<html><body>Iranian Presidential Elections June 16, 2005 Unedited transcript prepared from a tape recording. <TABLE width="100%" border=0> <TBODY> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%">1:45 p.m.</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="89%" colSpan=2> Registration</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="14%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%"> </TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%">2:00</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="14%">Panelists:</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%">A. William Samii, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="14%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%">Mohsen Sazegara, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="14%">Moderator:</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%">Michael Rubin, AEI</TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="14%"> </TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="75%"> </TD></TR> <TR> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="11%">3:30</TD> <TD vAlign=top align=left width="89%" colSpan=2> Adjournment</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE> Proceedings: MR. RUBIN:  [In progress] --released a statement by the President in which he said, among other things regarding the Iranian elections tomorrow, "Power is in the hands of an unelected few who have retained power through an electoral process that ignores the basic requirements of democracy.  The June 17th presidential elections are sadly consistent with this oppressive record.  Iran's rulers denied more than a thousand people who put themselves forward as candidates including popular reformers and women who have done so much for the cause of freedom and democracy in Iran." The President didn't exactly say what he would do, but it's still an interesting statement of policy that without doubt the Iranian elections tomorrow have garnered a great deal of attention in Washington, so I'm happy to host this program today. With me I'm delighted to have two guests, one who will be speaking first is Mohsen Sazegara who is a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  In 1979 he returned with Khomeini to found the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, and he held several subsequent positions.  He will be discussing many of the internal developments inside Iran as well as the process of the Iranian elections. I'm also thrilled to have with me Bill Samii who for years has written the invaluable Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Iran Report, often times weekly summaries of news, always sourced to the Iranian press in summaries and so forth, but also many more analytical articles many of which are in your packets today.  I've also included in your packets today recent analysis by Moshen Sazegara as well as by our own Vice President for Foreign Policy and Defense Studies, Daniel Pletka, who had a New York Times op-ed about the Iranian elections and American policy in today's New York Times.  And I'm Michael Rubin.  I'm a Resident Scholar here who specializes on Iran, Iraq and so forth.Without further ado, you didn't come to hear me speak, you came to hear our special guests Moshen and Bill, and so I'm going to turn the floor over to Moshen Sazegara. MR. SAZEGARA:  Thank you, Michael.  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. About the Iran's presidential election, first of all, as an introduction, I have to say about that, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has gone through three distinct political stages.  The first stage which began with the victory of the revolution and ended with the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was a period in which the revolutionary regime was established and consolidated.  This stage which also witnessed an 8-year war with Iraq may be referred to as the Republic of Revolution and War. The second stage known as the Republic of Terror correlated with the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  This period saw increasing popular dissatisfaction with the regime that led in turn to the Silent Revolution.  That brought Khatami to the presidency in 1997. As Khatami's second term draws to a close, the third stage in Iran's post-revolutionary development, the Republic of Reform, is also coming to an end.  The reform movement has been defeated.  The upcoming presidential elections in Iran may thus signal a new stage in Iran's political evolution with important implications for Iran's domestic political situation as well as U.S. policy toward Tehran. On the basis of Iran's current constitution, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has more than 80 percent of the country's power concentrated in his hands.  The Judicial Branch is under his direct supervision, and the Executive Branch whose head is the president must operate within the framework of key polities set by the Supreme Leader. Additionally, the military, the security and police forces and radio and television are all under the sole authority of the Supreme Leader.  And the Supreme Leader has authority to control the Parliament, sometimes even telling it which subjects it can or cannot discuss. But most important of all, the appointment of the members of the Council of Guardians is in the hands of the Supreme Leader.  This institution is a key instrument for limiting democracy in Iran.  In every election this council preselects the candidates from among those applying to run and in practice before the people themselves vote.  This council tells the people who they can vote for, and this is done under the supervision of the Supreme Leader.   In the parliamentary elections of February 2004, the Council of Guardians disapproved of the candidacy of 3,000 candidates.  In the current presidential elections, only eight individuals from among 1,000 who put their names forward have been selected for whom the people can vote.  There are no members of the opposition among these eight individuals, nor are there any women.   The main candidates are a former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former Minister of Higher Education, the wonderful Mustafa Moin, a former police chief, a former head of the state radio and television, and the former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard who resigned yesterday, all of whom are committed to the present system in which power is concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Leader.  No matter who wins the presidential election, there will be no real changes in Iran's domestic or foreign policy.  The experiences of the last 8 years showed that Mr. Khatami was not even permitted to shake hands with President Bill Clinton when both men spoke one after the other at the United Nations.   The Supreme Leader forbade it.  In practice, the control of foreign policy, nuclear policy and the main economic policies are all within the power of the Supreme Leader and, thus, it would be futile to expect any change from a new president.   Among the current candidates, Mr. Rafsanjani has claimed more than others that he can possibly bring about changes.  However, given that during all the past years Mr. Rafsanjani has been the Supreme Leader's partner in all his policies from acts of terror inside and outside the country to the suppression of university students and from closing newspapers to imprisoning journalists, he has always been by the side of the Supreme Leader.  It would be even more futile to expect changes from him.   This is especially true given that in suppressing the people he has acted and continues to act much more violently than the Supreme Leader and that rumors of his family's financial corruption are rife.   The experience of the last Parliamentary and municipal elections have showed that in Tehran and large cities about three-quarters of the people did not vote.  The only change that two of the candidates, Mr. Moin of Mr. Khatami's front and Mr. Rafsanjani, is if they can bring to the ballot boxes some of those who do not usually vote.   Those who usually stay away will vote for one of these two candidates.  If recent precedent holds and only one-quarter of the people show up to vote, then about half of those who vote, about 10 to 15 percent of the total eligible voting population, will be supporters of the Supreme Leader who will divide their votes among the three candidates who come from the front supporting the Supreme Leader.  I mean Mr. Larijani--   The front supporting the Supreme Leader has not been able to agree on a single candidate.  In this situation it's quite possible that no candidate will win the 51 percent required for victory, and so there will have to be a second ballot among the top two candidates on the Friday of the week following the elections.   The elections have not generated much enthusiasm among Iranians.  In most of Iran's universities, assemblies and sit-ins have taken place where the main slogan has been No To Election, Yes to Referendum.  Many political prisoners are on hunger strike including Dr. Zaraf Shan (ph), the defense attorney of the families of those killed during serial murders of decedents a few years ago, and Akhbar--a brave journalist who has been in prison for 5 years because of his anti-Rafsanjani writings.  Their families were attacked in front of the Evin Prison (ph) yesterday.   Calls for boycotting the elections and changing the constitution have come from many political groups and personalities such as Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, once Ayatollah Khomeini's designated successor, Abbas Amir-Entezam, Iran's longest-held political prisoner who has been in prison for 25 years, the National Front, the members of writer's associations, the leaders of the university student movements, and almost all the opposition groups and personalities outside the country.   What matters now for Iranians is not the elections, but the prospect for real change.  Iranian society may be at the threshold of a transformation in the structure of the current regime and the birth of a new structure which will not be in the shape of the current Islamic Republic.   For the first time, a large front comprising the opponents of the regime from--to republicans, from secular nationalists to observant Muslims, from leftists to rightists, seek to change Iran's constitution via a free referendum overseen by international organizations.  The low percentage of people who participate in these hollow elections will spur their democratic allies to even greater movement.   When President Khatami was elected 8 years ago, he ran on a platform of democracy, human rights, civil society and engagement with the international community.   The failure of reform since 1997 has led to a political depression in Iran.  Iranians need a renewed sense of hope.  In this respect, the West has an important, even crucial role to play.  For the first time, Iranians are looking abroad for assistance.  Specifically, the United States can do three things to signal its support for the promotion of democracy in Iran.   First, the U.S. government could announce that it will not recognize the results of the June 17th elections or any future elections held under the current Iranian constitution because any contest organized under its terms is certain to be neither free nor fair.   Second, the United States could put the spotlight on the human rights situation in Iran.  This can be accomplished by, for example, supporting the government of Canada in its investigation of the death of Iranian-Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemia, and calling for a trial for Said Mortazavi, the Tehran prosecutor responsible for her murder.  He is responsible for the closing of more than 100 journals and the imprisonment of several journalists and politicians.   Third, the United States could focus on Iran's role in sponsoring terrorism which has blackened the name of the Iranian people as well as those officials within the regime who genuinely strive to serve their country.   The United States could, for example, launch an international investigation into the regime's support of terrorism against Iranians and foreigners which would serve to inform the Iranian public of the regime's abhorrent policies while concurrently showing the rest of the world that those policies are in no way indicative of the attitudes of the peace-loving Iranian people.   These policies if implemented would serve to convince ordinary Iranians that the United States is genuinely interested in promoting democracy in their country and that there will be no deals behind the curtain with the current regime.   The Iranian government is trying to convince Iranians that commercial interests will force the United States to strike secret deals with the current regime as some Western governments have already done.   None of these proposals involves financial assistance or a militaristic action and--action which is not necessary and could in fact be harmful to those advocating political change in Iran.  As Iran stands at a political crossroads, American's words and actions, not its money and military forces, can best serve the cause of freedom and democracy in Iran.  Thank you.  [Applause.]   MR. RUBIN:  Thank you very much.  That was extremely informative, and I should say that we will have a good amount of time for questions and answers after the presentations.   With that, I'd like to turn it over to the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Iran analyst, Bill Samii.   MR. SAMII:  Thank you, Michael, for the kind introduction, and also thank you to the American Enterprise Institute for inviting me today.  I must say at the outset that my comments today reflect my own opinions and views and not necessarily those of my employer's.   The two key factors in tomorrow's election are the candidates and voter participation.  Rather than having me go on and drone on about who all the candidates are, I prepared a handout and I've seen at some of you have received copies of it.  It discusses the candidates, their views on a number of the issues.  It also includes some information on Mr. Rezai, the candidate who stepped out of the race yesterday.  Of course, Rezai was coming in dead last in all of the polls, but he's no longer part of the race.   I've also provided a handout listing not only the websites of the candidates, but websites that will be useful to you as you follow the election tomorrow and the events following that over the weekend and if there is a runoff up until Friday.   What I'd like to focus on today though in my comments is the issue of voter participation that Moshen has referred to and the factors that will have a bearing on that.  During the Q and A I can address anything else relating to Iran and the elections.   Election participation is the key issue, and I think we have to bear in mind there's a difference between apathy and a boycott.  Apathy is just basically you can't be bothered going to vote.  A boycott is a conscious action, i.e., staying away from the polls despite the government's constant urging of people to go and vote.   Turnout is very important to the regime as a legitimizing factor.  Supreme Leader Khamenei said yesterday, "Anyone going to the polling booth in fact will be voting for the Islamic Republic, the constitution, and the unchangeable articles of the constitution, that is, Islam and Islamic values."   You've got almost 47 million eligible voters according to the Interior Ministry which runs elections, and the Interior Minister said yesterday that he foresees a 55-percent turnout and he is prepared for a runoff on the 24th.   Other polls that have been done by Iranian State Radio which is a hard-line institution predicts that 54.8 percent of eligible voters will definitely turn out, or that's the response they've gotten, and another 15-1/2 percent that will almost certainly vote.   Another survey found that 68 percent of the respondents confirmed that they would vote, and another 16.3 percent said they probably would vote.  This survey was published in Kehan (ph) which is yet another hard-line newspaper associated with the Supreme Leader's office.  The man who runs the newspaper is in fact the Supreme Leader's representative.  Back on April 24th, by comparison, the Interior Ministry spokesman cited a survey that said some 42 to 51 percent of the public planned to vote.   This in a way is very optimistic.  There are certain people who can be forced to vote, conscripts, civil servants and people who are dependent on the state.  There is a belief in Iran, and I don't think it really holds true, but when you go to vote--your I.D. card, it's got pages in it, and they stamp it to show that you voted.  Of course, this is to prevent a person from voting more than once.   The belief is that either for work purposes or to perhaps get food coupons so you can buy food at subsidized rates, you have to have the stamp in your--people I've talked to say this isn't really quite the case anymore.  Perhaps you can confirm or deny if this is the way it really works.   The other way people can show their opposition to the regime is by casting spoiled ballots or--and it's a traditional way of showing disapproval when one is forced to vote.  In the 2004 Parliamentary election, 6 percent of the ballots were spoiled which reduced the official participation figure from 51 percent to 45 percent.   That's pretty interesting if you look at some of the provinces where, for example, Kurdistan Province, 14 percent of the ballots were spoiled.  And in some of the cities such as--which has a lot of Kurds living there, 54 percent of the ballots were spoiled--lot of Kurds, 25 percent spoiled ballots--are very popular and are not popular with the regime, spoiled ballots were 15 percent.  In Karaj (ph), 14 percent of the ballots were spoiled.  I don't know what's so special about Karaj, so this tells you a bit.   The end result is that voter participation figures since 1997 have been on a steady decline, and whether this is an indication of boycott or just general apathy and lack of interest in the elections is not exactly clear.  I side more on apathy.  People realize that going to the polls and actually voting for someone is really a pretty pointless exercise because they see that elected officials can't really accomplish much because of the way the constitution is set up with the Guardian Council vetting all legislation and vetting all candidates for elected office.   Another issue that's come up in this election most obviously is the role of the military in the election process.  The election headquarters issued a circular today to all governors who are Interior Ministry officials, and the election headquarters is run by the Interior Ministry, stating that offense committed by the armed forces personnel in the military or--that's the regular armed forces, the guards and the--should be reported immediately and in writing to relevant authorities, and a copy of the complaint should also be sent to the election headquarters.   Hashemi Rafsanjani, Moin, some of the other candidates have been complaining about the interference of the military in the election process, and this has a precedent again.  In February 2003 and February 2004, there were credible complaints from Interior Ministry and reformist officials about the role of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and its reportedly acting on behalf of the Islamic Iran Developer's Council, also known as the--the IRGC is essentially Iran's Praetorian force.  Despite the name of being revolutionary, it's no longer a revolutionary institution, going back to the studies of developing countries in a military role, a Praetorian force's task of defending the state, it tends to see itself as more important or its powers as superior to those of elected and civilian officials, and this is certainly in the case with the Revolutionary Guards.  There have been a number of examples in which the guards have interfered with the political process, denounced civilian officials and threatened civilian officials.   Then you've also got the Basige  which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards.  I hope you'll correct me if I'm wrong, but the Basige is basically full-time uniformed personnel, then part-time reservists, and then something I don't really understand, but these people seem to work with the Basige in uniform but they aren't really paid Basige personnel.  So when there were complaints of possible involvement of the Basige in the current election, the commander of the Basige whose name is--he said that you got to figure some of these people aren't really affiliated with is and we can't tell them what to do.  We can't tell them not to get involved in the election process.   However, he went on to say that his personnel will try to increase the number of people voting.  Based on precedent, this isn't really an encouraging sign when the Basigees come out and tell you to vote.  He went on to say that Basigees may serve as election officers in polling statements.  If you look at the election monitoring standards of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, the presence of military personnel at polling stations is undesirable and can lead to the intimidation of voters.  Of course, military personnel can be told who to vote for by commanding officers, especially if the voting takes place in the barracks or at military posts.   Another issue that's come up a bit especially in the few weeks, and I raise it because I've been criticized for raising it so that makes it more fun, is the issue of minorities and where they stand on the election.  Minorities have gotten more attention in this election campaign than they have in previous ones.  Candidates have gone out and talked about our Azari brothers, our Kurdish brothers and so on.  At the same time, Kurds and Sunnis and so on have argued more vociferously than before that their rights are not being fully realized.   Just to give you some statistics, Azaris make up about 24 percent of the Iranian population, Kurds approximately 7 percent, Arabs 3 percent, Baluchis 2 percent, and Turkemen 2 percent.  Most of the Persians, Azaris and Arabs are practitioners of Shiia Islam, the majority faith and Iran's state religion, but the Balushis, Turkemen and some of the Kurds practice Sunni Islam.  Some 9 percent of the Iranian population is Sunni.  There are also, of course, Bahai, Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian minorities.   The Iranian constitution states that although Shiiaism is the state religion, the other schools of Islam will be respected fully, and in regions where minorities predominate, local regulations will respect their faiths.   There have been incidents of unrest just in--province which is in the southwest, a lot of ethnic Arabs living there.  In mid-April there was about a week of violence with some killings and riots, and bombings of government buildings took place there on Sunday.  There were incidents with stun grenades being thrown in--province in the last couple of days.  Then there were explosions I think on Monday in Tehran and--but the government hasn't offered an explanation for this yet.   Moin, the candidate and others have voiced suspicion that these incidents reflect an effort to cause insecurity and get the voters to back somebody who is more security oriented, one of the candidates affiliated or in some way affiliated with the military.   Then, of course, on Wednesday there were some riots in--province with Kurdish groups.  As I said, the candidates have promised greater attention to the minority issues.  Some Sunnis and Baluchis have endorsed Moin--has received backing from some Azaris.   I want to make clear that what these minority groups are advocating is not separatism.  They don't want another state or their own independent state.  What they're advocating is greater attention to their constitutionally defined rights, use of their language, more publications in their own languages, greater economic attention to their region which in a way is somewhat unreasonable because the whole country suffers from problems like unemployment.  It's just that in these outlying regions things are felt more intensely and there's a lot of migration of people from these outlying regions to the major urban centers in the quest for employment.  Like I said, it's not that they're separatists.  They just want their rights.   Then a final issue that I'll touch on just to make it quick is the issue of women.  The total population of Iran is approximately 68 million.  Women aged 15 or over, i.e., voting age and above, is approximately 24.38 million or 24.4 million which equals 53 percent of the population.  As Moshen said, not one woman out of I believe 89 who applied to be candidates was allowed to be a candidate for the election and this focuses on this issue of the words--the term is interpreted to mean a man, but the wording is somewhat vague and some believe it should be a women as well.   These 89 women were disqualified.  There was a demonstration about this on June 1 and another demonstration took place last Sunday.  The most prominent woman in this presidential race is Elaheh Kulyai who is the spokesperson for Mustafa Moin.  It's very interesting in my opinion and perhaps that of others that there was supposed to be a debate among the spokespersons of the various candidates on May 30th.  The spokesman for--Larijani and Hashemi Rafsanjani refused to appear on television with Ms. Kulyai because she's a woman, so state television rescinded the invitation for Kulyai.  She asked later on how are these candidates going to fulfill their pledges to female voters, which I think is a pretty apt question.   Just a final point on the students which make up about two-thirds of the population, and the statement that came out yesterday or today, I'm not sure which, from the Office for Fostering Unity which is the most well-known student organization, they called for a boycott of the election and denounced the election process as a sham.   MR. RUBIN:  Thank you very much, Bill.  What I'm going to do is use my prerogative to act as a discussant for a few minutes and put the discussion as to the internal dynamics of the Iranian elections into the context of U.S. policy and to ask what this election really means for U.S. policy, if anything at all.   First of all, I'd like to point out in my role as discussant that we're also coming up to the celebration of two important anniversaries.  The first is and most important in the Iranian context, we're nearing the hundredth anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution which wasn't a one-day affair, but was, rather, a process that was drawn out over about 5 years of reforms, withdrawn reforms, protests, coups and so forth, counter-coups.   The important thing here is that while at least the Washington sense of history tends to last maybe about 20 minutes, perhaps at most 2 weeks, in Iran there really is a long sense of history.  Every time I've been to Tehran the people have discussed issues not only relating to events during the Safavid period in the 16th century, but also especially as to the comparative role of the religious clergy or the constitutional liberals or members of various tribes or other interest groups or pressure groups back in 1906, 1907 and 1908.  This is an issue which might percolate in the Iranian street and in Iranian discussions.  There might be references to it in Iranian newspapers even if it's not picked up ordinarily here.   We're also coming up, and this is more of an issue for U.S. policy, to I believe the twenty-fifth anniversary of Solidarity in Poland when labor unions stood up to a government and demanded support.  There was the whole issue of military law afterwards and so forth.  We can have a debate later on the impact of Solidarity, but it is a world event which bears keeping in mind because, frankly, as someone who did my doctoral work on 19th century Iran, and the same holds true today, Iranians are very aware no matter where they stand on the political spectrum of what goes on in the world around them and in world history.  And when you actually go into bookstores in Tehran and--and elsewhere, the bookstores tend to be filled with history books because it's a lot safer writing a very straight chronological as opposed to an analytical work than it is writing a novel which might be embraced now, but 2 years down the line might get you in trouble with the thought police.   Also when we look ahead, a lot of these characters aren't new, and I think both Moshen Sazegara and Bill Samii made that very clear.  Rafsanjani is a former president.  He served as president between 1989 and 1997.  It's very interesting to note, and this goes back to the theme of Washington not having a sense of history that lasts that long, it's interesting to go back to The New York Times and The Washington Post and so forth and see what people were saying about the prospects of a Rafsanjani presidency in 1989.  He's a real pragmatist, he can bring real social freedom to Iran.  Here is an opportunity for the United States to engage.   What was the legacy of Rafsanjani presidency?  A European court in Berlin found that he had signed off on the assassination of dissidents in the Mykonos Cafe.  He was also involved in the assassination of Kurdish dissidents in Vienna and so forth.  He is the father of the Iranian nuclear bomb.  Yes, Iran had a nuclear program before the Islamic Revolution, but the person who really developed the program, who really moved it forward, who was involved at a time when revelations as recent as yesterday showed that there was plutonium development and so forth going on.   What's the legacy of Khatami?  Khatami came in as a surprise victory.  Everyone expected Nateq-Nouri to win, the hard-line former speaker of the--the Parliament.  What happened was that despite this embrace, despite these calls of dialogue, of civilization, nothing much happened at all.  There was all this talk of civilizational dialogue, and if you actually look at the visa statistics, for example, from the year 2000, the Iranians granted Americans 800 visas, the Americans granted Iranian passport holders 20,000 visas.  It's wasn't exactly an even dialogue.  Regardless, I have either the fortune or misfortune to have been in Iran in what I would consider the real turning point in popular perception of the Khatami presidency, and that was in 1999 during the student riots and seeing the disappointment on students' faces when after the attack on the Tehran University dormitory people expected Khatami to speak up and he didn't.   You've had capital punishment more than double under Khatami.  You've had numerous newspaper closings and so forth.  One might say that he didn't control the levers of power so he can't be held accountable, but that in and of itself is a statement about the importance of the Iranian presidency.   We'll see.  Despite the doubling of capital punishment, despite Iran being one of the few countries in the Middle East where women aren't fighting for new rights, but for rights which they once had, people are correct, women can how wear their scarves a little bit further back on their heads.  We'll see.   Bill Samii had said that election participation is a key issue.  I'd like to underline this a little bit.  All too often the press in the wake of an Iranian election takes its statistics about election participation from the Islamic Republic of Iran.  This isn't necessarily the most healthy reporting.  Hopefully, journalists aren't just asking questions to the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, but are actually doing surveying and talking to Iranian professors, demographers and so forth.  Hopefully they're not just basing their reporting out of major cities like Tehran and Isfahan.   When I was in Karbala and Sulimanya in the past year talking to people in the wake of the 2003--election, people in the provinces where journalists often don't go estimated turnout to be between 13 and 20 percent.  Again, this doesn't mean revolution, it surely suggests apathy, and apathy is the result of losing faith in government.   Again, people in Washington often talk about the dichotomy between hard liners and reformers.  People in Iran increasingly talk about the dichotomy between regime officials, wherever they stand on that continuum, and democrats and dissidents.  We'll see.   Also it's always been frustrating reading reports of rallies, not only in Iran, but also in Lebanon recently, especially government-sponsored rallies.  Journalists should ask the question, who was at the rally?  Is everyone you're surveying a state worker or an unemployed person?  If so, that says a lot about the rally.  It takes a lot to get the working middle class out, but perhaps that can be important.   Just to sum up what this means to U.S. policy, I started off this discussion by reading an excerpt of a statement which was issued by President Bush today.  It's an important statement.  Unfortunately, I would argue that consistently while I agree with the sentiments expressed, the rhetoric doesn't often match the reality of policy, and there are many key issues that remain unresolved.   There is the whole issue of democracy which whatever one's stand is in this audience, have no doubt the President is sincere.  The question is, when sponsoring democracy, who do you work with?  When I worked in government, there were always certain key questions which came up.  If the Americans extend support to dissidents, to democrats, to anyone, does that tar them?  Does that tarnish them?   Again I'll go back and point out the twenty-fifth anniversary of Solidarity in Gdansk.  That's number one.  Number two, I would argue that while it's a valid conversation to have, ultimately it's quite arrogant and condescending, the reason being no one knows better what is good for them as an individual than ordinary Iranians.  If they think that they're going to be punished and they're not willing to be punished, they're not going to be willing to take aid from endowments or so forth.  If they so want to embrace it, so much the better, and if they're ineffective, then they lose that funding source as long as the matrix of U.S. government success isn't the amount of money, but actually getting results.  There is also the issue of unions and the right versus left.   When it comes to Sudan policy, over the last couple of years I think the effectiveness of putting Sudan on the radar was you had a coalition of the left and the right versus the center, because fundamentally people on the far left and people on the right when they talk about human rights, it's often not cynical, it's often deep-felt.  They might argue about other aspects of policy, but when it comes to Iran, for example, it's always surprised me how unwilling people are to deal with Iranian unions.  When you read Iranian newspapers from Isfahan or from other places, Isfahan where there's a strong textile industry often owned by these bunyats (ph), the revolutionary foundations, people walk off the job for unpaid wages, and yet all the unions are state sponsored.  Why are we so afraid to sponsor independent unions to offer people training if they want training?  Why is it okay to help train unions in Latin America and Europe, in the United States, but not in countries like Iran where workers are also exploited?  The same goes true for organizing other civil societies and so forth.   The other thing is while the rhetoric in this administration seems to my ears perfect, often times it's instructive that the real drive for the foreign policy towards Iran isn't coming from the State Department or even from the White House, but it's coming from the Senate.  That's what's pushing it.  This year we also have, I guess Libya is no longer on it, but the equivalent of the renewal of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act under a new name.  That's going to be an interesting debate.   With that, the last thing I would argue is often times, and again I'm going back to the lessons of Gdansk, it's useful to have a name associated with movements.  We know about the students.  People who don't know a single Iranian often talk about the students.  But the fact of the matter is, there are very real people who Americans in the White House should be able to rally around who may not be the most political people, may not be the most polarizing figures, but, for example, Arash Sigarchi, one of the reformist journalists and bloggers, he's out on bail.  He has a Damocles Sword dangling over his head, and several other bloggers are still in prison, but is there any reason when the White House issues a statement or when a Senator issues a statement that they don't bring up the case?  Because as I'm bringing up his name now, the fact of the matter is, it shows that he's not forgotten and if he is rearrested, if Akbar Ganji is harmed, if Ahmed Batebi suffers more medical breakdown, they're not going to be forgotten, and that's the most important thing for the Islamic Republic to understand, and it's been the failure to this point in American policy.   With that framing this in the context of U.S. policy, I'll turn it over to questions and answers.  Thank you.  I'm going to not only ask you, but insist that you identify yourselves and that you keep your question very brief rather than a statement.  We'll do this like Jeopardy!, all phrase your statement in the for of a question.  Thank you.   MR.          :  My name is--I'm from the BBC.  You said in your statement--and you cited one reason is that no matter who wins, there will be no change and one reason you cited is that the Supreme--holds 80 percent of the powers in his hand.  Is that the only reason?   MR. SAZEGARA:  Yes, the most important reason is the present constitution that goes all the power to the leader, and of course there are some other sources of power inside the society who are controlled by the leader besides to the constitution.  For instance, we have some foundations like Oppressed People's Foundation which is actually a huge economic complex, or Martiad Foundation (ph) which is under control of the leader.   And we have a parallel Secret Service.  It's the name that is famous in Iran.  They call it the Parallel Secret Service.  Again the official name is the Department of Security of Judiciary Power, but actually it's the Secret Service.  I was arrested by this part of the security forces last summer.  This is controlled by the leader again.   I mean that besides to what officially are at the hands of the leader, we have some other institutions, financial institutions, security institutions, and some other forces which are controlled by the leader.  So if he can control everything, and this is the reason that I say that it has been shown especially during the last 8 years that it's useless to have a president at the top of the Executive Division because he has no power and very low authority to do anything.   MR. RUBIN:  Other questions, please?  [End of side A, begin side B.]   MR.          :  [In progress] --but do you know if there is any validity to this whole talk about friction between Mr. Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei and whether or not this will do anything for the future policy of Iran should Mr. Rafsanjani win as the president towards the United States.   MR. RUBIN:  Bill, can you take that first and then Moshen?   MR. SAMII:  From my perspective, there are two ways to look at this.  One, it might be that there is some degree of competition.  Rafsanjani is really the second-most powerful man in the country, and becoming president would be quite a feather in his cap, I suppose.  But I find it hard to believe that the tension is all that serious.  There might be a competition between two equals more than anything else.   But there is another school of thought to this, and that is that Hashemi Rafsanjani is already very powerful.  He's got extensive personal networks throughout various state institutions, and his being elected as president would bring his power to close to that of Mr. Khamenei.  I haven't seen anything either way as convincing argument to that.   MR. SAZEGARA:  I agree with Bill.  This is true.  They have some competition with each other, and somehow especially after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Mr. Rafsanjani was famous as the First Man of Iran.  But gradually during the last 14 years, many of the institutions are now out of the hands of Rafsanjani.  For instance, his brother was at the top of National Radio and Television exclusively state run, or he was at the head of the army and the armed forces during the war.  But very soon after leadership of Mr. Khatami, he took the army and the armed forces at his hands, and several other institutions which now are controlled by the leader but now with Mr. Rafsanjani.   I know that he has said somehow to the people that if he will be the president then he will bring the Americans even to Iran indirectly somehow, and in some of the interviews he said that even he may change the--he goes for changing the absolute power of the jurisprudence in Iran.   But in the last few days, he has had some other interviews that have said, no, I am with the leader.  I am his old friend for 50 years and nobody in Iran is closer to the leader than me, and several other things.   I think that it doesn't make any difference even if Mr. Rafsanjani claims that he will be able to change, for instance, the nuclear policy of Iran or the key economic policies which were last month dictated by the leader to the Executive Division.   I think that he lies and even any other candidate who says that, yes, I will be able to change and to go on a way that the leader doesn't like unless they go to confront him or at least change the authorities that according to this constitution he has.  So I think that everybody who says that I can change the policies without changing the constitution, there is something wrong in this sentence if everybody says it in Iran.   MR. SAMII:  There's just one other thing I wanted to add.  Perhaps the way to look at it is not so much a competition between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, but a competition between the individuals associated with them.  The role of personal networks is very important in Iran, and I don't mean just informal networks, but the ones that are associated with an individual through where he works through his official position.   So if you are somehow linked with Rafsanjani and he is going to move up in the hierarchy and become even more powerful, some of that is going to trickle down to you and you through your association will become more powerful.   The same with Khamenei.  He is already quite powerful through, for example, the institution of the supreme leader's representatives, but somehow he is seen as being less powerful than the Supreme Leader's representatives.  All these individuals associated with him professionally and institutionally will thereby lose some of their power.  So I think that explains some of the dispute that's being played out over this issue.   MR. RUBIN:  Other questions?   MS. FARID:  I'm Matod Farid (ph) from USI News, and my question is for Mr. Sazegara.  If you could answer in Farsi as well.   As you know, Mr. Sazegara, there are numerous opposition groups in the United States holding talks, holding conferences, including--had a gathering the other day.  How influential do you think these opposition groups are?  Do any of them have any credibility with the people of Iran?  Do you think the United States should support these opposition groups?   MR. RUBIN:  If you could limit your answer to English, as we put the transcripts of the events online.   MR. SAZEGARA:  Yes, but she knows about my poor English.  I apologize for my poor English.   To answer this question, I think that you have to look at the Iranian society.  What is important that we have been transferred from a revolutionary discourse to a new paradigm which is liberalistic and democratic.  This is what has happened in Iran during the last 15 years especially amongst the young generation who are the absolutely majority of the country.  They are 70 percent of the country.   I think that every opposition group, monarchists, republicans, leftists, rightists, who want to have any influence in Iran must appreciate this new paradigm of our society.  Some of the opposition groups, I don't want to name any name, any groups, but I think that some of them still live in the revolutionary paradigm.  Some of them still live in a paradigm before the revolutionary paradigm which was a kind of nationalistic paradigm coming of that constitution revolution that Michael mentioned.   Everybody who wants to have any influence in Iran I think, first of all, must appreciate this new discourse of our society, first.  And second, that's not enough; must criticize his past, its past, by this new tool, I mean liberal democratic, liberalistic and democratic vision.   Third, have some ideas and some solutions according to these new theoretical points of view for Iranian society with respect to the economy, social problems and politics and the other cultural problems.   I think that now because of defeat of Islamists--when I say Islamists I don't mean Muslims in general, I mean the people who believe in religion as a--they are maximalists.  The Islamists from any division, reformists or rightists, traditionalists or modernists, all together the Islamists have been defeated in Iran.  Especially the defeat of the reform movement proved that we have some serious difficulties inside the basic theories.   After this defeat, now just a glance, one eye of the Iranian people is looking outside Iran amongst the other tribes of political families outside Iran, if I can call them families or tribes, like monarchists, like previous leftists, like nationalists.   I have said to many of them who have visited me, I have told them that you have to change your ideas if you want to have any influence inside Iran.  As I said, they have appreciated the new discourse of our society.   Of course, some of them have been changed, and this is the reason that I think that very soon out of these groups that have been changed and appreciated the new paradigm of our society, a kind of front, a kind of maybe congress or parliament, will come out of them and we will have a kind of unity amongst them which, fortunately, has been started, and this is a very, very good step.   The internal affairs of our society, of course relates to Iranian people and these are the Iranian people who must produce enough pressure on the present regime for changing the constitution and the structure.  So we don't want not only the United States but any other foreign country to intervene inside Iran, but they can support democracy in Iran, human rights, and they can support every opposition group who goes in this way without naming any groups.   If later on we succeeded to have, for instance, a parliament out of the opposition groups based on democratic action, nonviolent actions, I think at that stage then not only the United States or any other Western country, democratic country, we can ask them to support that specific organization.  But the most important thing I think in this stage is supporting generally democratic and democracy and human rights in Iran.   MR. RUBIN:  Other questions?   MR.          :  Mike--Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  I'm wondering if any of you are familiar with the current state of relations between the housa in Qom and the housa in Najaf (phonetic spellings) and if you think the housa Najaf can be a force for any good in terms of undermining whatever credibility the Iranian clergy have left?   MR. SAMMI:  It's been a little while since I worked on this, I'm a little bit rusty, but from my perspective, the housa in Qom and the housa in Najaf, they have two different attitudes towards the relationship between religion and the state.   The housa in Najaf has more in common with the housa of Mashad (ph) which promotes an apolitical religious attitude in which religious leaders may have an influence no policy, i.e., they can watch the way the state is rules and if it's completely unacceptable they're obliged to say this.  But they don't have a supervisory role over the leadership of a country, nor do they actually have a practical role in how the country is run.   In the case of housa in Qom, you've got a very politicized institution and it's become even more politicized since the 1979 Revolution.  The reason for that I believe is, one, the example of Ayatollah Khomeini and other leading clerics who were associated with him and I think--and they rose up and became politically active.  So that's one school.   What you have now is a lot of clerics who have Qom training and their role in the state, their position in life, is based on the theocratic state rather than their being pure seminarians or theologians.   My own perspective is that some of these clerics in Qom, the ones who are more apolitical, will start drifting away and as the situation settles in Iraq, they'll start moving back to Najaf where they can practice Islam as they see it should be practiced.  If that happens and Qom loses much of its legitimacy, that could serve to undermine the legitimacy of the theocratic state.   MR.          :  Is there anything we can do to help make that come about instead of just being hands-off?   MR. SAMII:  I'm not really a person to make policy recommendations.  It's not my function.   MR. RUBIN:  I'd like to add one aspect to that.  One of the figures I've seen in press reports or one of the factoids I've seen in press reports is that since the fall of Saddam Hussein there has been an increasing amounts of--basically religious taxes going from Iran into Iraq.  On one hand it's easy to interpret this as Iranian interference in Iraq, but I would argue that while there's plenty of Iranian interference in Iraq, the more interesting interpretation here would be the fact that people tend to pay--to who they follow--as their source of emulation.  And if ordinary Iranians are paying their so-called religious taxes to ayatollahs in Iraq, that is an indication as to how little legitimacy or with how little legitimacy they view the Supreme Leader who claims to be the source of emulation.   I believe it was in 1994 when Grand Ayatollah Araki died.  Ayatollah Khamenei made a big push to be recognized as not just the marja for Iran in his formalized politicized office, but also for the entire Shiia world, and he was laughed off the stage.  And the fact that people sometimes talk about voting with their feet, when you're voting with your pocketbook, it's really interesting to watch how this goes.   In answer to your second question, it's a shame that sometimes we don't shine a spotlight a little bit more on some of these trends because often times they are reported in the Iranian press, not necessarily--and the big national papers, but the local papers can be a treasure trove of information and it's hard for the Islamic Republic to say that what's published in a local paper isn't true because, after all, they're the ones that are publishing it, they're just not prepared for it to go mainstream across the nation.  Let me make an analogy, the way sometimes the Drudge Report will pick up a minor headline somewhere in the United States and suddenly make it national news.  There is no reason why we shouldn't help enable very nonviolently the Iranians to do the same sort of thing, but that's an aside.   What I would say is the best way to advance a policy is to actually have a policy.   MR. HARRIS:  Good afternoon.  I'm Winston Harris from the Center for International Relations.  This question is for Mr. Samii.  In your speech you said that about two-thirds of the population in Iran are students now.  Since most of the students are opposed to the theocracy, if this trend continues, do you think there is any potential for a counterrevolution in the future?   MR. SAMII:  I didn't say two-thirds of the population are students.  What I said is two-thirds of the population is under the age of 35, so that's a bit of a difference there.   Also I disagree that all the students are opposed to the regime.  I think, yes, there are a number of students who are opposed to the regime, but there are many of them who are not.  People who join institutions like the University of Basige (ph) or Student Basige, tend not to be focused against the regime unless they've been forced to join these institutions.  But I just wouldn't say that all of them are opposed to the regime.   Furthermore, what we call the student movement, and I want to distinguish a bit between student movement and youth movement because I've tried to and found it very difficult to do any serious research on youth in Iran in general.  I just can't generalize with that many people.   But the student movement is very factionalized.  You've got the Office for Fostering Unity which is the best-known student organization, but in 2002 that split into two wings, the--and the majority branch, the--branch, what they want to do is stay out of politics and just observe it from the outside, and they're the ones advocating the boycott of the election.   The other wing, the minority wing called the--what they're advocating is continuing participation and attempts to change the system from within, i.e., by voting.  So that's a major split.   Then you've got some more radical student groups like the group called, cleverly enough the--group after the--they advocate a more radical approach, but--he's in his forties.  Occasionally he gets arrested and thrown in prison, and I think that serves as a disincentive not only for him, but he's pretty brave and he keeps it up.   But younger people who are maybe a little less brave or have a little less experience in life, they're pretty unwilling to come forward and get arrested, thrown in prison and so on.  So things like that really cut down on the ability of students to act.   And something else that Moshen or Michael referred to, when someone is arrested, it's not just that you're arrested by the police and taken and treated like a human being, sometimes these parallel institutions will come and grab you and an individual disappears for days or weeks at a time, and it's pretty scary for that individual to know that he or she could disappear and never be heard from again.  An example of that is what was happening in Argentina in the 1970s.  It's a pretty intimidating situation.   Then what also happens to a lot of people is that they're released on bail.  The bail is a huge amount of money.  The person's family goes in debt to get the person out of jail.  Then there is always hanging over the head that Damocles sword of the police might come back and take you again.  So all these things serve as disincentives and deter people from real political activism.   MR.          :  My question is for Mr. Samii.  You said that the Azari population is 21 percent in Iran.  What is their role or influence during the election?  One of the most prominent Azari leader--lives in Washington.  Does he have any influence in Iran?   MR. SAMII:  I believe I said the Azari population is 24 percent, and if I said 21 I misspoke.   Yes, the Azari population will occasionally call for greater attention to its cultural concerns, greater use of its language by state broadcasting, greater use of the language in publications and so on.   But you should also bear in mind or one should also bear in mind that many of the leading figures in the state are of Azari origin.  The Supreme Leader is of Azari origin.  So it's not that they're completely marginalized.  And one Azari group recently supported or endorsed the candidacy of--in the presidential election.   As for--obviously I see his name occasionally, but I don't think I've ever seen a reference to him in the Iranian media, and I've been following the Iranian media pretty closely.  I don't know if that's just because he's not considered an issue or because there's an desire to avoid giving any attention to a person who is viewed as a separatist.   MS.          :  Miriam--Freedom House with a question for Mr. Samii. I one of your recent articles maybe 10 days ago you said what you said today about two forces operating before the elections, one is apathy and one is the call for a boycott.  I think in the second paragraph you said that a boycott is not likely to have any real change or effect or power, something like that.   Can you explain why you said that?  And if voter turnout for either reason, apathy or a boycott, is much lower than anyone expects, what effect will that have?  I just want to qualify it by asking you what you think how reliable are the state's figures on turnout and how much will they manipulate them?   MR. SAMII:  One of my concerns always is, because I do write a lot, that someone asks me about something that I've written and I don't remember it, but at least you remember it.   The reason I'm sure a boycott will have much of an impact is that in a way it plays into the hands of the state.  The state controls much of what we know about these election turnout figures, and so if the state decides that it wants to portray a large turnout it can do so, and it's not like we have independent election monitors, the OSC coming in to check on that.   Another part of this is that the way it works out is that the hard-liners have pretty easily mobilized constituencies, people are politically active, and they can get them out to vote.  Of course, the conscripts, civil servants and so on, they can be actively encouraged to vote and this will pump up the numbers a bit.   So in that sense the boycott won't really have that great an effect.  If people don't go, the hard-liners will anyway and they'll elect their candidate.   And if there is a high turnout, then the state can point at that as a legitimizing factor.  But even if Mr. Moin gets elected, even if Ibrahim Yazdi gets elected, there is really not that much he can do if it runs counter to what more hard-line elements in the regime want to happen.   You've got a hard-line controlled legislature, and then you're got the Guardian Council.  Then you've got the Expediency Council.  All of these are pretty hard-line with the exception of the Expediency Council which can maneuver a bit more and has in the past.  So the result of just not going to the polls might be a little embarrassment, but that's about it.   As for the figures, I'm glad you asked that, actually, because the source of statistics is usually the Ministry of Interior which runs the elections, but Guardian's Council which is tasked with supervising them.  In my own research, I've found that going with the Interior Ministry statistics is a little more reliable not because I think they're perfect, but just comparing the two institutions and their political biases, and also the fact that the Interior Ministry website makes all these stats accessible.  This doesn't mean they're perfect, but at least they're accessible and you can work with them.   Then also newspapers will put their own versions of the statistics based on their own political affiliations.  I tend to avoid the newspaper stats, although they are available more rapidly than the government ministries.   It's really not an ideal situation for anyone who's serious about following these things and number crunching, but sometimes to work with whatever is available.   MR. LUCIER:  I'm James Lucier (ph) with the Alliance for Democracy in Iran.  My question is for Mr. Sazegara.  You stated, and I think you're absolutely correct, that any type of military interference by the United States would be counterproductive.  What can the people of Iran do if there is a nonviolent democratic movement such as the color revolutions in the other countries?  Is there any hope that a significant part of the military apparatus or the security apparatus would stand down if required to oppose demonstrations of the people?   MR. SAZEGARA:  It's really hard for the regime.  Apparently it seems that they are very powerful and specially Ayatollah Khamenei has tried say to the people during the last 8 years that he can control everything, he can close every newspaper, he can put in jail every opposition group, and they can suppress any demonstration.   But I think that our experiences in Iran have shown us that if we create some actions that put them in a cross-roads that both ways are a defeat for them, for instance, myself, my experience, I was in jail, I went on a hunger strike for 79 says, and at last they were on a cross-roads.  They had to decide I was dead in prison or they could condemn me or they had to release me.  Then they have to calculate.  At last they decided to release me.   This is the way that you can go, and our experience again shows that, for instance, the Revolutionary Guards, definitely the Army is moot with respect to any political action.  But the Revolutionary Guard which they may use them to attack the demonstrations, nonviolent actions and so on.  Again, they are very fragile.   In the last presidential election in 1997, Mr. Khatami's election, it showed us that even amongst the--of the Revolutionary Guard, 70 percent of them voted for Khatami.  I think that Ayatollah Khatami knows that he is not able to use them to attack the ordinary people or even the students.   So I'm really optimistic, and I think that if we can give hope back to the Iranian people, it will happen very quick and easy in Iran to mobilize the people by nonviolent and democratic actions on some ways that put them on a forked way that both ways will be defeat for them.  So I have no doubt that we can do that.   When I say that we don't need any militaristic actions from the United States or any foreign country, I don't mean that we don't need the pressure.  For instance, when I said that we need an international investigation coming to terroristic actions of the leaders of the regime, it will create enough pressure.  Or about the sanctions, for instance.  Of course, I don't like any sanctions against the Iranian people, but I agree with some sanctions against the Iranian leaders like the Libyan leaders, to close their bank accounts to prevent them from coming out of Iran.  I'm sure that the Iranian people will be very glad if they hear that the bank account of, for instance, Mr. Rafsanjani or his family has been closed, or the other leaders.   I think that to these corporations and especially to the Iranian people, then we will be able to do even better than the other color revolutions that you mentioned.   MR. RUBIN:  I'd like to add a few comments to what Moshen has said to draw out a few issues with regard to U.S. policy and also trends within Iran.   It was an excellent question, but when it comes to the Revolutionary Guard, and again, Moshen is better equipped to talk about this than perhaps I am, one of the trends which I've seen discussed quite a bit among Iranians but I haven't seen featured so much in the American press is the trend of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran recently consolidating a little bio more power.  I don't mean just militarily, but I also mean political and economic.   The Turkish press in particular has reported on Revolutionary Guard interference with the opening of the Imam Khomeini Airport in the desert south of Tehran.  Also the Turkish press has been following closely the story of Turkcell (ph) which the Revolutionary Guard moved in to interfere with, and it actually resulted in Prime Minister Urdulan (ph) going to Tehran to discuss the issue.  Often times that's couched in terms of security, when in reality it has to do with the ability to enrich themselves.  If you control the airport, you can take cargo off the plane.  If an Austrian or a Turkish firm controls the airport, it gets a little bit more difficult to do some of the shady stuff.   The other aspect which has been going on for several years inside Iran and is in some ways discussed among the European diplomats, also in the Iranian press, is this idea of a China model, that perhaps we should replicate in Iran what's been done with China which is let's lay off some of the human rights issues, let's lay off some of the political criticisms and just engage with them economically and maybe that will trickle down.   What I would argue though is with the China model, comes Tiananmen Square, and this isn't so much just a symbolic analogy, the Iranians and the Chinese have very actively for several years been working together on crowd control.   When it comes to the idea of Iranians rising up, I would argue, and this is of course my own analysis which I had highlighted back in my 2001 monograph, that I wouldn't underestimate the ideological commitment of some elements of the Islamic Republic and this idea that they would necessarily want to give up power in the face of democratic will I think is a little bit naive.   If you're faced with as people said an overwhelmingly young population who don't believe in the same principles you do, but if you're ideologically committed, what do you do?  What the regime has done is slowly try to crack down on some freedoms, close down a couple newspapers, close down some blogs, shut down some Internet cafes and so forth.  If they get away with it, they win.   On the other hand, if you do something like attack the Amir-Abad dormitories such as what happened in July 1999, people come out of the streets, you have a crackdown, again you win if you have a successful crackdown.  The danger is that's a little bit of brinkmanship because if you bring people out in the streets, things might get out of control.   So what the Iranians have been doing recently is working to perhaps do a little bit more photographing of rallies and not cracking heads at the rally, but coming around a day or two or a week later to slowly take people in, to slowly draw out the televised concessions many of which I saw when I was in Tehran in 1999 in the wake of the revolution, and that sort of issue.   At the same time, when we're talking about the control over economic aspects of the society, and many in Europe and some in the United States especially in the academic community tend to often serve as either echo chambers for Iranian rhetoric thinking that somehow that will get the confidence of the Iranian officials with whom they're talking.  Or they think that if only we engage, if we tie Iran into the economic system, that will cause them to want to liberalize.   That again I would argue is not going to work.  It shows absolutely no understanding of the way the Iranian system is constructed.   Moshen had talked about the--Foundation of the Oppressed.  I know Bill has written for years about the foundations in several of his Iran Reports all of which are available online.   The point is that for most import-export, for all the oil contracts and so forth, you're not dealing with ordinary Iranians.  You're dealing with conglomerates whose leadership is appointed by the Supreme Leader.  You're not pumping money into the pockets of ordinary Iranians, you're pumping money into the pockets of Hashemi Rafsanjani and other--sons of important people who use their family connections for nepotistic reasons.  There are some real problems.   All I'm saying here, and then I'll go on to maybe one more question and then end it, is that it's important to look at the particularities of Iran which is why we had this event today with perhaps the two best experts on the topic.  It's always a mistake from a policy point of view to look at a country like Iran or like any other country and just look at it as a template upon which to put your theory without having an understanding of the way that country actually works, and that's especially true with Iran.   Is there any final question before we roll up?   MR. LAFISI:  Thank you very much for the great round table discussion.  My name is Rasul Lafisi (ph) and I'm a college professor.   Mr. Rubin, I feel that you have or you assert that there is an unblemished record of support of democracy in the Middle East by the United States.   MR. RUBIN:  I have not asserted that.   MR. LAFISI:  This seems to be saying--   MR. RUBIN:  No, I would say that you have interpreted wrong.  Do you have a question?   MR. LAFISI:  Yes, sir, I have a question.  What would be the difference in terms of policy if--is elected or Moin is elected?  Should there be any difference in policy in terms of dealing with these two candidates or the United States should treat them equally as the President of Iran?   MR. RUBIN:  What I would suggest with that is you have eight candidates, now seven, running for elections in Iran after 1,000 have been disqualified.  That's number one.   Number two, it's important when you deal with interlocutors, when you deal with another country, when you conduct diplomacy, diplomacy in and of itself isn't enough.  It's not a solution.  What matters is that both participants in the diplomacy have the power within the system in order to enact the changes.   Let me give as benefit of the doubt, perhaps Zarif, the United Nations Ambassador in New York from Iran is sincere.  Perhaps he is.  But he has absolutely no power to enact any agreement, and whenever a whole range of people go off and meet then or engage with representatives of the Islamic Republic, what they're doing is replicating the mistakes of 1979 by showing a willingness to stand up to an unpopular figure and not stand up with ordinary Iranians.   I'm a big fan of greater transparency in government.  I would strongly argue that there is absolutely nothing our officials can say in a private meeting in Geneva, in Athens, in New York, wherever, that they can't say directly over the airways to the Iranian people, and perhaps the United States doesn't have the most consistent track record.   Frankly, that's what all this policy battle in Washington has been about in the last 4 years is a fundamental battle over the direction of foreign policy, and that's why I remain critical of not only this administration, but past administrations as well, for not making the reality match their rhetoric.   MR. LAFISI:  So there is no difference between--   MR. RUBIN:  I would argue in conclusion they would need to demonstrate that they have some sort of ability to do more than just talk, that they're not either insincere or incapable like Mohammed Khatami has been for the past 8 years despite the plaudits of many university professors and pundits.   I'd like to thank our guests for coming today. </body></html>