<html><body><P>American Enterprise Institute</P> <P>September 6, 2007</P> <P>[Edited transcript from audio tapes]<BR></P> <P> <TABLE cellSpacing=1 cellPadding=1 width="100%" border=0> <TBODY> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>2:25 p.m.</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Registration</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>2:35</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Presentation</EM>:</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>The Honorable Lindsey Graham, U.S. Senate </DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>3:25 </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <P><EM>Panelists</EM>:  </P></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Michael O Hanlon, Brookings Institution</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Frederick W. Kagan, AEI</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>General Jack Keane, U.S. Army (retired)</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Moderator</EM>:</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Danielle Pletka, AEI</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>4:50  </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Panelists</EM>:</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Frederick W. Kagan, AEI</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>James Miller, Center for a New American Security</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Moderator</EM>: </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Gary J. Schmitt, AEI</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>6:00 </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Adjournment</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Proceedings:</P> <P>[Panel 1: Presentation of Senator Lindsey Graham]</P> <P><BR>Danielle Pletka:  Good afternoon everybody.  Thank you for joining us here at the American Enterprise Institute.  I m Danielle Pletka, vice president for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies here at AEI.  </P> <P>It is a great pleasure for me to welcome Senator Lindsey Graham to this panel this afternoon.  Senator Graham is the senior senator from South Carolina; he has served in the Senate since January of 2003.  He is, I believe, one of the Senate s most respected voices on Iraq as well as on other military and defense issues.  He sits on five Senate committees:  the Armed Services Committee, Judiciary, Budget, Veterans Affairs, and Agriculture.  </P> <P>Prior to being in the Senate, he logged more than six years of active duty as an Air Force lawyer from 1982 to 1989 and served in the Air National Guard until his election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1995.  Since 95, he has continued to serve his country in the United States Air Force Reserves and is the only U.S. senator currently serving in the Guard or the Reserves.  He is a colonel and is assigned as a senior instructor to the Air Force JAG School.  </P> <P>Senator Graham recently returned from two weeks of Reserve duty in Iraq.  He also served a brief Reserve duty in April and is the only member of the Senate to have served in Iraq.  A member of the Air Force Judge Advocate General s Corps, he worked primarily on detainee and rule of law issues while serving in Iraq.  In addition, he has visited Iraq six times as a member of congressional delegations.  During the first Gulf War, he was called to active duty and served state-side at the McEntire Air National Guard Base as a Staff Judge Advocate where he prepared members for deployment to the Gulf region.  For that service, he received a commendation.  </P> <P>It is a huge pleasure for me to have him here and for us to welcome a serious, thoughtful voice at a time of important considerations, both military and political on the question of Iraq.  Senator Graham, thank you.</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  I hate it when the introduction is so much better than the speech.  Serious and thoughtful - those are damning words in this town.  I really do appreciate that very much.  I m from the Federal Government and I m here to help you -- glad you laughed.  I want to congratulate everyone for having a job where you can get away at 3:00 or 2:00 and hear me talk.  So that is a compliment to each of you.  Now, my goal is try to keep it lively, keep you awake, and be as honest and candid as I can without overselling my -- we are one lawyer short of winning the war.  I tried to provide that lawyer but I would just like to comment about the war and where we stand in terms of troop level -- troop commitment.  </P> <P>The one thing that struck me the most about this last trip is morale is sky-high.  I mean, it is through the roof, noticeably different, better, sky high.  Why?  Well, I kept asking myself why.  Then a sergeant helped me figure that out, which sergeants are known to do.  Right, general?  When you got a real hard problem, ask an NCO and they will usually give you the answer.  About a year ago, I was in Iraq at lunch in one of the cafeterias, and I asked a sergeant, How is it going?   He said, Sir, I feel like I m riding around waiting to get shot.   Not the best feeling in the world.  This last time, not long ago, I asked a sergeant - basically the same unit, different person - How is it going, sergeant?   Sir, I feel like we are kicking their blank.   </P> <P>Now, from the military point of view, that is telling because the people in Iraq are doing the fighting and the dying and doing the sacrificing that is required of the surge, feel like they are engaging the enemy on new terms with a successful outcome.  There is life before the surge and there is life after the surge, politically, economically, and militarily.  I will admit to misunderstanding and making some serious mistakes about how hard it would be to go from a democracy -- from a dictatorship.  After the fall of Baghdad, I find myself overly enthusiastic about how the transition would occur.  Remember when the young man was riding the statute of Saddam?  Very grateful people?  Well, I did not understand as much as I should have about how raped the country had been economically by Saddam Hussein, how battered the people were and about the intrinsic problems that exist in Iraq.  </P> <P>After about six months, the second or third trip back, maybe within the first year, it was abundantly clear to me things were not going well.  Do we have enough troops?  Yes, we do.  Is everything going to be okay?  Yes, the insurgency is in its last throes.  You name the rhetoric we heard.  Well, what I was told and what I saw about for three years did not match up and people asked, Does it help to go?  Do you get a dog and pony show when you go?   Well, I would argue that if you go enough, no matter what you are told, you will be able to evaluate the situation for yourself better than if you never go.  </P> <P>And here was the big 30,000 view of things.  The first time I went shortly after the fall of Baghdad, we went downtown and we went shopping.  The fourth time I went, we were on a tank.  This is not getting better.  The ability to move throughout the country, the ability to engage the Iraqi people from a politician s point of view was greatly diminished.  You did not have to be a General Patton to figure out that this is not working; that the insurgency is getting stronger, not weaker.  </P> <P>So after a while we start hearing from the sergeants and the colonels and people retired: We got the wrong formula in place.  And after about three years, it finally dawned on us all that we are going nowhere quickly.  So the two gentlemen in front of us come up with an idea with their partners throughout the Department of Defense - retired folks, people on active duty - that we need to do something differently if we want to win in Iraq.  Bill Clinton said, Insanity is doing the same thing and expecting a different outcome.   It was insane to me after a while to keep the troop levels at where they were at and expect a different outcome because, literally, every time you went back it got worse.  Anbar was declared lost about six months ago -- eight months ago, whenever it was, that the intelligence report came back from the Marine Corp that Anbar province is lost. Well, the idea of adding more troops made sense to me.  </P> <P>Now, I m a military lawyer so I do not know much at all about military tactics.  If you want to get court martialed, call me and I could help you.  I was a defense attorney and a lot of my clients are in jail, so they may not vouch for me.  But I was also a prosecutor; a lot of those guys are in jail, too.  But the bottom line was good old common sense.  Interacting with the troops, looking at things a bit distant, taking the briefing and comparing notes with what you hear in the chow hall convinced me it was time for a change.  </P> <P>And the change made perfect sense to me.  More troops in the right areas will create a better outcome if you use them differently.  And that is the key: Doing something different with more people is better than doing the same with more people.  The reason I wanted to advocate more people going is I thought they had a different purpose when they got there; that they were going after the enemy; they were getting at the heart of the problem.  So we send more people - over 30,000.  Well, is that a lot?  Yeah, that is a lot.  It gives you one more combat person than you had before the surge.  It doubled the combat power.  </P> <P>So what have I learned?  I have learned that if you put more people on the ground and give them a new purpose, things can change.  What is the biggest change?  The Iraqi people decided they are tired of Al-Qaeda in Anbar and that had somewhat to do with us but mostly to do with Al-Qaeda.  So there is a magic meeting of the moment here.  You had Al-Qaeda in charge for a period of time and they were absolutely horribly brutal to the people under their control.  They overplayed their hand and we cannot take credit for that; that just happened.</P> <P>But here is what we can take credit for.  At the time they overplayed their hand, we created a new military model, a political, economic, and military model that seized the moment.  The battle space in Anbar had changed politically because the people who had lived in that province had experienced a taste of Al-Qaeda life and they said, No, thanks.   It ranged from incredibly brutal behavior toward people cooperating with us, literally burning children in front of parents to banning smoking, which, if you know anything about Iraq, was a dumb move.  So the people in Anbar were ready for the taking.  </P> <P>Along comes General Petraeus - more troops.  The colonel -- was it McFarlane?  [Cross-talking]  There is a colonel over there that went to a sheikh and the sheikh said, We have had it.  Will you help us?   The colonel on his own said, I will have a tank in front of your house tomorrow.   That started what is now the Anbar awakening - a colonel seized the moment, had the capacity to deliver and the Iraqi people, the Sunni Arabs in Anbar, understood that we meant it.  And here is the bottom line for me:  If the enemy thinks you do not mean it, we are going to lose.  If the enemy understands that we mean it, and the people of Iraq understand that we mean it when we say we are going to win, we will win.  </P> <P>Now, one voice can interject themselves in this whole experiment in Iraq to send the wrong message.  Here, this is September; the only way we can undercut the surge is by Washington sending the wrong message.  We have turned a corner but we are not out of the wilderness yet.  The only way the enemy, in my opinion, given the dynamics that exist in Iraq, can be reenergized is from action by Washington politicians that will change the political dynamic, and that is not going to happen.  The votes are not there.  Not only has there been a surge militarily that led to success in areas of Iraq previously not known; there has been a surge here at home among Republicans to hold the line.  And here is what I think will happen sooner rather than later, depending on how Petraeus and Crocker perform.  There will be some reevaluation of Democrats who are up for election in 08 and just Democrats in general to take a second look at Iraq.  </P> <P>So what you have accomplished, gentlemen, is that you have given a chance for the Iraqi people to make a better choice.  Without our additional combat power the ability to say no to Al-Qaeda would have been difficult, if not impossible.  With the ability -- combat capability provided to the Iraqi people in Anbar, they successively said no to an extremist group that is in our national security interest to defeat.  </P> <P>So the big question going into September:  Is this an isolated war front that is doing more harm to the war on terror than it is doing good, or is it the central battle front in a global struggle?  If you believe as I do, this is a war that we cannot lose globally and the first test of wills is in Iraq, then you would do what I m going to do in September:  Fight like hell to make sure that we do not back off, in the opposite direction pour it on.  So the debate on the floor of the Senate is going to be around that central question.  </P> <P>There are people who say we took our eye off the ball and we let Al-Qaeda reemerge.  I would argue quite differently.  Al-Qaeda has their eye on the ball.  Where is the ball?  The ball is in Iraq.  We are all over the world militarily.  They came to Iraq because we were there?  No.  They came to Iraq - Al-Qaeda did - because of what the Iraqi people were trying to do.  What the Iraqi people are trying to accomplish is a chilling nightmare scenario for Al-Qaeda international.  If we can successfully allow moderation to trump extremism in Iraq, a woman could have a say about her child in terms of Iraqi future.  It is a nightmare to Al-Qaeda.  They came to Iraq, in my opinion, not because we were there but because of what the Iraqi people were trying to do.  </P> <P>Now, they have been diminished militarily; they have been rejected by the people in Anbar.  That is not the story of the surge to me.  That is positive news but here is the story of the surge for me.  Not only did the people in Anbar turn against Al-Qaeda and join forces with us; they have done something that will allow the success to be sustained.  Twelve thousand people have joined the police in Anbar province in 07, and all of 06, 1,000.  They are making a commitment to their long-term security that will allow the successes against Al-Qaeda to be sustained.  </P> <P>What is next to follow?  Will they view Baghdad as part of the problem or part of the solution?  Make a prediction.  Within the next weeks, not months, there will be a major breakthrough on the benchmarks regarding political reconciliation.  Now, after the last two weeks of being a reservist, you could see Sunnis and Shias and Kurds taking a second look at Iraq.  The Sunnis are there for the taking politically.  If there were local elections this time around, unlike 05, they would vote in droves.  They are willing now to go to the polls and elect their local leaders but, more importantly, I think they are willing to reach across the aisle, as we would say here, to form a government where they will be a significant voice as a minority in a democracy.  They are beginning to get the idea that as a minority in a democracy, you can have substantial say about your family s future.  </P> <P>The Shias are very divided.  The Shia politician that can figure out the way to sustain power is to get goodwill from the Sunni community and the Kurdish community is going to be the dominant force in Iraq for a long time to come.  Whether it is Maliki or someone else, here is what awaits politicians in Baghdad sooner rather than later:  The people are war weary;  they are tired of the killing, general.  I went all over that country talking to judges and lawyers, county officials, mayors.  Local reconciliation, ladies and gentlemen, is going on at breakneck speed and is made possible by better security.  Better security is breeding better choices and people who have experienced the fear of sending their kid to school not knowing if the child is going to come back are beginning to stand up and speak.  The awakening is not just in Anbar; it is all over the country.  </P> <P>Now is the time for the United States government - its Congress - to reinforce this surge.  Not only do we need a political reconciliation in Baghdad; we need one in Washington.  We need to reconcile ourselves to the fact that whether we should have gone or not, we are there now and we cannot afford to lose.  </P> <P>Now, the test for my Democratic friends is what you said in April - some of you - about the war being lost and the surge failing.  Will that define you for the rest of the time that we deal with this problem?  Are you going to let those statements haunt you to the point that you cannot sit down and listen?  Now, I have been there.  I made statements after the fall of Baghdad and I was completely wrong.  Over time, it was clear to me that I was wrong.  One thing I ask of my colleagues in the Senate, regardless of what side of the aisle you are on - listen, not based on what is going to happen in 2008 or anything you have said in the past but listen based on what is best on our country for years to come.  One thing that Petraeus and Crocker deserve is to be listened to.  Whether you believe we should have been there or not as I said is a moot question.  To deny success is to deny the obvious.  To not talk about the challenges would be a fraud on the American people.  Let s talk about the challenges.  Let s celebrate the successes and let s listen.  </P> <P>The surge has worked.  Political reconciliation will come.  There is a lag time between better security and politicians sitting down and working out their problems.  It is going to be shorter than you think.  </P> <P>One final thought:  Being a politician, they say awful, bad things about you in this business, sometimes deserved.  I have been a judge; I have been a prosecutor, defense attorney; I have been involved in the legal system most of my life.  It is hard to lose and you get disappointed when your case falls apart or you get beat in court.  In Iraq, if you just step out and try to participate in the rule of law, they will try to kill your family.  If you want to be political leader in Iraq, they will try to kill your family.  The people involved in trying to pull this off are imperfect.  Maliki is not going to go down as George Washington.  I m not here defending the lack of political progress; I m here to try to put it in context.  None of us can even imagine what it is like living in that country where the insurgency was so out of control.  Why can we not do immigration?  I have got my brains beat out trying to do immigration.  Medicare, Social Security -- the politics of reaching across the aisle are difficult when political ads are being run.  They are even more difficult when the bullets fly.  </P> <P>So now, because of a lot of brave young men and women, the environment is the best it has been since the fall of Baghdad for people to sit down at a table and work through their problems without constant fear.  That is what the surge has provided.  Will the Iraqi people pull it off and step up to the plate and seize the moment?  Will their politicians deliver?  They will.  Not because Senator Clinton said they should or Senator Graham said they should; because the people who live in Iraq are going to insist they will.  To the authors of the surge, to the people who advocated the surge, in spite of the political polling, I think history will judge you well.  To the politicians who have said some things about the surge prematurely, history will judge you well if you will give it a second chance.  God bless, and I will take any questions you got.</P> <P> Danielle Pletka:  The senator has agreed to take some questions.  If I can just ask everybody to abide by AEI s rules, that is, to raise your hand; I will call on you.  And if you would be kind enough to wait for the microphone there is young man who is going to bring it to you.  Identify yourself and make your brief, one-sentence statement in the form of a question.  Thank you very much.  Questions?  </P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  I will believe this when I see it, okay?</P> <P> Danielle Pletka:  Sorry -- right in front, please.</P> <P> Bill Laker:   Hi.  Thank you.  I m Bill Laker.  I m concerned that the United States military is confronting elements of the Iranian Guards, the QODs in Iraq.  Is this true?  Have there been military battles between U.S. and Iranian military?</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  It is overwhelmingly true more now than any time that I have been to Iran -- agents of the Iranian government, the QODs Force in particular, are really accelerating their efforts to destabilize Iraq and they are accelerating their efforts to arm the militia.  And the question is why.  Well, they are not stupid.  They know what is going to happen in September.  Who is the enemy in Iraq?  I think there are three enemies.  There are sectarian groups who wish to control the country from a sectarian point of view, and they are a minority within the Iraqi people; they have to be dealt with one way.  There is Al-Qaeda, an obvious enemy to us and anybody who believes in freedom; they have to be dealt with not through negotiation but through annihilation and marginalization.  </P> <P>Then there is Iran, a much more sophisticated enemy but, nonetheless, an enemy of the Iraqi people and the American people.  The evidence is overwhelming.  The Karbala Case where there were five Americans kidnapped and assassinated -- I have had the chance to review that case as a military lawyer.  The evidence is overwhelming of Iranian QODs Force connections.  The EFPs -- I can give you a long list - I m sure Petraeus and Crocker will give a better list than I can provide - of Iranian involvement.  And the question is why; there is a why to everything.  </P> <P>I think the answer, to me, is obvious.  If you are an Iranian theocracy trying to hang on to power through a certain model, your worst nightmare would be to have a neighbor that uses a different model that may spur your people on to think twice about the way you are doing business.  Iran is trying to destabilize Iraq because in their long term self-interest, it would be a nightmare to have a representative government on their border.  Now, the president of Iran has done a lot of things and said a lot of things.  And about a week ago he said something I thought was chilling and I want to publicly thank him for it.  He said, We stand ready to fill the vacuum.   The question for America is do we stand ready to allow the vacuum to be created?  Now that is the question of our time.  </P> <P>So how do you confront these people?  You fight them within Iran; you try to get the International Community to sit down with Iran and say, Knock it off.   And here is what they are betting on:  If they can affect the outcome here in September, if we can get a large vote to begin to withdraw, then we are in a weakened condition when it comes to negotiating with Iran.  What if this happened?  What if there was a surge of political support for the surge here in Washington and the International Community, all at the same time, reengage Iran from a position of strength?  I think that is the correct model in terms of dealing with Iranians effort to destabilize Iraq.  </P> <P>The Gulf Arab States, they will tell you privately how afraid they are of Iran and they will say we have to do something about it.  And my response is, We means more than me.  We need a surge from the international community, sir.  Gulf Arab States need to reopen their embassies. It is something tangible.  It would be a statement by them that they see things getting better in Iraq.  The money dedicated to help reconstruct Iraq by the Gulf Arab State neighbors needs to be delivered upon.   </P> <P>The French are talking about coming in.  You do not have to send troops to help Iraq; there are many things you can do.  And the more the International Community will help Iraq, the weaker Iran becomes in its efforts to destabilize Iraq.  We need a surge of international, regional support for the Iraqi people.  The main goal is not only to stabilize Iraq but to contain Iran and that is the best way to do it.</P> <P> Barry Schweid:  Supposing you are correct -- </P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  Identify yourself...</P> <P> Barry Schweid:  Oh, Barry Schweid of AP.  I m trying to look further down the road.</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  Yes, sir.</P> <P> Barry Schweid:  Supposing you are correct - there is reconciliation; presumably, you need fewer troops.  Then what happens to Iraq?  What is Iraq s road?  Do you remember the original idea that everybody -- a lot of people ridiculed?  That Iraq could be the inspiration for democracy in the Middle East?  That was the original idea.</P> <P> Senator Graham:  Yes, sir.</P> <P> Barry Schweid:  What is your prognosis?  What happens if there is reconciliation?  American troops leave - what happens to Iraq?</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  Okay.</P> <P> Barry Schweid:  Can it survive?</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  Well, can Iraq survive?  The question is can we allow it to fail?  The difference between a dysfunctional government and a failed state are enormously different.  We have a dysfunctional government.  Can we create a mechanism for it to become stable?  And your question is if you succeed, what does it mean?  I think it is enormous.  I think the dividends to a functioning government in Iraq that is tolerant of its different populations that would allow representative democracy to flourish is enormous.  </P> <P>Qadafi gave up his weapons.  Why?  He thought he would be next, right?  I think that is the generally-held view that the fall of Saddam had a ripple effect in a positive way.  O-five was a great year - you had elections in Egypt; you had Syria being kicked out of Lebanon.  O-six was a disaster.  Why?  Because you have a thinking enemy; that enemy is Iran.  The gains in Lebanon had been rolled back because what did Hezbollah do?  At a moment in time when Iran was being pressed by the UN, they created another front; they created a war between Hezbollah and Israel.  </P> <P>So this I a chess game and the outcome -- I cannot promise you that I know the future of the Middle East but I can promise you this, that if we can get a foothold on a stable government in Iraq, it is the best way to contain Iran.  If it can be a functioning stable government that will allow its people to live in peace and prosperity, the benefits to the region are enormous.  It means Al-Qaeda is not coming back.  It means that Iran is not going to be the puppet -- be the owner of a puppet state in the south.  </P> <P>Can it be sustained?  The answer is yes, and it goes back to the people.  Once you have tasted peace and prosperity, once you have had a break from the killing and once you feel like your children are going to have a better life, I would not want to be the person to try to take that away from you.  So the ultimate answer to your question is will the Iraqi people fight to maintain the gains they have achieved?  I have been there enough to believe that they will.  It is up to them. </P> <P> Howard LaFrankie:  Howard LaFrankie with the Christian Science Monitor.  Thank you, Senator.  You said that you expect to see in weeks, not in the next week, not months, progress on benchmarks in terms of political reconciliation.  You talked a lot about sheiks and local populations coming around, but I m wondering what you saw in the government that leads you to say that and what progress you would expect to see and what issues --?</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  I saw a lot of scared politicians and I have been there; I have been there.  The best thing that happened is for those folks to get out of Baghdad in August.  Now, I thought at the time that was a dumb thing; they need to keep slogging through it and push hard and not go home.  Well, some of them went home and they got an earful.  </P> <P>What happened a week ago, Sunday, was very important.  The five major players recommitted themselves to creating a process that would lead to reconciliation.  They agreed on a document that would allow them to go forward.  I think you will have a deBaathification [sounds like] law passed sooner rather later.  I think you will have local elections sooner rather than later. But the thing that encouraged me the most was the prison visit.  I went to the central Baghdad prison as Colonel Graham and we invited Vice President Hashemi, the Sunni Vice President, to come and also a Shia Vice President, Al-Mahdi, the SCIRI representative.  </P> <P>You think immigration s tough?  Trust me, it is.  Trust me -- trust me, it is tough.  Imagine being a politician in Iraq where 85 percent of the people in jail are your constituents.  Imagine having a state where most of the people in jail are Republicans and you are a Republican.  This detention issue - prison issue - is incredibly volatile.  Ripe for demagoguery, right?  I mean, it is the ultimate issue to tee up; it is sort of their immigration.  </P> <P>We invited them to tour the jail because we are proud of the efforts we had been making to train the Iraqi prison guards.  We are increasing capacity for the judges; we have built them a court room.  We built a secure facility where the judges and their families could live.  We built a prison inside that compound.  It is called the Rule of Law or Green Zone and we wanted the Iraqi politicians to see it because it is now theirs.  And I would have bet everything I own they would not have come.  </P> <P>When I m in a photo with Ted Kennedy, it haunts me for weeks, months, because of the nature of politics here at home.  So when Senator Kennedy and I sat down to try to work on immigration, well, that is tough politics because there are people in my side do not like him and there are probably people on his side do not care much for me.  But we said, Okay, we are not going to play that game here; we are going to try to solve this problem.   When those two Vice Presidents agreed to be filmed together, that was a significant event and I walked around with them.  And the Sunni Vice President was held as a hero because he was coming to the jail and he was looking at the problems his people faced.  The Shia Vice President was respected by coming.  </P> <P>When they toured the jail, they sat down in front of the judge and they started giving the judge a hard time about the slow progress of getting people out of jail into the court.  I thought I was in South Carolina where you had two politicians beating on a bureaucrat.  And the judge was saying, My God, guys, if you gave me more I could do more.   And both politicians turned to each other and said, Yeah, okay.  Let s do it.   </P> <P>The press release from the Vice President Hashemi complained about how long it took to get to court, not the outcome.  He did not accuse the judges of giving sectarian verdicts.  He said, We need more capacity.   The Shia politician said, We have had too many people in jail under too tough circumstances.  We need a better process to get some of these people out of jail.   For them to have said that convinced me beyond any other event I have seen since I have been going to Iraq the people are thinking about coming together, not staying apart.  </P> <P>From a Shia point of view, if you could show the Sunnis that you have some sympathy for a big issue facing them, then your stock goes up.  From a Sunni perspective, if you are willing to throw a bone to the government that at least you are trying -- that told me all I needed to know about what is going to come.  Based on that one visit I m standing up here with the cameras rolling predicting that that attitude of making gestures in a positive way to each other is going to lead to reconciliation.  And I asked the Shia Vice President, Why did you say that?   And here is what he said: In the 60s, I was in jail for two years under Saddam.  It made a man out of me but it killed my family.  I know what these families are going through.  We cannot let that happen to Iraq.   Pretty telling; that is why we are going to have reconciliation.  Anything else?  One last question.  I will let smart people talk after this.</P> <P> Ketil Raknes [phonetic]:  Yeah, I m Ketil Raknes.  I m a Norwegian journalist.  You said that morale in Iraq is sky high and going through the roof.  How do you substantiate that claim?  I mean, from -- I have not been to Iraq so my impression is that --</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  Going eight times, knowing the difference, sitting there for 11 days, eating three meals a day with them, going all over the country, hearing what they tell you, seeing it in their face.  One thing I have learned about being in the military -- you can tell when the troops feel like they are going forward and when they are going backward.  Reenlistments are sky-high.  Those who have served in Iraq are reenlisting at the largest numbers of anybody in the military.  The Army met its recruiting goal.  The one thing I would tell my colleagues in the Senate:  Go to Iraq.  The more you go, the more you will learn.  </P> <P>And as to the troops, one caution to my colleagues here in Washington:  The only way we are going to break this army is to take away from them the chance to win.  The Army is strained; the Marine Corps is pushed to the limits.  But if you want to break them, deny them the chance to win.  They will do everything asked to win and then some.  My last visit convinced me more than anything else that the biggest benefit from the surge is to take the men and women on the front lines and change their attitude about their mission.  They have gone from riding around waiting to be shot to feel like they are kicking their ass.  God Bless.</P> <P> Danielle Pletka:  Thank you very much, Senator.</P> <P> Lindsey Graham:  Thank you very much.</P> <P> Danielle Pletka:  Five minutes.  Five minutes to our next panel. </P> <P> </P> <P>[First Panel]</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  Ladies and gentlemen, I think we are going to go ahead with our panel.  Thank you.  I m happy to encourage people to move -- some of you to move forward a little bit if you would like.  I only need some reserved seats.</P> <P> Again, welcome back.  I m Danielle Pletka.  I m the Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies here at AEI.  This is our first panel in our conference on the question of a middle way on Iraq.  I m proud to be joined by a colleague and two very, very good friends here on the dais.</P> <P>Next to me is General Jack Keane.  General Keane is a career paratrooper -- I ought to be able to do this from memory by now.  General Keane is a career paratrooper, combat veteran of Vietnam.  He is a four-star general and he completed 37 years in public service in December of 2003, culminating as acting Chief-of-Staff and Vice-Chief-of-Staff of the US Army.  He is a member of the Secretary of Defense s Policy Board.  He is now the senior managing director and co-founder of Keane Advisors, which is a private equity and consulting firm.  We are lucky to have him today.  He was testifying this morning on Capitol Hill on the question of Iraq.  He has traveled there frequently this year but also in the years past as a consultant to the Defense Department.  We certainly value his help and work here at the American Enterprise Institute.</P> <P> Next down on my right is Michael O Hanlon who is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and also a veteran Iraq traveler.  He is a specialist on US Defense Strategy and the use of military force, Homeland Security and American Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.  He is also a visiting lecturer at Princeton University.  He has written frequently on the Op-ed pages and in monographs on the question of Iraq.  And I m very grateful to Michael that he was willing to be here today.</P> <P> Last but not least, Frederick Kagan who had to be here today and is the reason that we are all here today to discuss a report that has been issued by AEI that we will cover a little bit more fully in our second panel this afternoon, that is, No Middle Way report on Iraq.  Fred has been at AEI for several years.  He joined us from West Point.  He has been to Iraq three times this year and has been writing copiously, if I may say so, on the question of US troops in Iraq.</P> <P>It think it is safe to say that all three of the gentlemen sitting to my right here today have been hard-nosed and thoughtful observers of the situation on the ground inside Iraq.  They have been honest in calling the shots as they see them and now is a perfect opportunity for us to hear from them.</P> <P>So General Keane if you would start today.  Thank you.</P> <P> Jack Keane:  I m sorry, I got the mechanics down.  Thanks for the invitation.  I m glad to be back and as well as sitting on this distinguished panel here with Fred and Mike, both great guys.  I just returned from Iraq, spent two weeks there in August.  I have been taking a 90-day snapshot every 90 days starting in February, normally, about two weeks.  I do the normal Iraqi and US government official and military briefings but I focus my visit on the street.</P> <P> I grew up on the streets of New York and maybe that is why I m comfortable but that is where I spend a lot of my time because I think the rhythm and patterns of life are very important and they truly - when you are dealing with people - reflect what is happening in the country and particularly what is happening to them.  After all, it is all about the Iraqi people.  That was the basis for my visit.</P> <P>Zero-six was a horrific year, remember?  This government was moving towards a cliff; Baghdad was literally on fire.  We conducted two operations to try to regain security.  Together forward, one and two, we failed.  Even to the casual observer, we realize that we had a failed strategy.  I had supported that strategy from 03 to August of 06 and then I realized it had failed.</P> <P>After that, I felt we needed a new strategy.  The only alternative that was left to us was to increase the force level and regain security so that we could make some progress economically and politically.  I took that message to Secretary Rumsfeld and to General Pace.  I worked a weekend here with Fred and his great guys on the specifics of that strategy and wound up in the Oval Office in December, talking about the specifics of it.  It became known as the surge; truth be known, militarily it is a counter-offensive.  That is what it really is.</P> <P>It is important to remember the purpose is to establish security as a precondition for economic development and political progress; to buy time for that and to buy time for the development of the Iraqi security forces.  It was always intended to be temporary; twelve to eighteen months is what its intention has been and still is to this day.</P> <P>In my judgment, where are we now?  In an overview, we have made remarkable progress.  Some of it is quite unforeseen and we have had some disappointments to be sure.  We have got plenty of challenges remaining.  I want to make six points to you before I give you a conclusion.</P> <P>One is security.  The security has dramatically improved.  The trends are all moving in the right direction.  The number of attacks is down.  Sectarian killings are dramatically down 75 percent from a year ago.  Suicide car bombs are down.  US casualties are now coming down.  We knew US casualties would go up initially because you are conducting a counter-offensive.  It was true with the Normandy invasion, which was a counter-offensive; it was true in Inchon, which was a counter-offensive; the Marines island-hopping in the Pacific was a counter-offensive, and we did a couple in Vietnam which were as well.  Hopefully, this trend in casualties starting to come down that has been going on for two months will continue.  But what you really see what is happening -- you get away from the briefing and you get on to the street and it becomes very obvious to you of the dramatic changes unfolding in Iraq, particularly when you take 90-day snapshots, and neighborhoods in Iraq are very different.</P> <P>So I have been down to all of those neighborhoods in Baghdad and in the suburbs - an American term - around Baghdad.  There is progress being made in all of them despite some of the challenges in some of them, and that is very obvious.  Schools are open and they were closed in 06.  Markets are all teeming with people; some are operating full capacity and some are still trying to get to full capacity, particularly the ones in the Sunni neighborhoods which have been on a diet in terms of services and other things.  But when I take a 90-day snapshot, it improves 10 or 20 percent each time I come back.  Clinics are operating; hospitals are operating; merchants are selling goods. </P> <P>There is obviously a very vast difference between a Shia middle-class neighborhood, which looks much like any middle-class neighborhood in terms of goods that are being sold and even comparable to what you would see in America, to a Sunni neighborhood where it does not have that range or goods and the socio-economic factors are different.  But nonetheless, goods are being sold; merchants are selling them; markets are open; people are there in very large numbers.</P> <P>This is important data because the rhythm and patterns of life - of sending children to school, unescorted, having them come home, walking the streets, seeing people in cafes at pool halls at night in their casual leisure time when the heat is going down in the country - is an important footnote to what has happened in the lives of the Iraqis.  When you talk to them and they are very willing to talk to you, whether they be Sunni, Shia or whatever, the point is that they believe things are improving.  It is almost to a person.  </P> <P>They have frustrations about essential services not coming fast enough.  Some of them do not like these barricades up because [indiscernible] the flow of people, et cetera.  But nonetheless, when you draw back from it and listen to what they are saying, one, security is improved: We are glad the Americans are here.   Many of them have confidence also in Iraqi security forces -- not all of them.  Second point:  Al Qaeda is seriously hurt and they are on the defensive.  They have lost Anbar Province, literally kicked out of there by the Sunni people, literally and so many are aided and assisted by Colonel McFarlane [phonetic] and Colonel Charlton -- is that his name?  I mentioned those names because they are Army guys.  No, they worked on Ramadi.  The Marines are also doing their part there.  It has been tremendous work that the military has done.  </P> <P>But the catalyst for it - let s give credit where credit is due - is truly the Sunni people in Anbar Province themselves.  I do not want to repeat what Senator Graham said; they deserve the credit.  But we drove them out of Diyala Province, which was a stronghold that they established in the provincial capital called Baqubah.  We just did that in the end of July and it was a remarkable operation.  They are gone from Baqubah and the people are returning to normalcy.</P> <P>The Sunnis are isolating the al Qaeda and this is very important because I am convinced in my own mind, dealing with the larger issue of extremists, radical Islamists - al Qaeda in Iraq - you put them all in the same bag and you are not going to destroy them by killing them and capturing them alone.  You have to hold their behavior liable to be sure.  But the moderates will defeat them because they will isolate them.  That is what defeats radical Islam in my view and also what defeats the Al Qaeda in Iraq.  The fact that the Sunnis are isolating them is very important.  We have been killing and capturing these guys for years by the thousands, to be quite frank about it, and they have been able to regenerate.  But the fact that the Sunnis are isolating them and they have no place to go and they cannot get their foothold in is very significant.</P> <P>They are up in the Diyala River Valley right now; this is where some of them fled from Baqubah.  We are now conducting a very aggressive and, I may say, a very successful operation against them in that Diyala River Valley because we want to stay on the offensive, stay aggressive.  We do not want them to be able to reset.  This all about the momentum that this military operation has and it is very important.</P> <P>The other footnote about Al Qaeda is they have tried all throughout 07 to provoke the Shia response that they got in 06 which put Baghdad on fire and nearly pushed the country off the cliff.  The Shias have not responded.  They have absolutely failed despite numerous provocations and their exclusive killing of Shias and most of them innocent people and those horrific car bombings.  They have not provoked the Shia response that we had in 06.</P> <P>Third point:  In my judgment, the Sunni insurgency is rapidly fading away.  It is remarkable what has taken place.  This is probably - and I agree with Senator Graham - the most dramatic change since the invasion.  It is going to have profound impact.  What has happened?  There has been a tribal revolt against the al Qaeda and it has led to a Sunni insurgent conversion from fighting us to helping us.  It is fundamentally a political movement and a social phenomenon that is changing the security and political landscape of Iraq.</P> <P>Tribes are part of the fabric of Iraqi society.  Almost everybody in Iraq belongs to a tribe and they have greater allegiance to that than they have to the religious sect, have greater allegiance to it than they have to any provincial government and, certainly, greater allegiance to it than they have to any central government.  So the significance of this is very important in terms of what it portends for the future in Iraq, given the breadth and depth of the movement itself.  It started in Anbar as the Senator pointed out.  But listen to me;  this is now in four other provinces and this is spreading faster than we can keep up with it.  It is in Ninawa province, in Northern Babil province; it is in Diyala province as well, and it is in Salah ad-Din and it is also in the capital city of Baghdad.  It is now touching about 40 percent of Iraq and almost all of the contested areas where the fighting has been going on.  Interesting enough, as an editorial comment, it is spreading to Shia tribes, as well, where they are rejecting the Shia militia, not on anything like the scale of the Sunnis but, nonetheless, that is beginning to happen.</P> <P>As I went around the country and talked to the commanders, it was just so dramatic to see since May the difference that I was encountering in August.  My back-of-the-envelope addition counted 30,000 people who are now working for us who weeks and months ago were fighting us.  I spoke to some of them and some of their leaders that brought them in to do it; that was remarkable in and of itself - males in their 20s, early 30s; all of them, to a person, insurgent fighters.  Some are even describing to me where they fought a battle against our forces just a matter of weeks ago.  This is a very dramatic thing that is taking place in Iraq - the Sunni insurgent conversion that is unfolding before our eyes.</P> <P>What is really happening with this, in my view, is at the tactical level -- and I apologize for using military terms.  The issue at the tactical level is security and it is anti-Al Qaeda in nature; that was the catalyst for it because of the repressiveness of the al Qaeda themselves.  They do not want to live under that brutality.  But there is also a strategic aspect of this, which is very important because it is a political movement.  They are recognizing that they cannot win in Iraq.</P> <P>Their original goals were to regain the regime, to drive the Shia-dominated government out.  They are exhausted by this war and the fact of the matter is that they were fighting us, U.S.; they were fighting Iraqi security forces; they were fighting Shia militia in a very heavy way in 06 and now, they are fighting the al Qaeda and they cannot handle all of that.  They cannot get to the political objectives they want using the means that they had, which was armed violence.  So the strategic nature of this is very important.  Also at the strategic level, what they are doing is trying to leverage the United States - the United States military, the United States government in the sense of Ambassador Crocker to leverage the Shia-dominated government so that they can gain political influence and get material gains from that.</P> <P>What do they want?  Initially what they want is participation in the Iraqi security forces because they want security for their communities.  They want essential resources and services and they need money to get all of that.  The challenge facing Maliki and us is to take this incredible movement that is growing faster than we could ever imagine and connect it to the Maliki government in some coherent meaningful way.</P> <P>Is Maliki doing anything about it?  Here Maliki deserves some credit.  Maliki has been a challenge, for sure, as presiding over a dysfunctional government, but here is what he has done.  He has been at Anbar three times.  He just provided $107 million to Ramadi to provide for reconstruction.  That is real money in a major city in the capital city of the province.  When he goes out there and has visits, he sits down in a room with the sheiks and tribal leaders and, believe me, he knows that these guys were trying to overthrow his regime and they were using violent means to do it.  But he is making accommodations to them because he understands the significance of it.</P> <P>In Anbar province alone, there are 18,000 people who were former Sunni insurgents on the payroll - 18,000; most of them in the police, some of them in the army.  Now, we have photographed them; the Iraqi military has done it.  They photographed them, they have fingerprinted them and they have retina-scanned them.  So now, we have a databank.  This is important to understand - they are not asking for authorization to have a separate Sunni militia.  They are asking to participate in Iraqi security forces, which is very meaningful because they are becoming part of the fabric of the Shia-dominated government.  I think that is a huge stretch.</P> <P>We just finished the military operation of Baqubah at the end of July.  Maliki was in there within about a week to 10 days meeting again with sheiks and tribal leaders.  He has put $38 million in Baqubah and has touched over 70 percent of the people.  This is real money and when they are moving money around Iraq, they move it in a military convoy and they carry it in bags in a truck and they start handing them out upon arrival.  This is a completely different operation than what you are used to.  There is no wire transfer here, all right?  This is cash upfront; very meaningful; people walk away and it is having positive impact.  560 tons of wheat arrived about 10 to 12 days ago in 21 trucks in Baqubah and there is a flour mill operating.  I mention this because the Maliki government is involved in this linkage.  If this thing is going to be successful, one, the Maliki government has to be sensitive to it and, two, they have to start doing something about it.</P> <P>Now we would want this to continue.  We would want his involvement to grow, certainly.  Now let s face facts here.  There are elements in the Maliki government that are very concerned about this.  They have understandable paranoia and fears that these are Baathists and all this is a strategic pause so they can regain the initiative after they regrow themselves and they are coming after the regime again.  That could be true; that is possible.  And you can understand that kind of paranoia.  But, also, as a political leader responsible for your people and security, it would be certainly irresponsible to not take the deal and to not cease the opportunity.  It appears to me that they are seizing the opportunity.  They are going to get all the encouragement they could possibly stand, certainly from Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus in this view.</P> <P>This is a very significant development that is taking place in Iraq.  In my own mind, it is so powerful that it is going to have profound impact on the national government.  I agree completely with what the Senator said:  It is going to move them towards national reconciliation in some form or matter; maybe not in a way that we browbeat them to achieve, but in some form. Now, already, they are doing some forms of it because, look, the De-Baathification law that we are trying to get passed, we want to bring people, particularly Sunnis, into the government and get them into the Iraqi security forces which they have been kept out of particularly in the police.  That is already happening; Maliki is making that decision.  He is already sharing revenues without the Oil Law.  I mean, the Oil Law will be certainly more comprehensive but the fact he is sharing revenues already is a good sign that could maybe lead to that reconciliation at the national level.</P> <P>Third thing:  Amnesty and immunity -- de facto, he is doing it.  If there are 30,000 people out there running around with weapons fighting on our side versus their side, there is something happening there, de facto, in terms of immunity and amnesty.  Could that change in a few years?  Certainly it could, but the fact of the matter is he is doing it.</P> <P>Fourth point:  The Shia militia is still a problem.  They are fragmented, to be sure; they are killing US forces and the numbers of that is certainly of concern.  The sectarian influence in the police -- less in the army and in the government as a result of the Shia militia.  And there is certainly Iranian influence and that is a problem and also a challenge for us.  Nonetheless, there is some positive movement in this area as well but still a lot of concern in this area.</P> <P>In my own mind, as the Sunni development continues to take hold and as the al Qaeda continues to be weakened, the very justification for the bad militia, so to speak -- not the good militia; the bad militia starts to evaporate and more political pressure can be applied against it.  I think Sadr s behavior is being influenced to some degree by Sustani and possibly also by Iran in terms of what he is doing right now in calling for the ceasefire.  By the way, he has broken five ceasefires in the past and I m sure this one will be broken as well.  But Shia militias are still a problem and so is sectarian influence.</P> <P>Iraqi security forces -- point number five:  The Iraqi army is improving in its capability.  It is already in the lead in northern Iraq.  It has taken over the lead in southern Iraq despite some of the problems down there.  It will eventually take over the lead in western Iraq as we pull out of Anbar province.  Gradually over time, little by little, starting in 08, they will start to take over certain neighborhoods in certain towns in certain districts in Baghdad and in the suburbs around it.</P> <P>So this is a good story.  The national police are fundamentally broke.  Nine brigades that General Hussein -- and I spent some time with; he fired all nine brigade commanders, 17 of his 24 battalion commanders, and they are still broke.  I have run out of patience with it; I told the Generals, Disband it.   They do not want to do that and I can understand why.  They want to get them out of Baghdad, get them up in the provinces and still work it because they have invested a lot in it.  There are nine brigades; there are a lot of people; there are some leaders there that they think are of value and they do not want to give up on it yet.  They are as frustrated as anybody else is, certainly, but they do not want to give up on it.</P> <P>The local police or the Iraqi police are mixed results, that is to be sure.  Some of them have sectarian influence and some of them are not very good and some of them are okay.  The thing I will say about police -- just remember when you are dealing with a counter insurgency, police are always the last thing to get fixed.  It is no exception here in Iraq; it is going to take some time and it is not going to happen overnight.  That is the reality of it.</P> <P>The political progress in Iraq is my sixth point.  It is what it is.  At the national level, it has not met some of the expectations people had but I think those expectations have been, quite frankly, so unrealistic.  To think that we could get that done within about 90 days of being in full stride with our military operation which came to full stride at the end of June, and here we are expecting all of these national benchmarks or at least some of them to have been achieved.  Now, maybe if one or two of them had been achieved, everyone would feel better about it.  But I do think that the fact that they are moving in that direction, we should judge that as progress.  The fact that they have not achieved these benchmarks, we should not consider that as failure, which people are doing.</P> <P>The national benchmarks in the United States of America -- they are like those old vinyl records we used to have.  Remember they would get stuck in a groove there?  This thing is stuck in a groove called national benchmarks and we cannot see beyond it.  So what else has happened in Iraq?  That is the reality of it.  Particularly, the political movement that is coming from the local level and the provincial level is very significant and this will have some overwhelming effect on the national leadership.</P> <P>One thing about this Crocker team that is there -- I have been very critical of the embassy in the past.  Ambassador Crocker and the team that he has just put together in the last 69 days is absolutely first-rate.  These people are committed; they are passionate; they want to win; they are willing to take some personal risks to get out there to do this.  They are on top of this thing.  I am convinced to put this team with that weak, at-times-dysfunctional Maliki government, they are going to make some progress here and much more so than what we have had in the past.</P> <P>We got this real security progress that is taking place.  There is some economic assistance finally happening but not to the degree we would like it to happen.  The Iraqi army is making some improvements to the point where they are going to be able to transition with us.  We still have some disappointments and I mentioned some of those, and we have some challenges.  Certainly, in my view those disappointments and the challenges that we have should not be able to trump the success that we have achieved and squander the gains that our soldiers have made through their sacrifice.  That makes absolutely no sense and, certainly, people are suggesting that we do that very thing.</P> <P>What we have to do is continue this military operation.  Let it buy time for the Maliki government to make some improvement.  Let s continue the economic assistance.  And I could not agree more because I said it this morning in testimony with Senator Graham that now is the time for the Congress of the United States, both Democrats and Republicans, to strike a deal, to come together in a bipartisan fashion, to support this progress that has been achieved and carry it forward into 08.  We will reduce our forces in 08, probably, to pre-surge levels.  We said from the outset that it was always going to be temporary and that is within the margin of acceptable risk.  What it would look like beyond 08 I think is too far away to tell.  Hopefully, we would be able to reduce our forces further in 09, but I do not think anybody can make an accurate assessment on what that would be.  It has to be condition-based; you have heard that term before - it is a military term.  It has to be based on the conditions which are, one, the security in the area and two, the capacity of the Iraqi security forces to take over responsibilities from us.  Thank you.</P> <P> </P> <P>Michael O Hanlon:  </P> <P> </P> <P>Thank you, Danielle.  It is an honor to be here and to speak after General Keane and to be part of this important conversation.  I want to agree very much with almost all of what he said.  I want to take a little bit different tack, though, and express a bit more concern about the state of Iraqi politics.  That is going to lead me to in the second part of my, hopefully, brief presentation say a couple of words about middle ways if there are any other ones besides the ones that I think Fred Kagan and others will discuss thereafter in the rest of the afternoon.</P> <P>Before I do that I want to talk a little bit about the battlefield realities where I do agree very much with General Keane.  I would like to, frankly, take advantage of this moment because he has done such a nice job laying out the basic argument to actually take on the GAO a little bit because I know that these questions are on your mind.  I, hopefully, will do this in a collegial spirit towards the GAO, an organization that I have a lot of respect for.  But frankly, right now, there is a certain amount of debate, to put it mildly, about whether there is military momentum in Iraq, whether there is battlefield progress.  I think we have to establish that.</P> <P>Coming off my brief trip to Iraq and more importantly perhaps, or, at least, more sweepingly over the years -- many years of study of this problem, to me that is the central reality we do have to agree on because I think it is a reality; it is factual.  There is plenty of room for debate about everything else in my judgment, about whether the military progress is sufficient to warrant the continued expenditure of American lives and treasure, about the opportunity cost that we have in Iraq that we could be using, frankly, our foreign policy muscle, the time of our leaders, our image, our reputation around the world and other enterprises.  In the end, I support the Surge but I think there is a serious argument that one can make that even with the military momentum that is real it is still not enough to justify continuation of this.  </P> <P>But let s begin with a real solid foundation in the facts.  There is military momentum.  Let me say a few more words about why and therefore a few more words about why I must respectfully but strongly disagree with the GAO.  The GAO spent a lot of time on the 18 famous benchmarks.  I m not going to talk about that, except to make a comment in passing that perhaps there is a standard of success the GAO is measuring against that was unrealistically high.  It should have been looking more for progress towards that standard instead of attainment of that standard.  That is a reasonable point to disagree about.  What I do not think the GAO did very well or responsibly was in its presentation of information about the security environment in Iraq.  </P> <P>To put it a little more specifically, if you look at the GAO report, they talk here and there about not being able to document any improvement whatsoever in the environment.  I think that is just wrong.  In fact, I think what the GAO did was to look at different parts of our government, different databases and say, You know what?  Different organizations define sectarian violence in various ways.  Their own internal measures may vary from one month to another.  There is imprecision in all the data and therefore we are going to throw the whole thing out, and basically say, Since we cannot document anything according to the standards of rigor that we would like, we are going to make the assertion that we cannot see any progress whatsoever.   </P> <P>On the one hand, if you are trying to protect yourself from saying something wrong, that is a very smart way to go.  On the other hand, if you are trying to take in a situation that is inherently messy and inherently imprecise -- it is a war zone for heaven s sake and perhaps, some of the US government agencies have not done a good enough job identifying standards they can use consistently.  Nonetheless, it is a war zone; you are not going to get precise data.  You have to, at some point, use your best judgment.  The GAO, in my opinion, did not do that.</P> <P>If you take your best judgment, if you look at DOD data, if you look at the National Intelligence Community s information as reflected in their recent National Intelligence estimate, people agree.  People who are on the ground collecting data agree there is an improvement.  The Iraq Body Count Project, which is an NGO in England - it does very good work on this - they have also documented a decrease.  There is plenty of room for disagreement about how much and I would be the first to acknowledge it has not yet been anywhere near what it needs to be.  We have probably taken violence back down to 2004 levels in Iraq.  That is huge progress relative to 2006 but it still leaves Iraq as by far the bloodiest country in the region, still very much a nation at war.  One does not have to sugar-coat but nonetheless there has been, by any metric I have been able to look at and study and by virtually any data source that I have been able to identify, real progress.</P> <P>On this point, I think today s Washington Post story was not very careful either, to be blunt.  I think they took some indicators of uncertainty in the measurements, some concern that there had not yet been a sufficient standardization of categories and they then said, Okay, we cannot document any improvement whatsoever.   That is just not, in my judgment, the most careful way to do this kind of business.  At some point you have to recognize the inherent nature of the data you are dealing with.  People who are on the ground - again I ll cite them - DOD, national intelligence organizations, Iraqi Ministry of Health, Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, Iraq Body Count - all agree that there have been trend lines in the favorable direction, reductions in violence over the course of this year by almost any category.</P> <P>Now Petraeus is going to talk about extrajudicial killings, sectarian murders; that may be a category where we have seen a steeper drop.  Obviously in August, we did not see a drop in car bomb deaths for that month because of the tragedy on August 14th in the North.  If you look at overall trend lines over the course of this year, by virtually any definition of violence you want to take in Iraq, by virtually any data source that is doing work on the ground, there has been an improvement.  It is probably anywhere from 10 percent to 50 percent or even maybe 75 percent, depending on which subcategory you look at and which source you believe.  Let s not disagree about this reality.  I do not think there is room for serious disagreement.  I just needed to be blunt on this point because I know it is on a lot of people s minds and I do think the GAO, in an effort to do a serious study, nonetheless made a big mistake.</P> <P>That is my first point.  I m just going to make one other broad set of comments or set of points and then be done.  I look forward to Fred s thoughts.  It is the question of whether there is a middle way, a third way, and I wind up fairly sympathetic to, I think, the argument that Fred s about to make although I should not assume I know what it is exactly.  But I do think it is going to be hard to think of such another path besides the logic of the surge in the short term.  Let me walk through very quickly -- just a couple of what the natural alternatives might be leaving the issue of the CNAS study, the Baker Hamilton logic, the train and equip concept more for Fred s remarks.  But I want to think about a couple of others.</P> <P>One of them, which is my favorite -- I wrote a paper on it in June with Ed Joseph, The Case for Soft Partition in Iraq:  The Bosnia Model -- create three autonomous zones -- there already is one.  The constitution already allows more and allows people to relocate voluntarily if they wish, build up regional governance and regional security forces.  Instead of having so much be done through Baghdad, insist on some kind of a resource allocation scheme that is fair to all.  I like this idea; others on this panel may not as well.  I bet you Danielle does not, for example.  But let me say one thing where I bet most of this category -- right now, the Iraqis do not want it or at least they are not going to do it.  Now, I would say Shia public opinion, Kurd public opinion is moving in this direction but that is not the same thing as saying that Iraqi political leaders are going to make this kind of a deal now.  </P> <P>By the way, even if they did, you would still need US troops at very large numbers there for a couple-of-year transition period.  Then you get a mission that looks like a large-scale Bosnia mission thereafter.</P> <P>So I think you have a 150,000 US forces for the first year and a half and then 50,000 to 100,000 for the next few years, even if you could negotiate a soft partition that allows for creation of Sunnistan and Shiastan, if you will, in addition to Kurdistan.  So soft partition, whether you like it or not, is probably not going to happen.  Even if it did, it would not allow us to reduce forces quickly.  Just thinking broadly -- what about the Musharaf option, the strong-man option?  Or the Ataturk [phonetic] option, if you want to think regionally?</P> <P>Of course, I could think of some people who I would not mind seeing in charge of Iraq in that kind of a way, a strong man, a benign autocrat.  But of course the Iraqis may not agree with me and they are more important in this decision than I am.  How are you going to create a strong man?  Even if you had such a person in position, and you suspended democracy for six or eight years and implement it by dictat [sounds like], some of these ideas that we commonly believe to be necessary for long-term reconciliation, like fair oil-sharing or reform de-Baathification, how are you going to choose that right person and get the security forces to obey that person s commands?</P> <P>The strong-man option is nice in theory.  If an Ataturk showed up in Iraq tomorrow, I would not be writing.  I will promise right now, go on the record, I m not going to write any op-eds opposing that person.  I will be delighted to see that person able to successfully rule in an autocratic fashion.  But it is not going to happen; there is no such person and the security forces would not listen to him even if he existed.  So I do not believe that option to be viable at this time.</P> <P>My co-author from the July 30th  New York Times op-ed that I recently wrote, Ken Pollack, is increasingly in favor of new elections in Iraq and a new electoral system that would give more power to the geographic zones and less to the parties as a way to try to weaken the sectarian-oriented political parties in Iraq.  I think it is a great idea but as a practical matter - I hope Ken continues to push it; Charles Krauthammer has recently done so as well - I hope this movement grows.  But even if you imagine it growing, you are going to need to take probably 12 to 18 months just to get to the point where any such new election system could be set up and elections held.  Then you are going to need some time for the new government to prove itself and create the kind of spirit of reconciliation that we know is necessary to reduce the sectarian tension.  So you are talking about a two to three-year project even for that sort of thing to change the dynamics very much from where they are right now.  I tend to be favorably inclined towards it but I do not really see how you can do it quickly which means, again, I wind up more in the Fred Kagan camp or the General Keane camp or the David Petraeus camp.  We are going to have to sustain substantial forces for quite some time with a logic similar to the surge.</P> <P>One very last quick thought on another possible option -- it is often proposed and my boss at Brookings, Carlos Pascual, has suggested among others an international conference, a peace conference, if you will -- diagnose Iraq to be in a state of civil war and therefore do not think about building reconciliation through peaceful democratic institutions but rather through a negotiation among warring factions with the regional players being brought in as well, pressured, cajoled and otherwise engaged to try to create a new dynamic.</P> <P>This may be a good idea.  In fact, I m inclined to think it is a good idea as perhaps a way to move towards soft partition or a new election system or something else.  But an international peace conference by itself or a peace process by itself does not get you to a different outcome right away.  It simply improves the odds of getting a better political dynamic somewhere down the road -- hopefully, not too far down the road.  So once again, you are brought back to the reality that for the next one or two or three years, it is pretty hard to change the trajectory that we are on.</P> <P>So what I have tried to do, Fred, in these remarks is to hopefully simplify your job.  I think you already have one particular model in mind that you are going to be looking at.  I tried to take on a couple of others and think through whether we do have middle options or middle ways.  I think we have to think outside the box, in conclusion.  I m a little less optimistic than General Keane about the Iraqi political situation and it is not so much a question of blaming the Iraqis for failing to deliver; the bottom line is we need them to deliver.  Whatever is realistic I think we need them to deliver because their country is still in a state of low-grade civil war and this is preventing us from making the kinds of progress we need.</P> <P>However, if you think through your various options, they are going to take time to develop and, unfortunately, in the short term, therefore, we are going to have to keep up very large numbers of American forces providing security not just in the perimeter, not just in the green zone, not just training Iraqi forces but in the streets where the sectarian tensions are the most acute.  Thanks.</P> <P> </P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  </P> <P> </P> <P>Thank you, Michael, Jack.  Thank you, Dany.  I will keep my remarks brief because we are going to lock the doors at the end of this panel and require you to stay to the next one where I will have plenty of opportunity to bend your ear on my opinion about Iraq.  One of the real and very few, I might add, joys of having been engaged in this policy debate over the past year has been the opportunity to have very serious thoughtful discussions about the situation in Iraq and how best to deal with it across party lines, across ideological lines and even with people where we come to different conclusions about things.  </P> <P>I want to take this opportunity to praise Michael O Hanlon and thank him for coming here and also Ken Pollack and a few others for a real intellectual honesty, rigor, providing very thoughtful reports, exploring options even when they come to the conclusion that those are not necessarily the best options to pursue, but exploring seriously other options to the current policy and then being able to sit down in civil discourse even in the midst of all of the partisan polemic that has been going on.  I think I can echo without much hope the calls of Senator Graham and others that we try to move beyond the partisanship of this and address the realities but I am afraid the political discourse does not seem to be moving that way.  </P> <P>Michael s first point is a key point; Senator Graham alluded to it; General Keane alluded to it.  I have been in Iraq three times; I was there in early April; I was there in early May; I was there at the end of July, about a week each trip and I went around.  I was also there with Jack Keane in May.  I also went around.  I saw the street, saw the captains, saw the generals, did the deal.  The change is remarkable from April to July.  The only way to imagine that there has not been improvement in the security situation in Iraq is not to go there, not to pay any attention to any of the people who have been there and what they come back and tell you.  It is very, very obvious if you are walking around or driving around Baghdad that there has been tremendous improvement in security over the past several months and that the improvement is due to the increase of the forces and the change in strategy.  As Senator Graham mentioned, both were key.  Adding more forces to a failed strategy would not have produced success.  Changing the strategy without adding the necessary forces would not have produced success.  Both were necessary.  </P> <P>Let me just remind you - because in Washington so many things happen in a day that it is hard to remember more than a few days ago what things were like - of what the purpose of the surge strategy was and what was expected of it when it was launched.  We at AEI -- General Keane and I and a few others proposed sending five additional army brigades and two additional marine regiments into Iraq for 12 - we thought maybe 18 to 24 months from January at that time.  So through 2008 - for the purpose of establishing security in key neighborhoods in Baghdad and holding on to whatever we could in Anbar because in November and December of 2006, no one had the expectation that we would be able to establish security in Baghdad and deal with Anbar at the same time with any reasonable force estimate.  </P> <P>We identified the single point of failure in Iraq at that time to be Baghdad, especially the mixed neighborhoods.  We said that if we cannot get security in central Baghdad in the mixed areas, there is no prospect; this is going to cycle hopelessly out of control.  We need to try and that was the plan.  We had no notion that we were going to succeed in Anbar.  In fact, if you go back and look at our original plan, Anbar was a subsequent operation that was planned that we thought would require pretty major expenditure of resources.  Then we knew that we would have to go into Diyala and so we had what they call in the military sequels planned for that also.  We thought we would have to conduct multiple successive operations on a large scale in Iraq in order to move beyond securing mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.  That was what our plan said.  </P> <P>When the President announced the strategy and General Petraeus launched it, it was called the Baghdad Security Plan.  From the outset, the objective was to stabilize Baghdad and attempt to stabilize Anbar; it was intended that the surge would be temporary - that is why it is called the surge.  But that was the goal.  What we have found is that we have been able to do much more than that.  The amazing thing is that the military operations, combined with the change in heart in the Sunni population that the military operations supported, have put us in a point where we are now working on stabilizing all of central Iraq.  We now have forces that have cleared Al Qaeda out of every single one of its urban strongholds.  I would not have expected that in January.  </P> <P>A reporter-friend of mine recently said she went to Ramadi, to Anbar, walked around, looked and it was very peaceful.  It is amazing, frankly, to walk through the market in Ramadi without body armor and with a handful of soldiers around you.  Not everyone smiles at you, by the way; it is not as though the Sunni are not all standing around and say, Hey, yay, Americans.   Some of them give you pretty dour looks, which I think is fine.  I would be more worried about it if they were trying to convince us that they were actually thrilled about this.  They know they have been beaten.  They are not necessarily thrilled about it but they understand the situation.  </P> <P>It is amazing to walk around, but she thought, Okay, this is fine but it is not very interesting.  I will go up to Baquba, which from a war journalist s standpoint, that was always good for some combat footage because Baquba since the middle of last year has been hell; it has been absolute unmitigated hell.  Al Qaeda owned half of it.  The JAM fighters owned the other parts of it.  You had the al Qaeda killing us, JAM killing us, al Qaeda killing JAM, JAM killing al Qaeda, everyone killing the locals.  It was really the 9th ring of hell.  So as a journalist you could be pretty confident if you go to Baquba, you will get shot at and you will get some good stories and good footage; it would be interesting.  She got up there and she said, It was the same thing as Ramadi; it was boring.   </P> <P>There is nothing going on in Baquba.  We have cleared Baquba.  There is virtually no al Qaeda left there.  As General Keane pointed out, in contrast with previous operations when we cleared the enemy out of an area, they flew out of Baquba and they tried to roll up the Diyala River Valley.  We are chasing them and we are hurting them.  We are not allowing them to establish new safe havens anywhere.  We are following them everywhere they go.  We have never done that before.  They were taken a little bit by surprise; as General Petraeus likes to say, Al Qaeda is a little bit off plan.   Things are not working out for them very well.  </P> <P>I would never have expected in January that this is where we would be in September.  The plan did not call for it and no estimates that we looked at suggested that it was likely.  It is very important to understand that.  People are going to talk a lot about Bush moving the goal posts and talking about local progress and not talking about the benchmarks and all like that to.  The general retort to that is, Look, you can do two things in war.  You can decide in advance that you have a certain set of objectives and certain ways of pursuing them and pursue the same objectives consistently with the same methods, regardless of the situation; that is called losing.  Or you can decide that you are going to look at the situation as it changes and develops and understand that you need to evaluate it on its own terms and react accordingly.  That is called winning.   </P> <P>Changing the way that you look at the situation is a normal part of war.  Not changing is a normal part of defeat.  It is natural for the President at this stage to say, This is the real situation as it is.  These are the things that we think matter now.  This is the progress that we see and this is the basis for making decisions.   What is not natural is to say, We have got this list of benchmarks that we drew up in the middle of last year because most of these benchmarks date from 2006 before any of these happened, when the situation was in the 9th ring of hell.  We were not meeting those so the heck with it.   That makes no sense at all.  </P> <P>But as we talk about moving the goal post, one thing that we need to keep in mind is that we have moved the goal post in another way because now we are really playing for all the marbles.  We are trying to accomplish and we are accomplishing a lot more than we ever thought would be possible.  I will put it to you in another way:  When you used to do a threat analysis particularly of al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency, you identified four areas that you needed to deal with - the upper Euphrates River Valley which runs into Anbar, the upper Tigris River Valley which runs through Salahadin and to Ninewa, and the Diyala which runs through Diyala province near Baquba and Baghdad.  We have run the enemy, Al Qaeda, out of its strongholds in Baghdad and to the South and in the belts.  We and the Anbaris have cleared the upper Euphrates which is what we all thought would be the hardest thing to do.  We and the Iraqis have just completed clearing the Diyala.  </P> <P>Now, we are conducting follow-on operations to work in the upper Tigris.  That is an amazing story in eight months, considering where we started because where we started in January 2007, all four of those areas were insurgents strongholds.  As Mike said, The military success here is unequivocal, unambiguous and unquestionable.   Now, will it lead naturally of itself to political progress?  I do not know.  </P> <P>I think the points that General Keane made are spot-on.  Again, if you stepped back from the benchmarks and say, Why were we trying to do each one of these things, you can see that in most cases what we were trying to do is actually already happening without the legislation.  It would be nice to have the legislation, too, but we are already making this progress.  Will it continue?  Well, I will tell you one thing that is for sure.  If we stop what we are doing now and abandon Iraqi people to their fate, it will not continue because one thing that is clear from all of the reports - it is clear from the Jones report, it is clear from our own evaluations, you will see it on our study - is that the Iraqi security forces are not yet capable of maintaining this level of security on their own without our significant support including support in a combat role.  That is a fact.  If you abandon them, they will fail and everything that we have accomplished this year will be lost and the prospects for political reconciliation will probably drop to about zero.  The options that Mike and Ken Pollack have looked at - soft partition or trying to hold the line, trying to prevent regional overspill - are going to start to look like really good options.  Whereas now, I think Mike would -- I do not know how you would describe yours; Ken describes his as the least worst option.  They are not, of course, good options.  They involve deaths of hundreds of thousands if not millions of people.  They involve mass migrations and they involve destabilization and they are very unlikely to involve anything that we want to call success.  </P> <P>So as I will tell you more -- I promised to keep this brief and then I did not.  I am sorry.  As I will tell you more in the next panel, I would agree strongly with Mike.  I do not think there is a middle way.  I think the choice before us is stark and I think given the obvious progress that we are making and the obvious trend lines, choice is also obvious.</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  Very good.  Thank you everybody for three fantastic presentations.  I have to tell you further to the conspiracy of AEI and Brookings that I want to be broadcast immediately out that AEI -- one of our scholars, in particular Michael Rubin, worked very assiduously prior to the decision by the UN for this proportional representation system to try and persuade the UN and the United States and the Iraqis that, in fact, a regional representation system was a far better idea, far more stabilizing and they did not decide to adopt it because, of course, they were wrong-headed about it.  But I could not agree with you more about that.  </P> <P>Let us turn to our audience for questions - and I see you - and if everybody would be kind enough to abide by the rules as I said it before:  Wait for the mic, say who you are, put your statement in a form of a question.  Phil, back there.  Let s make our interns get a little exercise.  Thank you, guys.  Right, keep your hand up.  If you do have a particular person you are directing your question at, do let us know.</P> <P>Phil Dine:  Phil Dine, St. Louis Post Dispatch.  You all talked about politics.  I would like to ask you about American politics.  At this point, most Americans are against the war and it seems they have pretty much tuned out the administration; they do not really believe what it is likely to say about progress even if progress is taking place.  Several of you talked about failed strategies that we put in place.  Does not the administration, if it is going to turn this around, need to acknowledge, not that it has made a mistake here or there but that it basically went to war with a flawed strategy that put us in the position we are in now?  But that now, we may have a way to turn this around if we all get behind it instead of Cheney and Bush continually talk about cut-and-run Democrats and people they do not think as a threat out there as if that is really the reason we are in this problem?</P> <P>Michael O Hanlon:  Phil, while I may agree with some of your points about the need for improved rhetoric especially right now on both sides, I do not think that revisiting the history endlessly is really the key to the solution.  I think the key to the solution is showing results on the battlefield and in the parliament in Iraq.  I think that while you are right and certainly, we all are aware that Americans are very frustrated and sad about this war, we also know Americans hate to lose.  Americans do not like the idea either in any poll I have seen or in what I know of Americans as a people of deciding to simply abandon this kind of an effort because it has not gone the way we hoped.  I think Americans are open to pragmatic modifications to our strategy but as much as they hate this war, they would also hate the idea of just accepting complete and outright and unmitigated defeat in going home.  That is a reality that both sides are going to have bear in mind as we shape up options for the future.  But the key point is what matters a lot more than apologies about the past, even though I might welcome one myself as a Democrat who has been critical of some of what they have done before, is strategies for the future and delivering results.  That is where people should keep the eyeballs focus.</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  Also, Phil, Public Opinion Strategies just came out with a poll that suggested that almost 60 percent of Americans believe that Iraq is a key part of the global war on terror.  I am not sure that your numbers remain as true as they were, perhaps, two months ago when things were going less well.  All right.</P> <P>Phil Dine:  Right.</P> <P>Jerry Schwartz:  It is clear you all agree --</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  Jerry Schwartz from AP.</P> <P>Jerry Schwartz:  Jerry Schwartz of AP.  You all agree that troops should stay.  You all think that things are looking up but you all also agree that there has been good reason and...recent facts that things are looking up is that the strategy has been changing.  What you have not said and what -- particularly, Mr. Kagan I would like to hear discuss -- what would you recommend for the future now for Iraq other than stay the course, keep the troops there?  Things are looking good.  Some dispute among people in town about whether Maliki deserves support or not and how much -- but what strategic -- O Hanlon touched on a little bit -- what strategic changes would help accelerate what you think is a positive process?  What would you do?</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  Look, our commanders on the field have been changing their approach on a regular basis in accord with the changing situation on the ground.  I commend them for that.  They have recognized that they have done tremendous damage to al Qaeda in Iraq and the Sunni insurgency and they have now turned their attention to Iranian-back secret cells and the [indiscernible] militia which I think is the right thing to do.  I am heartily in favor of that.  They have taken steps that we have never before taken to interdict Iranian support within Iraq for violence in Iraq, which I think is critically important.  They have been working very actively to disaggregate the military arm of Muqtada al-Sadr s militia, particularly the part that is supported by the Iranians, and I think that is right.  They have been doing general damage in a variety of ways to Muqtada al-Sadr s political movement, which is also very important, all the while working very hard to bring local Sunni into, first, neighborhood watch or concerned citizens groups, and then ultimately, through appropriate process into the Iraqi Security Forces.  </P> <P>None of this was foreseen in January.  None of this was part of the surge plan.  This is all, in my view, correct adaptation to circumstance.  It is what you are going to see in the coming weeks and I think it is the right thing to do.  We have just begun most of these initiatives and we are going to have to let them play out in the coming week and see where we get to and see how everyone reacts because war is a continual interaction of opposing forces.  We will have to see how the Iranians respond, how does Muqtada al-Sadr respond, how goals are programmed of finishing off AQI and so forth, and what sort of political progress do we see.  How much will the Maliki government do in terms of incorporating the concerned citizens groups into the ISF?  Where does that head?   We are going to have to evaluate that and then we are going to see where the security goes.  </P> <P>My expectation is that if things stay on course -- and it is always very dangerous to say that in war because you would have a thinking enemy who is going to try to win, and in this case, we have several.  My expectation would be that in 2008, it would be possible to start drawing down American forces and turning over to local Iraqi groups and growing Iraqi Security Forces.  That would be my hope and expectation but I guess my short answer is we have already changed.  We are again in the process of changing right now.  I am sure that will continue to develop but it has to be conditions-driven.</P> <P>Ibrahim Fuqara:  Thank you.  Abrahim Fuqara from al-Jazeera.  General Keane, the implications for the neighbors of Iraq if the surge succeeds and if the surge fails, how do you see those implications?  I have one for Michael O Hanlon.  You said that you are not particularly adverse to having a strong man in Iraq.  Does your predilection lie with a Sunni strong man or a Shia strong man, and does that mean that you have reservations on that basis about the execution of Saddam Hussein?  Thank you.</P> <P>Jack Keane:  First of all, none of the neighbors of Iraq, including Iran -- certainly, it is in their interest to have a failed state in Iraq, and in my judgment the actions that we are taking in 07 have really turned that from happening.  That is good news and has to have positive effect on those neighbors.  We know, for a fact, that the Sunni Arabs at a minimum have been cheerleading the Sunni insurgency as well as in some cases certainly funding it and facilitating it directly from the Syrian government s perspective.  But other governments also have had their hands in some funding activities.  </P> <P>This insurgency as I said is going away.  I would imagine that the concern Sunni Arab states would have is will the Maliki Shia-dominated government bring them in and participate holistically in the political fabric of Iraq.  Equally important is will the Sunni population afford them the kind of security that they need to have a normal quality of life experience.  The early indications of that are positive.  It remains to be played out in 08 and in 09 as it pertains to Iran, certainly.  In my judgment Iran declared war on us back in the 80s and it has been a tough time for us to fathom this.  But they believe that; I believe that they believe it and their primary objective in Iraq right now is to cause the United States to fail so they can have influence over this Shia-dominated government and enlarge what they believe is rightfully theirs - Iranian hegemony in the region.  This movement that is taking place in Iraq with some form of representative democracy is clearly the best bell weather against that kind of influence.  </P> <P>Obviously, there is an association with the Shias across transnational lines.  But the fact of the matter is a representative democracy in Iraq allied with the United States of America is not in Iran s interest.  It will help us deal with Iran in other areas.  I completely agree with Senator Graham; we are making progress with Iran.  When we thought things were going better in Iraq back in the 03, these people were listening.  When things started to go south in Iraq, the Iranian leadership was speaking vociferously and very antagonistically towards United States.  If this movement plays out the way we believe it will, it will help considerably in dealing with Iran in the future.  I have gone on too long so I will not deal with Turkey.</P> <P>Michael O Hanlon:  I will be brief on this theoretical option because I think that is all it is.  I do not think that it is realistic to think there is any viable strong man because the Iraqi security forces are too fractured along sectarian lines or, at least, could become so if there was this kind of a scenario.  How are you going to decide who the person would be?  It will be very difficult.  But just to play up the theoretical idea a little further, I think you would need to have a situation where Iraq s current government basically recognized that it failed, and as part of some international peace process [indiscernible] essentially could be convinced to turn over control to a temporary leadership which would probably have to have a pro Sunni/Shia at the top, I am guessing.  And it would probably have to have some kind of a small junta or ruling coalition that would be a little bit like Iraq s presidential council today in terms of representation.  But you can see how far I am getting down the theoretical path.  I would be very inclined to say, This is fine, if it were really doable.  I just do not see how it is doable.</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  I know just who sees himself in that job.  This gentleman right here.</P> <P>Paolo:  Thank you.  Paolo [indiscernible].  Just following up a little bit on the previous question in terms of the influence of Iran, I think it is established based on all the facts on the ground that there has been a great deal of progress about Al Qaeda in Iraq; that is established.  But is this our primary target or is it the pacification of an ethnic strife?  And if it is so, indeed, the role of Iran, how can we diminish it?  How can we intervene in a practical, constructive way to detach the Shia militias from Iran and create, therefore, the foundations in the future for - if I can use this word a secular government in Iraq that is not tied to the mullahs in Iran and, therefore, the majority of Shias do not become an appendix of Iran?  It seems to me that strategically this is what matters, notwithstanding the very important successes in the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq.</P> <P>Michael O Hanlon:  First of all, you cannot distinguish the issue of the ethno-sectarian conflict from the issue of fighting Al Qaeda.  The fundamental mistake that is made in this discussion in this town is that you will have people who will stand up and say, I am in favor of fighting Al Qaeda, including fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq.  But we have to get out of the middle of the civil war.   That is a contrary-to-fact statement.  You cannot be in favor of fighting Al Qaeda and say that you are going pull out of the civil war because it is the civil war that Al Qaeda has consciously and deliberately created because it benefits Al Qaeda; this is how Al Qaeda in Iraq functions.  We cannot imagine that there is some way to address the Al Qaeda problem without also dealing with the ethno sectarian violence.</P> <P>There are a variety of other predicates in your question that I would not agree with, including --  I do not think that the main problem with the Quds [phonetic] Force Operatives in Iraq is that they are likely to turn Iraq into a theocracy.  The question of secular government here is not really the issue.  The Iranians have been involved very actively in supporting some elements of Shia militias secret cells.  Iranian Quds Force Operatives have been supporting this in Iraq and in Iran.  Iraqis have been trained in Iran.  Lebanese Hezbollah have been brought into Iran to do -- okay.  </P> <P>We have spent most of this war doing very little about this in Iraq.  We have not, for most of this war, had troops on the lines of communications that link Shia centers in Iraq to Iran.  We have not had meaningful border forces at the crossing points between Iraq and Iran.  We have not been aggressively targeting Iranian agents within Iraq and so forth.  </P> <P>In the past few months, we have started to do all of these things.  A new brigade from the Republic of Georgia has been deployed into Kut with the mission of cutting that critical line of communication and supporting efforts to gain control of the Iraqi-Iranian border crossings.  We have deployed brigades east of Baghdad and southeast of Baghdad with the mission of interdicting those lines of communication.  We are aggressively targeting Quds Force Operatives, Lebanese Hezbollah and secret cells in Iraq.  I think all of these efforts need to play out.  This is something that we have not been doing before.  It is yielding success.  </P> <P>The Iranians have been upping the ante some.  They have been sending more weapons.  They have been sending more advisers.  This is a problem in the first instance to deal with in Iraq and we got -- the command over there has a handle on it.  This is what they are aggressively working on now.</P> <P>Trudy Rubin:  Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Inquirer.  I wonder if you could say a little bit more about how you think military gains will transfer into political gains because that seems to be the issue on which public opinion turns.  I think there is a willingness to see military gains but people look at the Maliki government.  They cannot understand how there would ever be integrated national security forces, how you would ever get to the point where they would not splinter and they would not be infiltrated, and therefore, how U.S. troops could leave.  If it is not the benchmarks -- you have progress out in the regions -- how can that transfer?  When it comes to the idea of new elections, since you have a national assembly that would have no interest in new elections because it would be voting themselves out of power, and since you have to have a vote in the assembly to change the election law, is that really a possible route?  If not that, what?  How does the outer progress on the ground make progress in the center politically?</P> <P>Michael O Hanlon:  Let me just start briefly and then I will turn it over to my colleagues here.  First of all, you do not have to have a change in the Election Law to know that in 2009, there will be another parliamentary election in Iraq.  Whatever the current parties feel according to the current setup, there will be another election.  They will have to do it in some way.  They will have to face the voters.  The question of whether there is going to be provincial elections and on what point and so forth is a different issue but you are going to have political change in Iraq.  My bet would be that by 2009, you will have a very different parliament.  A lot of the guys in the parliament are not now reflecting this sentiment on the ground and this is part of the problem that we are having.  </P> <P>We still have some Sunni maximalists who are sitting in the Council of Representatives saying that Sunni are 40 percent of population.  Those guys were elected in 2005 when very few Sunni participated and they have cloven to that view.  By 2009, one of two things is going to happen.  Either those guys are going to move back toward where their constituents are because their constituents do not think that anymore or they are going to be voted out of office.  That is going to happen.  </P> <P>The only other thing that I would say is we can get too caught up in the center-versus-periphery thing.  The Sunni movements that we are talking about are in Anbar, which, granted, for the Iraqis is the Wild West out there.  But they are also in Abu Ghraib, which is just on the outskirts of Baghdad and they are also in Baghdad itself where we have had concerned citizens groups come forward and request to join the ISF.  They are just to the south of Baghdad.  They are all around.  In other words, this is not a capital city versus province situation, and that affects the politicians as well.  </P> <P>They have got to deal with that reality and we are helping to force them to confront the reality.  The reality is that the Sunni population has shifted.  By working to bring the Sunni volunteers into concerned citizens groups and so forth, we are going to confront this Maliki government with a reality on the ground that it is going to have to handle.  </P> <P>As Jack and Senator Graham said, it is showing, so far, an inclination to choke a little bit and try to handle it.  But that reality is a reality on the ground and it is happening; it is already translating into differences.  At what point do they pass particular laws through the COR?  I do not know.  I am also not sure that I actually care.</P> <P>Trudy Rubin:  Right now, the hospitals are still controlled by Sadr militias because they have the ministry.  The government does not function.  I have had Shia officials crying on the phone to me: Can you Americans not make our government function?   I do not know that we can make it?  How do you do that? </P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  [Cross-talking] The Philadelphia Inquirer, I wonder.  Can one of you answer?</P> <P>Jack Keane:  I will touch that a little bit.  I think if we did not have the national benchmarks - it is somewhat of a distraction, frankly - the Ambassador and this first-class team that he has would be working on exactly the problem that you are dealing with.  The term that is used to describe that problem is ministerial capacity, which is wholly inadequate in most of the ministries, probably with the exception of the Ministry of Defense, and even there, there is mixed results.  So that lots of work needs to be done in doing that.  </P> <P>But I also believe that probably the Shia model of government over the long term is going to be a little different than what it currently is, which is more like a Sunni model;  there is a centralized government where most of the power and authority rest, and very little in the municipalities and in the provincial government.  I think that will change over time where the provinces will be given more authority and more power, more resources, more control over their own destiny.  But this is an evolution that is taking place.  This government is still in power in less than two years.   That is the reality of it and they put this model together because that is what their frame of reference was.  The ministerial capacity is absolutely crucial because it is through that that you respond to the needs of the people to provide them the essential services.  It is through that that you are going to increase the economic development of the country.  That is what this team that we have in Baghdad so feels is the center of gravity, to be quite frank about it, in moving towards the future.  Right now, they have to spend an inordinate amount of time helping to craft legislation and then helping also to get it through the various legislative steps that goes through the COR to get it passed.  Eventually, they will be able to get back to what they believe is the center of gravity, hopefully, after the session here in the Congress, and build this ministerial capacity, the connection to the people that is so important.</P> <P>Collin Kohl:  I m Collin Kohl from Georgetown.  I have a question for General Keane.  I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit.  You suggested during your remarks that you thought the tribal model might be applicable or be able to be grafted on to Shia areas.  My sense is that the Shia tend to give their allegiances much more to their clerics and parties than their tribes, and the people in the military and sociologists I have talked to seemed to agree with that.  As things may have gotten better in parts of central Iraq, things have gotten a lot worse in southern Iraq and most of the Shia violence -- with the parties assassinating each other s leaders, et cetera.  I wonder if you could comment a little bit about how some of the Sunni tribal dynamics might actually feed into the very anxieties that lead normal Shia to see their militias as self-defense since when they see the Shia arming, their perception is that they are arming on the other side of the civil war.</P> <P>Jack Keane:  Yeah.  My comment about that is because it was -- there is some evidence of it happening and most of that deals with -- there is good and bad militia.  The good militia essentially, in most people s minds are the ones that are protecting the people and the neighborhoods.  They really do not move out of there.  There is no offensive strategy.  They are not preying on the Sunnis and, for that matter, the other Shia.  The so-called bad militia is where this was taking place which has a criminal and thuggery aspect to it, which not only preys on us but also preys on Shia.  And as a result of that -- results of that activity, it brings to that community also a military response which in itself has negative aspects to it, to the rhythms and patterns of normal life.  </P> <P>I think some of these tribal leaders and sheiks have rightfully recognized that this has got to go; the people are fed up with it.  And what can we do to get that bad militia out of our mess?  I was not trying to suggest that the Sunni tribal influence that is touching 40 percent of the geographic part of the country is a model for the Shias.  I just was saying that it is interesting that it is also happening in that area.  To me what was interesting about is a reflection of the people s attitude being fed up with this kind of violence and wanting to do something about it.</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  We are going to take one last brief quick question from this gentleman right here and then move to our next panel.  I want to give everybody an opportunity to stretch.</P> <P>Bill Aiker:  Thank you, Danielle.  I am Bill Aiker.  Once again, General Keane, you stated that we are at war with Iran -- the U.S.; at least in a Cold War and to some extent, Hot War.  What progress has been made by Ambassador Crocker s talks with the Iranians?  What are we trying to do to get them to back off on helping the Sunnis -- the Shias that is? Excuse me.</P> <P>Jack Keane:  I think I said that we are at war with Iran.  I think they believe that they are with us and I think there is quite an important distinction there.  I do not know what kind of progress Ambassador Crocker has made with the Iranians other than what I have read.  I strongly suspect, probably, not much at all, out of those first couple of meetings.  The Iranians want to drive us out; they have got people in there aiding and abetting that and you are interested enough to give you a sense of the seriousness of the Iranians intent.  We have caught them at not just the obvious - providing aid to Shia militia - but also aiding al Qaeda and also aiding Sunni insurgents.  Obviously, they have no affiliation with those groups - quite the contrary - other than the fact we have a common enemy.  I do not think we have made much progress at all with Iran.  I share Fred s comments and associate myself with them.  Is that progress?  Is that your question?  The fact that we are talking to them?  But I do not see anything that has come of it in that talking to them.</P> <P>Danielle Pletka:  With that, I am going to close down this panel.  I would like to just make one quick comment before I thank our audience and our panelists.  Washington is in many ways a shallow town and our political debate can be shallow.  One of the things that we have tried to do in the last year under Fred s leadership, with the help of people like General Keane and, really, bipartisan support and intellectual support from people like Michael O Hanlon and many, many others, is to try and deepen this debate a little bit.  It is why we came out with the Kagan-Keane report that was so ably written and well-received at the end of last year that formed the basis for how we went forward.  It is why we are now trying, with this recent report that Fred has authored and will be debating, trying to think through whether in fact there are other ways to go forward.  It is right for the public to have a lively discussion that goes beyond the questions of General Petraeus being called an incompetent and others suggesting that perhaps it is only right to stay the course and do nothing more.  </P> <P>I hope that we have managed to bring a little bit more depth.  We only have been able to do so with the leadership of people like these to whom I am enormously grateful and the graciousness of people like Jim Miller who is going to be on our next panel and who continues to be willing to have a lively debate about just how America can be victorious.  So with that, let me thank our audience.  Just very quick turn-around for a change in panel and let me thank our panelists as always who were terrific.</P> <P> </P> <P>[Second Panel]</P> <P> </P> <P> Gary J. Schmitt:  Well, for you hearty souls that have made it through two sessions already, we will begin our third session here quite quickly.  I wonder if I get to order General Keane out.</P> <P> Male Voice:  Do not do that.</P> <P> Gary J. Schmitt:  That is the first time in recorded history.  I told four-- three star - four star, yes. Or that he has listened to me actually.  You really are hearty souls.</P> <P>I m reminded of this Labor Day, you know, the Jerry Lewis telethon and this is the AEI version only on Iraq.  The last session is going to be rather straightforward.  This summer, The Center for the New American Century -- </P> <P>Male Voice:  Security.</P> <P>Gary J. Schmitt:  Security.  I m sorry.  Not a very Freudian slip but a real -- put out a very interesting report on a strategy for changing strategy in Iraq called Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq.  It is precisely because the report was well-done, thought through although, obviously, as Fred will get to you in a minute, we think flawed.  But nevertheless, we did take it seriously and we wanted to take it seriously and precisely, because it is such a commendable work and there are questions that it raises we thought it would be worthwhile to begin to take a look at it in a very serious way.</P> <P>The way we will precede is Fred Kagan will begin by offering an overview of the AEI report.  Fred is the principal author for No Middle Way.  He will go for about 15 minutes and then Jim Miller from the Center will offer our comments on his report.  You have his bio, so I do not want to bother you with that, and I think it is really important to move as quickly as possible.  So, a) people can go home, and b) I can go get a Martini.  But nevertheless, I do want to say that Jim has had a distinguished career both inside and outside of government, working on the Hill in the Senate Armed Services Committee and then, was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and now, serves as the Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center.  He has also taught at Duke and has had a fine academic and government career.  With that, Fred, I turn it over to you.</P> <P> Frederick W. Kagan:  Thanks, Gary.  And I do want to thank Jim not only for coming here into the lair of the beast but also for writing a very important report.  I think I have said this many times before but I think that one of the problems that we have had all along with the Iraq discussion has been that people-- there has been a tremendous amount of hand waving about military solutions and what we should or should not or could or could not do.  And very few people have ever troubled to back any of their assertions with actual evaluation data, facts, explanation, anything.  And Jim and his colleagues at the Center for New American Strategy did that.  They ruled out --  </P> <P> Male Voice:  Security.</P> <P> Frederick W. Kagan:  Did I do that too?  God damn.</P> <P> Male Voice:  It is closer.</P> <P> Frederick W. Kagan:  Okay.  CNAS -- I m just going to go with your acronym.  </P> <P>Male Voice:  If you want to buy the name P.N.A.C., you can have it.  </P> <P> Frederick W. Kagan:  Anyway, Jim and his colleagues did a very good job of looking very hard at an alternative to the current strategy, producing a very serious report that laid it out in the most detail from a military standpoint that anyone has yet, trying to describe what it would look like.  And I really commend them for that effort because if we are going to have this discussion at all, we need to have this discussion on the basis of somebody actually sitting down and trying to figure out what is really possible and what is really meaningful and what we should be doing.  And so, I think it is wonderful that we are able to be here, having dueling reports about this on this level, and I congratulate Jim and thank him for his efforts.  </P> <P> If it had simply been the case that CNAS was rolling out a report in opposition to ours and that was the end of the story, we would not have probably gone to the trouble of bringing a bunch of people together and evaluating it, then bringing you all here to listen to the result.  We might have tried to take out our aggressions in the softball field, but we do not tend to do very well on the softball field, so I do not know.  But we probably would not have done this.  </P> <P> The reason why we thought that it was worthwhile putting this much effort into evaluating the CNAS report very carefully was because it seems to us to be the best thought through and most cogent and coherent statement of a viewpoint that a lot of people would like to hold, namely, that there is some middle road between the current strategy, which has large numbers of American forces out in dangerous combat roles into 2008 - strain on the army and so forth - and withdrawal and defeat.  And the great thing about the CNAS report is that its objectives are to avoid defeat and to establish a policy that can achieve bipartisan support so that it will continue through the next presidency and be sustainable for the force.  </P> <P>These are all laudable goals, and these are all things that we would all like to do.  And if there were a course of action that we could pursue in Iraq whereby we could draw down significant numbers of our forces sooner rather than later, whereby we could pull back from combat roles and transition to the Iraqis sooner rather than later, I would be the first to sign up for it.  And that is why when Jim rolled out his report, I was very eager to see it and very eager to take a hard look at it and see, you know, is this something that we can do.  </P> <P> The conclusions that we came to - and I have about 50 slide PowerPoint presentation that I m going -- no, I m joking.  The conclusions that we came to are that laudable though the goals are, the plan as Jim laid it out is militarily unworkable now.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to draw down on the scale and with the speed that is proposed in the CNAS report to transition to a training program rapidly, holding American forces out of combat rapidly, and so forth and still have anything that we might call success in Iraq.  As I said, it would be nice if it were otherwise, but we looked at it very hard and I do not think that this can work.  And, furthermore, I really think that in our evaluation of this, we came to the conclusion that you cannot really design a plan that will work, and there are a number of reasons for that.  </P> <P>First of all - and this was also very clear from the presentation of the Jones Report this morning - the Iraqi Security Forces at this point are very, very heavily dependent on coalition forces for a wide variety of things, including, logistics beyond basic life support.  That is not that unusual; in fact, most American allies are more or less heavily dependent on U.S. forces for those things.  But most American allies are not fighting in combat with 160,000 American troops in their country, so we do not care.  But nevertheless, it is true that the standard of independent operation that some people are trying to apply to the ISF is unreasonable.  Nevertheless, if you were to scale back the American effort in Iraq substantially and rapidly, the Iraqi Security Forces would collapse; they simply would not be able to sustain themselves.  They were never designed to. </P> <P>We focused in building the Iraqi Security Forces on getting light infantry forces into the fields so that they could take part in a counter-insurgency fight as rapidly as possible.  I think that was the right decision because from the standpoint of counter-insurgency, what is most important is that the Iraqi Security Forces are out there working with coalition forces against insurgents, not that they are in the back running truck companies.  But there is a price.  And the price is it means that it takes longer; we have to be there longer to provide a logistical backbone because that is not something that you can just whump up from spare parts in a few minutes, particularly in the context of a war-torn country with a relatively ineffective central government.  </P> <P>So if we were to pull down dramatically, if we were to withdraw dramatically in any short period of time, one thing that would happen for sure is that the Iraqi Security Forces would collapse.  At best, they would end up confined to their bases.  What they would not be doing would be to continue to conduct counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency operations.  In addition to that, we have a number of issues with the attempt - going back to the Iraq Study Group report - to say that the problem is we do not have enough trainers in Iraq and that we need to shift from a combat mission to a training mission as rapidly as possible.  And a variety of arguments are usually used to support that, ranging from complaints that especially date back to 05 and 06 that we are not sending are best people in the training teams and so forth.  And that needs to be addressed, that the training teams are too small to move around, which is certainly an issue.  </P> <P>The hope that if we send more trainers in, it would speed the process of developing Iraqi Security Forces which would allow us in turn to get out more quickly and the belief that if we fight for the Iraqis, they will not fight for themselves--  the last one is the most easily disproved.  Iraqi Security Forces casualties run roughly three to four times coalition casualties.  And Iraq is a volunteer army that makes - it is hard even to say that it is a volunteer army compared to ours. Iraqis volunteer every single day.  As the Jones report noted, they all go on leave every month to take their payback to their families; Iraqi soldiers have been doing that for ages.  That is not new, but that is what they do.  And there is no meaningful penalty for desertion.  Most deserters are not captured, are not brought in, are not punished.  And yet, you have manning rates in Iraqi units of 75 percent and they are getting shot at and taking three to four times our casualties.  </P> <P>What does that tell you?  It tells you that the are fighting.  It tells you that they are volunteering and they basically re-up [sounds like] everyday and they re-up every month, and they are coming back and fighting.  What is not happening is that they are sitting back waiting for us to do stuff for them.  So I find that argument to be entirely baseless.  The issue of what trainers could or could not do, I think, is a lot more complicated.  The problem is I think the situation has shifted significantly from when the ISG made that recommendation last year, when we had had a significant problem with Iraqi units not showing up to combat, soldiers not going into combat, Iraqis running away from fights, performing badly on the streets and so forth.  And when you looked at that situation, you said, What we need to do is send a lot of trainers down to company level and get these guys rolling. </P> <P>Now, General Odierno just briefed -- he said he cannot remember the last time he heard a report that an Iraqi unit had run from combat or refused to go into combat.  They are blooded.  Every single division in the Iraqi army has engaged in intense combat over the past eight months.  Almost all of the brigades have, some better than others, some worse than others.  But they are fighting hard.  When we looked at that and we looked at what the CNAS proposal was talking about in terms of training teams and the training effort, we had to conclude it is not likely to produce a very significant improvement in the overall fighting quality of a force which is already fighting very well.  If you send a lot of trainers down to company level -- and what those guys can really do is teach people how to fight. </P> <P>The problems that we are having in the Iraqi army now are problems that have to do with the logistical system with higher command, with planning, with a variety of things that would not be addressed by these training teams and this training effort.  And so on the one hand we do not think that you would actually get a lot of bang for your buck; on the other hand, this sort of training mission that the CNAS report is proposing would put strains on the army of another variety.  And in addition, it certainly would not create conditions whereby we could pull back from any combat role.</P> <P>One of the interesting things that I thought came out of Jones Report this morning supporting our assertions was that the program of partnering American units with Iraqi Security Forces units has been tremendously effective at improving the quality of Iraqi units.  And it is the most effective thing that we are doing from the standpoint of improving another major issue in the Iraqi Security Forces, which is sectarianism.  And so as you look at the situation and you say, What you want to do is create a more effective Iraqi Security Force, how do we do that?  The natural, sort of default standard counter-insurgency answer is to send trainers in.  But if you look at the situation as it is on the ground, I think the answer actually is continued partnership because that is where we are getting the biggest bang for our buck.  That is where we are getting the most improvement, as the Jones Commission reported and as I saw on several trips over there.  </P> <P>If you can go down to the American units and talk to them about this, and talk to the Iraqis that they work with -- and it is very clear.  We can get into details and Jim, obviously, will have a variety of comebacks.  I should note as a form of sort of full disclosure, Jim got a copy of this report on Tuesday; we did not involve anyone from CNAS in our deliberations; we did not send them preliminary versions of the report.  That was a conscious decision.  Our feeling was if we are going to make an independent evaluation of their product, it has to be independent.  And we are happy to have Jim come back and offer any corrections that he wants to make here, and he surely will do that.  </P> <P> The larger point that I want to make is if you adopt any sort of plan that sets a benchmark for a certain level of U.S. forces in Iraq by a certain time, you are going to run into a number of problems that the CNAS plan runs into because the situation on the ground changes continuously.  It changed since Jim wrote the report; it changed a lot since the ISG came out;  it will continue to change into the future.  The more you have a plan that focuses on timelines, the more problem you are going to have as the situation continues to evolve.  The more you have a plan that focuses on reacting to conditions on the ground with an open mind about what you are going to do, the more likely you are to be able to deal with things as they arise in an intelligent fashion.  That is just the fundamental nature of timelines.  </P> <P>Because one of the problems with timelines of any variety is that, look, no one wants to reduce the size of the American commitment in Iraq more than Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno.  Petraeus is now on his fourth year long tour since 9/11; Odierno has been over there once before, I think.  This is his second tour in Iraq.  I do not remember where else he has served.  These guys know what it is to be away from their families.  They are with the troops.  If they could send troops home without compromising the mission, they would do it in a heartbeat.  So if you are going to set a timeline and set a date and say, We want to get to a certain number by a certain date, what you are saying is, We want the commanders to get their forces down there even if it means mission failure.   Because if they could get down to that point and have success, they would do it.  And that is the problem with any timelines approach that I see.  </P> <P>And we can certainly talk -- you know, Jim could make the point; he is a reasonable person.  I m sure he would say, Well, 60,000 is a target and we could have other targets and that could change and all like that.   The date I do not think you can really change because the premise of the report was that we need to have something for the next administration, and the next administration is going to take office in January 20th, 2009, whatever happens.  So that is kind of fixed.  </P> <P>Our own experience from our own report, frankly, is that once you put a number on the table, taking it off the table is not easy.  And so, if you set a mark of 60,000, you are going to have to live with 60,000.  Now, you think you can fight and do all like that, but from the standpoint of political bipartisan arrangement, you have a problem.  And if you look at a cap in that vicinity, whether it is 60,000 or 80,000 or anything around there, significantly below what we have now, I do not see a force that you could design that could even prevent the Iraq army from collapsing, let alone actually maintain any of the current gains, let alone make any additional progress.  I do not see that happening.  It does not seem to be militarily feasible when you slice this all out and look at what everybody s capabilities are.  And so the precise number I do not think matters that much.  It is the scale; when you get down to that level we are not going to be able to do it.  </P> <P>And lastly, the issue of mission.  The United States pursued the strategy of training transition from 2004 to January 2007.  That was the stated strategy.  The objective was to build up Iraqi Security Forces as rapidly as possible, hand responsibility for securing their own areas over to them as rapidly as possible for all of the reasons that Jim outlined in his report, which are perfectly sound, by the way.  And I understand the rationale behind all of them, but they failed.  The strategy failed.  At some point, it will have to succeed.  Right?  At some point, the Iraqis will have to be able to take responsibility for their own security and maintain it without having American combat forces out there doing combat patrols.  That is got to happen if we are going to have success in Iraq.  And from that standpoint, there is no question that there will have to be a transition like this.  </P> <P>The question is when.  The question is is that something that we can start to do now.  And all of the answers that I can see are unequivocally no; it is not something that we can start to do now.  Is it something that we can start to do in a few months?  I do not know.  We are going to have to get to the situation there and see what it looks like at that point because we have to remember that this is a war.  And as my friends in the army like to say, The enemy gets a vote.   And the enemy has voted on a number of occasions in this war to our discomfiture, and I m sure that they will in the future.  Which is why, I do not think that you can - it is even intelligent to put a benchmark on the wall and say, We hope by such and such a date to have done this.   I hope a lot of things; as the Iraqis would say, Inshala [phonetic].   But you have to be prepared to respond.  </P> <P>But what I can say unequivocally, is that the notion that we could transition to some sort of training-focused approach, pulling our soldiers out of combat missions and going very rapidly down to a much lower presence in Iraq without having the situation deteriorate is without foundation in the reality of Iraq as we saw it, in the reality of the region as we saw it.  </P> <P> Gary J. Schmitt:  Jim, you are up.</P> <P> James Miller:  Thank you, Gary.  Thank you, Fred.  I last appeared at AEI in July, where I described myself as the skunk at the surge garden party, and I m glad to be here today as the straw man or, perhaps, the main course after Fred has sliced, diced, and mashed our report.  This is the first time in my memory that one think tank has taken the report of another and actually done a workshop, done some serious analysis, and developed its own report on it.  And I take that as a high compliment and thank you for your kind words.  I think your withering criticism of it will test the proposition that there is no such thing as bad publicity.  And I do want to say also that at least earlier there were copies of the report available outside and I encourage people to do a side-by-side comparison of what our argument was and how it was described in its critique.  </P> <P> My comments today are going to fall into three categories.  When I coach basketball I have five kids and four of them currently play we have a technique called the criticism sandwich:  Say something nice to them initially then give them the criticism then say something nice.  I m going to have an inverted criticism sandwich.  I m going to start with the tough and then have something more positive and go back to areas where we differ.  And I do want to say -- and I ll go through this as quickly as possible and look forward if you are now open to talking to us after this about what our report said.  There are areas - and I ll cover several of them first - where I felt that you misunderstood or possibly misrepresented - I m sure it is the former - what we had to say.  I ll give a few highlights only and look forward to following up.  But I do want to say that I do not believe that the independence, given your stature and your practice, in doing this kind of work -- your independence will be compromised by talking to us.  During the process, the Jones Commission, which you cited, went out and talked to a number of people and I think that their conclusions were -- I interpreted them slightly different from what you did, Fred.  I think that their conclusions fairly stand up as independent.</P> <P> Second, I will cover some areas where I believe that we are actually in agreement.  It sounds like it is from Ripley s Believe It or Not and I was surprised to find them and I ll be interested to know whether you agree that we are actually in agreement on these areas.  And then finally, some areas of continued disagreement; I think I m certainly on the way forward.</P> <P> First on the characterization of the aim of our study, which you referred to in your comments in which report really went into in some detail.  I ll use quotes only a few times, but I want to be accurate.  The report says, The aim of the CNAS report is to reduce American military presence in Iraq dramatically by the time the next president takes office.   And that is not the aim.  Our aim was, in fact, to suggest that, first, the United States should reconsider its goals in Iraq; its objective and focus on vital interest, not try to continue with the administration s goals of transforming the Middle East with a vibrant democracy, certainly not in the near-term, but instead to focus on what we call the three No s:  No Al-Qaeda safe havens, no regional war, and no genocide; and then, based on that, to develop a strategy that the United States could follow in working with our coalition partners and the Iraqis in pursuit of those interests and goals.  </P> <P>And our strategy talked about top-down, which we tended to deemphasize to some degree.  Bottom up, which has shown even more promise than we had hoped in the report, and it has been talked about earlier today.  And then, what we called outside [indiscernible] which was the real focus of the Baker-Hamilton, Iraq Study Group.  So, our hope and aim was to get the discussion oriented much more on the questions of U.S. interests and alternative strategies.  And our line of argument and our flow of the document was interest, strategy and then plan.  And based on my experience in the Pentagon and every-day experience for most people, that is a sensible way to proceed.  </P> <P>And our aim was really to try to lift the debate in a way that got away from the numbers, and I think you are right about the numbers [indiscernible] tonight.  I have had second thoughts about the prominence that has had in our discussion, but to attempt to lift the debate to more -- based on U.S interests, what is achievable and then what a strategy for pursuing that is.  And I certainly appreciate your efforts in that regard.  </P> <P> Just a couple of other areas, and there are a bunch and I have been selective.  Did we place a ceiling of 60,000 troops by a date certain and say that people should sign up to it?  Let me say that was certainly not our intent and you will find throughout the report statements that that is precisely not our intent.  We intended it, as your report says at one point, as a rough estimate intended to give a sense of scale so that people, both familiar with and unfamiliar with military planning, would just have a sense of what it was all about. </P> <P>The critique in the report which you implied in your statement was this number will take on a life of its own.  So far I agree.  Second, that a president or a member of Congress will sign up to it and it would be difficult for them to change gears once they have.  I would agree with that.  In other words, if someone says, 60,000 is the right answer, come hell or high water, I think that is a bad idea.  When we were here last time, I had thought that the range of -- I think I used the range 40,000 to 80,000, and certainly would not be surprised by numbers in that range in terms of a rough ballpark.  But our fundamental recommendation was, and for me, certainly remains, that the United States conduct detail planning - military planning, inter-agency planning - to develop a transition plan so that we have an option; whether it follows on the surge s success or less-than-success, we have a plan for how to go forward.  That was what we really hoped to do.  </P> <P> And a third area that is very important, and then I ll get to the question - the areas of where we have agreement.  The AEI report says that we focused principally or exclusively on training.  Again, I think I ll quote very quickly: The CNAS proposal focuses almost entirely on training and it goes on to describe that.   This is a huge issue because I would believe that approach is wrong.  I basically agree with your criticism of it and we devoted an entire chapter to talking about what the advisers would and would not do and where their focus would be.  And I could give a lot of examples.   I ll give one and that we said, Advisory teams in Iraq are often valued more for the combat and logistical capability they can offer to their Iraqi counterparts than their advice. </P> <P>And so, it is important to consider them as a connective tissue between U.S. combats support capability in the Iraq national local forces.  We talked about and bringing to bear air power, quick reaction capability, logistics, medical support, intelligence, and so on.  It is that connective tissue role that we thought was important.  And, second, as an important role in both intelligence and what someone called counterintelligence, which is trying to keep an eye on sectarian tendencies and to tamp them down and to report them to higher headquarters.</P> <P> So those - it is difficult to succinctly characterize another person s report.  And there are a number of other areas, but I want to move on to what I said at the outset is somewhat surprising areas of agreement.  And I should say stop me if I have got one of them wrong or pick it up in the following comments.  I heard you saying and I read the report saying at some point, we need a transition plan from the surge.  I believe this planning will take some time.  When it is undertaken, it would probably take several months or more.  We know that the plan will have to be adjusted on the fly, which actually adds time for planning as your earlier report talked about branches and sequels.  As you think about this type of transition, this will take some planning and our fundamental recommendation was to ask the administration to begin it, and to give it a starting point for doing so.  In my view, this means all the more reason to begin planning soon [indiscernible] one has to make assumptions about the conditions under which it is valid, of course.  But as I said, our report was intended to promote that process.  </P> <P>A second point of agreement, I believe, and that is that precipitous withdrawal is a very bad idea.  You have claimed that it would be the outcome of our approach, but we believe it is a very bad idea.  And from my perspective, certainly, that means that a transition plan should be undertaken over a substantial period of time.  The stakes in Iraq are high.  [Indiscernible] I'm sure that you do.  And I know that the longer it goes, the longer time they will be at risk but at the same time the interest to the nation are great and, certainly, my friends and colleagues have been willing to pay that price.</P> <P>So, precipitous withdrawal is a bad idea.  Going to a specific number, just for the number is a bad idea.  And I think that we agree on that.  And based on the detailed planning you have done in the past, I am sure you believe that detailed planning by the administration would make sense.</P> <P>Third area of apparent agreement, I think -- and I would like you to come back on this at least when you have the chance when I finish.  And that is that substantial numbers of American advisers will probably be required.  I think that you would see the mix somewhat differently than we described and that the slope essentially -- we assume that there is a mixed model underway for 18 months and you would have conditions based and expected to take perhaps longer.  I do not know if that is the case.  I think that is a reasonable point of view.  The graph that we provided was not intended to be the answer, as I said, come hell or high water.</P> <P>And our report explicitly acknowledges that advising Iraq Security Forces will be dangerous, just as deploying there is today.  And we recommended the number of steps including increasing the size of the teams, being selective in their deployment, and having the available quick reaction forces to protect them.  But a dangerous job, and certainly I wrote the report knowing that some colleagues and friends of mine might be the guys who are doing the job.</P> <P>Fourth point of apparent agreement and that is there will be a lot of tough challenges in planning and in implementing this transition from the surge whenever it occurs.  We note a number of them in our report, including the great difficulty of developing a cadre of advisers who is capable of performing the functions that the nation would ask of them while at the same time maintaining the high degree of operational tempo across the globe and particularly in Iraq.</P> <P>My view is that it is impossible to maintain the surge or to even maintain the unsurge, which would be taking five brigades out between April and August to maintain at 130-135,000 troop level, while still developing the numbers of advisers that will be necessary for transition that we have described.  So, unless one dips in deeper into the guard, unless one extends deployments further, it may be that that is necessary.  But working through those issues will be difficult; they will have impacts on many people and in my view those ought to be done early and planned through.</P> <P>And so, in fact, your report, Fred, has a large number of very specific criticisms about missions and functions that the U.S. force would perform.  And I think most of them are applicable whenever this transition occurs.  They will be present in varying degrees, depending on the details.  But I want to credit you for highlighting some.  We thought we did a pretty good job of trying to identify failure modes and risks associated with our proposal, and I credit you for finding a number of areas that will really have to be considered in planning, that we did not outline in our report.  </P> <P>Three key disagreements and I ll do this in about a minute each.  The report suggested that the major flaw in the middle way proposals, including ours, was a single inconsistency and that is if the surge is working and may actually produce a situation in which a responsible transition to an advisory role would be possible, that it would seem logical to continue it. </P> <P>My view is that the AEI report has a faulty logic here.  If the surge is succeeding and a responsible transition is possible, it makes sense to do the transition.  And maybe that is a question of linguistics but otherwise, it is like a driver who does not get out of first gear.  It is like a batter who just goes to first base and keeps going straight into the outfield.  At some point, you are going to do the transition.  And when the conditions are adequate -- I do not think they are ever going to be perfect but when they are adequate, it would be appropriate to do so.</P> <P>On that note, I heard a little bit of General Jones testimony this morning and what I heard him say in response to Senator Warner is that he would be inclined to begin to make that transition sooner rather than later, and that he recognized that that was a different -- he differed somewhat with the assessment of the NIE in terms of its -- the NIE suggested that doing that anytime in the coming months would create enormous backsliding, not minimal backsliding, which we all should expect.</P> <P>Second, considering the timeline for reducing U.S. forces help U.S. negotiating leverage.  In this case, I think the analysis from AEI got the cart before the horse and they suggested that we put it there.  The AEI report asked, How do we get a negotiated leverage after we set a timeline for withdrawal?   And our answer is we do not.  That is not how you do it.  We suggested the opposite and that is that the U.S. should negotiate with the Iraqi government, with various parties about the contours -- the timing and contours in terms of force structure and missions of our residual military deployment as well as our economic aid and everything else.  And that we should use that to our advantage in bargaining with them with respect to steps that each of those parties takes.  So, our argument was in fact to use the non-negotiating leverage.</P> <P>And then, finally, the question of timing.  I mentioned the NIE and said that a transition near-term would erode near-term security gains.  I mentioned General Jones and that those two are in conflict.  Taking these together, I would still suggest that a transition that begins relatively soon and that is expected to take place over 16, 18 months -- maybe the answer is longer.  But military planning -- in order to get the forces in place that can be the advisers, in order to think about what the situation in Iraq will be, what the deployments will be of residual forces, one needs to begin that planning sooner rather than later.  And I think when that happens, we can expect some backsliding and the fact that we do it and begin that process when there are still significant U.S. forces in the country is a good thing because those forces can then help counter that backsliding.</P> <P>In conclusion, today it looks most likely that the Bush administration will continue the surge through April 08 and then unsurge, which is take a brigade per month away to remove the five surge brigades by August 08, going down to 130 to 135,000 troops by August.  There are several problems with this approach from my perspective.  First, it will not include the buildup of the advisory forces necessary for the transition, or at least the administration has not described how that will happen yet.  Second, it is relatively clear that it will not -- because the administration has not described where it is going next in any credible detail.  And again, it does not have to be numbers but in terms of a concept, the concept of operations.  It will be extraordinarily difficult to get bipartisan support, which is helpful both to stay in power in the U.S. and helpful to signaling to both our friends and, most importantly, our enemies overseas that we are not going to engage in a precipitous withdrawal.  </P> <P>And third, because the forces will be in place for that period of time without any consideration of alternative uses, it may increase risks elsewhere.  And the nation should consider whether that is the right thing to do.  I guess I will stop there and just say that, again, I very much appreciate the opportunity to come. I believe that the discussion needs to get off of the idea of total victory versus total defeat or cut-and-run, and that talk about reasonable U.S. interests or reasonable strategy.  And that the administration should develop a plan and share not all the details but the basic contours of it with the American public and Congress, and try to forge away ahead for which there is broader bipartisan support.  Thank you.</P> <P>Gary J. Schmitt:  Thanks, Jim.  What I would recommend is, Fred, go ahead and give a short response and then, Jim, if you have things that you want to say, we will try to do that pretty quickly so that our guests can have a shot at questions.</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  I do not want to go tit for tat about what you said, you know, get into he said, he said routines over here.  I have enough of that in Idaho.</P> <P>The aim of the report -- we actually stated that the aim of your report was to establish something that could gain bipartisan support, which is what you said the aim of your report was, and that is fine.  The point that I wanted to make about that is that is that is a different aim from figuring out what is the best thing to do in Iraq.  And this was a divergence that was true of the Baker-Hamilton Report as well.  You can choose to pursue the approach that gets you the most support in Washington or you can choose to develop the approach that is most likely to succeed in Iraq.  If those things are not the same, and they are quite likely not to be the same, then which do you want to choose?</P> <P>Your report suggests that we should seek the one that gains the most support here without compromising our vital interests and you believe that you have laid out a way to do that.  I would say I'm less interested in achieving a fully bipartisan approach to this and more interested in making sure that we actually succeed in an effort that is vital to our national security.  I do not, in any way, dispute the wisdom of looking at interests and the way that you laid them out in the three No s, I entirely agree with.  And we did recognize in the report and I do recognize that you said this is just a ballpark.  What we concluded from our study was you cannot pursue those interests effectively within this ballpark at this stage with conditions as they are in Iraq; that was the conclusion that we came to.  We have shown all of our work as you did, explaining why we think that is true.  I'm convinced of it.  I do not see any way that in this situation as it is now, if we started moving in the direction that you were suggesting, we will not be able to accomplish the objectives that you laid out and that I also support.  That was our evaluation.</P> <P>I entirely agree with you that planning for post-surge should be going on.  It is going on.  Speaking of straw man, one of the straw men is that the Bush administration never thinks about anything in advance and so forth because they screwed things up in the past.  I was one of the people who was yelling about the fact that they were screwing things up in the past; I fully recognize that they are capable of doing that.  On this occasion, I happen to know that they are planning for a variety of contingencies including post-drawdown transition.  When they will share them, of course, is up to them.</P> <P>On your point about the focus on training versus focus on logistics, yes, it is true.  You do say that.  I ll tell you why we dismissed it.  Because a force structure of anything like 60,000 that has trainers of anything like 20,000 will not be able to provide logistical support to the Iraqi Army adequate to keep it going.  That was a rock-solid solid conclusion that we came to.  And that is why we dismissed that statement; it will not be possible.  You simply do not have enough supporters present in theater to sustain the Iraqi Army as we are sustaining it.  There is no system by which it could happen because the Iraqi Army is not now being sustained in a way that you could transition in that way.  </P> <P>And furthermore, in the environment as it is now - and this is really the key point that I want to get to - you could not safely even try to do it because without American combat forces providing security for convoys, you will not have convoys crisscrossing that country with security conditions as they are now.  And this is really the question, and here is the problem that I have with the defense that you just made: If you are saying that you want to be down to a ballpark level of 40 to 80 or whatever you want it to be by the time the next administration takes office because we need to have a bipartisan consensus and you think it is the right approach, you have to start withdrawing forces right now because the logistics of getting the equivalent of 22 brigades in and out of country, which is what will be required, mean that you have to start moving them immediately which means - and we argue all of this in the report - that you have to pull them off of combat duty immediately and start the process of getting them reconcentrated on FABs [phonetic], so that they can actually be moved.</P> <P>And the details -- I mean this is one of those things where the devil is really all in the details, and that is how we get to the conclusion that says, You will not be able to accomplish your objectives because for the first months of this, our military will be entirely caught up in the process of shuffling things around and planning and so forth in order to meet any sort of deadline that you want to name if it is going to be in the January 09 framework.</P> <P>Now, if you are willing relax that and say that we can aim at getting down to 40 to 80,000 some time over the next few years, I would say, Yes, sure.  I would love to have that.  That is fine.  We can talk about that.  Let s talk about a transition plan.   If you are willing to say, I want to have as a target getting down to 40 or 80,000, but I'm agnostic about what the level should be in January 09, we can talk about that, too, and you can develop perfectly plausible contingency plans.  In fact, that is I think what is going right now.  But if you say, that I want to be down to a given ballpark by a given day, and the date is January 09, then it locks up.  It does not work.  You will not be able to achieve these objectives in that timeframe.  That was the basic evaluation that we came to.</P> <P>So, you know, if you want to relax any of the constraints, then we can absolutely revisit this.  The only other thing that I ll say is, I do not think I do agree with you that we need essentially to plan at some point to go to a 20,000 advisory effort or do all of that.  I really do think that you and I have a fundamental disagreement about what is needed in terms of the post-surge advisory mentorship relationship and I do not actually think that -- but I fully agree with you and cheer you for calling attention to the fact that this is something that requires a serious planning effort.  It is something that we should start thinking about.</P> <P>And it was wonderful that your organization not only said that, but actually offered something that we could all use as a starting point to think about.  And so, the fact that I do not accept it or agree with it is in many respects less important than the fact that you have raised an important issue in the debate and it is something that we will continue to address.  And I thank you for that and I thank you for coming here and responding.</P> <P>James Miller:  Fred, I think you are correct that the idea of he said, he said will get boring to everybody pretty quickly.  Let me just say, that I think it is clear that we continue to disagree on some important points.</P> <P>However, at one place I will agree with you now after this experience in particular that numbers have a greater staying power than I had anticipated and certainly in writing the report.  And from my perspective the most important elements that need to occur for the nation are a consideration of the strategy and the general approach that will be taken.  And I believe that people will have a greater comprehension of that if they have a sense of the expected timelines under which that will occur in a sense of the rough order of magnitude of the forces involved.  And having spent several years of providing oversight of the development and review of war plans in DOD, I have a good sense of what it takes to develop a plan like that.  </P> <P>And I know that it will take some time and know that the involved timelines, although the planners always prefer and the operators always prefer to execute them in a way that it is conditions based.  And in that regard, I do not think we differ very much at all.  Perhaps it is best to open up to questions rather than go back and forth and I look forward to a private conversation to follow on.</P> <P>Gary J. Schmitt:  Thanks, Jim.  Please wait for the microphone and then identify yourself and please try to ask a real question.  And if you do so, I might let you follow up.</P> <P>Collin Kohl [phonetic]:  Hi.  I'm Collin Kohl from Georgetown.  I had a question for Fred that maybe ties together the two conversations - the two panels - and it is about numbers.  Much of the discussion here has been about numbers - should it 160?  Should it be 130?  Should it be 60?  Much of the previous conversation was about measuring progress, and the greatest progress is in Central Iraq and in particular in Anbar Province.</P> <P>That progress began in December of 2006.  By your own reckoning, the surge has really only surged in its operations over the last 60 or 90 days.  Unless you follow time in the wrong direction, the surge cannot be responsible for the tribal awakening.  It started before the surge; it is largely unhinged from the causal dynamics of the surge since, it is linked to the enemy of my enemy logic that is driving the tribes and former insurgents to battle Al-Qaeda.</P> <P>So, explain to me, Fred, why the momentum that you claim is happening is tied to the numbers since the added numbers are not responsible for the momentum?</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  I have always been clear that I -- the funny thing is I have never had the intention of focusing on the numbers, anyway.  It was Jim at fault.  No, the -- he was the one who put a number on the table.  And I do not think that numbers tell the story.  But I ll answer your question in a number of ways.</P> <P>To begin with, the funny thing is that if you go to Ramadi and Fallujah and if you ask the American soldiers who are there, and you ask the Iraqi soldiers who are there, and you talk the sheikhs who are there and you ask them, Did the surge matter?   They all say, Yes.   And then you say, But the movements started before the surge, and they say, Right.   And then you can remember that, as Jack Keane pointed out, in all of 2006, you had over 1,000 Sunni recruits in Anbar Province.  In 2007, you have had more than 12,000 Sunni recruits in Anbar Province.</P> <P>What I have tried to argue, and I have laid this out in more detail in the Weekly Standard article that you have in your packet, is that what you had in 2006 was an increasing desire on the part of the sheikhs to turn against Al-Qaeda and come over to us, and Al-Qaeda responded to that by going after them with vicious attacks.  As a result, the movement in 2006 was rather tentative and tenuous.</P> <P>Early in the part of the surge in late January, in fact, we sent two additional Marine battalions to Anbar, which reinforced the process that was already under way that Colonel Sean McFarland [phonetic] was undertaking in Ramadi.  It was very similar to what we have been doing in Baghdad.  And it allowed the incoming Colonel John Charlton to complete that process and clear Ramadi.  Ramadi did not become a safe city by January 2007, even though the tribal movement had started in 2006.  Ramadi became a safe city because coalition forces working together with the tribal movement protected the Sunni as they turned against Al-Qaeda.</P> <P>And that is a key point that I want to stress as we think about the war on terror.  Because we have been having a discussion about the war on terror as though what we need to do is win ideologically and persuade Muslims that they should not support Al-Qaeda and then they will turn on Al-Qaeda and the moderates will win and then it will all be okay.  And that, you know, sending American forces is kind of counterproductive because it stirs them up against us and creates more terrorists. </P> <P>What we saw in Anbar was the exact opposite.  You had the turn.  You had the leaders decide that they did not like Al-Qaeda, but they had a very difficult time doing anything about it because Al-Qaeda is a very effective killing and vengeance machine.  And it was not until we were actually able to interpose our soldiers between the sheikhs who had decided that they did not like Al-Qaeda and the Al-Qaeda killers that you actually started to see significant improvement, and then what you have seen is that the movement has snowballed.  And we can talk about Anbar, but there was no tribal movement in Arab Jabour, which was an Al-Qaeda stronghold; now, there is.  There was no tribal movement Ameriya, which was an Al-Qaeda fortress; now, there is.  There was no tribal movement in Diyala, which was hell; now there is.</P> <P>That is because in each of those areas, surge forces using a new strategy, namely focusing on securing the population, protected the locals sufficiently to enable the shift that was occurring within the Sunni movement to complete itself.  If we had not done that and if we stop now protecting them from Al-Qaeda attempts to reestablish themselves, I do not believe that this movement would have accelerated and I do not think anyone in Anbar thinks that this movement would have accelerated, would have moved the way it has, would have spread the way it has, and would have lasted in the face of Al-Qaeda efforts to turn it back.  So, that is, in my view, the relationship between the surge and what is going on there.</P> <P>Sarah Baxter:  I'm Sarah Baxter, Sunday Times of London.  The British are feeling quite pleased that having withdrawn from Basra Palace, that it has all been quite quiet down there.  And some people are saying that that proves the theory that the British presence was exacerbating attacks there.</P> <P>I'm just wondering if there are any lessons to be drawn for America from that or do you think it is too soon to tell?  I would like to ask both Fred and James Miller.</P> <P>James Miller:  A quick response - I think that the pleasure that the British feel of first buttoning [sounds like] up and then beginning to withdraw is understandable, but at the same time, the security situation in the south is very difficult.  And I frankly -- our report did not go into great detail because it was -- on the question of the situation in the south of Iraq because it is so dynamic.  I do not know what the outcome is going to be between the JAM, the Jaish al Mahdi and the Badr Organization as they fight it out; I do not know what role the Iraq Army might play in that regard.  And I think that is going to be a continuing struggle and a big question mark for some time to come.</P> <P>So, I understand why the British felt that they could not solve all the problems in the south of Iraq, but I think we are going to see a sorting out of some kind down there still.</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  The short answer to the question is a handful of days ago, the British withdrew from the palace.  The Iraqi 10th Army Division moved in and Muqtada al-Sadr ordered the Jaish al Mahdi to take a knee, to stop fighting.  In that context, it is not very surprising that you have had a few quiet days.  I think it is too soon to tell.  I certainly hope that it works.  I certainly hope that it does.  I'm not anymore sanguine than Jim is about the probabilities but it is really too soon to evaluate that.</P> <P>Paolo Funchita [phonetic]:  Thank you.  Paolo Funchita.  On the issue of, sort of, the necessary drawdown that surge is working - we have seen results, good accomplishments especially against Al-Qaeda - do we have a sense that those gains are sustainable?  That is, regardless of any deliberate cutting down of military presence, if there is this natural rotation that would imply going back essentially to pre-surge levels?  And in consideration of the substantial gains that have been obtained, so far, do we have a sense or is it too difficult to forecast at this point that these gains are sustainable?  That we are going to keep them and maintain them and especially as -- you know, part of the previous discussion, in consideration of the renewed effort for interdiction of support coming from Iran, which is substantial and worrisome? Are we going to have a sufficiently large residual force in the context of everything else of the upgrading of Iraqi forces, et cetera, et cetera that would enable us to succeed in that endeavor as we necessarily have to draw down regardless of any attempt to deliberately cut down the military presence?</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  This is what makes that possible if and when it becomes possible.  You have, on the one hand, an expansion of the Iraqi Army that is underway.  You have an improvement in the quality of equipment and training of that Army.  The Jones Report cites it, goes into a lot of detail; I think it is very accurate on that subject.  It is what I also saw and what my friends who work very closely with the Iraqi Army saw.  You have a force that is improving rapidly.  Of the fighting forces in Iraq, it is the least sectarian and it is the most professional, and it is the most committed to the idea of a unified Iraq; and it is fighting very hard and will fight harder and it is getting larger.  And Maliki is committed to spending Iraqi money to expend it over the coming year.</P> <P>And as the Jones Report noted interestingly, there is no lack of recruits for it.  They can recruit just about as large an Army as they want, it seems.  And now, they are recruiting both Sunni and Shia.  So, the Iraqi Army will very likely be able to take over a much larger portion of its burden and the command is now focused increasingly on addressing the logistical shortcomings and so forth, in helping the Iraqis set up a logistical system, so that over the next 12 to 18 months it will be able to operate more independently and with lower level of U.S. support for that.</P> <P>But in addition, the Sunni movement around Iraq has also led to the enrollment of a lot of Sunni into the local police, which again, as the Jones Report noted, is a tremendously positive development because police are most effective when they are local.  Whatever your -- you know, there are sectarian issues involved, but in general terms that is a good thing.  And now you have Sunni police in Sunni neighborhoods and, also, therefore defending them against Shia militias.  That is a very positive development and that will also relieve the burden on our forces over time.  And we have right now, literally, tens of thousands of Iraqi signed up in various concerned citizens groups whom we are moving, working with the Iraqi government to move into the security forces in an official way but who, right now, are out guarding their neighborhoods.  And they are backfilling for us right now and what that enables us to do -- it does not enable us to do what we did before.  We just sort of throw an area at them and say, Here, you take care of this.   But it does enable us to hold areas that we have cleared effectively, with much lower force densities than the clearing required.  And that is the sort of glide [sounds like] path that one would hope to be on in 2008, assuming that the enemies cooperate.</P> <P>Now, I think that Al-Qaeda -- we have a fair amount of leverage over the enemy cooperation there.  I think we have defeated Al-Qaeda very significantly and I think as General Keane said, the Sunni insurgency has also been largely defeated at the moment and most of its fighters are now entering the security forces or going down with Al-Qaeda.  The question is the Shia militias; we have also done significant damage to them over the past months.  We have done significant damage to Iranian lines.  So, I would say the odds are that it is reasonable to suppose that over the course of next year, the security situation will be sufficiently improved and the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces will be sufficiently improved, that it will be possible to draw down our forces gradually without sacrificing the gains.  I do think that right now, you hate to make predictions and more, but right now I think that that is actually a likely scenario. </P> <P>James Miller:  If I could follow very briefly.  I would just say two things.  One, anyone who believes he can predict in detail what is going to happen in Iraq is either psychic or psychotic.  And I would like to believe that people up here are neither.  But we can expect -- I agree in general with Fred s assessment.  I think we will see some backsliding in some areas.  I think, irrespective of the level of U.S. forces, I hope that we will continue to see some progress - in some cases, unexpected progress.  But I do not see the sustainability of it until there is further progress politically, as the people in Anbar Province -- they do not have an expectation that they have a future that involves access to the oil revenue; over time that is going to become problematic.</P> <P>In Kurdistan, depending on how things go again with respect to oil revenues -- but in other areas as well there is a possibility of growing conflict to the south and of course always tension where we hope for -- to avoid a surprise and I would like to see more active diplomacy to avoid one with respect to Turkey.  And as I suggested and as Fred described very accurately, in the south it is quiet now but I would not bet a lot that it remains so.  But it may be that we get in a break there and some aggressive diplomacy and that regard could help as well.</P> <P>[Audio glitch]</P> <P>Garrett Mitchell:  Thanks.  Garry Mitchell from The Mitchell Report.  And I will try to do this quickly and that is, as I have listened to this whole afternoon, I'm struck by what is the sort of clinical nature of this discussion, which is that it is all about war.  And when in fact, what may well be the ultimate issue that we have to deal with here is really sort of the tensile strength of the country and the democracy itself on this issue.  And it seems to me that one way to think about this is to sort of think about the distinction between a maximum and an optimum solution.  And if you look at that in terms of body temperature, the optimum is 98.6 and the maximum can kill you.</P> <P>And I guess my question is to what extent -- and I think this is a particular question to Fred and to the surge [indiscernible] how we want to describe it.  To what extent do you think your group has a responsibility to think not simply about what is the maximum military solution in Iraq, but what is the optimum solution in a democracy that is a) fed to the gills with this war and b) has dwindling, at best, belief and support in its commander-in-chief, frankly?</P> <P>Brian Marshall [phonetic]:  Yes, Brian Marshall.  And obviously there has been a major concern about the state of the Iraqi National Police.  Now, I have heard reports that the Ministry of Interior has had a bit of a shakeup; a number of key people have been released.  Now, can anybody amplify that report and possibly comment on it?</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  Garry, look.  We have been going back and forth on this issue for a long time and I appreciate the fact that you come and we engage and that we have a very responsible discussion and that is a fair question.  Here is the thing.  The optimum solution from the American domestic political standpoint, if I granted you all of your assumptions which, actually, I disagree with you on some, gets us to defeat in Iraq quickly in my view.  And it gets us to regional destabilization in the Middle East.  And it gets us to the accomplishment of none of the objectives that Jim quite rightly pointed out that should be the aims of our policy.</P> <P>In my view, based on every -- you know, I have been working this 24/7 for more than a year now.  And I regard that as a fact, I have to tell you.  Okay.  Now, if what you are telling me is that the American democracy is simply unwilling to accept what needs to be done in order to pursue our objectives in Iraq in a way that might succeed there, I ll say, Okay.   Then the conversation should be, This is what defeat would look like. </P> <P>First of all, let s make sure we are all comfortable with accepting that.  Okay?  And second of all, this is -- now, somebody tell me what we are going to do about it?  Because anyone who is going to move us down that road -- and by the way, I want to say, I'm distancing this from Jim because the whole point of Jim s report is to say that there is a way to do this.  It is not a defeatist report, which is one of the strong points of it.</P> <P>But if you are going to look -- if you take this from my perspective where I think there really is no middle way, then the leaders of the party that are going to be pushing for this need to be honest with the American people about the fact that what they are really pushing for is failure in Iraq; that they are willing to accept that for whatever reasons, which is fine; and that here is how they prepare to deal with the consequences.  And that is an honest discussion and that is fine.  What I'm trying to say here is I think that the notion that there is an optimum solution that can basically satisfy the Democratic party or the center or whatever and also in some way secure our interests in Iraq is a mirage.</P> <P>All of my analysis shows me that there is no such solution.  And so, what I'm trying to do here is to say to the American people with all regret and with all desire to have it another way, the choice is actually stark.  I recommend that we pay the price and choose victory.  We live in a democracy.  If, in fact, that is not what people want to do, then that is fine, but then we need to talk about how to deal with it.  But that is really what I'm saying about that.  And I did not write down the other question.  Can you remind me quickly?</P> <P>Male Voice:  Interior.</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  What is that?  Oh, the Ministry of the Interior.  Yes, the Ministry of Interior is a major problem.  The Jones Report nailed it in my view.  I think they described it quite accurately.  I think they described the problems in the national police quite accurately.  I think they were fair in their treatment of the Iraqi Police.  In general, I think the Jones Report was an excellent report.  It tallied with what I saw, particularly with regard to nefarious influences in the Ministry of Interior.  This is something that we have been working on; it is not something that is going to be solved anytime soon.</P> <P>What I would say is that if you look at the problem particularly of the national police, it is a major problem.  On the other hand, you are talking about the national police are too divisions of 25,000 Iraqis total.  There are about 150,000 Iraqis in the Iraqi Army.  There is about 190,000 Iraqi Police running around.  The NPs are unquestionably a problem.  They are not a rock on which the whole strategy rests and they are not a rock against which it will break.  They are a problem that needs to be solved.</P> <P>And this, in general terms, is -- just to leave it on this note as far as I'm concerned; I have never been a Pollyanna about Iraq.  I have never said, This is going to be easy.  We will just take care of this.  Just do what I say.   I advocated the war, but I thought it was going to be hard and I thought we needed to do more with the force and I criticized the way they did it, okay?  We are still there.  There are a lot of problems.  We are peeling back problems one by one.</P> <P>The thing that distresses me is that we too often -- and again, distancing this from Jim because this is not what Jim is doing at all.  But we too often, in this town, say, Oh, look, there is a problem.  I guess that means we have to stop.   And what I'm trying to do is to say, Look, you know, this is a sufficiently serious matter and the stakes are sufficiently high.   That when we come to a problem, the first question you should ask is, how are we going to deal with it?  Let s look for solutions and let s be persistent in looking for the solutions to the array of problems that we have come on one by one because it is important enough to do that.</P> <P>If we could have that kind of discussion instead of the, Oh, look, we have shown that there is problem, therefore, we have to pull the plug on this to set up a sort -- not an entire straw man because some congressman do say that, I think we would -- the general tenor of the discussion would benefit.</P> <P>Male Voice:  [Inaudible]</P> <P>Frederick W. Kagan:  They have replaced the number.  This has happened periodically.  You know that and three dollars will buy you a cup of coffee.  I mean let s see where we get to.</P> <P>Jim Miller:  Very brief comment on that topic.  A number of people have called for disbanding the Interior Ministry and let s remember what happened when we disbanded the Iraqi Army.  And it does not mean that it is an impossible choice or it is a wrong choice, but it needs to be thought through.  And what happens to this people afterwards and what they will be doing afterwards is worth considering, and it gets down to individuals.  And the question overall that Fred concluded with and the question of victory versus defeat -- there are numerous conflicts within Iraq.  We just named three very quickly - there is a conflict with Al-Qaeda in Iraq; there is a Sunni-Shia insurgency that is in long-term competition, and there is Shia on Shia as well; also tensions in Kurdistan to name a fourth.</P> <P>Those are not going to go away in a year or in two years or in the near term.  These are long-term problems.  To think that there will be a close solution victory, I think, is giving the wrong impression or to think that if we reduce our presence or withdraw over a period of years and leave a troubled state, a state that is currently number two on the failed state list, but leave a troubled state that we are assisting -- to consider that defeat, I think, is inappropriate as well.</P> <P>[Indiscernible] a discussion and have the national debate on what is achievable and what is in the U.S. national interest, and as much as possible, to move away from these extremes of -- as if there can be a particularly military victory or a clean defeat.  It is not going to look like either of those things.  Success, certainly, is not going to look like either of those things.  Thank you.</P> <P>Gary J. Schmitt:  We will wrap up.  A couple of thank you s; the first thank you is to you for surviving the afternoon here at AEI.  I hope you found it informative as I did.  And second thank you goes to Jim for coming and being willing to submit himself to Fred s onslaught.  And Jim did quite well in defending himself.</P> <P>I should just end with one note.  One of the things that happens when guys like us travel around the world is we are always struck by when you are talking to Europeans or Asians and talking about [indiscernible] what we do and the think tank we are all in, it is always striking, the a degree to which the reality is around the world, that the think tank system that we have in the United States is not duplicated anywhere else in the world, really.  And it is a really incredible strength that the United States has.  I mean, it gives people who have been in government a chance to refresh themselves with think tanks anew, gives people that are going to go into government ways of addressing problems so that when they go into government, they are prepared.</P> <P>And then you see things like today, which is you have a high level of debate and discussion that, frankly, you do not see around the rest of the world.  You see bureaucrats talking about things and maybe [indiscernible] but one of the great strengths of the United States, in fact, is its think tank system.  And it is not because AEI is partisan one way or the other; the debate between the think tanks and the ideas that get tossed into the public arena that help make -- I think, in fact, help make us a much stronger country. So, with that in mind, again, Jim, thank you for showing up.</P> <P>[End of file]</P> <P>[End of transcript]</P></body></html>