

Resolution 242

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
 - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces **from territories** occupied in the recent conflict;
 - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. *Affirms further* the necessity:
 - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
 - (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
 - (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. *Requests* the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

Statements on Israel's Future Borders on the Basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242

1. “The proposal said ‘Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied’, not from ‘the territories’, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.”
George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967.
2. “I was engaged in the negotiations for months of that resolution. That resolution did not say ‘total withdrawal’.”
Joseph P. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on Meet the Press, July 1970.
3. “In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was barely ten miles wide at its narrowest point, the bulk of Israel’s population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again.”
President Ronald Reagan, September 1, 1982
4. “Israel will never negotiate from or return to the 1967 borders.”
George Shultz, Secretary of State. September 16, 1988
5. “We believe that territorial compromise is essential for peace.”
President H.W. Bush at the Madrid Peace Conference, October 30, 1991

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6. “I would like to reiterate our position that Israel is entitled to secure and defensible borders, which should be directly negotiated and agreed with its neighbors.”

Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, January 17, 1996

7. “The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel's security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats... In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.”

President George W. Bush, April 14, 2004


New Post-Gaza Expectations of Nearly Full Israeli Withdrawal—No Defensible Borders

1. “Sharon wants to begin withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. However, he must also pledge that the withdrawal from Gaza is the first stage in a process that will lead to a withdrawal from all occupied territories.”
Javier Solana, Brussels' High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, October 25, 2004
2. “The foundational documents noted in the 2003 Roadmap for Peace, including UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and the Arab League peace initiative, either explicitly or implicitly adopt the 1967 borders as the borders separating Israel and Palestine, leaving open the possibility of small and mutually acceptable land swaps.”
RAND Corporation Palestinian State Study Team, 2005
3. “The outlines of a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement are no mystery, as they have been subjected to detailed negotiations in the last year of the Clinton Administration and detailed discussions ever since they would have to be based more or less on the following principles:...The Palestinian state to be established on 95-97 percent of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip, with territorial compensation for the 3-5 percent of the West Bank foregone.”
Martin Indyk , Saban Center—Brookings, 2005

Israel's Strategic Vulnerability from the West Bank



Allon Plan, 1970



The Pentagon Plan JCSM-273-67 29, Memorandum for the U.S. Secretary of Defense Regarding Middle East Boundaries, June 1967

Within days of the end of the June 1967 war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an appraisal of Israel's security requirements concluding that Israel would be justified in retaining significant tracts of territory on the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights to permit a more effective defense.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 19 June 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without regard to political factors, on the minimum territory in addition to that held on 4 June 1967, Israel might be justified in retaining in order to permit a more effective defense against possible conventional Arab attack and terrorist raids.
2. From a strictly military point of view Israel would require the retention of some captured Arab territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders. Determination of territory to be retained should be based on accepted tactical principles such as control of commanding terrain, use of natural obstacles, elimination of enemy-held salients, and provision of defense in-depth for important facilities and installations. More detailed discussions of the key border areas mentioned in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto. In summary, the views of the JCS regarding these areas are as follows:

a. The Jordanian West Bank

Control of the prominent high ground running north-south through the middle of West Jordan generally east of the main north-south highway along the axis Jenin-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then south-east to a junction with the Dead Sea at the Wadi el-Daraja would provide Israel with a militarily defensible border. The envisioned defensive line would run just east of Jerusalem; however, provision could be made for internationalization of the city without significant detriment to Israel's defensive posture.

b. Syrian Territory Contiguous to Israel

Israel is particularly sensitive to the prevalence of terrorist raids and border incidents in this area. The presently occupied territory, the high ground running generally north-south on a line with Qunaitra about 15 miles inside the Syrian border would give Israel control of the terrain which Syria has used effectively in harassing the border area

c. The Jerusalem-Latrun Area.

See subparagraph 2a above.

d. The Gaza Strip

By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be Israel's military advantage...

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
signed Earle G. Wheeler,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Vital Israeli Interests Threatened from Strategic Terrain Beyond the Security Fence: Protecting Ben-Gurion Airport and the Tel Aviv- Jerusalem Highway

