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The Evolutionary Origins of International Security in the Age of Terrorism:
Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region*

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I. Overview

The traditional contours of international relations in the twenty first century have undergone significant change in terms of the very basic sources, context, and parameters that define the relationship among varying national/state and non-state actors in the global system. The explosion of information networks, technological/communication breakthroughs, the expansion of the global financial market, and the attendant socio-economic transformations have wrought a visible weakening of the nation-state as the main cultivator of international relations--in more or less continuing conflict and cooperation with international and other trans-national actors, i.e., Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), media,¹ etc.--in generating national foreign policies, including the traditional duties of national security.

In fact, one of the main contentions in the current debate in international relations literature has to do with the nature and the degree to which the traditional role of the nation-state in the over-all formulation of national foreign policies have been challenged by these new forces, such as the rapidly spreading internet, the widely roaming global hedge funds, and even transnational epidemics, such as SARS, HIV/AIDS, and Asian bird flu.² In this respect, the 9.11 terror attacks on the US homeland can be viewed as an attempt by a trans-national organization, namely Al Qaeda, to challenge the state--the US--although the consequences in terms of reordering of the evolving international order has yet to be systematically understood and analyzed. Accordingly, the main thrust of this essay will be organized into the following parts: (1) review of political economy of international security in the twentieth century; (2) analysis of implications for the politics of national security in the Asia-Pacific region, largely restricted to the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas through interpretations suggested in part (1); and lastly (3) future prognosis on the sources, patterns and implications for national security in the Asia-Pacific region for the twenty first century.

II. Some Thoughts on National Security in the Twentieth Century

The ongoing debate among Realists, Neo-Realists, Liberals, Neo-Liberals, Institutionalists, Marxists, and others on contextualizing sources of change and continuity in international relations have spanned a life-time. Yet far from generating a consensus the debate has continued to fracture even further into what some scholars have termed "productive oblivion" that one is bound to ask the following question.³

¹ See, for example, Denis McQuail and Karen Siune of the Euromedia Research Group, *New Media Politics: Comparative Perspectives in Western Europe*, Sage Communication in Society Series, (London, New Delhi, and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986) which saliently illustrates the transnational impact of media and the European Union's attempt to regulate the market in the early 1980s. Here one can even include epidemics, such as SARS, and AIDS as having strategic impact of transnational significance. See, for instance, Stephen Elbe, *Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS*, Adelphi Paper n.357, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003).

² See foot note 1.

³ For less confused works in the field, consult, James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds.,

How do we make plausible sense out of these theoretical and interpretational clashes in being better able to understand the forces of war and peace by focusing on not only the traditional relationship between nation, and state,⁴ but also, and perhaps more importantly, the very make-up of these two notional units as key generators of national foreign policies? Who makes national security policies?; how?; with what objectives, if any?; and, how effectively? Can we detect a pattern concerning its sources, goals, and implications for international security in the Asia-Pacific region?

Political Economy of International Security Between the First and Second European Civil War, 1918-1939

The immediate impact of World War II on the international system was marked in several respects as this essay will argue later in this section. For national means of organizing the exercise, demonstration, and maintenance of force became ordinally revolutionary in their socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts due to tectonic advances in military technology, the rise of industrial capitalism, and centralization of political authority. Before the outbreak of the Second European Civil War (1939-1945), which became internationalized, armed forces were in conventional terms non-professional, clan-based, technologically inept, sub-national in scope, and weakly tied to the state apparatus.⁵ Military force was perceived as inglorious, ineffectual, unproductive, and popularly distant, a result of the preceding “trench” warfare during which the Western powers had so mired themselves to the brutality of its violence. The profound and wide-ranging toll of the First World War (1914-1918) in

Internationalization and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and K.J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴ Actually the debate has been thus-far contextualized in the so-called level of analysis problem residing at elite, state, and international systemic dimensions. For a classical analysis, consult, Kenneth Waltz, *Man, State, and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). Due to the limitation of this paper, this thesis will essentially limit its analysis to the domestic or state level with particular concentration on the historical evolution of the political economy of international relations. The reason being that while there are many works on East Asian security from international systemic or ad hoc policy dimensions, few analyses concentrate on its political economy in relation to foreign policy, wider regional institutions, regime or international relations. For a preeminent exception to this, consult, Amitav Acharya, *Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific*, (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 2002). For a representative realist analysis on East Asian security, consult, Victor Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: Japan-Korea-US Triangle*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

⁵ For classic studies on the development of the relationship between force and statecraft, see, Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Studies in Political Development n.8, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Michael Howard, *War in European History*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); and Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Saliently applied to the state of Muscovy in this respect, consult, Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971).

terms of lives destroyed, the physical destruction wrought, and the psychological damage done—or to put it more aptly, the First European Civil War⁶—on the wider European societal fabric was so devastating as to make the once chivalrous art something to be avoided, and if possible permanently. This factor, along with three hundred years of self-destructive conflict explains the relative peace and tranquility in Europe since 1945, including the successive fertilization of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the requisite French-German reconciliation under the umbrella of UK/US hegemonic interference.

For the late-modernizers, i.e., inter-war Eastern and Central Europe, Russia, and Japan—as opposed to the early modernizers, i.e., Western Europe, and the United States—the existing feudal conditions generated a highly path-dependent, and brittle state structure with porous borders, whose territory stood in more or less loose “geographical”—as opposed to clearly defined national or “state-like” terms. Within the confines of these geographical entities, many languages and dialects co-habited with one another, each sub-national unit expressing varying, and, individually distinct economic, communicational, and habitual identities. These “sub-national” units, which were identifiable by prevailing occupational trends, language, customs, and at times criss-crossing military alliances, were further split by individual clan structures. The clan more often-than-not revolved around a patriarch and/or matriarch, constituting the most basic social unit apart from the traditional family.

These social units were part of the agricultural system, just beginning to experience the first wave of industrialization led by the aristocratic state, which in turn was undergoing rapid bureaucratic expansion and modernization of its own. Until this time, the state personified by its ruler had propagated a personalized ideology and secularized religion, whose extent of societal penetration and control was relatively weak. No actively integrating ideology or holistic socio-economic infrastructure existed in the modern sense. Given the lateness of their industrialization process—political, social, economic and cultural life of an individual in these lately modernizing states was weakly differentiated, including the primitive role of force. Moreover, these geographical expressions lacked a strong center, capable of driving the type of political and socio-economic modernization that could catapult their status towards the ranks of advanced Western industrial powers as they were to today.

The politics of security before the Second European Civil War for these lately modernizing states, accordingly, revolved around inter-personal, and clan rivalry, often resulting in clashes among varying mobile social units located in different parts

⁶ This term was used by Professor Alan Kittel of Lewis and Clark College in European social history class in the early 1980s. For much of the arguments developed in this paper, I am most grateful to the ideas which were developed with my fellow graduate students in advanced graduate seminar on European politics at Harvard University in 1986 with Professors Stanley Hoffman, Charles Maier, and Peter Hall. On the political economy of national security during the inter-war years in this section, I have drawn much from the following works as well: Joseph Reither, *World History at a Glance: A Record of Events from Earliest Civilizations to the Present*, revised edition, (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1957); Henry W. Littlefield, *History of Europe Since 1815*, (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1957); idem, *History of Europe 1500-1848*, (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1957); Wilbur Cortez Abbot, *The Expansion of Europe: The History of the Foundations of the Modern World*, 2 vols., (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1918); and Chester G. Starr, Charles E. Nowell, Bryce Lyon, Raymond P. Stearns, and Theodore S. Hamerow, *A History of the World*, vol. 1, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1960).

of the geographical expressions--or proto-states. Security for these patriarchal and/or matriarchical heads amounted to unifying and allying with as many of these clan-based heads as possible, and if given the right terms with early modernizers who had the necessary capital, organization, ruling paradigm as well as military know-how, particularly in terms of applying massive fire power. Security was personalized, its decision-making structure unitary, and simple. Moreover, these elites were usually educated in the states of early modernization and were able to digest modern notions of statehood and nationalism as well as the means that are needed for their realization--i.e., modern bureaucracy, tax police, an intelligence organ, educational system, and armed force that would later comprise the state with extensive "extractive, regulative, and mediational" capacities.⁷

In these state structures, the decision-maker usually had only a few professionals to rely on for policy planning, tactics, and strategy while the rest of the population was set a part by significant intellectual, social-psychological and organizational distance. Security in these conditions was equivalent to the physical protection of one's sub-national border, stable provision of food, rations, home, maintenance of the general well-being of the population under immediate control, and prevention of hostile political forces from being materialized both within and without. Armed forces and prevailing military doctrine were territorially-bound with the exception of the conduct of diplomacy which was designed to reinforce and strengthen the short comings of geographically-bound force structure and strategy. Given the prevailing lack of internal socio-economic and political coherence, and in particular its low organizational density, internal and external security was more often than not one and the same, reflecting its generally underdeveloped nature of political institutions and norms. (Although I am on the main analyzing the political economy of late industrializing states during the inter-war years in this section, one can easily recognize how many nation-states in today's world still fall under this category, i.e., Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea which gives still more reasons as to why we should study political development during the inter-war years).

Armed forces were based on conscription with lax age limits with locally raised personnel usually being posted on their home territory. Lack of advanced, modern communication and transportation channels limited the state in being able to deploy these militias effectively in relation to given political objectives in a timely

⁷ Modern nation-state building was to occur following the end of Second European Civil War (1939-1945) in the Soviet-controlled/influenced zones of Eastern Europe, comprising the late modernizing states of Albania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, and in East Asia, in the late modernizing Mongolia, People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea where Soviet styled-systems came into being. In the US zone--in the late modernizing states of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan a US-styled political, and economic system came into existence. In the case of Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, and North Korea political system was directly implanted by Moscow through military occupation and implantation of an indigenous leader educated in Moscow; while in Albania, Yugoslavia, and the PRC it was the indigenous elites who instituted a modernized state structure a la the Soviet system without Moscow's military occupation. In the case of South Korea the indigenous elite educated in the US adopted a US-styled model; while in Japan it was US military occupation imparting a wholly new state structure on the indigenous elites. See the chapter on Leninist regimes by Samuel Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

manner. Ability to mobilize soldiers in these sub-national units were further made difficult by the underdevelopment of accurate statistics on demographics on which effective conscription could be implemented--as well as the low "extractive" capacity of the state,⁸ reflected by weak policing, taxing, and other "repressive" powers of the state at hand. Likewise, warfare was "pre-modern" and "physical contact"-oriented. Thus, individual offense predominantly centered around hand-to-hand combat with bearing of rifle, hand-gun, and knives with random fire-power, and mobile divisions (tanks, cannons on cart) being utilized in either tactical operations or battle-field theater. Strategic warfare or intelligence was lacking given the underdeveloped nature of military technology and the equally under-formed nature of the (proto) states at the time, not to mention the near absence of human resources, and know-how for its operationalization. The art of military strategy was based on the "linear" or "bean-counting" school, rather than "maneuver," given the primarily quantitative--as opposed to qualitative--nature of warfare prevailing at the time.⁹ In a system lacking well defined individual units, expediency demanded hierarchical means of relating with one another in such a chaos, including protection of one's security. Operationalization of balance of power in such a system was either difficult or meaningless, accordingly gaining as much territorial conquest became the norm in which easily quantifiable measures were used in warfare when hierarchy could not be enforced. A typical force structure and doctrine in these sub-national units reflected an unbalanced mixture of the "modern" and the "backward" in their varying technological and organizational elements.

The family system¹⁰ in these proto-states was essentially traditional in value structure and in organizational terms with strong ties to the countryside in an otherwise underdeveloped urban setting. Such "emotional" nexus linked each household to the larger clan, ultimately making-up the sub-national units discussed thus-far. The individual perception of security was thus primarily "familial" and clan-based with much premium placed on patrimonial loyalty, and hierarchy, while links to the articulated center was personalized, based on aristocratic blood ties. Accordingly, apart from the noted foot soldiers, who made up the bulk of the armed force in these late modernizing states there lacked professionalized military academies, and hence a reliable corps of officers in the modern-day sense, whose composition was not restricted to the aristocracy, but open to those from all quarters with career

⁸ Still the best work on the growth of the state can be found in Huntington, op.cit.

⁹ For classic works on the art of war, consult the following: C.W.C.Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D.378-1515*, rev., and ed., John H. Beer, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986); F.E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macadonian Art of War*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1957); William McElwee, *The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier*, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1966); and Eduard Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987).

¹⁰ For salient analyses, see Elizabeth Colson, *Tradition and Contract*, (Chicago: Aldine, 1974); Clifton Wharton, "Risk, Uncertainty and the Subsistence Farmer," *Economic Development and Social Change*, ed, George Dalton, (New York: The Natural History Press, 1971); and Samuel L. Popkin, "Free Riders, Lemons, and Institutional Design," *Public Choice and Rural Development*, eds., Clifford R. Russell and Norman K. Nicholson, (Washington DC.: Resources for the Future, 1981).

opportunities to serve in the highest offices (nevertheless the military academies have served as one of the most forward, modernizing institutions compared to other sectors of traditional societies). Only hands-on-combat offered ample opportunity for battle-seasoning for these militia, while the officer corps was restricted to the aristocratic class, deeply ensconced in the affairs of protecting its wealth, and entitlements composed of the very people serving under arms. What tied the man in the village to the center was, therefore, romantic inspiration for kinship and fraternity. Security was, thus, romantically thought-out from bottom-up, while more modernizing, and rationalizing concepts--i.e., internal and external balance of power--was limited to the operational ideology of the ruling class at the top, signifying a large gap between the ruler and the ruled. Such difference was not unlike the current times although the gap in many instances has narrowed not always to the best interest of the state. Security was on the whole "sub-national." There was very weak, or virtually no "national" security per se in the meaningful sense of the term.

What about the politics of national security in the early modernized states prior to the outbreak of the Second European Civil War? In contradistinction to the existing trends in the late modernizing states, the national means of organizing, exercising, demonstrating and maintaining force was modern in the true sense of the term. Armed forces in these early modernizing entities were professionalized, nationally-based, technologically well adapted, and strongly tied, if not fused with the very state apparatus. Induction standards were rational, and not ascriptive, including its intra-organizational social mobility. Budget allocation for force structure was calculated to respond to both external, and in the case of political intelligence, internal threat perceptions. As the famous adage well explains the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the military and the state during the times of "modernizing monarchs" of 17th century Europe, "war made the state, and state made war," a case equally applicable to the advanced industrial powers of Western Europe during the inter-war years.

For the early modernizers, the accumulated capitalist forms of production generated a relatively strong state structure with non-porous borders, whose territory stood in very clearly defined national or "state-like" terms--as opposed to the more or less "geographical" form in which the late modernizers were positioned. Within the confines of these national-state actors, homogeneous, if not standardized languages and dialects were adopted. Prevailing occupational, demographic trends accelerated, while other productive, communication/transportation, and social identities were established on a national basis, whose whole was aligned externally for protecting and enhancing integrated state interests. These national-state organizations were based on strong executive organs, allied to relatively docile legislatures and judiciaries with extensive extractive, and regulative capacities. Bureaucracy was highly developed and therefore modern in the Weberian sense with a strong developmental and distributive role.

These early modernizing states were part of a highly industrialized capitalist system with a dominant middle-class, and stable societal fabric amenable to the pressures of national political integration and military mobilization. There was a strong political penetration of society by the state. The state in this sense was personified by the national industrial elite, and this prevalent "exultation" of the government was based on inclusionary--and oftentimes exclusionary--nationalism married to industrial

capitalism.¹¹ Nationally integrative ideology and holistic socio-economic infrastructure was also in the making. Social, economic, political and cultural life of the individual citizen was sufficiently differentiated to permit autonomous, and even professionalized military activity. Force was an important facet of a state's policy and organizational domain, whose institutional base was entering the stage of developed industrial/finance capitalism on a pre-corporatist basis. These modernizing political entities hosted a strong center with a relatively weak periphery. The state was strong in every sense of its definition.

Politics of national security for these early modernizers before the Second European Civil War (1939-1945), accordingly, revolved around international rivalry, tension and clashes over either other national-state actors in the international system or sub-national units discussed above. (Of course such international clash lasted well into the post-Second European Civil War period up to this very day in the form of the War on Terrorism) Given the relatively robust level of internal coherence, and integrated political stability, which provided the backbone for these units in the global capitalist system, the potential friction being generated from labour, capital and state from within was low. Thus, political gravity on the whole was oriented towards other national-state actors for the maximization of their state interest as the executive branch in these early modernized states placed their prime interests in either unifying or allying with as many international actors as possible, while further developing indigenous capital, organizational know-how, and managerial basis for the most effective conduct of applying raw force usually through power projection. While learning new technology¹² and its new applicational context for the armed forces in the form of emerging doctrine and force structure as well as civil-military relations, they were perhaps more so interested in exporting their distinctive styles of rule and production system through projection, demonstration and maneuver of force to the late modernizers. Through this "exporting" process the early modernizers in turn digested new methods of warfare from the late modernizers, especially unconventional methods; while resultant clashes with other developed industrial powers allied to targeted colonies bred new technological development in their arsenal as well as in strategy.

The decision-maker in these industrial powers usually had a stable corps of professional advisers with respect to planning, tactics, strategy, intelligence, command, and control while the rest of the population underwent a significant level of general educational, scientific, socio-cultural, economic and political socialization. The expansion of the state, and its increasing bureaucratization and specialization demanded the creation of varying specialists, including in the field of warfare, in providing the most cost-effective application of force for a given purpose. The decision-making structure was unitary, differentiated, and specialized with standard operating procedures (SOP) linking the various ministries of the state. Given the increasingly "machine-like" nature of the governmental process, charismatic

¹¹ On exclusionary nationalism in the East Asian regional developmental sense, see Byungki Kim, Hyun-Chin Lim, and Jin-Ho Chang, *Towards a Preliminary Analysis of the Political Economy of East Asian Integration: Differences from the European Union*, Institute for Social Development and Policy Research Working Paper, (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2004).

¹² For the best work in this field, see, Martin Van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present*, (New York and London: The Free Press, 1989).

leadership had in certain respects a greater role to play in planning and executing the desired policies of the state. Although both the legislature and the judiciary remained weak, not to mention society at large its dormancy was not to last long.

National security in these conditions was equivalent to the physical protection of one's national border, including major socio-economic, military, demographic and bureaucratic infrastructures. The well-being of the populous depended not only in being able to ward-off hostile forces from destroying the nation's productive potential, such as factories and energy sources, but also, and equally important, maintaining secure sea lines of communication (SLOC), and airspace for the purpose of free trade and commerce on which the nation's bloodline depended. In order to reach these objectives, national energy was directed towards preventing any one or group of powers from gaining unilateral advantage. Thus, in contradistinction to the late modernizers, armed forces and prevailing military doctrine were not geographically bound, for they were designed for wide-ranging duties of regional and/or global security directives, including the ability to project power well beyond one's borders. Both force structure and strategy were intermeshed with diplomacy to reflect the duties of not passive territorial defense as was the case in the late modernizers, but active engagement with the powers beyond its border for maximizing national interest. Coercive, compellent, deterrent, and swaggering roles of force actively entered the strategic matrix to achieve better, and more effectively these objectives of the state at hand.¹³

Given the prevailing robustness of internal socio-economic and political structure, and consequently high organizational density within the state, internal aspects of national security was saliently distinguished from its external dimension both conceptually and practically. Whereas in the late modernizers the theory and practice of (sub-national) security was relatively simple as internal and external dimensions remained (almost) one and the same--due to the undifferentiated nature of its political economy, in the early modernized states, differentiation carried its impact into the realm of national security. For example, given the relative autonomy of political, economic, socio-cultural, and military activity and varying institutions, norms, and elites which reinforced these traits, the underlying basis for safeguarding these elements required a much more complex understanding of the integrative machinery required to run these diverse instruments of the state at hand, including the affairs of national security.¹⁴ Management of national security was much more complex than was the case in late modernizing systems. As a corollary, this meant a need to draft at least on paper the legal bounds separating domestic from external security with particular respect to maintaining a balance between individual liberty and state security, and to think about the institutional grounds on which such concerns may develop in the future.

Armed forces were based on a much more organized conscription with specific age limits usually being drawn from the pool of "able-bodied worker" across the nation who were functionally posted according to need--with the exception of reserve

¹³ For a classic analysis on the political economy of these early modernizers, see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987).

¹⁴ For a paradigm, consult, Byungki Kim and Hyun-Chin Lim, "Social and Political Dimensions of National Security in Korea, 1945-1998," *Asian Perspective*, v.2, n.3, 1998, p.223-258.

guards who were divided into national and local deployments. Relatively advanced, modern communication and transportation channels enabled the state to deploy these armed forces in a politically relevant, and timely manner--although the latter's scale prior to the outbreak of the Second European Civil War was limited to small-sized commandos on special assignments with the exception of those serving under German "lightening war" or blitzkrieg. Logistics was still slow by today's standards, for it would take weeks to transport artillery and other heavy arms, not to mention personnel, which could now be done in a matter of days, if not hours. Development of communications, control, command and intelligence (C3I) ushered in an era of integrated warfare, enabling greater precision, and concentration of fire power on the articulated enemy.

The ability to mobilize professional cadres in these advanced industrial powers was made easier by the development of statistics on demographic conditions, reflecting the deep penetration of society by the state. Such political osmosis was realized through a timely institution of detailed demographic, gender, regional, organizational, occupational, and linguistic categorization on which state's evolving extractive and regulative capacities depended. The state was not only able to infuse new blood, but also do so on the basis of its own making, that is molding individuals to the needs of effective execution of national security. This tendency was reflected in the increasing specialization of technical functions in the armed services ranging from commissioned to non-commissioned officers. By extension, the structure of armory reflected not so much those needed for hand-to-hand combat with rampant fire-power and mobile divisions as was the case in the late modernizing systems, but rather a much more versatile combination of the two, enabling massive application of force through greater depersonalization of warfare, based on functional division of labor. The art of military strategy was likewise based on equally "linear" or "bean-counting" schools as well as "maneuver" groups, given the still predominantly quantitative, but increasingly qualitative nature of warfare being developed at the time. The effective reach of force was still largely limited to regional and off-shore theaters of operation.

The family system in these advanced industrial states was traditional, and increasingly nuclear with ties both to the countryside and urban centers. Individualism was strongly engrained as a result of marketization and industrialization, although this seeming social anomie was still largely constrained by traditional kinship/clan, collective village values. Nationalism linked the populous to the strong concept of the nation-state, transcending regions, provinces, and locality, creating a collective national consciousness. The nexus between the man in a factory and the state was therefore still romantic and organically based on the notion of hereditary citizenship; but the closeness of this individual link between the citizen and the nation was also beginning to be premised on provision of a satisfactory standard of living and other provisions on a contractual manner. Such a "rationalist" relationship meant that national security for the average citizen was both a romantic, emotional duty as well as a mechanical necessity to protect the state's fine machinery which was enabling the very life the individual was entitled to. During the periods of plenty, growth and productivity, there were as yet no articulated tensions among labor, capital and state, which was to occupy entirely another domain of a state's affair in the latter half of the coming century.

Apart from these civilians out on the street, there were professional military academies designed toward producing the best and the brightest of the national

security establishment. These academies shed their cloak of aristocratic dressing and took on the clothing of the most modern incubus of learning in the scientific art of warfare. In the halls of the universities and research institutes specialized study and curriculum combining the art of war and diplomacy began to abound ready to provide both professional mandarins and advice for the most effective, and nationalized approach to the conduct of foreign policy. Security during this time for these early modernizers took on a truly “national” scale.

Political Economy of National Security after the Second European Civil War, 1945-2004

The politics of national security thus far discussed has revolved around the domestic context of respective systems in early and late modernizing states. Accordingly, as far as conduct of foreign policy is concerned, I will be dealing with the system of relationships between the two systems as well as within the respective entities. I will now review the domestic and external context of national security policies following the Second European Civil War up to the present before proceeding on to the analysis of international security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The projection of force by the early modernizers to the late modernizers during the Second European civil conflict, which became internationalized, had profound consequences whose impact is still discernible at this point in time. The direct exposure to revolutionary warfare in the application of arms, tactic, strategy, and organization transformed what was once weakly developed geographical expressions--once so-called proto-states--into stronger, but still brittle state structures. The underlying social, economic, political, cultural and scientific basis of the national security establishment underwent significant transformation, creating a recognizable challenge, and even threat to the established powers in the evolving international system. The legacy of this rivalry and tension between the two systems occupy much of the national security problematique of our time.

It is no secret that war and social change--or call it progress--is no newcomer to modern history. War has made states, and states have in turn generated war. For the late modernizers following the Second European Civil War, the raw exposure of their social, political, cultural and economic fabric to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) left an indelible mark as to the necessity of acquiring national power which would enable them to enter into the ranks of advanced industrial nations. Born of socio-economic turmoil, and governmental incapacitation, the preceding aristocratic, kinship-based, post-feudal state structures found themselves politically irrelevant, if not bankrupt. Ideologically pulled between the right and the left, the new government in being tasked itself towards national reconstruction. This objective was implemented by centralizing and expanding all institutional and organizational links within the territory under one authority, vested with ideological legitimacy of either free market or command economy.

The primary objective of these loosely tied sub-national units was to create a pan-national state structure with upgraded extractive, regulative capacities. The political elites, who were usually Western educated, established a pro forma ruling paradigm resembling the early modernizers in a radically diverging socio-cultural context. The state in these late modernizing countries began to standardize varying local customs, traditions, language, dialects, while integrating and expanding hitherto isolated, and regionally based transportation and communication infrastructure

towards the national level. This process of standardization, integration, and institutionalization at all levels was effectuated by compulsory education, investment in R & D, bureaucratic penetration, and most importantly, the expansion of the state apparatus that enabled national mobilization. As a result of government-directed industrialization, functionally defined--or class based--cleavage was created, co-existing hand in hand with now repressed local customs, kinship ties, provincialism, and sectionalism which were to raise their heads later. For the time being state encapsulated society.

The politics of national security in these late modernizers demanded the following prerequisites without which national development was viewed as impossible. First, for national energy to adhere itself one could not afford luxurious dissent; the political system had to be centralized for the prime objective of national economic development, that is as a means of catching up with the West. As a part of this plan, regime security was equated with national security wherein a strong executive branch co-existed with a weak legislature and even weaker judicial branch. The traditional duties of national security, such as territorial defense, protection of sensitive military, political, and economic infrastructure fell on the responsibility of the armed forces, and domestic intelligence, which were patterned after the models developed in the early industrializing countries. Given the centralizing, integrating and standardizing mission of the developmental state, the military became not only a symbol, but the very instrument through which these new meritocratic procedures were being tried at the national level. Force structure and doctrine reflected these "modernizing" and "developmental" tendencies. While not underemphasizing the human element in warfare, the role of technology, organization, logistics and intelligence entered the existing strategic equation with the goal of weeding out not only internal, but also, external enemies of the state.

Regime security as a prerequisite to statehood was viewed as crucial by the entering post-colonial, aristocratic leadership. Weakness was defined as economic and political backwardness, the main cause of military defeat and occupation, which have generated centuries of internal division and civil war. In order to overcome this barrier, a strong and unchallenged polity was deemed necessary not only for the sake of compressed economic development, but also maintaining territorial integrity and expanding the country's sovereignty. Regime security, when dissected had several levels of operation.

First, was the necessity of an all-encompassing ideology able to legitimize factional rule--soon to flourish into organizational dictatorship--and economic and political programs, while either excluding or weakening other competing notions of authority and development. Second, once these Western-educated--or more appropriately, inspired elites were able to set up their factional organization, regimentation and propaganda were adopted as the major instrument for capturing, maintaining and expanding the popular basis of power where terror played a significant role (one could see this as the early modernizing elites' adoption of the French Jacobin's or Blanquist's tactic of capturing and expanding revolutionary power following the French Revolution). Third, by developing factional authority into a pan-national institution without which both productive economic and political sovereignty were situationally perceived as impossible, intelligence organs were instituted to combat all dissent both internal and external for the explicit purpose of promoting political stability. Forth, these centralizing measures were proffered in the name of

national modernization, and the exultation of the developmental state where in autonomous economic, social, political and cultural life of individual citizens were curtailed for the sake of national development.

In this environment, the politics of national security as discussed took on a new meaning. Armed forces and domestic security services, as part of the expanding state apparatus were first and foremost geared towards stabilizing the domestic political order. New paradigms of organizational culture, meritocracy, hierarchy, professionalism, expertise, and tools of centralization, regimentation, control, and watchdog functions were all ideationally imported from the advanced industrial powers. Geo-strategically born into a hostile bipolar international environment, for the political elites of early modernizing states, external vigilance first and foremost meant elimination of the internal enemy through centralization and exclusion. That is why national security unfolding at the time was concerned more with internal than external aspects, including the parallel measures of internal survey, education, campaigns, and other formal and informal organs of the state acting as socialization channels.

In order to professionalize the armed forces, security service, police agencies, and other outlying mandarins who could fill the varying ministries of internal affairs, defense, foreign relations, academies once again modeled after those extant in the early modernizing systems were instituted with the best talents being sought after on the basis of gratis education, employment guarantee, and career optimism with unconventional perks. Research institutes and think-tanks were generously endowed for developing research and curriculum in the comprehensive field of national security that could provide both mid-to long-term policy direction, and specialized personnel for the country's establishment. For the first time in history, modern bureaucracies explicitly devoted towards the scientific conduct of national security affairs were instituted with wide-ranging departments responsible for foreign relations, defense, internal affairs, and science and technology. Effective management of these organs, comprising the larger decision-making domain for the political elites constituted a significant affair of the state. Given the amount of information available at the top as well as organization and force at its disposal, the ruling elite was able to reign as he or she saw fit in a predominantly autarchic, closed environment.

Armed forces were organized around the defense ministries and the joint chief of staff's office giving advice for the political leadership on national security policy. Rudimentary coastal/border guards were established, and conscripts were drawn into a highly regimented life through which a significant pool of the nation's young populous was socialized. They participated in not only border patrol, training, and combat, but also in national development projects. Force structure and doctrine in these late modernizing countries was a mixture of the "old" and "new" elements, in their varying technological, ideational, and organizational contexts with the old component still dominant. A typical force structure would consist of army, navy, and air force capable of engaging in border/coastal defense, armed expedition through provision of personnel, but not off-shore power projection on a sustainable basis involving high-technology weaponry. They were in short no match for the armed forces of early modernizers at the time. The predominant duties of the armed forces, while hosting rudimentary nuclear arms, technology and even delivery means were mainly internally directed as part of overall state-directed modernization drive and effusive nationalism.

Looking into the grass-root level, the extant clan-, village-based social systems

began to be supplanted by the over-arching organs of state apparatus; the industrialization drive began to cut through the traditional ties between the individual and the countryside accelerating the pace of urbanization at the national level. Societal trajectory was following the Western path; the dormancy of traditional legacy bordering on sectionalism, provincialism and ethno-national differences entered a period of hibernation.

As these late modernizers entered the 1980s, several strains were evident in their political-social fabric as a result of change in the international environment and domestic response designed to meet these challenges. While all these regimes following the Second European Civil War started out on more or less highly centralized methods of government, one group of states began to relax gradually its once tightly knit political and economic fabric; the other maintained traditional political control while boldly attempting marketization and internationalization of its economy. Some did neither. Common challenges to these regimes were how to adapt to advanced finance capitalism and explosion in the information sciences, which had repercussions far beyond the immediacy of its rule, i.e., on grass-root citizenship movements, autonomy of basic social units at the level of family and village, and perhaps of most concern, the consciousness of their citizens towards traditional conceptions of authority, and supplier-oriented economy.

The dilemma for the elites of these late modernizing states is how to preserve their authority, yet allowing unprecedented globalization of their socio-economic fabric.¹⁵ Privatization and restructuring generated diffusion of state power¹⁶ as now once state-owned corporations changed its ownership to private and foreign sectors, while a wildly roaming work force was released from the comfortable factory place once so well ensconced in the public sector, posing potential dangers of radical social disruption. The driving incentive was not national development per se whose successful impact was to trickle down to the individual unit as was the case in the past, but, recognizable individual wealth viewed as making up the holistic national prosperity. Private commercial activity, and the entrepreneurial state advanced greed and egotism as the new state ideology, but in the realm of politics, dissent was still discouraged, if not ruled out to one varying degree or another. Such diverging tendencies in the political economy of these late industrializing systems cannot be left alone to the whims of their own force; there must be an integrative mechanism able to reconcile these varying forces at work as this thesis will argue.

The impact of 'glocalization' for these states meant a shift in power basis from the center to the periphery, social groups, and reliance on an increasingly differentiated cadre of technocrats needed to deal with the modern management of the national economy. In most instances, the emerging technocrats came from their own ranks that remained at the apex of the political system, while previous organs of force, such as the army and security service, began to undertake entrepreneurial activity of their own. For the average man out on the street the visible differences in the growing income gap

¹⁵ Which is the precise dilemma faced by contemporary North Korea. See, Byungki Kim, and Changrok Soh, "The Dilemma of North Korean Reform: Where Is It Going?," *East Asian Review*, v.12, n.4, (Winter 2000): 105-119.

¹⁶ This is an expression used by Joseph Nye, jr., in his, *American Strategy after the Cold War*, The Fourth Series of the Incheon Memorial Lecture, forward by Ha-Ryong Kim, (Seoul: The Graduate School of Policy Studies of Korea University, November 12, 1990).

was a sign of changing times; whether acceptable or not he or she must be made feel proud of being a part of the “collective-we.” Acquisition of new weaponry as well as demonstration, and maneuver of force as a symbol of power and prestige likewise serve as unifying element when potential cleavages along newly developing lines, such as class, center-periphery nexus, regions, provinces, state-labor-capital complex, and vying factions within the ruling hierarchy may generate unwanted tension, and even conflict.

International and transnational repercussions during this second reawakening in the 1980s and 1990s have even greater effect on the national psyche of these late modernizing states. The internationalized elite who are either home-grown or trained overseas carry new forms of epistemological knowledge across borders, whether it be in the realm of commerce, trade, investment, or national security. Information concerning the high-level decision-making process travels faster than the speed of light from one capital to another. Likewise, major disruptions in the transnational security system have its effect on other regions, including in these late modernizing countries where contextual variable makes its imprint on the political leadership graphically real. Issues such as human/minority/labor rights, and other generally accepted international norms and practices advanced by early modernizers either directly or through multilateral fora come into direct clash with indigenous norms and practice as this paper will show in the next section. The contending task of these late modernizing governments is how to reconcile the pressures of international and internal reform without losing political balance.

Armed forces and the strategic exercise of force, thus, took on the added role of upgrading the nation’s prestige in the global system, while major energy was devoted towards stable management of internal socio-economic and political transformation. Externally, such an imperative demanded a stable international environment, and hence either attempted resolution or avoidance of outstanding tensions and conflicts with other international actors that may give rise to potentially undesirable domestic disruption. As long as fundamental transportation and communication channels linking the country’s major economic resources to the outside world were secure, unnecessary conflict was viewed as costly in economic, political and diplomatic terms. But on matters affecting national political temperature, such as long standing territorial disputes--an issue which could easily be emotionalized at the popular level--unavoidable demonstration of force was perceived as inescapable, particularly when power transfer was on the making.

The politics of national security, accordingly, were grounded even more deeply on the domestic context as the stable transition of the socio-economic and political order constituted the single most important agenda for the ruling elite. It is no wonder that issues such as stock market trends, interest rates, fluctuation in the financial market, liquidity, micro-economic stability, standard of living, unemployment, structural adjustment, and other important socio-economic phenomena occupied foremost attention for the security services as these indices translated directly into voting behaviour, and ultimately national political outcome.¹⁷ For still closed systems, the social change unleashed by state-managed reform

¹⁷ For an excellent analysis of the United States along this line of argument, consult, David Winston, “What Voters Want: The Politics of Personal Connection,” *Policy Review*, n.95, (June/July 1999): 47-57.

underlay the seeming legitimacy of the regime in power, thus making the state highly sensitive to these indicators. Pressures for transparency, accountability, and mutual check, thus, also increased, making the system at least on the surface more open in the name of higher productivity and efficiency, allowing networking between varying interest groups within and without the country.

What about the politics of national security in the early modernizing countries following the Second European Civil War? How have they evolved and in what kind of relationship with the late modernizing systems? Given the relative robustness of the state structure in these systems, and the maturity of the socio-economic, and the underlying ethno-national make-up, major effort was devoted towards shaping the international order most conducive to their security interests, defined in commercial and power political terms. Such imperative meant acceleration of internal economic adjustment, and its internationalization in the areas constituting late modernizing systems as well as establishment of military-diplomatic alliances designed to protect such regional clusters, and if possible contain and roll-back alien paradigms from subversive penetration.

In order to achieve these two dual objectives, the state was forced to design the most modern bureaucracy being able to manage the complex relationship among force, statecraft, and trade for maximizing one's national interest. As regards force structure and doctrine, latest technological breakthrough was actively infused in designing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and delivery means spanning the continents, thus making power projection capacity truly global in scope. The art of strategy as its hand-maiden was further cultivated with international, regional and local levels of action in mind with tactics, operations, and strategy occupying a flexibly integrated role. Given the radical improvement in the accuracy of these arsenals, as well as shortening of flight time, extant linear or "bean-counting" thinking gave a way to sophisticated maneuver, i.e., iterated precision-bombing. Thus, advanced development of articulated enemy's socio-economic and political infrastructure also generated targeting plan, based not so much on quantitative, but qualitative calculus, such as C3I.

Technological development and the conduct of strategic diplomacy required an enhanced understanding of not only science, and economics, but, the area-knowledge of the very late modernizing systems that were being targeted for national security purposes. Training of language, area specialists began to flourish in the advanced industrial powers, actively promoting international academic and other practical exchange program with the late modernizing system's elites, further acculturating the foreign policy bureaucracy to the intricacies of alien ways of life, including in their organizational, managerial, and even scientific contexts. Research institutes, universities and foundations served their role as incubus in breeding a new cadre of foreign affairs specialists who were able to promote and enhance the penetration of capital and arms into the targeted area, tailoring the local environment for the facile maximization of national influence.

The national security bureaucracy, including those directly responsible for defense, and internal security was expanded, further differentiated internally, and endowed with the best possible human and material resource in a continuously revolving intercourse with the academia and think-tanks. In the area of gathering, categorizing and analyzing information for strategic use, and high-technology warfare, added momentum was particularly infused, thereby giving the needed organizational and institutional gravity for acquiring the state of the art know-how in all the related

fields of competition. Confronted with these challenges, the decision-making channel in the ever more complex governmental machinery was being adapted for greater efficiency and productivity, pen-ultimately linking them to the highest echelons of power. In order to access such sophisticated system, ranks of those running the government opened itself towards the managerial elite of the financial/industrial worlds.

For the average citizen, continuous growth and expansion of the national economy ushered in a period of golden prosperity. The politics of growth and productivity generated ample opportunity for the man out on the street to enjoy one's life, and thereby extend his or her silent approval for the government. The global status enhanced by the blue-water fleet and inter-continental means of WMD all reinforced the pride of the individual in belonging to the nation-state. But as the early industrializing state entered the 1980s and 1990s with the domestic economic pie shrinking, budgetary pressures began to rise, driving public opinion to question the very wisdom of overseas alliance and commitments, all constituting what Paul Kennedy has termed "imperial overstretch."¹⁸ The initial response to this social change was expectedly polarized with one group calling for splendid isolation, while the other eschewed more internationalist line, arguing that one's national interest lay in overseas commitments. Some wholly abandoned or partially reduced their commitments, while others took the road of maximum economization that is either reducing or maintaining the previous rate of human and financial investment, while forcing the late modernizers to bear the subsidiary, but what was perceived to be necessary financial, human, political and military costs. In situations of perceived challenge from early modernizers both economically and militarily, initial reactions of containment soon gave away towards constructive engagement in a subtle game of managed interdependence, i.e., via "linkage"¹⁹ politics.

Following the genesis of asymmetrical warfare by the late modernizers against the early modernizers through the operationalization of transnational actors with capital, organization, fire power, intelligence, and mobility, the latter's response has keyed in not only the transnational organization in question, but also, the early modernizing states with questionable ties to the origination of the asymmetrical offense itself.²⁰ The fertilization of such transnational asymmetrical threat against the early modernizing state was triggered by perceived geopolitical inequality along varying ethno-national, religious and developmental cleavages as well as uneven impact of glocalization, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, offense was characterized by low-intensity conflict with significantly long duration whose mission constituted not so much in attempts to breakdown the enemy's will to fight, but to destabilize its ability to exist as a normal functioning entity. Thus, the mission objective of transnational low-intensity warfare was open-ended, undetermined, and uncertain against the early modernized state. The commanding elite who masterminded this strategy came from the ruling class of the late modernizing state

¹⁸ See, Kennedy, op.cit.

¹⁹ See, Nye, op.cit., p.12.

²⁰ For a recent study, see, Byungki Kim, and Yun-Chu Kim, eds., *Global War on Terror, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and North Korea: The Future of Air Power Cooperation, and Korea-US Alliance*, Korea Aerospace Institute Working Monograph Series in International Relations n.1, (Seoul: The Institute 21 for Peace Studies, 2004).

whose family has been educated extensively in the states of early modernization.

In response, the early modernizing state instituted measures to neutralize multi-nationally based sources of finance, capital, and organization with some limited effect. Faced with an inchoate enemy, it responded by attacking the articulated national bases of transnational terrorism by destroying the existing political, military and socio-cultural institutions, while trying to export political institutions and norms after its own image with questionable success. Independent of difficulties underlying any institution- and norm-building in alien entities, the failure of early modernizing state to co-opt intelligence, special security service, and the armed forces of the ancient regime, however, ideologically distasteful, has provoked unconventional means of resistance by the fractured old order. Together with the inability of the exported political elites, long acculturated in the early modernizing state with loss of institutional, organizational, and normative memory of the targeted entity to capture the ancient regime, mobilize its public support, and centralize its authority have resulted in continued political instability.

The transnational impacts of such successful military and unsuccessful political operations in other late modernizing states have been mixed. For the late modernizers with radically diverging system of economics, politics, and religion with purported development of WMD, their standing political and social fabric has felt the pressures of regime change along the lines of either joining the international security, trade or socio-cultural regimes as few have done or continuing to gauge by purported negotiation by maintaining WMD as others have. For the late modernizers with of yet uncompleted nation-state building processes, still confronting centrifugal tendencies in their political enclaves, tactical cooperation with the early modernizer in sharing intelligence, provision of military bases, and diplomatic support have earned dividends in credits, trade status, and most important the early modernizer's support, if not reticence over previously problematic asymmetrical warfare in their own political structures. The case has also been similar with late modernizers which have adopted open-style economic and political systems, that is, those categorized as transitional systems. By joining in the evolving coalition, they too have received credits, military security, and favorable diplomatic support, while for the other late modernizers of more advanced economic and political standing, a degree of societal and political backlash has been coupled with attendant need to readjust its force structure, strategy, and intelligence as a result of the early modernizing state's transformation of force.²¹ The impact of force transformation, including Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)²² has touched on beyond allied state's force structure into civil-military relations, and even external strategic dilemmas.

II. Implication for the Politics of National Security in the Asia-Pacific Region in

²¹ See, for example, Lynn E. Davis, and Jeremy Shapiro (eds.), *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, (Santa Monica: Arroyo Center, Rand Corporation, 2003).

²² See, for instance, Bruce D. Berkowitz, "War Logs on: Girding America for Computer Combat," *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June 2000): 8-12; Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Ibid*, v.75, n.2, (March/April 1996): 37-54; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Can High-Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?" *Foreign Policy*, (Winter 1998-99): 72-86.

the Twentieth Century

This essay has reviewed the paradigms of politics of national security in the twentieth century in the respective systems of early and late modernizing states through a historical examination of its political economy. Applied to the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the debate will focus on the US, Japan, China, Russia, and the two Koreas.²³

The politics of national security in the Asia-Pacific region in the latter half of the past century has revolved around socio-economic reform, and political liberalization. Although the intensity of reform differs, and consequent robustness of state structures likewise vary outward manifestations of national interest have been foremostly based on these two internal variables, notwithstanding behavior deriving from international systemic factors which do take on a life of its own. Let us first summarize the sources and pattern of national security in the Asia-Pacific region before proceeding onto its implications, and prognosis for the future.

Given the primacy of internal reform brought about by the fall of Eastern Europe (1989) and the Soviet Union (1991), expansion of the global financial market (the financial crisis of 1998-9), and explosion in telecommunications, stable management of internal socio-economic and underlying political change has been crucial. This imperative, as argued earlier, has created a need for a stable external environment. Here one can name post-Mao China, driven by Deng's four modernizations, and consequent drive to accelerate this process of globalization under Jiang Jemin, and Hu Xintao. In Russia under Gorbachev, Yeltsin,²⁴ and Putin a similar process has evolved, namely, acceleration of economic modernization, and political reform, although the trajectory, as I will argue, has been different. In terms of politics of transformation in these late modernizing states of China, Russia, the two Koreas, and Japan,²⁵ one can observe the following trend in relation to the early modernizing state of the United States. While recognizing the international systemic dimensions of friction and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, which have been well analyzed by others,²⁶ I will purposely concentrate on the domestic political economy of these actors as a way of recommending its significance in both policy, and theoretical terms.

Politics of modernization, as discussed in section I, has varied with respect to its path-dependency in the states of late modernization—namely, Russia, China, the two Koreas, and Japan where state structures are relatively brittle—while in the US, a state of early modernization where state structure is less brittle, and its developmental path less dependant. Consequences in external security perceptions has been markedly zero-sum oriented, siege-mentality driven, and survival conscious as national, and

²³ For an analysis on strategic interaction among China, Japan, the US and the two Koreas, consult, Byungki Kim, "US-Japan-China: A Strategic Triangle? Impact on Korea," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, v. XI, n.1, (Summer 1999): 169-195.

²⁴ For an analysis, see, Byungki Kim, "Russian Political System in Flux: A Presidential Perspective," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, v.10, n.2, (Summer/Fall 1996): 262-288.

²⁵ On categorization of Russia, China, and Japan as late industrializer, see, Peter Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy," in ed., Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p.336.

²⁶ See, for example, Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, v.22, n.3, (Winter 1997/1998): 36-73.

regime security was often identified with national security in these late modernizing states as a result of weakly developed domestic institutions. Because more or less centralization of authority has been achieved in a short time span—less than a century as opposed to the case in the states of early modernization where it took twice that period for it to evolve—state institutions lack capacity for versatile transformation. Its brittleness also creates radical pendulum swings in the system in times of political transition whether it be in new factional, coalitional, generational, social, or political turnover confronting major challenges of globalization and internationalization.

In terms of the relative weakness of state institutions, one can argue North Korea as having the most rigid and thereby also highest path-dependency. The system, which underwent successive bureaucratic modernization over a half century, has been endowed with one-party, one-man rule in the person of Kim, Il-Sung and Kim, Jong-Il. The political legitimacy of the state in the form of Marxism-Leninism-Kim Il Sungism has been fused with the personality cult of the Kim dynasty, making any socio-economic, and political reform extremely dangerous. The political need to glorify nationalism in the form of staunch anti-Japanese, and anti-US ideology, and rhetoric in the context of severe, and radically destabilizing socio-economic conditions, and transformation of once friendly former Soviet and East European Socialist system into one of betrayal have made the once modernizing state increasingly ossified, and reliant on force. Although there are signs of selective marketization, and generation of independent economic activity at about 15% level of the entire economy—constituting in essence the second or black market economy—enhanced tightening of policy controls, and outward manifestations of state's prestige in nuclear weapons seem to be the only viable agent of continued rule.²⁷ It is in this domestic respect that the resolution of WMD must first and foremost be understood.

To make the matters worse, alternatives to such dire policy reside in changing the leadership en masse from nepotism to more ascriptive-based leadership, which will most probably involve much political violence, a factor deterring any radical change. If one were to add the second-term election of conservative U.S. President George Bush who has at one time or another advocated regime change against the states of the "Axis of Evil," comprising Pyongyang, Baghdad, and Tehran, and equally conservative Koizumi leadership in Japan, the immediate external environment as a positive contextual variable seems to be much lacking although Beijing and Seoul seem not have run out of their patience. The armed forces, and special security services in North Korea, therefore, are internally-directed as much as they pose a formidable local and regional threat apart from its biological, and chemical weapons stockpile as well as the delivery means in the form of long-range artillery (LRA). The hybrid state of civil-military leadership in the form of Military Affairs Commission also makes it that much more difficult for radically civilianizing its national security policy. Entrenched isolation has also reinforced zero-sum approach to national security, as it would be very difficult or impossible to find more reforming concepts of cooperative security or pre confidence, and security-building measures (PCSBMs) in the North Korean

²⁷ For example, see, Byungki Kim, "North Korea's Nuclear Policy in the Year 2000: Sources, Strategy, and Implications for the Korean Peninsula," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, v.7, n.1, (Winter/Spring 1994): 32-57. On a recent estimate, see, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *North Korea's Weapon's Programmes: A Net Assessment*, (London: The Chameleon Press Limited, 2004).

Ministry of Defense, its Joint Chiefs of Staff or its military academies giving main advice to the highest political leadership.

China has undergone successive political transformation in terms of elite change from first to fifth generation in being able to preserve a practical coherence in the balance of personality-cult of Mao Tse Tung, Deng Xia-Ping, and associated socio-economic reforms bordering on free market (read: oligarchical) economy. Such elastic political transformation was possible given the gradual nature of change within the state structures through ongoing institutionalization, devolution, and even organizational engineering both within the Party and the state through ideological renovation with particular respect to economic programs. Political stability was managed through ongoing glorification of both nationalism, and armed forces—particularly in their unifying role in increasingly urbanized society—while the political monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party enabled continued retaining of relative political stability, and even versatility. Through incremental reforms, the Chinese state has already significantly reduced the risks of abrupt political readjustment, and by extension, political violence, minimizing the type of fracturing that could happen to the late modernizing North Korean state structure discussed above as well as moderating path-dependency by iterated reform. While the impact of RMA on North Korean force structure for reasons of budget, and political isolation can be said to be minimal, the lessons of the first and second Gulf campaign seem to be quite apparent to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its ongoing process of modernization, development and learning. The noted political renovations in state institutions, ideology, and socio-economic reform have to a certain extent devolutionized the Chinese system as a holistic unit with much political salience, savvy, and even versatility, and it is primarily nationalism and the attendant glorification of armed might that these energetic reforms are being directed, at least from the political elite’s perspective. If one were to add the still unfinished business of nation-state building over Macao, Taiwan, and the need for exerting occasional, and residual influence over the Taiwan Strait, the Spratly Islands, not to mention the need to guard against potential irredentist sentiments from a re-unified Korea, the PLA has a very crucial dual function of looking over both issues of internal, and external sovereignty.

But the institutional role of the PLA, and the security service is a somewhat different from the North Korean case for while the PLA and the services were a very fused part of the Chinese Communist Party in forging the Revolution for over a half century, because the state structure—in comparison to that of North Korea—has underwent a process of functional differentiation, specialization, and devolutionary empowerment as a result of generational turnover, political renovation and socio-economic reform the armed forces have become much more modernized. Such is the case not only in terms of arms acquisition, evolving force structure, its sensitization to RMA, and increasingly robust power projection capability, but also in terms of its potential for reaching much more moderated versions of security, such as cooperative threat reduction or other kinds of PCSBMs through both complex/simple learning as well as accelerated integration into the global trading system, and arrival of rough perceived balance of power in East Asia. The difficulty, of course here, is that weak preconditions exist for such realization in current Chinese strategic thinking, which makes strategic engagement of the PLA in multilateral operations crucial in further globalizing its roles and functions—which can be said to be equally applicable to the North Korean case provided other measures are also taken in conjunction.

Beijing's role in the coalition on terror in terms of intelligence-sharing and diplomatic coordination has also benefited its tightening of coercive measures against the separatist Tibet or Uigurs of Xinziang region by the US, thereby easing the pain of transition over remaining nation-state building process. While historical memories of its unhappy past still lingers in the Chinese political psyche, especially with respect to Japan, and to a lesser extent the West, the U.S. attempt to encircle the PRC will not have much long-term impact in terms of internal Chinese politics in constraining the PLA given already its increasingly modernized path of development—in fact it will have the opposite effect of possibly creating a political reaction in providing greater rationale for further militarization of evolving Chinese national security interests. China will, much like Russia, have her place in the sun, yet attempts to resist this process will create increased destabilization in attendant regional order on the way, especially if one were to involve Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.

What about the Russian case? The politics of modernization in Russia have experienced even greater change than either the cases of North Korea or China. From 1917 to 1991 Soviet state institutions, and the Communist Party structure went through extreme personalization of power under Stalin, thaw, and depersonalization under Khrushchev, bureaucratic modernization, and industrialization under Brezhnev, and finally major rift under Gorbachev resulting in the loss of the one-party, one-ideology, command-economy system. Prior political elites have been emasculated, while some have survived the game, and some technocrats, and underground organizational leaders have captured both state, and non-state powers. State institutions did not experience reform; rather it was one of violent fracturing in terms of ruling elite's turnover while ruling paradigms have changed from socialism to capitalism. Because of abrupt transformation, Russian state institutions had to absorb the violent shock of its change, resulting in a relatively low path-dependency for reform as well as overriding the once brittle state structure through its partial destruction under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, reconfiguration, and finally recentralization under Putin. Institutional necessity for centralization, including the establishment of iron control over the media, financial, energy groups and other conglomerates have derived from security-, and nationalism-conscious elite in the person of Putin as well as the vastness of Russian territory, and varying centrifugal tendencies trying to weaken, if not to destroy the multi-ethnic fiber, such as the Chechen problem. Derivatively speaking, Putin's active support for the war on terror has paid off in US reticence over Moscow's own war on terror in Chechnya

Accordingly, the armed forces and security services in Putin's Russia serve an extremely important internal role in centralizing the vast Russian empire in the aftermath of its disintegration, socio-economic revolution, and political transformation through its pervasive intelligence network, organization, and coercive powers. It is not only budgetary constraints, and shrinking of its territory that has made the armed forces, and special security services more inward, rather than outward looking—but their very role as a state recentralizing, redefining the border, components, and enforcing the legal responsibilities of a strong guardian. Much like China, and North Korea although the latter is not practicing its policy to realize it, Russia for this reason needs a peaceful, and not a tension-ridden international environment, including in Northeast Asia in which nation-state building can take place. In this respect, while Moscow will maintain a modest arsenal of strategic range vis-à-vis the United States, China, and Japan its force structure will be designed towards meeting the objectives of

ethno-national and other outlying sub-national conflicts within its border or those crisis developing from without which may spillover into its body politic. If one were to place the evolving political economy of Siberia located in Northeast Asia as a primary concern, Moscow's main interest will lie in economic development and cooperation with North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the advanced West, including the United States, particularly through the development of trans-Siberian railway, gas, and other energy sources. This does not mean that the armed forces will not be interested in continuing RMA, arms acquisition and development—they are—rather they will be dormant for another five years before activating their once aggressive force structure, and attendant strategy under the Soviet period.

South Korea too has undergone turbulent, yet peaceful change of power since the founding of the state in 1945. In terms of state structure, the process of devolution, pluralization, and infusion of new blood which began in 1992, one can argue the body politic as having actually engineered too-abrupt-a political change, particularly with the coming of the Roh, Moo-Hyun government. In evaluating the current caliber of evolving South Korean state capacity, including its brittleness and path-dependency in terms of socio-economic reform, and political agendas to be set the state in my opinion has become more fractured while becoming more entrapped in its own ideological policies. Thus, with respect to the state in South Korea it has not been ossification, decay or immobilization that has made the state retain its in-born brittleness, and high path-dependency, but rather too-abrupt-an infusion of new elites from the previously excluded sector (dissidents, provincial elites, NGOs), its shock-therapy approach to the management of bureaucracy, economics, social issues, and foreign policy based on populism, nationalism, and social democracy. Such political sequencing have resulted in much downgraded institutional stability, while their political and organizational emphasis, and monopoly on ideological correctness has polarized their policy platform, in essence undermining the policy flexibility needed for globalization and internationalization of Korean economy and body politic. In this context, the armed forces and the security services have also felt the shocks of radical political attempts to reform their institutions without, however, taking into consideration both actors' primordial stability, robustness, and goals, and missions in society, namely, to guard national and minimally necessary internal political security in light of undiminished, or even increased unconventional threat from North Korea, and destabilization resulting from the noted political reform within the state, coupled by unprecedented social change.

Given the internal preoccupation of the ongoing Korean political process, and the recent attempts by the Roh administration to further civilianize the armed forces, and the special security services, it is only natural that Seoul too needs a peaceful external environment in which the essential restructuring of civil-military relations, and the continued overhauling of the national security establishment can take place. The problem here, however, is dual. For one, although North Korea has not shown any signs of cutting back its highly offensive force structure nor its purported development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the context of its radically destabilizing economic, socio-cultural, and even political relations, both national security actors have been pressured to represent at least in public an absence of such a North Korean posture. In this context, the armed forces have been absorbing, learning and institutionalizing RMA to its benefit, while keying on so-called independence, and autonomy in national security by responding positively to the United States Forces in

Korea's force transformation in terms of burden-, budget-, and role-sharing. Consequently, one may detect a serious concern of morale, professionalism, and across-the-board organizational robustness and stability in the armed forces as a result of external shock, and the short-time span under which its force transformation is being asked to take its roots. In the mid- to long-term view, the confused political direction of the state in taking the North Korean threat more seriously, moderating reforms, and responding actively towards its alliance responsibilities with Washington, and its virtual duties with Japan might create some stumbling blocs in both peninsula and regional security initiatives. In short, while South Korea needs to prepare for reunification by solidifying a consensus among the major powers, and Pyongyang by realistically addressing both security and economics, while preparing the institutional grounds for what in essence could only be "reunification by absorption" it has thus far failed in all its aspects.²⁸ To make the matters worse for the moment Seoul's joining the coalition against terror has made both society and the political system under rapid flux react in a highly destabilizing manner although the depth and duration of its consequences have yet to be understood and analyzed systematically.

Tokyo since the early 1990s has also witnessed a fracturing of the once towering hegemony held by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has of recent date been able to re-amalgamate itself with other splinter factional groups in generating what appears to be an increasingly conservative and politically coherent Diet. While the bubble economy has burst, and its recovery seems to be held in abeyance, the armed forces, and special security service's role has expanded in policy purview beyond the Peace Constitution, while their organizational anchoring likewise has become rapidly modernized, and bureaucratically prosperous. The empowerment of the Japanese state to become more "normal" or to retake the rights of member, deserving of its economic, socio-cultural, and political growth in the international community has been accompanied by conservatizing social trends whose state is entering the age of post-industrialism. Thus, similarly brittle state structure, and high path dependency has been to a large extent overcome by reconnection of the fragmented parliamentary conditions under the leadership of conservatizing factional groups in the Diet, and the expansion and modernization of Self-Defense Force (SDF), and intelligence agencies under the aegis of expanding US-Japanese security arrangement into "out of area" bounds. In this respect, Tokyo has regained and formalized what in essence have been its silent military capacities for more activated logistical and rear-area operations in support of US contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and Korean peninsula with eye to rising China.

But contrary to neighbors' (natural or even rightful) concerns about Tokyo's remilitarization, the state of Japanese civil-military relations will restrain the type of militarization of Japanese society envisioned by the outlying actors in Northeast Asia. The greater point of concern, therefore, is not the unbridled ultra-conservatization of Japanese society and politics – which is structurally constrained by its well-civilianized

²⁸ This failure includes the inability to help North Korea economically, for without the active and positive engagement of the major powers, especially the US, and by extension, the European Union, Japan, China and Russia, Seoul cannot alone infuse sufficient funds for major infrastructural development in North Korea, which is what is happening today. In order for such condition to be met, high-politics or military security problems have to be resolved in a comprehensive manner along with the creation of a peace regime.

political economy (of high-technology and energy security)—but rather the tightening of evolving US-Japan alliance in terms of its expanded area of operation as well as infusion of new technology into its force structure, such as the realization of Missile Defense (MD), which will cause fear in China.²⁹ Tokyo's relations with Moscow over the past decade have achieved significant progress in PCSBMs. However, it is the Chinese, and to a lesser extent North Korean and South Korean concerns that will turn out to be important points of management for the future stabilization of Northeast Asian security order. While Tokyo needs to develop more direct and indirect dialogue with China to institute PCSBMs, including over issues on the Korean peninsula, such as WMD, related six party talks, problems of ongoing North Korean destabilization, i.e., the refugee crisis, and political stability, the expanding Japan-US alliance and its resultant purview of responsibility over Korean contingency must be carefully calibrated with South Korean authorities. Problems of territorial dispute, such as Senkaku islands, historical problems of textbook controversy, which constitute sensitive issues of concern in its relations with Beijing and Seoul in essence must be resolved internally as it is reflective of on the whole of the level and nature of Japanese political development.

Lastly, Washington as the sole early modernizing state has across-the-region impact in the Asia-Pacific to an unprecedented degree whose fundamental causes are rooted in its political economy.³⁰ Having experienced a radically diverging nation-state building process with extremely versatile state structure, and institutions as well as relatively low path dependency due to incremental political change and socio-economic development spanning three centuries—a rare phenomenon in the history of political systems—its is the oldness and aging of American social system fused with the latest sources in technological revolution and financial power that it has become an empire both in fact and name. The ruling elite is rooted in this old society, and views its hard and soft power for the empowerment of Pax Americana, including and over the Asia-Pacific region where the rise of China is seen as a primary security threat, in strong connection with North Korea's WMD, while temporal emasculation of Russia has been met with positive comfort. Washington in this equation treats China holistically, that is in terms of its evolving military, socio-economic, and political capabilities as a potential regional hegemon to be both contained and engaged in juxtaposition with closer alliance with Taiwan, Japan, and however unrealistic at the moment with South Korea. North Korea is perceived mainly through its WMD problem without much consideration about the political and socio-economic problems underlying what in essence constitutes the political economy causes of Pyongyang's evolving nuclear threat. To make the matter even more difficult for the Bush leadership, the Pentagon has been no newcomer to RMA, accelerated by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's force-in-transformation plan which in essence strengthens deterrence and

²⁹ For a salient analysis on this point, consult, Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, vol.46, n.4, (Spring 1999): 49-80

³⁰ For excellent analyses of Bush presidency, including its domestic sources, see, G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment," and Jack Miles, "Religion and American Foreign Policy," in *Survival*, v.46, n.1, (Spring 2004): respectively, 7-22, 23-37; and Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

defense on the Korean peninsula. Add to this MD, long-range precision strike, and revolutionary logistical capabilities of the forward-based forces in Japan, and Korea both Pyongyang and Beijing are becoming strategically jittery, and rightfully so.

The crucial question here is to what extent is the United States—hit by 9.11, and turning inward in its security outlook—able to understand and share the geo-strategic sensitivities of its allies, competitors and sworn enemies in the region to further stabilize, and not fragment the evolving Northeast Asian security order. While the ongoing impact of Afghanistan and Iraq will not end in the foreseeable future, the traditional nature of American society reflected by the “fundamentalist” identity of Bush leadership with primordial emphasis on Christian, family, and American values fused with the impact of high-technology revolution and most advanced high finance capitalism will continue to generate uncertainties, and even disruptions. Unless unilateralism, force, and pendulum swings in globalist-isolationist tendencies were to be moderated in Washington’s strategic outlook, and actions, Northeast Asian order will be in for some disquiet period wherein domestic conditions which are in a rapid flux will come into rapid contact with other actors, producing much friction, uncertainty, and even destabilization.

III Conclusion

This thesis has reviewed the history of political economy of international security over the last one hundred years with respect to both early modernizing, and late modernizing states. Emphasis has been placed in examining the sequence, structure, and duration of nation-state building with particular emphasis on whether or not state’s solidity or brittleness was high, and whether its institutional latitude to pursue a given socio-economic and political program was high or low. It turned out that in this preliminary research design although varying in degrees all the states in the region, namely, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, and Japan as a result of being late modernizers have consequently had as a result relatively low institutional stability as well as high path dependency, making each state’s security, on the main, hostage to history, and not one of choice as was the case of the United States.

What such preliminary conclusions tell us about the prognosis for Northeast Asian security order as a whole is that seen in light of comparative historical context, most of the regimes in the region are still coming out of the process of the still incomplete nation-state—and in certain cases the possibly failed nation-state—building process, i.e., North Korea, while for some the process has yet to be completed, i.e., the two Koreas, and China, making threat perception of ruling elites relatively acute and zero-sum oriented. Such state of affairs—to make the matters even more pessimistic—has been met by the high-technology revolution and ongoing impacts of globalization in the region, which has made the region’s various outlying force structure and security services privy to more advanced, and surgically mobile WMD, a trend which do not augur well for peace and stability in the region. Lastly, unbridled by the institutional burdens of history it is ironically the United States as an outside hegemon with extensive economic, strategic, and socio-cultural presence in the region, which has the predominant capability to moderate this uncertainty in the region, but which due to its own stage of development in its political economy that its outlook, political style, and reliance on high-technology is wrought with dangers of unilateralism, exertion of force, and internal preoccupation.

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