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Transforming America's Alliances

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Despite ingrained perceptions of unilateralism, the Bush administration has overseen the most sweeping expansion of American security commitments around the world since the dawn of the Cold War. Even as recriminations over Iraq dominate headlines, the contours of a new alliance system are quietly emerging out of America's partnerships with dozens of countries, from Mali to the Philippines, under attack by al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates. The challenge now is to ensure that this coalition of the willing is also a coalition of the committed—an enduring network of relationships for fighting the war on terror that the Bush administration can bequeath to its successors, be they Democrat or Republican.

The question of alliances has always been the source of controversy in American politics. On the one hand, a tradition of unilateralism can be traced to the very beginning of the Republic's foreign policy. George Washington, in his 1796 farewell address, famously advised his successors to "steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world," for fear that it would "entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice." Instead, Washington argued "we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies"—ad hoc coalitions of the willing, in modern parlance.[1]

Washington's words found diplomatic expression throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. As secretary of state, John Quincy Adams spurned Britain's offer of a joint Anglo-American statement against the re-colonization in the New World in favor of a unilateral declaration—the Monroe Doctrine—arguing that "it would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly . . . than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war."[2] A hundred years later, Woodrow Wilson insisted on entering World War I as an "associated" power, rather than an "allied" power, of London, Paris, and Saint Petersburg, and his pronouncements on postwar policy, including his "Fourteen Points," were made without prior coordination or consultation with his counterparts in Europe. Whether isolationist or interventionist in its international relations, the United States consistently avoided formal alliances with foreign powers from its founding up until the 1940s.[3]

It was during that decade that a countervailing approach to foreign policy came to the fore under the leadership of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman. In the face of the existential threat posed by the Axis powers, Roosevelt rightly recognized that American security was inextricably linked to that of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Beginning with Lend-Lease in 1941, he set about to fashion what he would call, after Pearl Harbor, "a grand alliance" to defeat the Germans and the Japanese. Roosevelt similarly envisioned a postwar security architecture in which "four policemen"—the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China—would share responsibility for maintaining global order. Under Truman, the United States led the charge to establish the United Nations, and more importantly, devised

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and embedded itself in a range of formalized, multilateral security relationships to contain and deter the threat of Soviet aggression. The most successful expression of this strategy was in Western Europe—the central front of the Cold War—where the United States cast aside George Washington's admonition against entangling alliances and instead pledged itself to a mutual defense pact that effectively placed the region under an American nuclear umbrella.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the attacks of September 11, 2001, America's two diplomatic traditions were thrown into apparent competition: a clash of strategic cultures, each with a distinct lineage in American diplomatic history and a claim on the present moment in international relations. The foreign policy of the Bush administration, it is commonly argued, represents a restoration of America's earlier approach to the world and a break with the past fifty years of institutionalized alliances. "America Unbound," in the words of Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay of the Brookings Institution, has meant foremost that the Bush administration has sought to "shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies, and international institutions."[4] In waging the global war on terror, this line of thinking goes, the Bush administration's motto has been, "unilateral when we can, multilateral when we must."

Senator John Kerry, by contrast, staked his national security agenda in last year's presidential campaign on "rebuilding alliances," to the point that he appeared passionate about little else. He opined wistfully that, "there was a time, not so long ago, when the might of our alliances was a driving force in the survival and success of freedom," and promised to "launch and lead a new era of alliances for the post-9/11 world" as the first priority of his foreign policy.[5] At times, it seemed the entire debate about George W. Bush's national security strategy, from the invasion of Iraq to the doctrine of preemption, was being filtered through this overarching argument about the nature, purpose, and value of America's coalitions and partnerships.

Predictably, however, the past season's partisan mudslinging tended to obscure more than it revealed about the state of America's international alliances and the Bush administration's management of them. While the president's reelection campaign was, for obvious reasons, eager to stress his determination to defend America's security interests irrespective of what Paris or Berlin might think, the truth is that the Bush administration has fostered an unprecedented degree of cooperation among the great powers, maneuvering countless governments into its counterterrorism coalition. Furthermore, the web of security commitments the United States has cultivated for more than fifty years has—far from contracting—expanded radically over the past four years. With the eastward growth of NATO, new relationships with governments of formerly hostile countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, and partnerships with other countries and societies around the world under threat by radical Islam, the Bush administration is guiding the transformation of the U.S. alliance system in ways it may itself not yet fully appreciate.

An Arsenal of Democracy

In crafting its response to the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has been explicit in its intention to wage forward-leaning, aggressive operations against al Qaeda and by extension, the political conditions in the greater Middle East that have made possible its rise. Speaking at West Point in June 2002, President Bush explained: "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action." Although the president was careful not to reject the Cold War defensive doctrines of deterrence and containment, he argued that they alone are insufficient: "Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies."[6]

The Bush administration's emphasis on forward operations has important, if little explored, implications for alliance-building in the war on terror. As Harvard's Stephen M. Walt has noted, "offensive alliances are generally more fragile than defensive ones."[7] By its very nature, an institutionalized "go-to-war" alliance is problematic in that it requires its members to be ready to sacrifice blood and treasure for a cause that may not be wholly or equally their own. Rather, the decision to go on the offensive—and remain committed to the offensive—is almost inescapably ad hoc, subject to shifting, not to mention idiosyncratic, political calculations and perceptions. France may elect to deploy its Special Forces to Afghanistan but block U.S. attempts to use the NATO Rapid Reaction Force there; Germany may elect

to dispatch its Navy to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa but decline to send troops to Iraq. Defensive alliances are by contrast less demanding and thus comparatively more predictable, geared toward preserving, rather than overturning, the international status quo.

In this light, the failure of the transatlantic alliance to transition smoothly from the defensive posture of the Cold War to the offensive operations required by the global war on terror is hardly surprising. At the same time, however, it would a mistake to assume, as some political theorists have suggested, that unilateralism is the inevitable consequence of an aggressive American strategy.[8] Indeed, as the Bush Doctrine tacitly recognizes, the global war on terror *will* turn on America's ability to forge meaningful alliances where they will matter most—with the governments and societies of the greater Middle East.

While having NATO in Iraq is undoubtedly a good thing, the center of gravity for the conflict there is not transatlantic politics; it is the politics of the Iraqi people themselves.

Indeed, from West Africa to Southeast Asia, the United States is quietly working to recruit, mobilize, and support locals willing to join the fight against radical Islam. In essence, just as al Qaeda has been said to "franchise" jihad—outsourcing the grunt work of suicide bombings to angry young locals from Turkey to Indonesia—the Pentagon is building a rival franchise in counterterrorism. Thus, while having NATO in Iraq is undoubtedly a good thing, the center of gravity for the conflict there is not transatlantic politics; it is the politics of the Iraqi people themselves. In addition to sheer manpower, local allies can also provide the United States with assets that are otherwise unavailable; by virtue of speaking the language and knowing the population, for instance, they afford better intelligence than foreign troops ever will.

While these operations are a matter of power projection for the United States, they must be understood as something different for the soldiers, policemen, civil servants, and ordinary citizens of the region. To them, the global war on terror must be a war of *defense*—a defense of their homelands against the transnational threat of radical Islam, a defense of their religion against those who would desecrate and pervert it, and, most profoundly, a defense of their natural rights and political liberties.

Obviously, this dynamic has a better chance of taking root in emerging democracies like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Indonesia than in the authoritarian states that otherwise dominate the region's landscape. Therefore, when the United States pushes for democratization and political reform, it is partly because free societies foster the sense of ownership that will empower local elites capable of defeating radical Islam.

This approach to the war on terror, it bears emphasizing, derives less from Adams's nineteenth-century unilateralism than from Roosevelt's multilateral strategy against the Axis. As historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued:

> Roosevelt intended for allies, at least in Europe, to do most of the fighting. This idea had been implicit in his "arsenal of democracy" concept prior to Pearl Harbor: the United States would furnish weapons, but the British and the Russians would actually use them. . . . It was to depend on allies while simultaneously coming to their rescue.[9]

Indeed, the "arsenal of democracy" formulation captures perfectly the Bush administration's response to the September 11 attacks. Consider, for example, the Philippines. There, in the summer of 2002, the Bush administration dispatched Marines to partner with local military forces and rid Basilan Island of Abu Sayyaf, an Islamist guerrilla group affiliated with al Qaeda. The Pentagon provided training, doctrine, intelligence, and materiel, but the tough work of defeating the insurgents ultimately fell to the Filipinos themselves. So, too, in Afghanistan, where the U.S.-assisted Northern Alliance provided the lion's share of manpower to drive the Taliban out of Kabul, and the U.S.-trained and equipped Afghan National Army is today rapidly becoming a pillar of stability behind the new democratic political order.

These new alliances are also important in that they facilitate access to strategic battle space for the United States. Just as the Euro-American alliance of the Cold War was anchored in the understanding that, should the Soviet Union launch a military assault on the West, Germany would be the central front of that war, partnerships with countries in the Islamic world allow the Pentagon to stay close to the front lines of the war on terror. In addition to actual bases, access can also take the form of less visible arrangements, such as intelligence sharing, the

pre-positioning of materiel, and "gas-and-go" agreements for the U.S. Air Force.

Thus far, the Pentagon has approached these counterterrorism partnerships in predominantly bilateral and informal terms. In many cases, however, the United States would benefit considerably from formalizing them, acting as a kind of "systems integrator" for a region—much as it did in Western Europe after World War II—pulling governments into a collective "grand alliance" against radical Islam. For instance, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) this past year brought together the military chiefs of nine West African governments to discuss the movements of radical Islamist groups across their nations' ungoverned, porous borders. Before the meeting, several of the generals had never met despite living next door to one another, while others were accustomed to eyeing their neighbors with suspicion rather than cooperating. EUCOM also coordinated a multinational manhunt across three countries for the leader of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an Islamist terrorist group linked to al Qaeda, providing intelligence from Navy P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft to the local African troops tracking him down.[10]

Another example of this kind of regional framework can be found in Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Established in October 2002 and headquartered in Djibouti, the Task Force is responsible for detecting, disrupting, and defeating transnational terrorist groups in its area of responsibility, encompassing the airspace and land areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. Although CJTF-HOA performs various missions—from airport security in Nairobi to humanitarian outreach in rural Ethiopia—it also serves as a mechanism for fostering regional security cooperation. As Brigadier General Mastin Robeson, former commander of CJTF-HOA, explains: "This is not a U.S. operation. This is a coalition. The transnational terrorist issue has the potential to . . . rise above local and even historical politics."[11]

By bringing countries into a formal framework for cooperation, the United States signals its seriousness about what Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice has called a "generational commitment" to the transformation of the region. Much as in Europe after World War II, both friends and foes in the greater Middle East today suspect that Washington simply does not have the staying power for the "long, hard slog" ahead. Just as institutions like NATO were meant to embed the United States into a transatlantic security architecture, raising the costs for withdrawal, the Bush administration should establish similarly enduring relationships to ensure its successors remain deeply engaged in the Islamic world.

This kind of arrangement will also provide the United States with increased leverage to push for political reforms in the greater Middle East, as the populations of the region recognize that we are there for the long haul. Just as Roosevelt included Stalin in his alliance during World War II, there are strategic imperatives in the current war that have prompted the Bush administration to embrace regimes of dubious legitimacy. Although these alliances may be necessary to fight Islamist radicalism, they create perverse disincentives for partner regimes against addressing their internal failings, which are themselves responsible in no small part for the phenomenon of Islamist radicalism. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen of the U.S. Army War College sum up this dilemma neatly:

> The problem for the United States is finding an effective way to encourage or, if necessary, force the partner to undertake needed reforms at the same time that its security capabilities are improved. All too often a partner will conclude that, if they are important enough to attract Washington's commitment to help them, American policymakers will not let them fall and thus will overlook continued repression, corruption, or other shortcomings. In addition, American assistance makes partner regimes feel more secure which can, in their eyes, diminish the urgency of change.[12]

Regional security partnerships provide a means to begin to address this challenge. Rather than merely facing bilateral criticisms from Washington, individual countries would instead recognize that their failure to reform weakens them vis-à-vis less obstreperous neighbors. Ironically, then, multilateralism in this context facilitates a divide-and-conquer strategy. In addition, formal institutions—like clubs everywhere, and especially those associated with wealth, power, and prestige—create what Robert Cooper has called the "lure of membership," which in turn can be used to influence internal behavior, as both NATO and the European Union amply demonstrate.[13] And while such a strategy will never work against willful pariahs like Saddam Hussein or the Taliban, the greater Middle East has fewer such actors today than crumbling autocracies that might yet be brought in from the cold.

The Great Power Peace

To the extent the United States succeeds in being an "arsenal of democracy" to societies in the greater Middle East, it is partly a function of the post–Cold War great power peace that the Bush administration has preserved and, arguably, deepened. Among the most striking attributes of the post-9/11 world is the unprecedented degree of alignment among world governments, including regional heavyweights such as Japan, Russia, India, China, and Germany. Even as critics have deplored President Bush's "with-us-or-against-us" rhetoric as simplistic and alienating, the fact remains, in grand strategic terms, almost the entire planet has chosen to be with us. Moscow, despite some grumbling, has acceded to U.S. counterterrorism alliances with former satellite states like Georgia and Uzbekistan; Washington has been able, miraculously, to strengthen its strategic relationships with archrivals India and Pakistan *simultaneously* over the past four years. As the Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy* observed: "Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos."[14]

Alignment, of course, is not the same thing as popularity, and it is undeniable that President Bush is disliked by wide swaths of European and Middle Eastern public opinion. Popular animosity toward the Bush administration and anti-Americanism more broadly constitute a serious strategic challenge, especially in democratic societies where politicians can exploit these forces for electoral advantage.

Yet, at the same time, it is striking that the past four years have by and large not witnessed the rise—whether by the ballot box in democratic societies, or popular revolt in autocratic ones—of expressly anti-American regimes. Indeed, when governments changed hands between 2001 and 2005, the United States has usually been strategically better off with the result (Iraq and Afghanistan, of course, but also Georgia, Colombia, Japan, Canada, Malaysia, Turkey, Kenya, Liberia, Indonesia, and Ukraine); only rarely have we been worse off (Spain and South Korea).

With the partial exception of the decision to invade Iraq, popular animosity toward President Bush has not translated into a rush to actively oppose his strategic priorities, much less ally with Islamist insurgents. Democratic elections in Muslim countries where anti-American sentiment runs high, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey, have done nothing to strengthen al Qaeda; rather, they have weakened it. And while the Bush administration has effectively maneuvered countless governments, both traditional allies and historical foes, into its counterterrorism coalition, Osama bin Laden's organization is more an international pariah today than it was four years ago, utterly bereft of state sponsors. Even al Qaeda's former Taliban hosts have apparently splintered, with many pursuing an arms-for-amnesty offer that will allow them to rejoin Afghanistan's increasingly democratic, peaceful political process.[15]

In short, the United States may not be winning any popularity contests, but neither are our enemies.

Projecting Power

In addition to deepening alliances in the greater Middle East and facilitating cooperation among the global powers, the Bush administration has also worked to develop effective partnerships for projecting power in the war on terror. As noted above, this is an inherently tricky proposition, far more challenging in some respects than the anti-Axis and anti-Soviet alliances assembled for World War II and the Cold War. At the same time, however, it is also extremely valuable. No matter how good the U.S. military is, it remains a numerically small force; no matter how strong the U.S. economy, it remains insufficient to bankroll the transformation of the greater Middle East.

To this end, President Bush has rightly emphasized his intention to "reach out to our allies and friends" in his second term, especially "our partners" in NATO and the European Union.[16] NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was the first foreign visitor to the White House after reelection, and President Bush's first trip abroad after his second inauguration will be to Brussels. Already, the Bush administration has advanced the thankless work of pushing NATO toward preparing for "out-of-area" deployments and narrowing the capabilities gap with our partners in Europe. It has engaged with the G8 and the EU on democratization and civil society initiatives in the Islamic world. Despite the exchange of transatlantic spitballs over Iraq, day-to-day counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Europe has expanded since the September 11, 2001, and March 11, 2004, suicide bombings. European forces are deployed as part of the larger counterterrorism campaigns in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, and the majority of

NATO member states have dispatched troops to Iraq. The Bush administration has also prevailed upon the Europeans to take more responsibility in their own backyard, thereby freeing up American forces for use elsewhere. Nine years after the Dayton Accords brought NATO to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, almost all U.S. peacekeepers have departed, transferring command to the European Union. In its second term, the Bush administration should expand this dialogue to include other regions of strategic importance on Europe's doorstep—foremost, the Black Sea littoral and North Africa.

But even as the Bush administration tries to work with European partners, it should attach equal if not superior strategic value to the great democracies of the Asia-Pacific region—Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and, arguably most important, India. India's decisive entry into an American-led counterterrorism coalition could represent one of the most significant strategic goals for the next four years. Already India offers a model of an increasingly prosperous, multicultural state in which democracy and Islam coexist. Indeed, India, with its nearly 130 million Muslims, is the third largest "Muslim country" on Earth. New Delhi also has a large, professional military force at a time when most Western countries are tapped out of troops.

In his first post-election foreign policy address, Bush pledged to "foster a wide international consensus around three great goals," the first of which is "to defend our security and spread freedom by building effective multinational and multilateral institutions and supporting effective multilateral action."[17] Perhaps the best example of the Bush administration's innovative thinking about multilateralism is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush in Krakow, Poland, in May 2003. The brainchild of John R. Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, the goal of PSI is to create the basis for practical cooperation among states to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials, at sea, in the air, or on land. In the language of Under Secretary Bolton, PSI is "an activity, not an organization." As he explains, "It has no director general, it has no headquarters, it has no secretariat, it has no budget. It's a question of the participating nations cooperating in a variety of ways when the occasion arises."[18] More bluntly, it is a program that is geared toward producing concrete results rather than meaningless summitry and interminable dialogue.

The Proliferation Security Initiative is noteworthy in several additional respects: First, it has matched the global threat of proliferation with a truly global coalition. Rather than cleaving transatlantic relations and transpacific relations into separate spheres, PSI encompasses both Asian maritime powers like Japan and Australia, but also European states like the Netherlands, Poland, and Britain. Beginning with eleven core nations, PSI is now formally supported by over sixty countries.

Second, PSI is a flexible instrument, allowing different states to become involved in the PSI in many different ways, depending on what capabilities they can contribute. Some countries have participated in information meetings; others have been involved in interdiction training exercises. Involvement within PSI is voluntary, thus making maximum use of each government's strengths to combat the threat of proliferation within a cooperative framework.

Third, PSI is important in its application and interpretation of international law. Rather than construct an elaborate new legal architecture, the emphasis of PSI is to build on existing treaties, controls, and regimes against WMD proliferation that are currently being circumvented and violated. In doing so, it recognizes that the threat of WMD proliferation is less a function of the absence of strongly worded global treaties—there is no lack of them—than of signatories' willingness to comply with their obligations.

The Proliferation Security Initiative has already had quantifiable successes since its establishment—its most notable thus far coming in October 2003 with the seizure of the *BBC China*, a ship hauling uranium-enrichment centrifuge parts to Libya. The capture of these materials was, in turn, pivotal in convincing Moammar Gaddafi's regime to abandon its WMD programs and in unraveling the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network in Pakistan.

Given its accomplishments and effectiveness, it seems all but certain that PSI will continue long after President Bush departs from office four years from now. Indeed, its endurance represents its final noteworthy attribute. Although an "activity, not an organization," PSI points the way to the broader, enduring security architecture that the Bush administration has begun to construct for the post-9/11 world.

A Force Multiplier at Home

In looking toward its second term, the Bush administration has notable successes to draw on. Contrary to

the unilateralism of which it is so often accused, the administration has tended to pursue innovative, even iconoclastic, forms of multilateral action—deepening its alliances in the Middle East, fostering cooperation among the world powers, and pushing for effective partnerships to solve global security threats.

In understanding how the Bush administration is transforming America's alliances, it is important to distinguish between the cosmetic and the real. For all intents and purposes, the United States will continue to contribute the bulk of the military effort in the effort to transform the greater Middle East, just as it did toward the effort to contain Soviet communism. There is no walking away from the reality of American superpower.

At the same time, however, it is useful to remember that the international institutions and alliances of the Cold War were effective precisely because they codified American hegemony across the non-Communist world, though under a multilateral veneer. U.S. policymakers today should similarly recognize that even the *appearance* of burden-sharing is valuable—if only because it makes the American people more willing to bear the considerable costs of the struggle ahead. John Kerry's populist appeals against American largesse in rebuilding Iraq failed to catch fire against the more idealistic, liberal vision President Bush articulated, but opportunistic politicians are certain in the future to revive the cynical choice between firehouses in Brooklyn versus firehouses in Baghdad. Alliances make it harder for them to succeed. What a less powerful America was capable of accomplishing in 1949, a more powerful America should be capable of doing in 2005.

Notes

1. George Washington, "Farewell Address," September 19, 1796, available at gwpapers.virginia.edu/farewell/transcript.html.

2. John Quincy Adams, "Account of the Cabinet Meeting of November 7, 1823," available at www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/jqacab.htm.

3. The only exception to this was a treaty with France signed during the Revolutionary War, which President Washington urged the United States to honor.

4. Ivo H. Daalder and James H. Lindsay, *America Unbound* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 13.

5. John Kerry, "Strength and Security for a New World" (May 27, 2004), available at www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0527.html.

6.George W. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," Office of the White House Press Secretary (June 1, 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

7. Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 159.

8. See Dingli Shen, "Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2004). Shen argues that "alliances are only legitimate if they establish security partnerships for defensive purposes that together provide a system of collective security for all parties involved. . . . In contrast, alliances formed for aggressive purposes . . . inherently lack lasting legitimacy and subsequently lose relevance."

9. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 50–51.

10. Craig S. Smith, "U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists," *New York Times*, May 11, 2004.

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12. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, U.S. Army War College, (November 2004): 19, available at www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB586.pdf.

13. Robert Kagan, "Embraceable EU," *Washington Post*, December 5, 2004, available at www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16224.

14. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, Washington, D.C. (September 2002): 25, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ nss.html.

15. "Taliban Have Contacted U.S. Over Amnesty Offer," Agence France Presse, December 8, 2004.

16. George W. Bush, "Radio Address," Office of the White House Press Secretary, November 6, 2004.

17. George W. Bush, "President Discusses Strong Relationship with Canada," Office of the White House Press Secretary, December 1, 2004.

18. U.S. Department of State, "Press Conference on the Proliferation Security Initiative" (May 31, 2004), available at www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33556.htm.