<html><body>Can the U.S.-Turkish Relationship Be Repaired? March 23, 2005 Unedited transcript prepared from a tape recording <TABLE cellSpacing=1 cellPadding=1 width="100%" border=0> <TBODY> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>11:45 a.m.</DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Registration</DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Noon</DIV></TD> <TD>Speakers: </TD> <TD>Murat Mercan, AKP </TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> Richard Perle, AEI <?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> Robert Pollock, Wall Street Journal </TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD>Michael Rubin, AEI </TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>1:30 p.m</DIV></TD> <TD> Adjournment</TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE> Proceedings: MR. RUBIN:  We have a lot to talk about today, so I'm pleased to get started.  We have quite a distinguished panel here today. I'm proud to welcome Professor Murat Mercan, who's a founding member and a deputy chairman of the AKP.  He is a parliamentary deputy and also a professor at Bilkent University. It's always good to have Richard Perle, the former member of the Defense Policy Review Board and a former assistant secretary of defense, who's long been very involved in Turkish-American relations. I'm glad to welcome to the American Enterprise Institute Robert Pollock, who's a senior editorial page writer at the Wall Street Journal, known to many of you for some of his recent commentary on Turkish-American relations. I'm a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.  I'm going to both be the moderator and also a commentator on today's panel. We want to keep our remarks brief to allow the most possible time for questions and answers.  I'm going to ask Professor Mercan to start, followed by Mr. Pollock; I'll make a few comments; Richard Perle will make a few comments; and then we'll have some opportunity for Professor Mercan to respond and to open the floor to questions and answer. Without further ado, Professor Mercan. MR. MERCAN:  Thank you very much.  Ladies and gentlemen, it's also an honor for me to be here with you today.  At the heart of heated discussion, heated debate about Turkish-American relationship, it would be a bit of opportunity for us, for me in specific, to talk about Turkish-American relations. As you all know, Turkey is the only democratic, secular, and modern country whose population is predominantly Muslim in the Middle Eastern region.  The westernization process in Turkey started in 1923 with the formation of the republic, thanks to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the republic.  We see our EU membership process as being the natural consequence of the modernization process. Today, Turkey has established a strong partnership with the United States.  This almost-60-year-old partnership is based on shared values.  This partnership has flourished in many areas, like defense, energy cooperation, and education.  The world is going through a transformation process.  The threats and challenges we face today cover a wide range of issues, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime, and -- mass migration.  Political, economic, and social problems within and outside our geography create a fertile ground for these threats and challenges. Fighting against these threats and challenges requires collective action and increased cooperation.  I personally believe that Turkish-American relationship is essential for the maintenance of peace, stability, and prosperity, as well as for the preservation of freedom and democracy in the wider geographies of mutual concern. I am not going to talk about the contribution that Turkey has been doing in detail  --, but I will just point out a very few items where Turkey has contributed to the cause of modern, stable, and peaceful world. The Iraq no-fly zone policy for years has resulted in a safe region for U.S. troops in northern Iraq.  Also, Turkey, despite the failure of the March 1st resolution, immediately after the resolution opened the air space where U.S. aircraft used air space for the war.  And then, in October of the same year, Turkey passed another resolution which enabled up to 10,000 Turkish troops to be sent to Iraq.  Unfortunately, this has been declined for some reason--of course, for maybe rightful reasons--by the United States and by the Iraqi government then.  For that reason it would be unfair for Turkey to be criticized from some American authorities that Turkish unwillingness to contribute to the Iraqi war resulted in some negative implication in Iraq, because Turkey has offered that opportunity even before the terrorist activities started in the region.  Now, we had a lot of other contributions to the cause of the Iraqi war. Also in the Middle East, we have supported the Middle East peace process from the very beginning.  We are committed to support and facilitate the road map prepared by the Quartet committee.  We support the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel.  We have already initiated projects and arrangements that will provide direct assistance to Palestinian institution-building and rehabilitation.  We also have openly and frankly advised Syria to withdraw her troops and intelligence units from Lebanon according to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559. Our contribution is not only limited to tackling threats, but is extended to transform a better and more democratic region.  In this regard, we have the same objectives toward consolidating the independence and promoting democracy and stability in the Caucuses and Central Asian republics.  We encourage democratization and modernization in the broader Middle East, plus Turkey is co-sponsor of the Democratic Assistance Dialogue. Despite all this cooperation between the two countries at the governmental level, it is sad to see that public perception of the two countries is deteriorating, and I think this is one of the reasons why we have such a furor.  In my opinion, there is not substantial evidence or substantial reason for U.S. public, as well as Turkish public, to be too negative against each other, because Turkey and America have been strategic allies for 60 years and also Turkey has contributed to the cause of modern countries. For that reason, I think we should be more careful in the coming days when we discuss about Turkish-American relations and we should not delve into detailed minor issues; rather, we should look at the global picture and the big picture.  Otherwise, we might be swallowed by those people who are categorically anti-American and anti-Semitic.  Because you will always find in any country some extremists, some radicals who would benefit from lack of mainstream policies as well as who would benefit from intense or from strained relationship between the two countries. Turkey is determined to be part of the modern world.  Turkey is working very hard to this endeavor.  Also, Turkey is struggling very hard to stabilize its economy. Personally speaking, neither at the governmental level nor at the political level is there any anti-Americanism.  There may be differences of opinion; that is understandable.  There may be some disagreement on certain issues.  But in any case, we should never forget the big picture.  Sometimes, to be honest with you, we should not be focusing too much on what Turkish media writes and what sometimes American media writes. I'm going to show a few books written in Turkey against us.  For instance, this book depicts the Statue of Liberty, where at the top our lamp, which is our symbol, is put--which implies that AK Party, the Justice and Development Party, is having a very strong alliance with the United States of America.  I have another book here.  This is in Turkish, [Turkish phrase], which implies that Justice and Development Party has close relations with the Pope in the Vatican. So you will see a lot of views against, you know, Turkish-American relationship and AK Party's views on that, and you will see a lot of other articles and publications in other places where they would like to depict AK Party as an Islamist party.  So in other words, you always need to look at what the prime minister and the chairman of the party has been saying and what the officials of the party and of the government have been saying vis-a-vis Turkish-American relations and anti-Semitism. For instance, in this regard I would like to tell you that our foreign minister was the first Muslim foreign minister who has visited Auschwitz camp when it was, you know, inaugurating its anniversary a few months ago.  And also, I'd like to note to you that, for instance, our minister of justice, Cemil Cicek, has visited Holocaust Museum in Israel and has made an excellent speech.  So we should sometimes focus on mainstream ideas, mainstream thoughts, and mainstream statements, rather than, you know, focusing on extreme thinkers or radicalism.  Otherwise, it would be really damaging to our relationship. For that reason, within that remark, I'd like to ask Michael Rubin to reconsider his thought about my party based on these new publications--and I have a lot of other publications that appeared in other journals here, in other journals in Turkey--and maybe discuss these issues both with Mr. Rubin and Mr. Pollock vis-a-vis our perspective, our understanding of Turkish-American relations. I think I took up much of your time.  Later on I am going to respond to the question-and-answers.  Thank you very much for listening. [Applause.] MR. RUBIN:  Thank you very much, Professor.  I will now turn the floor over to Rob Pollock from the Wall Street Journal. MR. POLLOCK:  Thank you. "If anybody needs good public relations advice, it's the Turks.  They're loyal NATO allies and long-time friends of the West who fought alongside the United States in Korea.  Turkey is by far the most democratic and liberal country in the Muslim world.  Yet whenever the foreign press trains its spotlight on this nation, it seems to be looking for human rights abuses or anti-democratic measures, be it the oppression of the Kurds or the frequent attacks on Islamist movement in political life.  Indeed, as the trial of Abdullah Ocalan opened this week, people seem more interested in the supposed shortcomings of the Turkish justice system, particularly its death penalty and state security courts, than in whether or not the Kurdish rebel leader is actually guilty of waging a campaign of terror that the Turkish government claims has cost 37,000 lives." Who wrote that?  Someone called Robert L. Pollack wrote that June 1, 1999, the Wall Street Journal Europe. Another contemporaneous article from the Journal Europe, an unsigned editorial--we don't identify the authors of those, but it might have been me--"Thank God for gun barrel diplomacy.  As the world attention focused this week on U.S. President Bill Clinton's photo-op summit between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, few seemed to notice how Turkey reached a new truce with its hostile neighbor, Syria.  This month, the Turks finally said enough.  They made no concessions to the conventional nostrums, land for peace and so on, that govern Western diplomacy these days and always seem to require compromise with the most evil of regimes.  They refused to discuss water.  They refused to discuss Hatay.  They simply said, in effect, shut down the PKK or we'll crush you.  And Assad gave in." I think those are two samples of many articles that the Wall Street Journal was writing about Turkey within recent memory.  So, what happened to the Wall Street Journal, what happened to Robert L. Pollock to make him write something that has become so controversial and perceived as anti-Turkish? Well, I would say one--I'll confess to a certain disappointment with Turkish policy.  I mean, the Turkey that I was heralding in these articles is admittedly the Turkey that took what I consider to be a tough, no-nonsense approach to terrorism--in fact, an approach I thought was a model for what America and the West ought to be doing.  And it's for that reason that I consider it a special shame that Turkey has thus far generally refused to join us in the war on terror.  I mean, that's certainly their democratic right to do so, but they have a real opportunity to be leaders here and I think this is an opportunity that they've passed up to date. But again, I respect the fact that Turkey is a democratic country.  So I wouldn't have written an article like that just because of policy disappointment.  Why I wrote it, I guess, is because I perceive that there are all sorts of things being said in Turkey that went far beyond legitimate differences of opinion over policy and were instead, frankly, outright lies designed to foment hatred against the United States of America.  And I think that's unacceptable.  And, from what I can tell, the article has--it's obviously inspired a debate.  I hope it's inspired a constructive one. One other point I guess I'd like to make a propos of the article before we move on is--you know, I've been asked--people have accused me of using a tone that was too strong.  I've read in the Turkish press and various places that I've conceded that point, but I'm not sure that I have.  But one regret I would express is I am sorry that the article is being used in disputes, particularly between Turkey and Greece and Armenia.  And just in case I didn't make this clear by explicitly saying in the piece that Ocalan was captured in the Greek embassy in Nairobi, let me make this clear.  I think the Greeks have nothing to be proud of on this point.  The Greeks were state sponsors of terrorism until the late '90s and they've never been called to account for that fact.  And I would appreciate it if they weren't sending my article around to bolster their cause. MR. RUBIN:  Okay, I'd like to say a few words.  First of all, I do want to thank everyone for being here again.  We chose the title of our panel carefully, because I do think that the one issue--actually, I suspect we agree on many issues, but one of the issues which the four panelists today agree on is that American-Turkish relations are too important to deteriorate further, that very much the relationship needs to be repaired. The purpose of this panel is not going to be recrimination of what went wrong, but rather what needs to go right.  And that's what, to some extent, I'm going to focus my comments upon. There are problems.  And diplomatic statements made prior to today, that relations are back on track, are nonsense.  I think everyone is here today because they realize that there are very real problems, but they are also very committed to setting things back together.  It is a testament to the maturity of both the American democracy and the Turkish democracy that Americans and Turks at all different levels are trying to work out their differences through dialogues like today's. Turkey is a democracy.  But democracies are not immune from disagreements.  That is what diplomacy is about.  Diplomacy is not just about cocktail parties.  The fact of the matter is, just because we have disagreements and just because we have disagreements in the public, does not mean that Turks are anti-American necessarily--some Turks are not anti-American--or that all Americans who criticize Turkey are anti-Turkish.  Criticism of Turkish policies does not mean anti-Turkish sentiment. Now, what I'd like to do is go through some of the more specific issues at hand about what the United States needs to do.  I would agree this is not all about the March 1, 2003, vote.  And I've written about this before.  You also have the July 4th incident in northern Iraq, which I think, for long-term relations, is a much more serious issue.  I would call the Turkish press into account, though.  That incident was in the process of being resolved quietly when someone had leaked it to the Turkish press, which used it to fan fairly nationalist flames.  And what I would ask is, stepping back, for the Turkish press to consider who leaked it and what did they try to achieve by leaking it.  I'm not saying it's not a problem; I'm not saying it doesn't need to be addressed.  But I would argue that some people tried to create impediments to a proper resolution of that incident. With regard to the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party--I guess its new name is [inaudible].  No matter how sympathetic one can be to any cause--and I am not sympathetic to the PKK--the second any group commits terrorism, they are terrorists and they make their cause illegitimate.   One can be sympathetic to Kurds in northern Iraq, one can choose not to be.  One can be sympathetic to Kurds in eastern Syria, one can choose not to be.  One can be sympathetic to Kurds in Iran or in Turkey, one can choose not to be.  But the point being, as soon as a group picks up a gun and commits an act of terrorism, they are terrorists and they make their cause illegitimate.  I can't underline that strongly enough. And in that regard, I do think that the Iraqi authorities now, as well as the multinational forces, need to take a much stronger stance against any active or passive PKK presence in northern Iraq.  Safe haven is not acceptable.  And part of the war on terrorism is not just addressing terrorists which kill Americans; it's addressing terrorists which kill Turks or Israelis or Lebanese.  Or anyone else.  Terrorism, in my definition, is the use of violence targeted to civilians for political gain--and we can't allow that to win. Along those same lines, I'm going to say something which hasn't been said before.  The United States has done a great deal to shut down charities associated with Hamas because, whatever one thinks of the Palestinian cause, Hamas is a terrorist group.  The United States has labeled front groups and banned front groups for the Mujahadeen al-Khalq, which has killed civilians in Iran.  And as came out of a discussion with my former Yale University colleague Soner Cagaptay, it's probably about time that the United States moves to shut down PKK front groups in the United States. Now, what I would like to say, and I will put some thought as an analyst now on the Turkish government, oftentimes when I read the Turkish media or when I'm in conversations with Turkish diplomats or when Turks are making comments to newspapers, the focus tends to be all over the place.  Yes, the Turkish government did tell Dr. Rice, according to the Turkish Daily News, that the PKK was a problem, and at the June NATO summit in Istanbul, Prime Minister Erdogan did likewise.  But I would chide gently some of the Turkish officials for not having a consistent focus.  During the time of Ronald Reagan, one of the strengths, which both Democrats and Republicans would acknowledge, is Ronald Reagan stayed on subject.  And sometimes when the discussion branches off into the realm of conspiracy theories, tit-for-tats, who did what, the fact of the matter is it's not on the issues which are most important to Turkish-American relations, and I would argue that the focus needs to stay put. Now, with a few other issues.  Conspiracy theories are a problem.  I will acknowledge that there have been conspiracy theories in the United States.  I remember that when I first got to the Pentagon, when I started working there, several of the people in the hierarchy didn't know me.  They had no reason to; I had never met them.  I had spent five weeks at American Enterprise Institute before my security clearance came through.  And the fact that I ended up on some wire diagrams gave some people excuse to ask, Who is this guy?  And in many ways, the conspiracy theories served counter to their purpose.  Sometimes conspiracy theories can be ridiculous.  I would urge in this case both Americans and the Turkish media to pay attention to sources. Some of the most damaging conspiracy theories which have appeared in American journals, like the American Prospect, Mother Jones, and The Nation, have been written by someone who, if correspondents want to look back at the record, used to be, prior to 1980, the Middle East correspondent of Lyndon LaRouche's Executive Intelligence Review.  You can look up his book, "Hostage to Khomeini," which was published in 1980, and see his dedication to the Lyndon LaRouche organization.  The fact of the matter is that the same conspiracy theories which were being spun--this isn't a Democrat or Republican issue and it's not an American or Turkish issue--but the same conspiracy theories which are being spun should not be accepted.  It's important for both Americans and Turks to know their sources.  Along the same lines and by no means is this a continuation of Lyndon LaRouche. I'd like to commend [inaudible] and Radikal--and memory highlighted this in the past day--for pointing out that, in response to a question, Ambassador Edelman answered, "The important point is that the international community is in consensus behind Resolution 1559 of the U.N. Security Council.  This resolution was jointly prepared by France and the United States and calls for immediate withdrawal of all Syrian forces from Lebanon and arming of the Lebanese militias.  This position has international support.  During President George W. Bush's visit to Europe, this agreement was confirmed by Chirac, Schroeder, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.  We believe that this is the way to follow in order to maintain the stability in the region.  We hope Turkey will join this international coalition.  Of course, evaluating this position of the international community is Turkey's decision." I commend Eric Edelman for his statement.  I find it regrettable that the same newspaper, Radikal, and several other newspapers reported it as, "U.S. ambassador gave Turkey an ultimatum about Syria."  An ambassador, even of a superpower, cannot give ultimatums to a country where he serves. Now, we do see this in some--most--I would argue that it is a problem in the Turkish media.  And what I would point out is that, if you look at the footnotes of my article--and I would stand by my article and I would point out to--or I would respond to Professor Mercan that what I hope results from the article is that, as in the United States and as should be the case in every single country regardless of where it's located in the world, transparency is something to be commended and to be strived for.  The more transparency, the better.  And I do believe that [inaudible] has been doing a lot of articles in the last week in this regard. Now, with regard to the statements, I do find curious--the research from my article, which was controversial--not as--I wasn't labeled notorious like my colleague to the right.  But as you can tell by the footnotes, most of the interviews were conducted in July.  The idea that somehow this was all coordinated with some cabal in the U.S. government is ridiculous.  In some ways, frankly, many of us are wondering whether some of the journalists who are arguing, without basis in fact, that somehow this is some part of some vast conspiracy, that might be a reflection on some of the mentality of government relationship not with newspapers in general, but with some specific journalists in Turkey, in Europe, and elsewhere.  It's simply not the case and it shows a profound misunderstanding of the way Washington works and of the fact that many people who are often linked in those wire diagrams have never met each other and don't talk to each other on any regular basis. Now, the last thing I want to point out before turning the chair to Richard Perle and then back to Professor Mercan is, for the sake of improving U.S.-Turkish relations, one of the aspects I find most regrettable is that some of the Turkish columnists--and I'm specifically saying "columnists" and not "media"--by attacking some of the activists in the United States who most lobby for Turkish interests and who most agree with Turkish interests because of the war on terrorism and because of the nature of democracy, by attacking those journalists, by seeming to go ad hominem, and by seeking to try to get them to not comment on Turkey anymore, it's doing the Turkish-American relation profound harm; because frankly, Turkey does not have a strong lobby in the United States.  It needs to build coalitions, and through coalitions come its strength.  And if those coalitions are damaged, it becomes a problem.  That may not be the intention of the Turkish government, but I do think it's very positive that, ever since Dr. Rice's visit, the Turkish government has taken far more seriously instances of anti-Americanism.  I to think the AKP has taken it much more seriously in the last month or so. With that regard, the last point I will make is with regard to Injerlik and with regard to mutual Turkish-American concerns in Iraq.  The fact of the matter is, whatever the decision comes with regard to the future of the American relationship with Turkey at the Injerlik base, the fact of the matter is Turkey and the United States can achieve much more by working together, by coordinating our actions, and by acting in unison.  The more Turkey and America seem to air their tension and their dirty laundry in the press, the harder it is to extract the concessions which both Turkey and the United States want in other areas with regard to, for example, Kirkuk, or with regard to the future of the Peshmurga in northern Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, or elsewhere.  Because basically, if there's a united front, it's harder for third parties to take a strong line.  Their bargaining position is stronger when we're fighting.  Turkey and America have too much to lose together for their own internal security, for the war on terrorism, and for regional security to not act together. So I would just end with the statement that through our unity, despite our differences, the relationship should improve. Richard. MR. PERLE:  Thank you, Michael. When Michael sent me an e-mail asking if I would participate in a discussion on the theme of U.S.-Turkish relations, I jumped at the opportunity.  It is, as everyone here has said, an important relationship.  It is also a relationship with real depth, and that depth flows from Turkey's commitment to secular democracy and American admiration for Turkey's history.  It reflects the numerous common enterprises in which together we have improved the lives of our citizens and made our citizens safer.  So whenever there are difficulties, the first instinct must be to try to resolve them and get things back on track. This institution, the American Enterprise Institute, has taken a particular interest in Turkey and U.S.-Turkish relations for many years.  I first came here in 1987, and the first recommendation I made was that we invite Turgut Ozal to visit AEI and make a speech.  And he gave a memorable speech on that occasion, a quite moving speech.  He was a good friend of this institution, and we were good friends of his.  And I believe every Turkish prime minister since has visited AEI. I'm delighted that Professor Mercan is here.  You heard his remarks.  They were precisely the spirit that has always prevailed when there were, as inevitably there will be from time to time, differences on specific issues.  And what he has had to say is enormously helpful and helps put things in perspective. It's very clear from what has already been said that the free expression that we enjoy in both countries includes the freedom to say things that are not true and to say things that are true at decibel levels that are disproportionate.  And that clearly has been happening in a lot of comment in the press.  It needs to be put in perspective.  I was interested in Michael's remarks about conspiracy theories.  They abound.  They're almost never true.  And with respect to the United States government, it's been my experience over 35 years that we are incapable of organizing a conspiracy.  Every time we're tempted to think otherwise, we get ourselves into real trouble.  That is also true of cabals, by the way.  I've tried on several occasions to organize a cabal and have consistently failed.  Nevertheless, I'm often accused of being part of one cabal or another.  We're not good at conspiracies and we're not good at cabals. What I like to think we are good at is recognizing what is in our interests and acting intelligently and forcefully to protect those interests and, in the course of doing it, to try to bring to others less fortunate than we--that is, those who have been denied the opportunities that individual freedom affords the citizens of a democracy--a chance to participate in the democratic process.  That is now, people will have noticed, the central theme of President Bush's administration.  It's long overdue, in my view.  The end of the Cold War has liberated us from the lesser-of-the-evils approach that often led to our countenancing some pretty dreadful regimes around the world. And I hope this will come to be understood in due course better than it is today.  When I hear about anti-Americanism in Turkey, I'm afraid I have to acknowledge that I also hear about anti-Americanism in Germany and in France and in the United Kingdom and, indeed, in many places in the world.  Just before coming here, I did an interview with Irish Radio.  And you would have thought, listening to the interviewer, that the United States was a menace to the rest of the world, that by liberating Iraq and bringing an opportunity for a decent life to 25 million Iraqis, we had done something that requires the rest of the world to treat us with opprobrium. We certainly have not done the job that we should have done in explaining what we have been about, and in particular what we were about in Iraq.  And I understand the frustration of Americans, including American officials, who see American motive described in such unfair and unreasonable terms.  I have not seen those descriptions in the mouths of government officials, but they surely appear in the press, and it's very annoying when we are accused of, I don't know, going after oil in Iraq.  When we need oil, we've found a method for acquiring it that is absolutely fool-proof.  We buy it.  And we buy it at whatever the world market price happens to be.  We don't steal other people's oil.  We don't invade countries in order to obtain their oil.  And it's understandably annoying when we're accused of doing that. I think in time--in time--what the United States has accomplished in Afghanistan and in Iraq, things that we were driven to by September 11 but that have effects that are far more profound and important than the mere response to September 11.  As people come to appreciate what it means to deliver the opportunity--no guarantees--the opportunity for democracy and individual freedom to 25 million Afghans and 25 million Iraqis, and one begins to see the stirrings of real demands for democracy elsewhere in the Arab world, about the only threat all of this poses to Turkey is that Turkey may lose its monopoly as the only democratic country in the region other than Israel.  Because I think we are now beginning to see that the desire for freedom, the desire to live not in fear is universal and it will assert itself.  And Turkey, thanks to Ataturk and a long struggle on behalf of many people, including the Turkish Armed Forces, has achieved a level of democracy and individual freedom that we can only hope will be achieved by Turkey's neighbors. There's no point rehearsing the differences of the past, the decision not to facilitate American forces going into Iraq.  I wish it had been otherwise, but I also wish that when Turkey did offer to send forces to Iraq, we had said yes.  It was a terrible mistake to say no.  It was a mistake driven, I think, by prejudice and ignorance.  And I wish we could do that all over again. So let me just conclude by saying--because we're going to have a chance to air all of the issues, I'm quite sure, in the question period--I'm delighted that we're having this session.  I'm delighted that we've had such a positive contribution from our Turkish friend.  And what the United States and Turkey have in common is so much larger than the small differences that emerge from time to time that I'm absolutely confident about the continuation of what has been an historic and a very good relationship. MR. RUBIN:  Thank you very much.  I'll let Professor Mercan make a few final comments before going to questions and answer. MR. MERCAN:  Thank you. At least we have two things in common--one is war on terrorism, the other one is the media--that we really complain about.  Let me start with terrorism. No one in the world has suffered from terrorism [inaudible] other than Turkey.  So we know the importance of fighting terrorism.  I fully agree with your definition of terrorism.  I share your definition of terrorism.  And Turkey, not only in fights with PKK, in fights with al Qaeda, in Afghanistan and in other places, has always contributed to the cause.  And we will continue to contribute to the cause as well. Now, I just want to remind you what Turkey has done in Afghanistan.  Turkey is now assuming the second commandership, where we could hardly find other countries to take the commandership.  And Turkey has contributed a lot in the Iraqi cause as well.  I would wonder whether, for instance, Germany or France or Italy or other countries who are classical allies in the Western world have contributed as much as Turkey has done so.  Of course, to my understanding, regrettably, the parliament did refuse for the March 1st resolution.  But in October of the same year, the parliament voted otherwise.  And again, immediately after the March 1st resolution, we opened our air space as well. Now, it is regrettable that some columnists, some journalists are being anti-American.  But also, I'd like to remind you that just a few years ago, during the Clinton era, the [inaudible] of Turkish people of Americans were at the peak.  When President Clinton visited Turkey during the earthquake and hugged a small Turkish kid, Turkish child, I would think that the whole atmosphere could easily change if, for instance, Mr. Bush made similar gestures in Turkey.  Like, for instance, opening new borders in Iraq and fighting harshly against PKK terrorism in northern Iraq.  Things can easily change.  As I said in my opening remarks, the hatred of America in Turkey is not permanent.  It's political.  It can easily change, as I have told you. And also, regarding the transparency that you mentioned, now, we have determined to be an EU member, i.e., we want to be as transparent as any European country.  We want to be as democratic as any European country.  We want to be as, you know, respecting human rights as any European country.  In other words, what we are saying is that the process that we are going to go through will definitely lead to more transparency, the EU process that has been taken by my government, by my party. And my party, in response to one statement in your article, my party is the most open party in Turkey.  We always announce our expenses and our income on our Internet page.  So our income is mostly 99.9 percent government support, and our expenses are very clear.  So if you claim that, you know, our party has to announce its financial sources, it really hurts, because we know, we publicize it.  We're like a public company.  We don't think, you know, we are a very closed institution.  We are a public institution and our deeds, our statements, our policies are open everywhere.  We don't have any other second agenda. Now, I'm really sorry about Mr. Edelman.  Edelman is a good friend of mine.  He is a diplomat.  He is a very career personnel, intelligent person.  Unfortunately, the Turkish press has, you know, labeled him as an unwanted man.  Now, everything is reciprocal.  If the Turkish press does the same thing, you'd expect a similar approach from America, from the United States of America, toward our ambassador in the United States.  So press has to be very careful; I fully agree with you on that.  But we refrain from press a lot. I'm just going to one headline which was circulating around 300,000 publications.  Now, this is the headline, you know, about us, about AK Party, labeling Mr. [inaudible] as an infidel.  So all we have done is to open a lawsuit against this press and we won the lawsuit.  In other words, in handling press, we know they work very hard, we should work very hard, but we should also see the impact of it in the other country.  For instance, if and when American TV channels air anti-Turkish sitcoms, it really hurts, I've got to tell you.  Or if some columnist in New York Times or in other respectable papers writes unsubstantially against Turkey, that damages our relationship. Because after all, we should never forget that neither anti-Americanism nor anti-Turkishism nor decaying relationship between the two countries help mainstream policymaking in Turkey.  Those criticisms, unsubstantial criticisms, only helps the emergence of radicalism in our countries.  So when we approach to the media, we should be very careful about that and we should, you know, advise our general directors of media, you know, and have better relationships. Now, the last point I have to make is vis-a-vis Injerlik.  I would expect that the decision about Injerlik would be made very soon in Turkey.  So that--since I'm not in a governmental position, I cannot tell you when, but that is my hope, that the decision is going to be made soon. So in other words, let's be, you know--let's trust each other.  Let's not see conspiracy theories damaging our relationship.  Be open, be frank, and maintain the communication channels as much as we can because, as has been said in this panel by panelists, Turkish-American relationship is not so simple and-- [flip tape] --pay probably more attention despite some disagreement, because we might have difference of interests for the short term policies.  But let's trust each other and let's not suspect our ambition and our willingness to contribute to the cause of modern Western world. Thank you very much. MR. RUBIN:  Thank you, Professor. I'd like now to go to questions and answer.   Before we begin, I would very much like to urge that the question be a question.  Be as brief as possible and please identify yourself, who the questioner is.  Thank you. QUESTIONER:  My name is Suzal [ph].  I'm [inaudible] Turkish journalist, and I'm working for my newspaper, [inaudible] Gazett. Both sides blame the Turkish press.  Don't you think the U.S. and the Turkish government also have some responsibility, from manipulating the press, giving to some information, to using the relations, and also other events?  For example, in Iraq, taking the 10 Turkish soldiers as prisoner, for example, and promising them the [inaudible] is doing nothing.  Don't you think that both countries have some responsibilities on all these events, and the relations? MR. POLLOCK:  I do, sure.  The government has done lots of stupid things in Iraq, and I've written about them.  But I think we have to be very careful about magnifying any one of those stupid episodes into some kind of international incident, when oftentimes it's just soldiers acting on bad information.  I mean, I'm very sorry about what happened to the Turkish soldiers.  But people also saw what we did to our ostensible allies in the Iraqi National Congress, which I also think was really stupid.  And, you know, I'm sorry.  Bad decisions get made in war.  War is run by a government bureaucracy.  Government bureaucracies don't function any better on the battlefield than they do in real life.  They do stupid things, and it's not an--it should never be interpreted as an indication of any particular feeling between two countries when a little incident like that happens, I think. MR. PERLE:  If I could just add a word on that.  I happen to have followed that incident closely.  It was over the 4th of July weekend.  I was out in the Hamptons and got a desperate telephone call from friends in the administration, both here and in Turkey.  And we tried very hard to resolve it as quickly as possible and to contain the damage.  If it hadn't been the 4th of July weekend, when it was very difficult to reach people, it might have been easier.  A mistake was made.  In the end, it was sorted out. There are times when, it seems to me, the responsible press will draw a line under an incident like that and look not only at the initial mistake, but the way in which it was ultimately handled because that's a better expression of the relationship between us than the initial mistake.  And the fact that this is still a source of resentment after all this time really is not helpful.  Now, you can't stop people from expressing their resentments, and often the resentments are broader and focus upon a specific incident, but we really should draw the line under that.  We handled it badly, but it's over, it's finished.  It was a year ago. I'm happy to apologize. MR. MERCAN:  Now, each country's government may have some, you know, deficiency in maintaining good communication with the media.  But in my opinion, I wholeheartedly believe that media should be more responsible and should study, should investigate the issues more thoroughly using their own resources.  Of course, there may be some lack or miscommunication, there may be differences of opinion, and expectations from one country to another country may not be met in a timely manner or as much as demanded.  But this should not create a big hatred among the two countries.  Everything has to be put into its own perspective. That's all I want to say. QUESTIONER:  Umit [inaudible] with Turkish Television. Well, thank you for this media-bashing session, in the first place.  I think the media in both countries are not the reason why the relations are bad.  The relations are bad in themselves.  You haven't talked about that.  The policies of the two countries have diverged so much--that has never happened this way in history.  For example, what do you think about Turkish policies about Syria and Iran?  Do you think there is a major kind of reconciliation on this matter, or are the relations in really, really bad shape because the two countries are following totally different policies? MR. MERCAN:  First of all, I don't agree with Umit vis-a-vis Turkey's Iran and Syria policy.  Turkey has clearly and openly advised Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, on several occasions.  And just last week, Foreign Minister Mr. Gul invited the Syrian ambassador to kindly request the withdrawal. Vis-a-vis Iran, Turkey is the only country, probably, in the neighborhood of Iran who will suffer from nuclear weapons, possible potential nuclear weapons in Iran.  So the objectives of both countries, in my opinion, are the same.  The means might be different.  The approach might be different.  But the objective is always the same.  We don't want availability of nuclear weapons in Iran.  That's for sure.  Iran and Turkey are neighbors and 500 kilometers apart from each other.  Iran and the United States are thousands of kilometers away from each other.  So how can we disagree on Iran? The approach might be different, the policy implementation might be different, there might be differences of opinion.  But in all issues, including terrorism, Iraq, Syria, the broader Middle Eastern project, and Iran, I don't think that there is difference of opinion. MR. POLLOCK:  I think the questioner is absolutely right.  There does seem to me to be a pretty strong difference of opinion.  The rest of the world seems to be united not only around wanting Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, but isolating Syria.  Even the French seem to be on board with us on that point right now.  And they seem to be fairly united, although they're not necessarily saying so openly, in really wanting to see the back of the Assad regime.  I find it pretty incredible, personally, that the Turkish president is going to go to Syria and show support to a regime that--or at least be perceived to show support to a regime that, you know, less than a decade ago was waging a deadly proxy war against Turkey.  That's one, I think, example of serious policy divergence.  I think that's correct. MR. RUBIN:  And I would agree that there have been serious policy divergences in the case of the forthcoming trip of President Sezer to Syria.  I think actually what should be focused upon more is not the he-said/she-said among the Turkish public or the United States, but rather the message it sends to the Lebanese people and how the Lebanese people respond to it. MR. PERLE:  Perhaps you can enlighten me.  I would not assume that because President Sezer has decided to go to Damascus that the policy of the government of Turkey is to support either Syrian military and secret police forces in Lebanon or, for that matter, the essence of the Syrian dictatorship.  Setting aside historical problems between Turkey and Syria, I see no reason to believe that this should be read as support for a dictatorship in Syria. QUESTIONER:  This is Tubine [inaudible] with Turkey's Star newspaper. Just on this point with the Turkish president's visit to Damascus, I think I do see two opinions coming from Mr. Rubin and Mr. Perle.  I would like to ask, you know, pose this question to Murat Mercan as the representative of the Turkish government.  If you are doing all the things right with good will, and there is no reason for the rest of the world, meaning the United States and the European Union officials, to be concerned with such a visit or increase of ties with Turkey, Syria, and also Iran, then why do you think that the American and European officials do not understand you?  Where do you think that the gap is originating? Thank you. MR. MERCAN:  First of all, I just spoke, I met with a person, an official from the National Security Council yesterday and with an official from the State Department yesterday.  And to be honest with you, they didn't sound like very much against President Sezer's visit.  Now, the exaggeration, in my opinion, plays a critical role for such communication.  It's up to the president to do what and what not.  It is personal choice and it's his choice.  And no one in the world, I think, should have any suspect against his ideas, his views.  But if a president is being criticized publicly, then would you expect him not doing things that he has already committed to several months ago? So this is a nuance.  To be honest with you, if I were in the place of President Sezer, after all these, you know, media criticisms, I would go to Syria because of the independency of a country, because of the sovereignty of a country.  Now, this can be criticized.  But this never would be thought of as if Turkey is, you know, lighting an orange light to Syria, as had been said by Mr. Pollock.  We didn't forget how many Turkish people were killed due to PKK terrorism and who had supported PKK terrorism until recent times.  I don't want to name the countries, but you all know who had supported them.  We, as Turkey, [inaudible], don't envy the democratization process in the Middle East.  To answer your question, we really would like them to be more democratic, to more in line with modern world. QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  My name's Yassim Chunger [ph].  I am with CNN Turkey and Milliyet.  I have two quick questions and I will specifically address them to Mr. Perle and Professor Mercan. I'll begin with you, Professor.  You said Ambassador Edelman is a good friend and you're sad about what happened.  And you blamed the media for beginning this campaign against him.  But it was also the prime minister himself who had been waiting for six weeks when he asked for an urgent appointment last year.  Also, it was interesting that you used a book as an example to show the campaign against AK Party in Turkey, how AK Party could be criticized on the ground that it has a strong alliance with the United States. So I would like to ask you about the public sentiment in Turkey and how much of the pressure it generates on the policies of the AK Party.  The fact that there is an anti-American sentiment in Turkey now, has that caused certain decisions being taken, certain actions being taken, certain appointments not being granted, or certain policies being upheld just to respond to that sentiment?  Or can you just say that AK Party's decisions vis-a-vis Iraq, vis-a-vis the region, vis-a-vis the bilateral relationship have all been the result of, you know, genuine policies and genuine disagreements with Washington? And my question to Mr. Perle, you talked about that the conspiratorial and cabalistic thinking does not only exist, it doesn't even work.  But as we speak here today, in Turkey there's a [inaudible] newspaper with a huge headline which says, "They pressed the button."  So I want to ask you about this button, and buttons. Government leaders themselves in Turkey have said that they pressed the button, explaining the media, also the United States, as if they started a campaign to bring about the downfall of the AK Party government.  I would like to ask you if there is such a button, if it has been pressed.  But more seriously, has the United States found a strong ally in the AK Party government? Thank you. MR. MERCAN:  Now, in any country, not only specifically Turkey, foreign relations are based on mutual interests of each country.  Now, Turkish-U.S. relationship, or Turkish policy in Iraq or in other parts of the world, is irrelevant of public sentiment because, in my opinion, public may have a lack in understanding these policies.  If, for instance, to give you an example, we were to ask our Cyprus policy to Turkish public just before it started, and we would have acted upon the public perception, then we would have never gone along with Annan's plan.  So for that respect, I would think that Turkish foreign policy and AK Party's foreign policy is solely based on the interest of Turkey and its strategic allies with other countries.  There may be difference of opinion, we may get some second thought on public opinion, but the course of the policy will remain unchanged. Thank you. MR. RUBIN:  [Inaudible] the button. MR. PERLE:  Yes, well, if we had a button that could bring governments down, you'd see governments falling all over the place.  But it wouldn't be the Turkish government. [Applause.] MR. MERCAN:  Thank you. MR. PERLE:  You asked about the AK Party as well.  In most countries, there's a high degree of continuity from one administration to the next with respect to the basic outlines of the foreign policy.  And the bureaucracies that exert very substantial influence over foreign policy relinquish the policies to which they become attached slowly and reluctantly.  I don't see dramatic changes in the underlying foreign policy of Turkey, from the previous administration to this one. It is true that there were some specific decisions that had to be made that didn't turn out the way we would have liked, and in some cases they didn't turn out the way the AK Party would have liked.  Unless my memory fails me, the AK Party government tried to gain approval for the U.S. moving through Turkey in the Iraq war, and it failed in the parliament.  And people will debate endlessly why and how it failed, but the government did try.  And as we've already discussed, the government subsequently approved sending Turkish forces to help in Iraq. From time to time there will be specific differences, but I don't see a dramatic change from the Ozal government--with which I had a lot of dealings because I was in the Defense Department at the time--to the current administration and to the AK Party. QUESTIONER:  My name is Connie Zulam.  I'm with the American Kurdish Information Network.  I'm a Kurd from Turkey myself--spent 20 years of my life in that country. This debate started with the sick men of Europe.  I expected some serious discussion on the issue of what's happening in terms of the media-- I lost my train of thought. I mean, we have to really address the issue.  Eleven days ago, Financial Times ran a headline, "Young Turks Discover Sudden Interest in Mein Kampf."  About two weeks ago, the Washington Times said, "No one noticed as Turkey nabbed the gold medal recently in the global anti-American stakes."  Those, the most negative views of the Bush administration's administrative policies, are Turks, with 82 percent. This, you know, don't worry be happy, feel-good, I'm sorry, I feel your pain--I mean, Clinton was actually like this.  And from this institution, for these issues to be covered like this is really not addressing the problem. MR. RUBIN:  What's the question? QUESTIONER:  The question is, you know, the media is supposed to be watchdog, not lap dogs.  What happened on July 4th should be covered.  I mean this is-- MR. RUBIN:  What's the question? QUESTIONER:  The question, you and Mr. Pollock have the animus towards the Kurds of Turkey and seem to have, especially you, Mr. Rubin, a lot of sympathy for the Kurds of Syria, Kurds of Iraq, Kurds of Iran.  And I'm wondering if a militant Islamist government like, let's say, Taliban takes over Ankara, will you shed some crocodile tears for the Kurds of Turkey too? MR. RUBIN:  The answer to that is simple, from my perspective.  I have absolutely no animus to the Kurds of Turkey or any other Turkish citizens, except for the Kurds--any Turkish citizen, be they Kurd or otherwise, who conducts terrorism.  The vast majority of Kurds in Turkey are peaceful and fully participate in the Turkish political system.  Presidents and prime ministers of Turkey have been Kurdish.  There's absolutely no animus.  But I need to underline the point that whenever any group, and that group may claim to represent a far larger group, crosses the line between political advocacy and violent terrorism, then they lose their legitimacy.  Period. QUESTIONER:  [Inaudible] with Turkey's [inaudible] News Agency. I was wondering, especially Mr. Perle and Mr. Mercan, what about--did the comments that Don Rumsfeld made on TV this past weekend that Iraq would be different now if Turkey had let American troops pass through from northern Iraq, what do you think about that?  Especially, these times when especially the government officials of both Turkey and the U.S. should be more sensitive in regard to their comments and communications back and forth.  How do you see those messages? MR. MERCAN:  In fact, in my opening remark I tried to reply to Mr. Rumsfeld.  We could make similar arguments vis-a-vis the United Nations resolution.  If the United Nations Security Council would have passed a resolution before the war started, the war would have been completely different.  Then would we be in a position to blame France, Italy, Germany or others?  If the United States agreed to accept Turkish troops immediately afterwards, the war would have been different. So you can always come up with such counter-arguments to respond to Mr. Rumsfeld.  I personally don't think that Turkey should be blamed for the events that [inaudible] after the war started.  Now, it could have been better if we had passed the resolution, but in a few months' time we passed a similar resolution. Thank you very much. MR. PERLE:  I think you can't replay history and so it's impossible to know how things might have been different if the 4th Mechanized Division had entered Iraq through Turkey.  The fact that we were unable to come in through Turkey probably contributed to the tactical surprise that was gained when we did initiate hostilities, and that was undoubtedly beneficial.  So I think it's hard to make those judgments.  I think it wasn't very helpful for Don Rumsfeld to say what he said at a moment of the sort of sensitivity that's brought us all together in this forum. Just one word about the appearance of Mein Kampf in bookstores in Turkey.  I don't know how to explain the appeal for this ponderous screed by Adolf Hitler.  I gather it has now been published by several different publishing houses.  And the inquiring press to which you refer might well devote some time and attention to how that happened, that you simultaneously have the appearance of this book published in several different places.  Were there subsidies involved?  Did anyone encourage the publication?  There are some governments in the region that have been publishing Mein Kampf for a long time, and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as well.  So I would not exclude the possibility that this is a quite malicious effort--not necessarily a cabal, but it is curious that suddenly several publishing houses would publish this book. And finally, I imagine that the book has been used to stop a lot of doors, because I can't imagine that Turks are spending their evenings reading Adolf Hitler in 2005. MR. MERCAN:  It is very sad that, you know, this book is getting attention in Turkey.  Because Turkey is one of the few countries who hosted the victims of Adolf Hitler and has been very friendly to Jewish community in the last, I would say, 500, 600 years, and will continue to do the same thing. I also wonder how many books, how many Mein Kampfs are sold through Amazon.com.  It's available on Amazon.com.  And sometimes, you know, focusing on certain things is not helpful. We are not capable of preventing a book in my country, because Turkey is a democratic country.  And so is the case in the United States.  But we as a society have had always good relations, and we continue to have very good relations, and we sympathize to the Jewish casualties back in the world wars of recent history. Thank you. QUESTIONER:  I'm Soner Cagaptay at the Washington Institution for Near East Policy. Michael, I agree with your assessment that in terms of both breaking the lull in the relationship as well as turning the Turkish public opinion in a more favorable position towards the United States.  One of the main avenues of action is the PKK, whether it's through decisive action against PKK presence in northern Iraq or action against PKK front and charity organizations in both the United States and Europe. In this regard, my question to the panel is it seems to me, I would suggest, there's another avenue of action for the United States for these purposes, and that would be Cyprus, which we haven't discussed yet.  Measures that would ease the humanitarian and political and economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot State would not only make life easier for them and reward them for their compromising and, hence, very European position on last year's referendum, but also cause a significant shift in Turkish public opinion within Turkey.  So I'd like to see if you have any comments on that. MR. RUBIN:  Yes.  I do think that many were surprised when the Turkish Cypriots accepted in the referendum the United Nations-brokered agreement and the other side did not.  That said, it's not a subject about which I am very informed.  And one of the rules of Washington, and I hope it's a rule that extends beyond Washington, is when you don't know a lot about something, just shut up and learn. MR. PERLE:  That is not a Washington rule. [Laughter.] MR. PERLE:  I would hope that we would recognize, in fact, the lengths to which the Turkish Cypriots went, and acknowledge and reward their action.  Sadly, we haven't done that, but I believe we should. QUESTIONER:  My name is Mehmet Celebi.  I'm president of the Turkish-American Alliance in Chicago and vice president of the Assembly of Turkish-American Associations. We established that there's no button, as you just said.  Actually, your articles recently have really kept us, as communal leaders, very busy in Turkish-American communities responding and trying to really come up with ideas.  But how can you blame us of coming up with conspiracy theories and ideas when, really, what the Turks feel is not very different from what some of the traditional U.S. allies--the Germans, the French, the Italians, all the other allies, and even non-allies--are feeling globally towards U.S. policy?  Yet you don't see the same kind of treatment, comments coming out of U.S. administration officials or U.S. officials and U.S. press covering those same things.  All of a sudden, these are coming up within a matter of a few months, you know, when we're really not different, acting any different than what the rest of the world is feeling. MR. POLLOCK:  I mean, look, with no other traditional ally that I know of has the U.S. ambassador felt obliged to organize a conference call with the U.S. Geological Survey to explain to people that we didn't cause the Indian Ocean tsunami.  And, you know, I think there's been a little bit of minimization--I'm sorry to say--by Mr. Perle on the panel today.  He suggested, like you have, that, well, there's anti-Americanism everywhere.  I don't think it's the same everywhere.  You don't have other countries where the paper most closely associated with the ruling party is alleging that we used chemical weapons in Fallujah, as alleging that we raped the women and children there and left their bodies in the streets to be eaten by dogs.  I mean, we don't have other allies where the so-called respectable press is behaving in that way.  They don't go that far. We also don't have other allies in which the chairman of the leading opposition party has accused the CIA of being behind a plot against him.  That's not normal.  That's not normal anti-Americanism. [Laughter.] MR. POLLOCK:  We also don't have other allies where the former prime minister has accused the CIA of trying to kill him, which Mr. [inaudible] just did.  That, again, that's not normal.  That's a little bit different.  And frankly, when you have an intellectual environment where people feel comfortable saying these things and in fact think they'll be rewarded for saying them, that is cause for concern. And that's why, while I might, for example, be tempted--if Mein Kampf were the only example that anyone threw up at me, maybe we could write that off.  But the fact is we've also got a best-selling book in Turkey where, you know, apparently young Turks are getting their testosterone up reading about a future war with the United States.  Again, that's not quite normal. So, no, I don't think this is just a matter of there's anti-Americanism in Turkey and there's anti-Americanism in other places.  The anti-Americanism I see in Turkey right now is qualitatively different. MR. PERLE:  I certainly didn't tend to minimize the sentiments that we're now seeing.  There is a question of how durable this sentiment is and whether it will yield in time, and in particular as we gain some distance and perspective with respect to Iraq.  I don't think there's any doubt that the invasion of Iraq has caused enormous difficulties for the United States all over the world.  I happen to think we did the right thing in going into Iraq and that eventually that will be far more widely recognized than it is today.  But it has certainly facilitated those who are anti-American to begin with to capitalize on popular sentiment which was very much opposed to what we did in Iraq. If I thought this were permanent, if I thought that a generation of Turks were developing anti-American ideas that would persist the change in circumstances, I would be deeply concerned.  But I do think it's very much a product of some immediate events--the war in Iraq in particular--and then a kind of craziness.  And it sometimes happens.  And you're quite right to point to the extremity of some of the accusations that have been made.  There were some similar books in France that weren't quite as crazy, but almost as crazy. So we'll get over this.  The basic relationship is in pretty good shape, and the relationship between the governments is a good deal better than this popular sentiment.  Sometimes I've heard the criticism made that the government should stand up and put an end to this anti-Americanism.  Well, it doesn't work that way in a democracy.  And Prime Minister Erdogan could stand up tomorrow and declare himself against some of this craziness and I don't think it would have a big effect, frankly. When really crazy stuff appears in the press, that ought to be taken head-on.  And it could be confronted by government officials as well as others.  So when a story circulates, like our having caused the tsunami with an underground nuclear test, it's certainly appropriate for the government to say this is nonsense.  The Turkish government has a means of knowing whether the U.S. was behind the tsunami.  It shouldn't be up to the U.S. Geological Survey to defend against an absurd charge like that.  So the government surely could do more in this regard, and I hope the government will do more to deal with some of the lunacy that appears in the press. MR. MERCAN:  Of course, I'm not in a position to accept all these conspiracy theories against the United States.  It doesn't make any sense.  It's illogical.  One thing which I would like to remind Mr. Pollock is that our party, our government is of equal distance to Turkish press.  We don't have, you know, we don't favor a certain publication, a certain newspaper, unlike the previous policy of politicians.  I've seen, for instance, I think you might be referring to [inaudible].  I've seen one of the [inaudible] well-known columnists criticizing AK Party very harshly and labeling AK Party not doing work which it is supposed to do vis-a-vis European Union.  And I just read it before I came here. So in other words, free press can say a lot of things.  It's true that, you know, government officials may comment on those crazy ideas about what U.S. did and what U.S. did not.  Maybe we should be more careful about this.  But the same thing should be expected from American media and American government when Turkey is unfairly--my government is unfairly criticized.  We should expect we have all the right to respond to those statements as well. Thank you. MR. RUBIN:  I'd like to thank our panelists, especially Professor Mercan, who made quite a long trip to be here.  I do think this was an important discussion.  I take heart in the fact that so many people stayed through it all.  And I'd like to remind everyone that both the video and the transcript of the conversation and the discussion and the questions and answers should be online at the AEI Web site by the end of the day. Thank you very much.</body></html>