIV/AIDS problem. The military in Russia is a conscript military, the old draft issue. When they bring a new person into the military in Russia, they do a test on them for HIV/AIDS. Somewhere between 30 and 50 percent of all of the conscripts tested have HIV/AIDS in Russia--HIV at least--30 to 50. That's a strategic issue. Because you know what we were talking about earlier, we're trying to get them to help themselves build militaries to take care of local problems. They aren't going to have the manpower.

The estimate is from the economists that in the next 20 to 30 years, in Africa, there will be 20 million HIV/AIDS orphans. Now, the bad news is all of those orphans are going to have HIV/AIDS. The real bad news is it's like Zimbabwe multiplied by about 50. Zimbabwe was a great agro economy, and all of a sudden Zimbabwe's economy just went South because basically there's nobody out there farming--a different reason than HIV/AIDS, but the same output, and the output is no economy. The same thing is going to happen in Africa.

Now, we talked about demographics moving North, we talked about international crises. We're going to have them on our hands. The good news is a lot of people are doing a lot of good things about it. As you know, President Bush has pledged \$15 billion for HIV eradication around the world in the next 5 years. There are 15 countries that are going to benefit from that. Thirteen of them are in Africa.

Bill Gates has offered \$1 billion for both malaria and HIV/AIDS eradication in Africa. It's a good thing. And the United States military in Europe, by the way, is putting in--actually, it's the Department of Defense, but we're helping manage it--\$28 million into different militaries this year in Africa.

We have a program with the South African military. Our Surgeon General at European Command, with the South African Military Surgeon General, to do a comprehensive program on AIDS eradication, prevention and identification. That's a good thing, and it sounds like something that a military wouldn't traditionally do, but we have to do it because of these issues I've just told you about. It's going to be a huge strategic issue that we can't not face, and it's got to be an international approach.

I just told you what the United States is doing. The rest of the world puts about \$6 billion a year into HIV/AIDS eradication. This is a huge issue that we all have to think about strategically and do something about.

This is one of my favorites. This is what you call, to me, "penny wise, pound foolish." Now, I'm not criticizing anybody. This is just the United States, but you could put the whole world in this category. We put about \$50 million or so a year into programs like the education and training of militaries.

By the way, Secretary Powell said, "If I had one more dollar to invest in anything in the State Department overseas, it would be in IMET," which is the Military Education Training program, where we take military folks from African countries all over the world, as a matter of fact, and send them to military schools in the United States, the Command and General Staff College the Army has in Fort Leavenworth, et cetera.

By the way, recently in Africa, and Liberia, for example, is a good example, but every place we've ever had anything good happen in Africa, led by in this case a Nigerian general officer in Liberia, was a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. This General Seth Obeng from Ghana I was telling you about is a graduate of the General Staff College.

The people that go to military schools in the United States go back and do good things for their countries because our military schools teach respect for civil control and also a good ethos, as far as what militaries do. So that's a good program. We do IMET, foreign military funding, which means people can buy things like C-130s, which they don't get enough of that, and then ACOTA. That's how much we put into those programs over that period, 5 years.

And these crisis response, you can see the number. Now, to me, I'm not out here, you know, tin cup in hand, advocating for more money, but I can tell you that a little bit of investment preventively in Africa would make a huge difference, we think, in what could happen there, and we go back and respond.

Now, in Liberia, the United States has been criticized, I think, for a late response with U.S. military folks in Liberia. I think that is specious, incorrect criticism, and I think the United States has stepped up to the plate in Liberia. As a matter of fact, there are monies in the budget right now for us to train the Liberian military. I will tell you that I think the U.N. needs to get off dead center and start doing the disarmament and reintegration, fast, in Liberia. But from a governmental standpoint, I think the United States has done a great job.

So that's kind of what we're doing. And we could talk about all of this for, I could talk to you for days on this. But our approach is basically help Africans help themselves. Use creative approaches to do that. Use nontraditional approaches that most people pretty much gag on, get over the stovepipes, quit worrying about who gets the credit, all cooperate together, and we can make a difference. If we don't, 10 years from now, you're going to be sitting here saying this is the worst crisis I've ever seen.

So thank you very much.

[Applause.]

GENERAL WALD: Should we do some questions?

MR. DE MUTH: Yes, do you want to do about 10 minutes' worth of questions?

GENERAL WALD: Okay. Anybody?

MR. DE MUTH: You--

GENERAL WALD: I can hear. Go ahead. Right here. Okay. Go ahead. We'll get a--I'll stay here all night. That's fine.

MR. HERSHEY: I'm Bob Hershey. I'm a consultant.

You mentioned the state two-country programs of Eastern Europe and Africa. Are you doing other things that parallel from the two parts of things that you've done with Eastern Europe that worked for Africa, also?

GENERAL WALD: Yes. Well, we're just starting with--the one you're talking about is Partnership for Peace, for example. In Istanbul, and once again this is at the political level, so I haven't had any input yet, but I think there's a thought, on General Jones' part and European Command, that some of the programs that were previously initiated in the former Warsaw Pact Eastern Europe, Partnership for Peace, et cetera, would be very good models for Africa, where European countries could actually help through exercises, training, and presence to actually bring those militaries up to speed. I think that's a good thing.

We do joint training together all of the time. As a matter of fact, our Special Operations group in Europe, called SOCEUR, which is stationed in Stuttgart headquarters, next year, and they do an exercise annually called FLINTLOCK, which is a major special ops exercise, and next year we're going to do it with the nine countries I pointed out earlier in North Africa, for example, and actually have them all have the benefit of some synergy.

But we think, to answer your question, Europe and the United States, but Europe, particularly, should do a lot more of the type of training they did prior to these seven countries on 2 April ceding it to NATO, the same thing they did in those countries, PFP exercises.

As a matter of fact, the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, is a fantastic example. And I know General Fulford has talked about some of these from his perspective of where right now the George C. Marshall Center, of mostly European countries, but as a matter of fact, it's expanded to bring in individuals from Mongolia, as a matter of fact, from the Middle East and other areas, where they actually learn civil military relationships and civil control and how to actually develop an ethos, is a great example. There are 700 students in that course, as we speak today. It's huge. But we think we can expand into Africa with something similar to that.

But, yeah, we could do a lot of that stuff. It doesn't cost a lot of money. It just takes a little bit of creative energy and some forethought.

Right here.

PARTICIPANT: General Wald, thank you for that wonderful presentation.

After the concerns you expressed with regard to African security, how do you explain the United States yanking military assistance from programs such as IMET because of differences over policy issues, such as Article 98?

GENERAL WALD: Well, I think there's a "carrot stick" approach for anything. I think, personally, if the countries in the world would really think about Article 98, other than feeling pressured by the European Union or France, for example, they would probably join and sign up to Article 98. Article 98 really doesn't change anything, but the United States has got to take care of our people.

The one thing I'll say, the United States government takes care of the military. They take care of them overseas. They watch them. Now, an example would be Belgium indicting Secretary Powell, Schwarzkopf and Tom Franks for war crimes--and most of you probably don't realize this--because of the law they had passed in Belgium that any person any place in the world that's a Belgian citizen could claim a court suit against any individual. That type of stuff is crazy.

There's no way the United States military is going to be able to go out to places like Africa or any place else and help solve crises problems and then be susceptible to somebody's precipitous notion that they can send you to the Hague for some kind of war crime. So that's number one.

Two is I think we have to look at things in a new, creative way, though. I will say that after 9/11, the world, the environment changed, and we have to look at things in a more unique way. We have to have nontraditional relationships. I will tell you that before 9/11, I don't think anybody in here would have thought that the Chief of Defense from Algeria and myself would become good friends. I mean, we have a relationship with Algeria right now, a good one. We're working on terrorism together, as a matter of fact, all of these countries down there.

I'm taking our group of general officers from European Command to Algiers in May to do what we call a train walk. The traditional train walk for the military is to go to a place like Gettysburg and have somebody talk about the history and learn from the lessons.

We're going to go to Algeria and learn about the Battle of Algiers. We're going to learn about urban warfare. They're going to take us around Algiers and show us how that worked and how they're fighting against GSPC. That's different. I don't think anybody would have thought of that a couple of years ago. We have a new environment.

So I think we need to have nontraditional partners. I think the world is different. I think countries that are traditionally against things like Article 98, some of them are being pressured by the European Union. We're going to have to face up to the fact that we have to set some of those aside, and we have to actually partnership up if we're going to win this war.

This war on terrorism, this euphemism, the "war on terrorism," is not a euphemism. It's a reality, and it's going to get a lot worse before it gets better. And it's going to take all of the countries, the free countries of the world, to do something about it, including Africa. Africa.com.

You know, we're setting up a--while we're waiting--during the Kosovo crisis and the Bosnia crisis, the United States government set up what was called the Balkans website, and it's basically an open-forum website that takes people from the Balkans that write articles, they put it on there, and it gives people access to open literature, free society issues, democracy, that they sometimes wouldn't have access to. Today, they have 5 million hits a month on that website, 5 million. Do you know what we're doing? We're setting the same thing up starting in a couple weeks in Africa. So we're going to be in competition with you. You know what ours is? We're going to have both sides of the issue, not just one side, like you guys.

[Laughter.]

PARTICIPANT: I'll leave all of that alone. With regard to your--meaning the "institutional" you--your recognition that Africa, you needed a strategic plan for Africa, which you've talked about at some length, I'm interested in where NATO fits in this. Does it, too, have a strategic plan for Africa? Are you lobbying NATO for really an expansion of NATO's mission to the South, and what are the implications of that?

GENERAL WALD: This is my personal opinion.

First of all, the good news about European Command is General Jones is SACEUR, and he wears both the Strategic Allied Commander of Europe hat, as well as the European Command hat. And what he's doing in NATO, basically, we're part of NATO. You know, we talk about NATO and the United States like it's an out-of-body experience, but the United States is part of NATO.

So, first of all, de facto, NATO has a mission in Africa because we have a mission in Africa. But number two is I certainly believe NATO has a mission in Africa, a big mission, basically, because of the security of Europe, and NATO's interests are not now sitting in garrison, in Germany or France or the U.K. or someplace like that, waiting for a million Russians to come across the border and fight. That ain't going to happen. It's gone. It's over. Forget about it.

What is going to happen is all of these new environment threats, these transnational threats, these kind of nontraditional threats, are going to be a threat to Europe. And the problem is there are people in the United States that mix up preemptive with preventative sometimes. And preventative medicine needs to be there. We have to have it. Europe has to have it as well. And Europe needs to get out of theater and go forward and do some prevention. It's in their own interests.

We talked about the Caspian hydrocarbons. We talked about demographics from Africa. We talk about transit through Europe because of the Schengen laws. You aren't going to sit back in Europe and do that in a defensive crouch. You've got to get out and do some preventative maintenance. Whether it be near term, mid or long term, Europe has a part of it. NATO definitely has that mission.

PARTICIPANT: Could I just follow up? Is NATO given to this at this point?

GENERAL WALD: Well, I think they will be. Here's the way I look at it.

Everybody's going to come to the same conclusion at some point. Some will get there faster than others, but you're all going to get to that conclusion, I contend--which of course we wrote the briefing, so I think I'm right--but I think this briefing is the issue.

And I think everybody will come to that conclusion eventually, whether it be threats to Europe or whatever else.

Now, there's been some huge wake-up calls lately, and I'll tell you the United States is not interested in having another 9/11. We're not going to let it happen. So we're not going to sit back in the United States and just wait for it to happen. You just had the President say that, the Secretary of Defense, a bunch, and Europe has to go down the same path, I think.

MR. DE MUTH: General, I won't come to the microphone, but I want to thank you very much for concluding what has been a hugely productive day. I would just, for myself, thank you on behalf of AEI. I would like to thank the audience as well for hanging around after a long and I hope educational and useful day for everybody. I can promise you there will be follow-on events, but please join me in a round of applause for General Wald.

[Applause.]

MR. DE MUTH: We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned.]