<html><body>Sudan: Genocide, Terrorism, and America's National Interest August 6, 2004 Unedited transcript prepared from a tape recording <TABLE width="100%" border=0> <TBODY> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">10:15 a.m.</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%" colSpan=2> Registration</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%"> </TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">10:30</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">Panelists:</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%">William Kristol, The Weekly Standard</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%">John Prendergast, International Crisis Group</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%">Ronald Sandee, Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">Moderator:</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%">Thomas Donnelly, AEI</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">11:30</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">Keynote:</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%">Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.)</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="50%"> </TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="25%">Noon</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%" colSpan=2> Adjournment</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE> Proceedings: MR. DONNELLY:  Good morning, everybody.  Hosts of conference are naturally obligated to express their thanks to the presenters and to the audiences, but today my thanks, I think, go well beyond these perfunctory courtesies. It's such a beautiful day here in Washington.  It's a Friday, it's August.  By any reasonable standard--certainly, by any Washington standard, this conference center should be a lot emptier than it is.  But we have really a remarkable turnout, and I think that's a reflection of the gravity of the topic, as well as the growing understanding within the Beltway that what's happening in Sudan is something that is of vital importance and we can't afford to ignore it any longer. The situation in Darfur is rightly described as the world's current worst humanitarian crisis.  There are at least 30,000 dead.  More than a million people are displaced, uprooted from their homes, and it's estimated that perhaps as many as 1,000 more people are dying everyday. These facts are known to us largely through the courageous work of the International Crisis Group and other similar kinds of groups.  They have worked tirelessly and courageously over the past months to bring this to our attention, and because of their efforts American decisionmakers, and indeed the world can't profess ignorance about what is happening in Darfur and there is far less excuse for inaction. But while saving lives is the most urgent task--and we will discuss today some of the immediate and pragmatic steps that the United States and the international community might take to alleviate the suffering--it's equally important, and one of the things that I particularly want to stress here is that we try to begin to understand the political context within which the slaughter has occurred. So the problem in Darfur is not simply a humanitarian problem; it's a political problem.  And the problem of Darfur is a subset of the many problems of Sudan, which is to say a further subset of the myriad political problems of the greater Middle East. Since the September 11th attacks, we've heard a lot about the strategic imperative of standing up for the cause of freedom in the greater Middle East and the Muslim world.  And I would certainly say that if it's important for us to speak out in favor of free speech in Saudi Arabia or political rights in Egypt--and there are serious issues for the United States, to be sure--it is equally important and equally serious to consider the case of the deaths, the murder of 30,000 Muslims in Sudan. And more troubling still is the level of support for Sudan from the rest of the world, even among the so-called great powers.  France, Russia and China--the infamous axis of veto in the Security Council--again pose major roadblocks to gaining any useful UN resolution.  And particularly disturbing to me is Beijing's alliance with Khartoum, spurred by China's growing need for oil and Sudan's desire for weaponry. The struggle for the greater Middle East is the centerpiece, declared centerpiece of American strategy.  And yet a palpable Iraq fatigue, if I can use that term of art, and, of course, the natural conservatism, if not paralysis, of an administration running for reelection kind of combine to raise a serious question as to whether the United States itself has the political will power necessary to push for effective action in Darfur. Against this backdrop, I think you can understand why I'm pleased that we're here today to talk about these issues.  We have a really fine panel, a distinguished panel of experts. We're going to hear from John Prendergast, who is a special adviser to the president of the ICG and has recently returned from extensive travel in Sudan and Chad. Following John, we'll hear from Ronald Sandee, a senior counterterrorism expert in the Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands.  And when it comes to Africa, Dutch intelligence is often far better than American intelligence. Wrapping up this morning's panel will be William Kristol, Editor of the Weekly Standard.  I've asked Bill to put the situation in Darfur in the context of American foreign policy and our domestic policy. When the panel is complete, we're going to hear a keynote address, which I think is kind of the icing on the cake, from Representative Frank Wolf, whom you all know to be one of the leading Congressional voices on Africa, and Co-Chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Let me just conclude my remarks by reminding everybody of our standard operating procedure for conferences.  Presentations will be followed by a brief question-and-answer session, which I will moderate to the best of my ability. And I promise to be ruthless in interrupting statements of opinion that masquerade as questions, and I'll remind everybody of that again when we get to that point. But, again, most welcome to AEI and to the conference.  And, John, the microphone is yours. MR. PRENDERGAST:  Thank you very much, Tom.  I'd like to also echo your accolades of this hearty audience.  I think--what kind of people would give such a lovely to come and talk about genocide and terrorism?  Bless your hearts. I think I'm very glad, also, that you, Tom, and Vance and AEI have raised this nexus between counterterrorism--between the support for terrorism that the Khartoum regime has demonstrated over a 15-year period and the genocidal activity that the regime is undertaking in Darfur, because together these two instruments represent two of the Khartoum regime's principal instruments of survival during its bloody 15-year tenure.  The trajectory of these two instruments says a lot about this regime, and perhaps even more about international political will. Let me make my thesis statement right up front.  Sudan's support for terrorism has diminished dramatically over the last six or seven years because the U.S. cared enough to act, not just talk, but act. Conversely, Sudan's engagement in genocidal activity has increased brazenly over the past six months, in particular, because although we make fine speeches about this heinous reality, we have not yet acted in any meaningful way to confront this regime's actions. So let me make a quick discussion of the counterterrorism arena and leave it for my colleagues here to talk more about it. Beginning in 1992, and spanning three administrations starting under President Bush senior, the U.S. slowly began to ratchet up the continuum of pressure in response to Khartoum's evident support, clear support and growing support for international terrorist organizations. We put Sudan on the state sponsors of terrorism list.  We worked assiduously in the UN Security Council to impose multilateral sanctions; yes, the same UN Security Council that last week wouldn't even use the word "sanctions." We imposed--the United States imposed unilateral, comprehensive sanctions that were at the time one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes that we had ever imposed anywhere.  And then in the post-9/11 environment, we have threatened the regime implicitly more than explicitly with action if they were to resume the activities that got them into hot water in the first place. Now, we built up U.S. leverage through specific actions like the ones I've mentioned to you and many other things that are under the table, and these were all aimed at isolating Khartoum in the international community and demonstrating that there would be a price to be paid for the actions that were taken. We then used that leverage to induce behavior change.  There was a tremendous debate, and there have been debates, again, spanning three administrations about the question of whether we pursue regime change or behavior change.  And every time that the argument has been made, it has ended up being a decision to pursue behavior change. And in the case of counterterrorism in Sudan, again, spanning three administrations, in a two-word assessment, "it worked."  No, we didn't have the Europeans with us most of the time, nor did the Arab League come along with us.  In fact, we were often working at odds with their agendas. And I say "we"; I mean that again in a bipartisan manner spanning three administrations, though I did work in the last one, where the counterterrorism agenda was a much higher priority in terms of the ladder of priorities in Sudan. But the U.S. exercised leadership despite the fact that we were often acting alone.  We exercised leadership on this particular issue in terms of counterterrorism.  We acted forcefully and we achieved our objective. The record is much bleaker with respect to our response to mass atrocities and crimes against humanity committed by this regime.  I think this is because we have maintained what is basically a conflict resolution mentality when addressing these atrocities, rather than a human rights mentality that might seek more robust action. We have pursued particularly over the last three years a constructive engagement strategy that has sought to resolve understandably the war between the government and the SPLA.  And we have mistakenly, unfortunately--and this is a whole other discussion we can do in the question-and-answer period if people are interested--we have mistakenly called this war a north-south war rather than a center-periphery war, rather than a war between a narrow regime and most of the people in the country. Now, in the context of that conflict resolution agenda, we have not pursued any meaningful punitive action nor any measures of accountability, despite having 16 months now to witness the slow motion unfolding of an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west. The only action that has been taken, in fact, is that we, Friday, last Friday, imposed an arms embargo against the rebels, which is basically the only group that can protect the victims, since we're not.  That lack of any action--again, underlining the word "action"--there are lots of good speeches made.  I'm telling you, this is one of the best speech-making runs I've ever seen in the international community.  But the lack of action has emboldened Khartoum considerably. It realizes now--the government realizes now that we have--basically, what is developing is a priority list and it does just enough on the higher items of that priority list to stay off our hit list.  The first priority list, understandably and from a national security interest rightly, is terrorism.  And again, as I said before, we succeeded in our objectives in that regard to a large extent, so a mop-out problem, but manageable. Secondly, our second priority is conflict resolution; again, understandable and terribly important over the long run.  But the question is can you negotiate with this regime and gain agreements that will, in fact, be implemented and meaningful for the people of Sudan. The third issue on the priority list is famine relief, and then the final issue, the last issue is this issue of human rights, confrontation of atrocities, a confrontation of genocidal activity. Now, if there is no cost, no identifiable cost to the regime or its officials for undertaking genocidal activity, it will continue.  If there is a cost, I guarantee you it will stop; again, reference counterterrorism. So, time left? MR.          :  [INAUDIBLE.] MR. PRENDERGAST:  What do we do about it?  I don't want to sit here and tell you we could do something and then leave you hanging about what we could do, and I think there are four areas where we need to do a lot more if we really want to do something meaningful about Sudan.  And again I would say that the record of all three administrations, last three administrations, is exemplary with respect to confrontation of the terrorism threat posed by the Sudan government and its support for terrorism organizations internationally. So I want to move beyond that for a second to say here are the other things that we need to focus as robustly on as we have and potentially as successfully as we have the counterterrorism agenda. The first area is the simple one; it's the one everybody always goes to first in any kind of crisis around the world, and particularly in Africa, is humanitarian.  At this point, after all the talk, we are reaching one-third of the people that are at risk of starvation in Sudan right now--one-third. Now, the Sudan government has removed or reduced most of the obstacles that it had put in place over the last 16 or 18 months to block humanitarian access.  It has begun to reduce those significantly.  It still uses security aspects to block further relief deliveries, but the visa, the custom, all the things you heard a lot about when Secretary Powell and Secretary General Annan were in Khartoum have been eased over the last months. But that has now exposed the fact that the United States and the European Union and other donors particularly in the United Nations are not prepared to respond.  We don't have the resources.  The United Nation's appeal--you know, these appeals are basically the way we fund all of the elements of the relief effort--is about 40-percent funded. And we're reaching, as I said, a third of the people with food, but we're reaching an even lower proportion of those people for the much, in fact, even more critical inputs into a humanitarian assistance effort like this one, which are the water and sanitation arenas. This is where, in the midst of a rainy season like we're experiencing now in Darfur, that the killer diseases are going to rip through these camps and everybody is simply unprepared to do anything about it.  And that's when we're going to start to see mortality rates, despite--and Christian Amanpour and CNN will publish--start to see the beginning end of that, and there are a number of other networks that are going to go in over the next month that we will start to record this, and then you'll start to get   ?   back from them.  But will it be too late?  Of course, you can always save lives, but we're woefully late.  Let's put it that way. So the humanitarian arena could--there is so much more that we could do in the humanitarian arena that the sky is the limit, and we need to do that on the logistics side and we need to do it on the cash side. Secondly, the second area of action that is absolutely fundamentally critical to every agenda that we might be pursuing in Sudan is the agenda of civilian protection.  What we have is certainly a failure of the Sudan government to protect its own population, to respond to its own population's needs. And what has certainly developed over the course of the last decade in the aftermath of the Cold War is a growing understanding and acceptance, at least in some circles, of the international community's responsibility to protect civilians in the context of mass atrocities. And, of course, by the way, a footnote.  We've signed conventions that sign us up to do all that we can, that compels us to do all that we can to prevent genocide, that compels us to do all we can to confront mass atrocities.  And all these things--as you're looking at sort of legal definitions, all these things have been triggered long ago and they haven't triggered the kind of action that should accompany the oath that we take when we sign these international covenants. So what do we do?  Okay, nobody in their right mind is calling for U.S. troops on the ground.  It's unnecessary.  The African Union has pledged at this juncture--it's an internal debate, but it's winding to a conclusion--that it will send at least two battalions, at least 2,000 troops from Nigeria and Rwanda to Darfur, to both protect the cease-fire monitoring mission that is already being deployed in Darfur, but it also will be there to undertake an agenda of civilian protection. And this is so fundamentally important that we, the United States, the European Union, the Saudis, the Chinese, anybody else who has cash, will finance the deployment, the lift and logistics necessary for that AU force to be put into the field tomorrow. I love the fact--though I hate the fact that the French embarrassed the United States last week, I love the fact that somebody did because they have demonstrated that after being stung by a lot of correct criticism about their lackadaisical response to the overall problems in Darfur, they deployed their forces to the Chadian-Sudan border in a matter of hours in order to pursue their interests. And I think that we, if we were serious about responding to the problems in Darfur, we have the logistics available.  Yes, it would require some moving around of the chess board, but I think we, along with the Europeans and led by the Dutch government, I think, are prepared, if we make the political decision to do it, to aggressively move that forward rapidly. Women are still being gang-raped in these camps.  Men are still being executed.  When I was in Darfur last month, we saw a mass grave scene that would make your skin crawl.  And so, you know, this is a compelling, imperative humanitarian agenda that could be pursued immediately with great benefit and no direct cost to us outside of resources.  It's a choice, a choice whether we're going to do this or not. The third arena that needs to be addressed immediately is accountability.  I think perhaps nothing will concentrate the minds of Khartoum--we go back just for a second to the discussion earlier of what has worked and what hasn't, what has made a difference to Khartoum and what hasn't.  When I told you that we introduced all of these measures, unilateral measures mostly, but we did work through the Security Council on some of them, and succeeded in changing Khartoum's behavior with respect to a very important element of its survival strategy, which was the relationships that it had developed with terrorist groups, the same is true for the connection between us taking action on the accountability agenda and Khartoum changing its behavior with respect to atrocities. I think at this point there are number of actions we could take, again cost nothing, don't require U.S. troops on the ground, that would make a major difference in how Khartoum deals with its own people. First, I think the targeted sanctions debate.  Now, there are a number of regime officials who are sitting on boards of directors in Khartoum of companies that have been incorporated and that do international business.  They are oil service companies, they are construction companies, they are import-export companies.  These are companies, in my view, that if we want after them very, very aggressively internationally--and if we can't do it through the Security Council, let's get 5 or 10 or 15 other countries who are willing to stand up to genocide and say, okay, we're going to take out the microscopes and try to find where these assets are and make it harder for these guys to do business abroad.  We're going to stop them from traveling, we're going to make them international pariahs.  Let's start a campaign and say these are the 5 or 10 or 15 people that are responsible not only for what's going on in Darfur right now, but who have been responsible for what has happened in the south for the last 15 years. And I don't need to tell you; you all know.  Two million people dead.  If that's not enough, I don't know what is.  So, really, again, very little cost; have some investigators on the trail, willingness on the part of the banks in certain countries to say if those assets go through our banks, we'll freeze them. The second thing we can do in the accountability arena, I think, is to look at the important continuum of actions--to begin the important continuum of actions that prepare us one day to potentially have some prosecution for war crimes that have occurred in Sudan. Now, how do you do that?  Well, usually, the first step that's taken is you create--you authorize an international commission of inquiry.  The Security Council would have to do that.  The Security Council last Friday basically wimped out and said they called on the Sudan government to investigate whether or not it had committed any crimes. So I think at this point we have to ratchet it up and say let's be realistic.  What's going to influence Khartoum is to introduce the first step down the accountability chain.  And then that goes--that commission, whether they get the cooperation of Khartoum or not, goes out and they produce a report that says whether or not crimes against humanity have been committed, whether or not war crimes, whether or not genocide is, in fact, taking place.  And they collect and they build dociers on individuals who are responsible for that. This is a warning.  You want to talk about a warning shot at the officials of this regime; that is it.  And we're not doing it.  I don't understand why.  It wasn't even in the draft.  It wasn't in the thing that was red-lined.  Why not at least push it and see if the Chinese and others push back and see how far we can get with it? There are many other things we can do on accountability, but I'll leave it for time.  But at least--at the very least, to go back to the earlier comment about imposing an arms embargo on the rebels, I simply can't understand how, after this war has gone on so long in the south and how this war has gone on now so violently in the west, that we can't impose an arms embargo on the Sudan government in the Security Council.  We need to push it. And then, finally, the fourth area that we need some more aggressive action, I think, is in the broader peace-making arena.  Now, this is the area, I think, that this current administration here in Washington has done the most good work in with respect to the government and the SPLA conflict. There has been an assiduous effort on the part of President Bush on down to engage in the necessary diplomacy to push the peace process forward when many people didn't believe it was possible.  And we're on the brink of a successful agreement between the government and the SPLA to end that 21-year war. However, we've been on the brink for some time now and it's, in fact, our enthusiasm and our desire to get that deal done particularly at the end of last year and in advance of the State of the Union Address, to which a conditional invitation was extended to President Bashir to attend if he would only sign on the dotted line at the time that the ethnic cleansing was at its height, by the way. You know, this effort, once it was understood by Khartoum that the United States and others were more interested in trying to get that deal done and were willing to work on that deal, and then once they got that deal done would start working on Darfur--well, I mean if you're sitting in Khartoum, you say, okay, let's just not sign the deal because as soon as we sign it, they're going to start nailing us on Darfur.  So we lost precious time. From October until April--and I only think in April we woke up because there was the tenth anniversary of the genocide and everybody was looking around for speeches to make.  And they realized that, in fact, everything that we were going to say about "never again" was happening in Darfur.  If we still made it, I don't know if we'd even have this session today. But we did wake up, so we are moving forward.  And I think that we need to look much more aggressively at how to move the conflict resolution agendas forward both to finalize the deal that is led by, of course, the Kenyans, but, in fact, very closely by us between the government and the SPLA, and link it not formally, but coordinate it with the incipient efforts by the African Union to move the peace process forward for Darfur. And it's a lot of work.  It's four major areas, four agendas.  But, again, if we're going to match the rhetoric with action, we've got to work on these kind of multi-layered crises with multi-layered responses.  And I think we have a chance to do something. So in conclusion, I'd like to return then to my earlier thesis that U.S. leadership and U.S. action has a proven track record in changing the Khartoum regime's behavior.  They may not like it.  I mean, Bashir may call up his former running buddy and say, you know, I'm really sorry, Usama, I'd like to help you right now, but the heat is on me.  But they are complying with the objectives of the international community with respect to the counterterrorism arena, whether they like it or not. We really have to stop barking and start biting, and start biting hard.  The victims of genocide deserve that much in Sudan. Thanks. MR. DONNELLY:  Thank you very much, John. Ronald, over to you. MR. SANDEE:  Well, first, thank you for the opportunity to talk to you today about Sudan, and I would like to stress that I am talking to you in a strictly personal capacity and without in any way representing the Dutch Ministry of Defense, where I'm employed, not an official view held by the Dutch government. But the subject of my talking to you today is Islamism, jihadism and terrorism in the Sudan.  I look at Sudan as one of the seven states that are labeled by the U.S. State Department as states who sponsor terrorism.  Also, in the war on terrorism, much time and energy is used on Afghanistan or Iraq, but it sometimes looks as if we have forgotten Sudan, a country where Usama bin Laden lived for more than five years. Islamism in Sudan started more or less with the introduction of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1950s.  Since then, they have been trying to mold Sudan into their view of the world.  They aim to turn Sudan into an Islamic state which is run by sharia. Also, since the early 1950s, there has been one undisputed leader of the Islamic movement in Sudan, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, now 72 years old and once again in jail, although he might be free within the coming days. Jihadism and terrorism were introduced to Sudan in the early 1990s, when Usama bin Laden and his followers came to the country and built an extensive training camp infrastructure, as well as setting up a business and financial network. But it was not only Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda who were active in training Mujahadeen fighters and al Qaeda.  Also, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had their camps in Sudan, and still have.  And the Islamic regime in Khartoum itself created the Popular Defense Forces.  The PDF have camps throughout the country where young volunteers were drilled to be a member of this pro-government militia. The PDF was used to militarily support the power of the Khartoum regime, often taking the brunt of the fighting against SPLA, and later was used in the Numamai [ph] Mountains to fight against the Nure [ph] people. Let us return to the birth of the Islamic movement in Sudan.  The Islamic movement in Sudan has been known by many different names since it first appeared in Sudan in the early '50s.  In 1954, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood was established.  Although the Muslim Brotherhood still exists in Sudan, the Islamic movement also has other manifestations, like the Islamic Charter Fund, the Islamic   ?    , the National Islamic Fund, and recently the Popular National Congress. The Islamic movement in Sudan has changed in name, structure and working methods, but its main ideology, its objectives and its leader, Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi have essentially remained the same in the 50 years of its existence. The ideology of the Islamic movement is founded on two pillars.  The first is sharia, the Islamic law, and the second is the Islamic state.  This is based on the conviction that the sharia should regulate all aspects of human life, and that the ideal society can only be achieved if its political organization is Islamic. This ideology ultimately requires the transformation of the present world order into an authentic pax islamica.  To fulfill the objectives of the Islamic movement, the whole international system of states much change from a secular to a religious logic. Turabi confirms that his ideology contains risk of conflict.  He said, "I admit that we are a threat to the present world order.  We just seek to correct the world order.  We just seek to express our Islamic values."  In 1987 he stated, "Our aim is to utilize fully the rich heritage of the igwan [ph]," which is the Muslim Brotherhood, "in such areas as organization, documentation, education, high spiritual and moral standards, specialization and international relations, and streamline it with the growth in numbers and size of the movement, which has now observed hundreds of thousands of people in Sudan." In view of the over-powering role of Hassan Al-Turabi in Sudan in this Islamic field, we should have a close look at this 72-year-old Islamist intellectual. Hassan Abdullah Dafalla Al-Turabi in 1932.  His father was a religious judge and encouraged his son to study Islam.  But he studied law at Khartoum University, got his M.A. at the University in London in law, and a doctorate in law from the Sorbonne, in Paris.  Turabi clearly   ?   the nation state and feels a strong alliance to the Yuma [ph], or the world community of the Muslims. The ultimate objective of the Islamic movement in Sudan has been to establish an Islamic state on the principles of sharia and the unity of the Yuma.  Furthermore, Islamic movements are committing to fight secularism and to establish God's order in society, according to Turabi.  The ultimate goal should be the freedom to address the whole world through Islam without any restrictions whatsoever. He said about this, "We are calling for a unified strategy of life for all of humanity and that transcends the narrow divisions of greed, color or national origins, and allows us all to cooperate freely and equally for a better world.  This is our gift to humanity.  This is our main task as Muslims today." To achieve the Islamic state on the principles of the sharia and the unity of the Yuma, Turabi underlined three ways of access to power--revolution, as in the case of Iran; through the military institution, as in the case of Sudan; and through the ballot box, as in Algeria.  He actually endorsed all of these examples as legitimate. He said, "Fellow Muslims living in alien countries have to be supported, albeit never in contravention of any treaty obligation.  Islamic movements already emancipated from nationalist ideology are interacting more intensively across the world." On June 30, 1989, Omar Al-Bashir seized power in a bloodless military coup and Turabi was taken to prison for technical reasons.  He was released early in 1990 and declared his readiness to work with the new regime for aims that he considered identical to those of his party, the Inef [ph].  He became Speaker of Parliament in 1996. During the 1990s, the Islamic movement and the Islamic regime in Sudan had overlapping membership and power structures.  The phase between 1989 and 1999 was a period of cooperation and consolidation between the military regime and the Islamic movement.  It started with the military coup in 1989 and ended with the dissolving of the Sudanese Parliament on December 12, 1999. This dissolution of Parliament was the culminating result of a power struggle between Bashir and Turabi.  The government of Sudan provided during this period safe haven and support for members of several international terrorist groups operating in Sudan.  The regime also permitted Tehran to use Sudan as a secure transit point and meeting site for Iranian-backed extremist groups. Sudan in 1989 was more or less bankrupt.  Previously smooth relations with the U.S. had soured after the coup and preferential relations with the new Sudanese government kept with the Saddam Hussein regime.  The relation with Libya was excellent in the '80s, but cooled down in the early '90s. Soon after the coup, the Sudanese regime sought a deepening of the relation with Iraq, but after the Gulf War and the UN-installed sanctions regime against Iraq, Sudan had to find a new financially strong partner. On the instigation of Turabi, the Sudanese government started courting Iran.  In the spring of 1991, a strategic partnership was concluded.  Both countries would not only work together in the economic and political field, but also in the para-military and military and intelligence fields.  The partnership was sealed during a visit of Iranian President Rafsanjani to Khartoum in December 1991.  Rafsanjani flew from Senegal to Khartoum with a delegation of over 150 officials.  During the visit, he described Sudan as the vanguard of the Islamic revolution in the African continent. The fresh Iranian-Sudanese cooperation got an extra dimension due to the input of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and especially the at that time newly-established Qod forces.  The Qod forces' main task within the IRGC is to perform special operations which are mainly sensitive and clandestine operations. Furthermore, the Qod forces are responsible for external IRGC activity and for exporting the Iranian revolution.  This branch of the IRGC is also the liaison with the revolutionary or radical Islamist extremist groups. In the early '90s, experienced IRGC personnel was flown from Lebanon to the Sudan, first to train the Sudanese para-military Popular Defense Force and later to train all sorts of Mujahadeen jihadists or terrorists.  With the help of the Pasdaran, an infrastructure was created to train thousands of combatants.  For specialized training courses, for instance, working with explosives, specialists from outside were brought in especially from the Lebanese Hezbollah. Also flown in from Lebanon was Iran's new ambassador to Sudan, Majid Kamal [ph].  He was a heavy-weight revolutionary who was Iran's ambassador in Lebanon during the time of the kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut.  Within a few years, it was said thousands of Iranians were active in Sudan. In early 1992, Sudan emerged as a strategic outpost and key part of the infrastructure for Iran's export of the Islamic revolution throughout the Near East and Africa.  In short, the relations between Islamist Sudan and the revolutionary Iran were of mutual benefit.  Sudan sought assistance and financial help and Iran could use Sudan as a spring board in Africa. In 1991, it was Hassan Al Turabi who invited Usama bin Laden to come and live in Sudan.  After sending a reconnaissance team, UBL accepted the invitation and settled in Khartoum.  There, he got special privileges and tax exemptions as a businessman, and started construction work, import-export and agricultural enterprises. Usama bin Laden ran a complex network of 70 to 80 businesses and charities from Sudan.  Bin Laden got the free hand to build and exploit at least 23 training camps for his followers.  The Sudanese government denied that there was a terrorist training camp infrastructure in their country.  Turabi said, "As for harboring terrorists, let me say this: We have no interest in terrorism." According to the Sudanese regime's definition of the concept of terrorism, the statement was probably correct.  This definition is that all fighting in the name of jihad, including the fight against Israel, is legitimate and in accordance with the duty levied on all Muslims.  However, many of the Islamic groups that Turabi distinguished as religious movements are perceived as terrorist organizations in the West; for instance, al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Aljama [ph] Al Islamiya, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. During the early '90s, extensive discussions took place between Usama bin Laden, Turabi and representatives of Iran in Khartoum.  Once Turabi defined the theological compromise between Sunni kutubism [ph] and Shia homonism [ph] on the role of Islam as the supreme force in the modern world and applied the compromise to the Islamist revolutionary process, the road was open for a close and genuine alliance between Iran and al Qaeda. Turabi and Sheik Mohammed Sayed Numani [ph], who was called an adviser to the Iranian Minister of Culture, or a bridge homonism in the Horn of Africa, jointly went to Usama bin Laden in Khartoum and they concluded that such an alliance was possible. During the discussions, an agreement was reached between the Sunni movement of Usama bin Laden and the Shia hard-liners in Tehran to cooperate.  Both had a common priority to fight the great satan, the U.S., and the little satan, Israel, first before setting any intra-Islamic quarrels and attacking each other. With the set 23 training camps constructed by Usama bin Laden under his direction, there were at least an additional 12 camps under the guidance of the Iranian Pasdaran.  In the largest country of Africa, it's easy to hide certain training facilities. In August 1992, George Logofar [ph], the then Sudanese Minister of Labor, defected to Egypt and described the situation in the training camps.  He said, "They receive tough training in all types of combat, violence and assassinations, and are to be sent from time to time to some neighboring countries to explore their situations, carry out limited and swift operations, and await a major plan devised by the National Islamic Front to send its members to countries chosen as targets for intensive activity." The inner Sudanese power struggle between President Al-Bashir and the Speaker of Parliament since 1996, Al Turabi, culminated in December '99 when Bashir dissolved Parliament.  Turabi condemned Bashir's dissolution of parliament as a military coup and rejected the state of emergency as unconstitutional. Within this political turmoil, the long-time confidants of Turabi and also long-time hard-line Islamists like Ali Othman Mohammed Taha [ph], presently the First Vice President; Dr. Frazi Salahadin [ph], presently presidential adviser for peace affairs; Dr. Nafi Ali Navi [ph], presently Minister of Federal Government; and Dr. Awad Ahmed Al Jaz [ph], presently Minister of Energy and Mining, shifted their alliance and became part of the national Islamist camp of President Bashir. Turabi and his followers started to cooperate in the opposition to Bashir's National Congress Party.  On the 20th of February, 2001, Turabi's newly-created party signed an MOU in Geneva with the most powerful armed opposition group in Sudan,   ?   Ranks SPLA.  This came as a surprise to both external observers and local politicians. In response to the MOU with the SPLA, security forces arrested Turabi on February 21, 2001, and he was detained.  After being held for more than two years under house arrest, he was set free on 13 October, 2003, only to be arrested again on the 31st March of this year.  The latest announcements are that Turabi will be released soon. But the Islamists in Sudan are not working through politics and violence alone.  They also use the Islamic mission, or the Dawa, as a tool to accomplish their goals. The Sudanese NGO Munazamat Aldawa Islamiya [ph], or MDI, is financed mainly by the Sudanese government and is involved in Muslim missionary activities in the Balkans and in Africa.  The MDI is active in the field of cultural reconstruction, aid rehabilitation of injured people and development. MDI is also associated with trying to link aid for famine relief to conversion to Islam.  Recent activities of the MDI are focused on central and southern Africa.  It's also known that activists of the MDI are on good terms with the Jamad Atabli [ph], a proselytizing Muslim organization with roots in Pakistan which is known to be an entrance hall to jihadist and salafist [ph] extremist groups. After 9/11, and after the U.S.-led coalition attacked and defeated the Taliban regime and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, the solid base that al Qaeda had in Afghanistan was gone.  A part of the al Qaeda leadership and a certain amount of fighters remain in the remote tribal areas in Pakistan and in the eastern part of Afghanistan until today. Others struggled with their families through Pakistan and through Iran to return to their home countries.  Another part stayed in Pakistan.  A large group went to Yemen.  What was remarkable was that most of the students within al Qaeda were asked by their teachers to come with them to Mauritania, and they did.  Others ended up in Sudan. Also, soon after 9/11 and the start of the campaign to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan, stories and information popped up that large quantities of gold and gemstones were transferred from Afghanistan through Pakistan and Iran to Sudan.  This gold and gemstones, it was said, belonged to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and were brought by ship and plane to the Sudan to be put in safe places.  Probably, they were deposited in Islamic banks in Khartoum. By now, we can say that Sudan has again assumed a role as one of the training centers of al Qaeda and Mujahadeen fighters.  Like in the first half of the 1990s, Sudan contains an ample number of training camps where Muslim extremists and jihadists are taught the techniques of guerrilla warfare.  They come from Europe, central Asia and the Middle Eastern countries, and from Sub-Saharan Africa. After being trained, they are facilitated by an organization that is still in place and is able to deliver high-quality false documents, means of communication and organized travel arrangements.  The newly trained fighters in Sudan turn up in the southern Sahel countries, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to fight coalition forces. We also see Sudanese who were trained in PDF camps turning up at the border with Israel.  It is interesting to note that during the latest prisoner swap between Israel and Hezbollah in January 2004, three Sudanese citizens were included. Sudan has never made a secret out of its relation with Palestinian terrorist organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.  Also, links with Hezbollah are almost institutionalized.  Against Western pressure, Sudan will not concede that Hamas is a terrorist organization.  Hamas is among friends in Khartoum.  As a former Hamas representative in Khartoum said, "We have an Islamic project.  Sudan has the same project and we are going to carry out this project in all Islamic countries." The Sudanese government cannot expel the mentioned organizations because the country has a political relationship with Hamas and they see it as an organization with a legitimate cause.  Foreign Minister Ismail [ph] refused to call Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah terrorist organizations because they are fighting to end occupation and expel the occupier, and are exercising the right to self-defense. He also said that the people must not confuse matters and regard them as terrorists.  According to the Sudanese, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have not carried out any military action outside the occupied Palestinian territories.  Again, it is just a matter of definition. Turabi has indirectly supported acts that the U.S. and many other Western countries define as terrorism.  In a press interview on the suicide bus bombing in Tel Aviv by Hamas in October 1994 which left 22 people dead, Turabi called the attack an honorable act. In Sudan, Hamas had not only a political bureau, but it also has other organizations like the Palestinian Students Union in Sudan and the Sudanese Ansadar [ph] movement which is active in fundraising.  Also, Hamas has a little business empire in Sudan consisting of profit-making companies. But we can assess that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have training camps in Sudan, especially after President Bashir told his fellow countrymen on the 4th of April, 2002, that "We now order the Popular Defense Forces and all the political and military leaders to now open all the military camps to be opened in estates and villages.  No peace with the Jews or surrender to the Jews, for war is jihad, jihad is jihad." Two days later, the PDF announced the opening of [TAPE CHANGE] Mujahadeen in all Sudanese starting [INAUDIBLE].  The PDF commander affirmed that it was determined to pursue public mobilization in support of the Palestinian issue.  He said, "In support of Al Qod," which is  ?   Jerusalem, "we have started implementing it in all our sectors and institutions." Sudan is being used as a hub for Palestinian terrorist groups, al Qaeda and jihadist networks.  In the Arab-controlled part of the country are training camps for a wide range of groups, including the IMU from Uzbekistan, al Qaeda, the   ?    Islamic jihad movement, Hamas, Saudi oppositional groups, and Mujahadeen who turn up as volunteers in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Some of the camps are located near the border with Eritrea or north of Port Sudan in the Jabokaroush [ph] mountains.  Others are near the Libyan border or in the Nuba mountains or in the Fuhr [ph].  Some camps are not more than 100 square meters and look more like a Boy Scout camp than a terrorist training camp, but the same goes for a lot of training camps of terrorists in the  ?  border area.  For groups up to 25 persons, it is useful and working. It is said that Mujahadeen were used in the Darfur conflicts.  Groups of foreign fighters were used by the government to side with the Janjaweed [ph] against the people of Darfur.  For the Mujahadeen, it was a kind of training on the spot.  After these live-firing exercises, some of the Mujahadeen were sent back to the southern Sahel countries where they came from or back to countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, Togo and Benin. It was opposition leader and former Prime Minister Sadik Al Mahdi [ph] who stated only recently on July 29th to the Reuters press agency, "Many of the Janjaweed come from Cameroon and from Chad," he said.  "The Arabs of Darfur have so far taken a fairly responsible attitude not to get involved." Recently, training camps were also established in remote areas of Sudan like the Jabakaroush mountains north of Port Sudan for Saudi radicals.  In June 2003, 19 al Qaeda suspects with Sadafi [ph] roots were captured in the port of Saudi Arabia.  They were trying to set up new training camps Nuba mountains, also. In August 2003, Syrian nationals and two Sudanese were convicted of running a terrorist training camp in the west of Sudan that taught Palestinians and Saudis how to carry out anti-U.S. attacks in Iraq. To come to some of the concluding remarks, the question remains if the Sudanese government as such is supporting the activities of training camps in the country as a matter of policy.  This is a question that I am unable to answer and I simply don't know.  However, one can probably state that certain Islamist hard-liners within the government must know to a certain degree what is going on. There are entities within the country that benefit from the situation.  Although Turabi is once again in jail, it fits within his world view.  Islamic fighters who are trained in Sudan and from there go to multiple areas to try to topple governments    ?    , and this all within the name of Islam. At the end of July, Sudanese government officials started to give sharp warnings to the international community not to intervene in Darfur.  If U.S. and British forces would intervene, according to these officials the locals would see them as occupying forces and attack them like in Iraq.  Also, leaders of the Janjaweed warned that foreign intervention would lead to attacks. In view of the above, these warnings in all probability need to be taken seriously.  A Western intervention seen within the West as based purely on a humanitarian imperative will easily be seen as an attack on a Muslim nation and draw in Islamic fighters like a magnet, as has happened in Iraq.  The complications could be staggering.  It might be the start for a new round of fighting between the Western forces and Muslim radicals. Lastly, Sudan is a complicated country with a lot of power structures and networks.  Even seasoned diplomats from the Arab world are sometimes exasperated by the complexities of the Sudanese power networks.  However, the recent external pressure on the government in Khartoum has evidently led to a closing of ranks. It is interesting to note that right now government officials and opposition figures are setting aside their differences and are united, since a week we hear that Turabi might be released. Also, robust statements have been coming from Khartoum, like claims that the Janjaweed are in the process of retraining and re-arming and setting up new camps to halt any possibility of foreign military interference. Other leaders of Turabi's party have already been released at the end of July.  It seems that the national Islamists like Vice President Ali Othman Taha and the international Islamists have at least for the moment reconciled their differences.  One can conclude that the government leaders still need Turabi when it comes to international Islamist support and contacts with jihadist and terrorist organizations. If they expect a military intervention, they need to prepare for that situation and then there is only one who can help them.  It might be Tehran. Thank you. MR. DONNELLY:  Well, thank you very much.  You've convinced us all that the problem is a complex one. Bill, if you can sort this all out for us, I'd appreciate that very much. MR. KRISTOL:  Thank you, Tom, for that impossible assignment.  I really know much less about the Sudan than both these gentlemen, and I'll be therefore brief in my remarks and really offer them almost as footnotes to those two very interesting and quite persuasive presentations. First, you know, let me say a word about the regime, which John Prendergast really alluded to when he said this is better thought of not simply as a humanitarian problem or not primarily as a humanitarian problem, but rather as a political problem.  This is a humanitarian crisis, a humanitarian disaster which is caused not by the weather or by earthquakes or by terrible accidents, but by the actions of particular political entities either sponsored by the regime or tolerated at least by the regime. And I think that is a crucial point to make.  I mean, we have an interest in helping people in a purely humanitarian way, but the way in which one thinks about doing this is different if there really is a humanitarian crisis and you're going in to help because there has been a terrible earthquake or because people are being killed directly or indirectly because of the actions of a particular political entity or set of entities--the National Islamic Front, the Popular Islamic Congress, Al-Turabi, whatever. Now, that doesn't mean you need to have regime change as your goal, though it's always worth keeping that in mind as a possibility.  As John said, you can sometimes pressure a regime to change behavior.  One interesting question is how much the pressure even on terrorism has actually caused them to change their behavior in any permanent way. I would say that Ronald's presentation may suggest that the change on terror was more temporary than permanent.  But it also may be the case that they could afford to make more changes in terms of their support for terrorism than they can on something that's so essential in a certain way to this kind of Islamist regime, which is the non-toleration of people who are not part of that fundamental agenda of the Islamization of Sudan and the export of that Islamic radicalism or Islamo-fascism or whatever one wants to call it. So it is--you know, too much of the coverage, I think, and the rhetoric about Sudan has been sort of in the humanitarian box as opposed to in the strategic war on terror, and not just war on terror, but as the 9/11 Commission said, the war against--defending ourselves against radical Islamic terror.  And I think it's very helpful especially with Ronald's presentation to see the Sudan as part of this broader fight especially for the Middle East, but, in fact, it goes beyond the Middle East, too, because of the ability of the terrorists to export their terror to other parts of the Islamic world and other parts of the world simply. So it's a political problem.  It's not simply a humanitarian problem.  I'm all for pressuring regimes to change their behavior, and we can accept that as a tolerable or at least interim solution.  But one wonders in this case whether a regime change does not have to be the policy.  That doesn't mean it has to be done immediately.  It doesn't mean necessarily military intervention. But once one says that regime change is the policy, it does trigger different ways of thinking about dealing with the situation than simply, gee, that's a particularly nasty civil war and it's a humanitarian problem and we need to solve it in a sort of patchwork one-off way. Secondly, on the--this is really on Ronald's presentation, which was very interesting, on the sort of Islamic--the Islamism, let's say, side of the equation.  It's always interesting to see, contrary to all the experts who spent so much time telling us that Sunni and Shia could never work together, that religious Islamic fanatics could never work with secular regimes, they all seem to have worked together extremely well. Bush was much more right than he probably realized when he talked about the axis of evil, and the more we learn about both the spread of weapons of mass destruction, A.Q. Khan [ph] from Sunni Pakistan dealing with Shia Iran, dealing with secular Libya, dealing with non-Islamic North Korea--I mean, the degree to which there really is an axis of weapons of mass destruction producing and proliferating regimes, an axis of terror supporting, financing and exporting regimes, and the degree to which--and I think this was brought out well by Ronald--the degree to which one needs to deal with it as a general problem--again, it doesn't mean that one needs to go invade them all at the same time and it doesn't mean that one can't have priorities and different tactics and strategies for different elements of this problem. But it is one problem and to some degree it has to be dealt with comprehensively, partly because when you suppress it in one place, as we saw with Afghanistan, they're not idiots; you know, they move to a place where they have more opportunity to cause trouble and to reorganize. And so you do need a sort of global effort against this global threat.  And I think the most important thing that Tom and AEI, who I also want to give credit to for sponsoring this panel, at which I've learned a lot--the most important thing perhaps that can come out of this whole debate now, the renewed interest in and emphasis on Sudan, is the notion that it has to be thought of as part of this broader struggle. Again, that doesn't lead you necessarily to any particular immediate policy conclusion about the use of force or what kinds of sanctions to impose or what mix of diplomacy and pressure and threats to use, and how to use the international community and all that.  But I think it is much more accurate and more helpful to think of it as part of this broader problem, as opposed to a sort of one-shot, isolated, particular story that has its own sort of agenda and has to be dealt with discreetly. Third--this is really picking up on John's, just elaborating on the implication of what he said--the international community has had plenty of time to deal with this problem.  It hasn't done a very good job.  To the degree that the international community, if one can even use that term, has done anything much, it has done so, I think, almost exclusively because of U.S. pressure and U.S. leadership. I don't say this in any triumphal way.  I wish it were the opposite, frankly.  And, you know, it's not so easy for the U.S. to provide leadership in all these different parts of the world.  In fact, when there's too much of a burden on one nation, things fall through the cracks and one wishes that other nations had done more and were doing more. But the United Nations has been pretty pitiful, obviously.  Sudan reelected to the UN Human Rights Commission in--what was that--May, just the latest instance of an almost ludicrous, willing blindness on the part of the United Nations, supposedly the sort of main representative of the international community, and then obviously the recent Security Council resolution, which I suppose is some progress.  But John, I think, effectively laid out its very significant limitations, and the only progress came because obviously we pushed it so hard. And I think the President deserves a lot of credit for what he did, for the attention he devoted to Sudan in terms of settling the civil war, if that's the right term, or let's just say the slaughter of the people in the south and getting that peace agreement, which we'll see if it goes into effect or not in any serious way. But obviously we're now engaged again in this other front of what is ultimately the same struggle against the same atrocities being committed by the--perpetrated by the same regime.  It does make one wonder. I mean, I'm perfectly willing to have endorsed behavior modification, behavior change, as opposed to regime change if we think it could work or if we thought it could work.  But at some point, we'll have to say here, as we've said in one or two other instances--and in each case we've gone to regime change; we first tried a behavior change.  We gave the Taliban an ultimatum that they could change their behavior and kick out the terrorist groups. We gave Saddam, obviously, repeated ultimata.  I wonder whether we are not approaching a moment here where similarly and analogously we need to move beyond ultimata that seem not to be--that the regime ultimately cannot or will not accept or will not honor if they say they accept them. In any case, my only point here is from an obvious U.S. leadership point, and I think it's important.  I mean, it says something about the international community, but it also says something about what we now need to do about Sudan because we have now staked a certain amount of credibility on being serious about the problem in Darfur. If you look at the statements--and John referred to them--they're quite eloquent by President Bush and Secretary Powell.  I would simply say--Vance Sherchuk pulled some of these together for a piece we're trying to write on this--the degree to which both the President and the Secretary of State have not just denounced what has happened in the Sudan, but have said, to quote Secretary Powell three months ago, "Time is of the essence and action is of the essence, so we have got to act now, not later," or Secretary Powell again on July 1st, over a month ago, "We're talking about days and weeks" in terms of the time line during which he expected to see real improvements on the ground in Darfur, it becomes a question of U.S. credibility, not just of--in addition to, you know, doing good things to help save lives and to help change the behavior of a particularly noxious regime in Sudan. And I think in that respect, leadership and--not in that respect--leadership and credibility are to some degree indivisible, obviously, and a failure to act now in Sudan and a willingness to abide by misrepresentations and false promises and equivocations would have implications for other nations' views of how seriously to take U.S. commitments and U.S. threats. So I think this is now beyond a question of, you know, are we doing as much as we should be doing--and I agree with John that we're not, but are we doing as much as we should be doing to deal with this particular crisis and what spillover effect will this have on views of how seriously to take U.S. promises, U.S. credibility, U.S. threats elsewhere in the world, and particularly in the region, since, as Ronald reminded us, Sudan is not sort of some little island standing--big island standing alone in the middle of the Pacific or the Atlantic.  It is part of the greater Middle East, or the larger Middle East, we're supposed to call it these days. And therefore it has real concrete implications for our credibility in that region, which is obviously the crucial region for us right now in our broader foreign policy.  So once again this panel brings home to me, at least, the necessity of thinking about the situation in Sudan in political terms and in regional terms, in terms of the Middle East and in terms of U.S. leadership and U.S. credibility, and putting it in this broader context, not treating it as a stand-alone sort of issue. Finally, Tom mentioned Iraq fatigue in the upcoming election and the question of whether that has paralyzed us.  I think it is yet another reason for more urgency in dealing with Sudan, not the opposite. It's very, very bad to let people think around the world and in that region that they can get away with stuff until November 2nd.  I mean, that's a long time away and a lot of very bad things can happen.  A lot of terrorist plots can be hatched.  A lot of people can be killed.  Lots of U.S. interests can be very badly damaged if people think they have a free ride for three months. To be fair, I don't think the administration believes that, and I don't even think it's fair to say that they've acted in that way.  I would say that given that this is an election year where there is a general perception Bush is overreaching, imperial over-stretch--you know, we've got to be prudent and pull back--I would say the administration has been pretty forward-leaning, actually on Sudan, and actually in some other areas as well. But I would simply say that they need to continue that.  I actually don't think they would--I think the American people would fully understand that we are in a global war.  This is a global challenge with a whole bunch of sub-challenges, in which this is one major one, and we can't not do things for the three months before an election. Similarly, we can't not do things because Iraq turned out to be more difficult than we expected and we have 140,000 troops there rather than 50 or 80 or 100 and because it's taking more money than expected.  I mean, that is really--to permit that perception around the world or around the region is extremely dangerous, for obvious reasons, and I don't think it should be allowed to--that perception should be allowed to exist.  And the best way to not allow it to exist is to act forcefully so no one can believe it. So I'm actually more inclined to be more hawkish, if you want to use a simple term, on Sudan in an election year and given the difficulties in Iraq than perhaps in other circumstances because I think it's very worrisome the lessons the government in Khartoum, but also other regimes and terrorist groups who are close to that government--the lesson they will take if we look paralyzed. Now, it's easy for us to sit here and say we should do more, we should do things, and harder to, of course, know exactly what to do.  John laid out certain items.  My only qualification would be I don't think you can enter down the path we've entered without holding open the possibility of the use of troops. I mean, it was a huge mistake which I believe the President, President Clinton, now acknowledges--certainly, his senior advisers now do--to have entered down the path of stopping ethnic cleansing in the Balkans while ruling out the use of ground troops.  And, in fact, it's only when we seem to be about to un-rule out the use of ground troops there that Milosevic finally capitulated.  And I think here, too, you just need to have the ultimate threat behind all the diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and the like. There are intermediate things between sending in 10,000 U.S. troops and no use of troops.  Obviously, there are no-fly zones, there are international forces, with the U.S. over the horizon back-up.  I don't know what to do precisely and we should obviously look prudently at all kinds of things short of landing, you know, two battalions right in Darfur or in Khartoum, which might sort of solve the problem more quickly. But I really think it can't be ruled out, and it's important for all of us who are advocating a more aggressive stance here to at least be honest about that and to say that it can't be ruled out.  And it doesn't have to be ruled out.  We obviously can do it if we have to, even though we're stretched thin, even though our army should be larger and even though Iraq has required more troops than the administration thought it would a year ago. So in conclusion, I just sort of reiterate these points.  I mean, my simple-minded view of this is that, you know, this is a terrorist-sponsoring, atrocity-committing, even slightly WMD-related regime--we don't have to get into that, the question of whether, you know, the chemical plant in 1998--but radical Islamic, terror-exporting and terror-harboring regime that is killing tens of thousands of its own people, as well as harboring terrorists who seek to kill and have killed Americans. It doesn't seem to me to be a very--if there's a good candidate for the Bush doctrine of at least pressuring and maximally removing these regimes, Sudan is very high on the list.  And they've now put them frankly--they would have been, I think, lower on the list as sort of a problem we deal with more through containment and pressure if they hadn't decided to start slaughtering a whole other bunch of their own citizens.  And when they start doing that, there's absolutely no reason not to elevate them on the list and to say that this regime needs to be pressured much more aggressively, and if that falls short, to be removed. MR. DONNELLY:  Thank you so much, Bill. With the tyranny of time, I'm going to improvise a bit on the planned program and I'd like to get Congressman Wolf to the podium as soon as possible.  However, I would like to invite the panel to stay seated and to be available to take questions if there is time later. Bill I'm willing to excuse if you would like to put a magazine out.  That's a pretty good excuse, but I'm very appreciative of your time.  And, John and Ronald, if you could just stay where we are, I would like to get as rapidly as possible Bill on about his business if he needs to go, not that I'm trying to kick him out. MR. KRISTOL:  I can take a hint. MR. DONNELLY:  Okay, and we look forward to reading it on Monday morning. But while Bill is skulking out, I would like to introduce Representative Wolf.  I said in my initial introduction in many ways to this audience he needs no introduction.  His work in Africa and as the Co-Chair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus is well-documented, but it's worth also reminding the audience that he has been a determined defender of oppressed peoples throughout the world, not simply in Africa. His work to call attention to human rights abuses in China, in Tibet, in Bosnia, in East Timor and in Chechnya, and his work in Africa is far broader than simply humanitarian issues, although "simply" is not the right word.  But his attention to the issue of blood diamonds from Sierra Leone and, of course, the genocide elsewhere in Sudan is a matter of public record. So I can't think of anybody better to keynote our discussions today than Congressman Wolf.  Please welcome him to the podium with me. [Applause.] MR. WOLF:  Thank you very much, thank you very much, and I'm amazed to see such a large crowd and I'm pleased that so many people are interested in this, and I want to thank AEI for having this forum. And I don't have the benefit of knowing what the other panelists said, but what I'd like to do is maybe take five or six minutes just to say some comments, and then we have a six-minute video, a film that Senator Brownback and I have taken. Usama bin Laden lived in Sudan from '91 to '96, controlled the   ?   Arabic trade, construction.  The people who did the assassination attempt on President Mubarek came out of Sudan.  Up until about a year ago--and I think the Bush administration deserves a lot of credit.  Quite frankly, the President should say he is the President that has stopped slavery in Sudan. Up until a year ago, you could have flown from here to England, taken a flight down to Nairobi overnight and gone out to Wilson Field, flown for three-and-a-half, four hours, trekked for five hours and we could have taken you into a camp where you could purchase people.  So because of this administration and what it has done, they have made a tremendous difference. This is genocide.  I think it is very important for the administration to say that it is genocide.  I just got off the phone talking to somebody, urging them to say clearly that it is genocide. Estimation--and I know John has been there and has a lot of good information--30 to 50,000 have perhaps died.  Darfur is a very desolate area.  Some say up to 300,000 could die.  But these are numbers and numbers and numbers, so I want to talk about real people. Here's what we were told over and over.  The morning comes, the Antanoff [ph] bomber--and you'll see that it comes in, drops the bomb.  Then Soviet Hine [ph] helicopters come in, which you'll also see, with large gattling guns, machine guns on the side, attacking and shooting people as they, in nervousness, waking up with the bomb running out. Then the Janjaweed, which you'll see, come riding in on horseback and on camel, killing me, raping women.  And we have a report in the report that's passing out--we don't put the names, although the women gave us their names.  We're going to show you pictures of the women who told us.  We have not released these because we don't want the government to see them, and so we have not shown it to all the different groups.  But the men come out; many are killed.  Women are raped. Then they told us the helicopters land with supplies for the Janjaweed, and sometimes the military.  Supplies are taken off.  The booty is then put on.  Then the torches are lit and they burn the villages down. The woman then walks with the children and some elderly men for four, five, six, seven days.  And John knows, having been out there, how hot it is, not very much water, no vegetation.  They get to these camps, many of these IDP camps now.  The numbers are--I don't know what the numbers are.  Some are very well-run--Abushuk [ph], where the Secretary was--but most are not.  Feces all over the place, animal feces, human feces, cholera in some places, measles outbreak in two of the camps we went, kids very sick, women sick, very depressed. And then in the morning in the camps where they are--some have been in for two and three and four and five months--the bigger the camp, the Janjaweed are out there surrounding, if you will.  Imagine putting your mom or your dad or your son or your daughter or your wife or hour husband in these conditions, or your sister. And so the men feel kind of demoralized because they know if they go outside the camp, they're going to get killed.  Clearly, they will get killed.  The women they then ask to go outside the camp may be raped, and so they get up very early in the morning, the women, very, very early in the morning to go out.  And the longer they've been there, the farther they have to go out because, as you know, if you've been camping in the Shenandoah Valley or the camp--and the campsite the first night, you get the branches in the trees closeby, then the farther you go out, the farther. So they've been there for four and five months.  Forty thousand go out, and so therefore they go out for a long distance and they're raped.  And sometimes when they're raped, they are marked with a blade on the back.  Little food, measles, malaria, sickness, all the conditions. The women told us--you're going to see on one of them--to make lighter-skinned babies.  You're also going to see on the film where they say you are slaves.  It is genocide.  I've seen it out of my own eyes.  I've read Samantha Powers'[ph] book.  I think you have to ask what will Samantha Powers or other who writes about this a year from now say. But, you know, the Greek word "genos," race; the Latin word "cide," killing, black African villages.  We've seen the satellite photographs, but now we've been--Brownback and I have been in the villages; Arab village intact, black African village just destroyed.  All the people in the camp are black Africans. In one village--I think Sam Brownback has a picture--a mosque was burned.  The Holocaust Museum thinks it is genocide.  The House voted overwhelmingly, working with Don Payne and Charlie Rangel and the Republican leadership in the House, who moved this thing quickly; Henry Hyde, God bless him, who allowed this to be released from his committee. The last night we were in, we went over to meet with Senator Frist and he moved this thing.  I mean, generally you can always find a Senator who will block something and nobody knows who they are.  Frist, to his credit, and the good work of Sam Brownback, moved to this Congress now for the first time while something is taking place, believes it is genocide. And I think if this were taking place in a little village in southern France or in western Germany or--you know, the world would be electrified by it.  And these people are of the same value of anybody that lives in Europe or the United States.  And when I go into something like this, I always identify as a father of five children, as a grandfather of nine children.  Four of my children are daughters.  They have no place to go. And so with that, if we can just show the film, it's about six minutes, and I think in it you'll see the connection between the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed. These pictures were taken by Dan Scanlon.  There are the Hine helicopters.  That's the tail of the Antanoff bomber.  On the side, if you can see, sometimes there's a machine gun.  You get another side shot of them.  They're flown by the government of Sudan pilots. This next--we took these at two different base.  At this base, the Janjaweed camp is 150 yards from that helicopter and the government of Sudan military were about 200 yards from the Janjaweed camp. This is outside of Janine [ph].  That's a Janjaweed, that's Janjaweed.  They're outside Mrni, Mrni camp.  They're outside all the camps.  That's M-r-n-i, very close to the Chad border.  More Janjaweed. This is the Mrni camp.  People came up and told us--although the handlers stayed with us, Brownback and I broke away from them.  In this camp, we couldn't--the people still said--you hear the Harding [ph] machine gun.  You'll see the guy gets in front of the machine gun.  They still--people still told us--the women said they were raped. This is a village.  We were in four villages like this; there are so many as you go.  Burned-out village; tortured after the helicopter lands, takes the booty away. This was in SLA territory.  We crossed the line into that, and you'll see one or two families have come back.  You'll see them just--there was a mosque burned in this village.  These are all Muslims, black African Muslims.  They didn't have time to take anything.  They said they didn't have time to bury their dead.  There were stories, too--and I don't know if John mentioned it--of dumping bodies down wells that would pollute the well. This fellow came back.  We asked why.  He said because of his belief in God, and also the SLA controlled the area, a very desolate area, very hot.  People walk for--the roads are not paved roads and they walk for miles and miles to get to the IDP camps.  You'll see a couple IDP camps.  Every one was burned, so they really have no place to go back to.  Security is the number one issue because they say they're not going to go back until they have security. This is an IDP camp that was being set up.  They cut the bushes down and develop a sort of a hut, which will not keep the water out, but will keep the sun out.  When it rains, it rains really hard, very hard. This is the camp that Secretary Powell was in, and Kofi Annan, Abushuk, a very-well run camp, the World Food Program there and other groups, Save the Children, and latrines and wells.  But this is the best-run camp.  Some of these people have been there for months and months and months.  There are probably 70,000, I think, in that camp. The people stayed with you.  We took off in different directions and split up and had opportunity.  But, generally, the   ?   in that camp stayed, this camp and the last camp.  They stayed pretty close to us.  This is a constant scene in every place. Can you turn the sound up just a little? She got here this morning.  She had walked for days.  This is Abushuk again.  That tarp keeps the rain out; they're very secure.  There are latrines and wells on the other side.  This is another camp.  The kids were drawing pictures, and psychologically, helicopters and bombs. Now, we go to the film that we've never shown before--I hope it's on there--Dan said he--of the women.  These sisters were raped yesterday; beat them, raped them, Janjaweed.  You're a slave.  Why are you coming here?  We were in the region when these two women were raped.  It took a lot of courage for these women to do this.  They mark the woman on the back after the rape, the branding.  Four hundred women raped in this village.  A nine-year-old girl was raped and was bleeding. That's enough.  In the report, too, we have the letter.  The women gave us a letter with their names.  We had it translated by the Library of Congress.  In the report, we don't list the names.  We have not listed names because obviously--but they were willing to come forward to say that they had raped--they're willing to be signed.  And if you read it, it says that we, most of us, are without husbands.  We are carrying the babies.  We have aborted some babies. And the graphic nature of the racial issue--this is targeted against black Africans and this meets the definition of   ?    .  This is genocide.  We know it now; the world knows it.  And quite frankly, I think--and I don't know what was said about the administration.  Secretary Powell has done a good job.  The President has done a good job. Roger Winter [ph] and Andrew Natzias [ph]--most of the food there is food from us.  They got to do more, and I think they need to declare this thing to be genocide, which will electrify the world.  But I don't think you can criticize this administration.  I think they have done well. I think now, though, it's just like anything in life.  You know, it's what have you done for me lately, and I think you have to do more because you have a lot of people that are dying and will continue to die. With that, I'll just end. Yes, sir? MR. DONNELLY:  If you could--sorry--if you could wait for the microphone, tell us who you are.  And once again, I'll remind people to ask questions and not make statements, and I will be brutal in interrupting if you don't observe our ground rules. Thank you. MR. HELMAN:  Yes.  I'm Richard Helman [ph] from the Middle East Research Center Limited, MERCL, and I want to correct the record slightly that Congressman Wolf didn't hear--earlier, it was said no one is calling for U.S. boots on the ground.  We are calling for U.S. boots on the ground, in cooperation with the 5,000-troop brigade that the British have offered, the Nigerian troops and anybody else who is ready to step in.  I think it's time for a new coalition of the willing. MR. DONNELLY:  Is there a question in this? MR. HELMAN:  Yes, there is a question. MR. DONNELLY:  Can you get to it? MR. HELMAN:  Why not a coalition of the willing instead of more debate by the unwilling or the unready?  And as a follow-up, there has been pioneering academic work at a university on a preventative approach which would identify the early indicators of genocide--mass terror, mass slaughter--much as would be done in an epidemiological approach. And we are calling and would ask why not congressional action to call for our representatives at the UN, in what is an emerging coalition of parliamentary democracies in the Human Rights Commission, to have a preventative protocol to act against the early indicators of genocide and mass slaughter rather than waiting until thousands or hundreds of thousands are dying. MR. WOLF:  Well, I think that's a good idea.  That's why Senator Brownback and I went there, not to be waiting to read a book by Samantha Powers two years from now where she says--and that's why we went, and I think you do need those indicators because every other time--in Rwanda, the follow-up was pathetic, if you read her book, which is a great book if you haven't read it. I sent a letter to every American ambassador asking them to read it.  The cables were going back and forth.  Jim Zalaries [ph]--now the very difficult--the Canadian general who said if we had only done more.  So I think your point is well taken and they ought to do that. I wrote with Don Payne asking Secretary General Annan, and I thank him for going, and made the comment that the genocide in Rwanda took place when he was head of the UN peace-keeping forces.  And to this credit, he has gone.  I think he now knows it's genocide. And I think the administration is doing--I, on my way over here, spoke to them and I said you have to start telling the American people all that you are doing because you ought not hide your light under a bushel basket.  You should do it, and in addition to doing that, you should do more.  Until you have some effort with regard to security, this will continue. I understand the Rwandans are prepared to send some troops.  I understand the Nigerians are prepared to send some.  The Ghanians are sending some.  The African Union appears to be very willing.  We are now funding 15,000 U.S. peace-keepers in Liberia, which was actually my amendment in subcommittee.  That's half the size of Darfur. So you really need--and the African Union, I believe, is ready to do that.  And I think we should cooperate with airplanes and contract the planes that you need to get them on the ground.  But I think some mechanism of early indication is important, but I think this is--we now have it; we now know what has been going on, so there's really not an excuse for not doing something. MR. DONNELLY:  I believe John Prendergast had a brief comment he wanted to make. MR. PRENDERGAST:  I want to piggyback on Congressman Wolf's point there.  I think it's a form of subtle racism to say or to think or to believe that it has to be U.S. or British forces that does everything everywhere.  The Rwandans in the form of counter-insurgency operations, the Nigerians in terms of peace enforcement operations, have more experience than anyone around the world, and I think they can do the job. We spent the last decade over three administrations--Bush I, Clinton and Bush II--building the capacity of African forces to do just this thing.  We've promised that we would resource it.  The time has come today, yesterday, to resource this deployment, just as Congressman Wolf has said. MR.         :  Yes, sir. MR. DONNELLY:  Again, I'm sorry.  I really would--I'm going to insist that people ask questions.  We have invited you here to hear the panelists and to hear the Congressman.  I'm sympathetic to the deep emotions that these issues touch in people, but we have an obligation to be disciplined just at this moment. Sir, I think this woman here has the microphone, and then we'll kind of work across here. MS. SCHULTZ;  I'm Terry Schultz [ph].  I cover the State Department for Fox News Channel.  And Secretary Powell has consistently said that we would be doing nothing different if he concludes a finding of genocide, which he expects to do in the next couple of weeks.  You seem to think that would make a difference. And earlier, Bill Kristol said that he believes there may come a time in the not too distant future where regime change should be discussed, since a behavioral change in the Sudanese government is not apparently taking place. Would Congress support something like that? MR. WOLF:  I'm not--I have--we have 435 senior class presidents in the place that I work on in one way or the other.  I'm not prepared to speak for the Congress.  I think we need a system--the frustration I've had--TAPE CHANGE--I spoke to Charlie, Charlie Snyder [ph].  Andrew Natzias burns for this. Roger Winter, who I think is in that region now, cares more--I mean, they just have to tell people, and I think as you move this process I think they now need to say this is genocide, because by saying that it's genocide, that will put great pressure. And John is exactly right.  Both the Clinton and the Bush administration have done a tremendous job of training many African forces.  They are running the operation in Sierra Leone, they are running the operation in Rwanda, and they are actually prepared.  And there is a Ghanaian general who is now on the ground now up in the Alsashar [ph] area. But I can't speak for what the Congress would say, but I think the administration--well, you know, I don't want to get bogged down into that.  I want to help the women and the children and the people that told me, Mr. Wolf, take this word back.  I want to make sure that the death stops.  I want to make sure that the Janjaweed is disarmed. I want to make sure that the West--that Samantha Powers and others can't write books about that we stood by.  We are a different country.  We provide the leadership.  John Danforth did a good job up in the UN.  The Chinese were not with it.  In fact, go to Khartoum.  The Chinese are all over Khartoum, many of these governments.  So the administration has moved it. I want to do everything we need to do to make sure that the rape stops, the killing stops, the people can return to the villages and live in peace.  And you're dealing with a regime, though, with a government that was involved.  2.1 million people died from the south, mainly Christians, but a large number of Muslims and   ?    .  So we want to do whatever we can to make sure that what's taking place stops. MR. DONNELLY:  I'm sorry.  We really only have time for one more question.  I promised this gentleman here, and once we're done I'll call for sort of concluding comments by the panel. MR.         :  Congressman Wolf, in your report you call for the establishment of a no-fly zone.  To your knowledge, what sort of discussion and operational planning has been happening on the U.S. side and with other forces capable of doing that primarily in Europe? MR. WOLF:  The administration has been talking about a lot of different things.  They've been talking to the British, they've been talking to the Dutch, they've been talking to a number of others.  I cannot tell you specifically where they are on that, but they have. And I know the President is deeply concerned, I know the Secretary is deeply concerned, and I know the other people that we did--and I just think you need to take the next step to say--and I would like to see President Bush say we now believe, based on what we now know, this meets the test and this is genocide. In closing this, you know, one, I'm really impressed to see so many people here, and I know you're not here to hear me.  And I think the more you're speaking out, the more you're talking, the more you're   ?    , we can tremendously make a difference.  And I want to thank AEI for holding this. MR. DONNELLY:  Thank you very much. [Applause.] MR. DONNELLY:  I want to thank our two experts for hanging on for a bit, and as either a penalty or a reward for your patience, I'll give you the opportunity to make some very brief closing remarks. I myself would like to make two very brief observations.  One, other than just the human story that Congressman Wolf's film tells, it also tells to me a very clear military story.  Those helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are not weapons employed by militias; those are weapons employed by governments. To maintain those systems, those aircraft in a combat zone, it requires a large-scale logistics effort, which I would say at least off the top of my head I can't think of a single militia in the world that's capable of doing that.  So if you're talking about the military operation that's resulting in the genocide or the ethnic cleansing or whatever term of art you want to use in Darfur, that has every military earmark of being an operation of the central government. Secondly, I come away with this not simply impressed by the immediate crisis, but a sense that the feature of the regime is as much part of this question.  I won't go through that in excruciating detail, but whether it's provoking a war from the center to the periphery or as a crossroads of international terrorism, or even of the autocratic regimes in the region or indeed of external great power meddling, I think that certainly the interests of the United States, and I hope of the international community in the future of Sudan again extends beyond the admitted crisis of the moment. So I want to sort of make a pledge to the audience at least on behalf of myself, and I hope on the part of AEI that we will continue to return to this issue periodically for a whole host of reasons and looking at the problem from a whole host of dimensions. So I will stop now and ask first Ron and then John Prendergast to give some brief closing comments.  And, again, thank you so much, all of you, for coming. MR. SANDEE:  Thank you.  Well, I just want to state I hope I made my point that we must see that the Sudan is not only bad inside its own country, but this government also has a lot of hard-line Islamists who are not only playing the role within their own country and not even respect their own Muslim minorities if they aren't from their own race, but that they are also--are at least entities within this government, at least people who know, are still involved in what we still call terrorism. There are training camps where Mujahadeen are being trained to fight the coalition in Iraq.  There are training camps from where Mujahadeen go to Saudi Arabia to attack government installations.  So Sudan is still paying a major role in the international terrorism. Thank you. MR. PRENDERGAST:  Well, it's a rare pleasure for me to sit on a panel on Sudan where I'm the moderate.  And you met some doosies, Congressman Wolf. We really don't have to go to regime change.  We have the tools.  We can change the regime's behavior on this thing if we act more forcefully.  We have three stark choices--I just want to reinforce this--right now, today, as we sit here. Number one, do we double the relief effort in Sudan or not--money?  Number two, do we do what it takes to deploy this African Union force today--money?  Number three, do we hold the government of Sudan accountable for the war crimes and crimes against humanity that they've perpetrated?  That's political will.  It is our choice. Thanks. MR. DONNELLY:  Again, let me say a final thank you first to Congressman Wolf, secondly to Ronald, John and Bill, in absentia.  And, again, what a fabulous turn-out.  Thanks to you guys also for coming. [Applause.]</body></html>