<html><body><P>American Enterprise Institute</P> <P>September 20, 2007</P> <P>[Edited transcript from audio tapes]</P> <P><BR> <TABLE cellSpacing=1 cellPadding=1 width="100%" border=0> <TBODY> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>8:30 a.m. </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Registration and Breakfast</DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>9:00 </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText><STRONG>Panel I: What s New about AFRICOM and What s Not?</STRONG></DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Panelists</EM>:  </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Gen. James L. Jamerson, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), Lockheed Martin Corporation </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Theresa M. Whelan, U.S. Department of Defense</DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Paul Wolfowitz, AEI</DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Moderator</EM>: </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Thomas Donnelly, AEI</DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>10:30 </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><STRONG>Panel II: African Security Priorities</STRONG></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Panelists</EM>: </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae, Center for Policy Research and Dialogue, Addis Ababa</DIV> <DIV class=BodyText>James Kimonyo, Embassy of Rwanda</DIV></DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Linda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. Department of State </DIV></DIV></DIV> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Brig. Gen. Robert Winful, Ghana Armed Forces</DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Moderator</EM>:</DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Mauro De Lorenzo, AEI</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Noon</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><STRONG>Luncheon and Panel III: Models of U.S.-African Security Cooperation</STRONG></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><STRONG></STRONG> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Panelists</EM>:</DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText>Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Opande, Kenya Armed Forces (Ret.)</DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Brownie J. Samukai, Liberian Ministry of Defense</DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Michael L. Smith, U.S. Department of State </DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText><EM>Moderator</EM>:</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Mauro De Lorenzo, AEI</DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>2:00 p.m.</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText>Adjournment</DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR> <TR> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD> <TD> <DIV class=BodyText> </DIV></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE></P> <P>Proceedings:</P> <P>Panel I: What s New about AFRICOM and What s Not?</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  We shall begin.  On behalf of the American Enterprise Institute and on behalf of my partner in crime here, Mauro de Lorenzo, I would like to welcome you.  My name is Tom Donnelly.  I do defense and national security work here at AEI and we are very pleased to welcome everybody to our seminar conference today, trying to investigate just what the nature of US-AFRICOM, US - Africa Command is likely to be.</P> <P>Just very quickly, to offer some stage setting remarks, I m very pleased to see attendance at such an overflow level.  The news of AFRICOM s impending partial birth, or whatever exactly the creation of a sub-unified command should be described as, has been somewhat subsumed in the flood of war reports from Iraq and Afghanistan.  But it is still a huge deal.  It is not very often that the United States creates new theater military commands and when it does, it is often in response to some great cataclysm or disaster.  What is now US Central Command was a creation resulting from the many unfortunate events of 1979: the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, seizure of the Grand Mosque, a band of Sunni revolutionaries, and the rise to power of the then relatively unknown tough guy by the name of Saddam Hussein.  And more recently the creation, for example, of Northern Command was a response to the attacks of 9/11.  And even the few sub-unified commands we still have, like US Forces Korea, were created in response or in the aftermath of a war.</P> <P>So AFRICOM does not seem to fit the pattern yet it is pretty clearly still a major event and in a major [indiscernible] reflects a new and profound commitment of the United States to African security.  It may also represent a new course for American strategy in policy toward the continent sort of collectively and towards the individual states of Africa, where our approach during the Cold War was largely again subsumed or driven, sometimes rather blindly, by the need to contain and then to roll back Soviet influence.</P> <P>And since then we have too often ignored just the fundamental politics of African states and in the continent.  And those politics have produced a number of sizable wars and reintroduced the term genocide to Western vocabularies.  Or too frequently we have flirted with a kind of patronizing form of humanitarianism.  So possibly the advent of AFRICOM heralds a new, for want of a better term, normalization of American policy and strategy towards Africa in a way that may benefit both the United States and the people of Africa.</P> <P>So I hope in some sense that is what our efforts today are about.  We have three panels, as you will know from reading the program.  Our first panel is to help define what AFRICOM may be, what it is now, what it is not going to be; there have been a huge amount of rumor mongering about what kind it is going to be.  And we are going to talk a bit about the background of US security policy [sounds like] towards Africa.  How did we get to the moment where we created AFRICOM?  </P> <P>And then our second panel will be kind of look at some African perspectives on this.  This is an element in the new American approach of building partnerships.  So when you are building a partnership that implies that your partner has an equal voice and a common purpose.  And then, finally, we will look a little bit more deeply at questions of African security and politics in the final panel.</P> <P>The batting order for this panel will begin with Theresa Whelan, current Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the Pentagon and someone who is as deeply involved with the creation of AFRICOM as anybody has been.  I m not going to read her entire bio nor of any of the other panelists, but Theresa has been a distinguished civil servant for many years.</P> <P>Following Theresa will be General James Jamerson who is, I think in his final posting, the Deputy European Command to D.C. [sounds like] in Europe, and the officers who have held that post have often essentially had the African portfolio.  So in some sense you might say he commanded AFRICOM before there was an AFRICOM.</P> <P>And finally we will hear from our new AEI colleague, Paul Wolfowitz, who will talk a bit about the nexus of development policy and security policy which is a key issue, certainly, for Africa Command but also has been an important political issue on the continent for many decades now.  And if there is anybody who understands that nexus, I cannot think of anybody who understands it better than Paul.</P> <P>So that is what we have on offer here in the first panel.  And without further ado I would like to turn it over to Theresa.</P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  Thanks Tom.  Well, I am from the Department of Defense so I do have a PowerPoint slide but it is only one PowerPoint slide.  So, that is right.  But hopefully, it will prove that we are able to not have to speak entirely to slides.  But I will speak to each one of the bullets.</P> <P>I think one of the biggest problems that we have had since we began discussing the command and what our intent was in establishing the command, what the Secretary of Defense s intent was and the President s intent was I think dealing with myth versus reality.  And many things I think quickly became misconstrued and pulled out of context in this current world media environment, which I think happens quite frequently.  So I think one of the main thing that I wanted to do this morning is address, essentially, what is new and what is not or sort of the realities and the myths behind the Africa Command.</P> <P>With regard to the what is new, well, the command itself, having a single command for Africa clearly is new.  For those of you that are not familiar, we divide currently Africa up among three different commands:  Specific Command, Central Command and European Command.  That has been the case since 1983.  And much of that was due -- the division was due to our perspective at the time in 1983 of Africa looking at it through a very Cold War-based lens.  That organizational model worked for us in the 1980s.  But after the Cold War ended, we began evolving our thinking about the role of the continent vis-�-vis US security.  And I think that our thinking on that has progressed to the point where Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld last year instructed us to explore the possibility of actually reorganizing the unified command plan and creating a single command for the continent, where we would have a single four-star that could focus entirely on the continent as opposed to three four-stars who had other responsibilities other than Africa and of necessity, quite frequently, got distracted by those responsibilities.</P> <P>So that is clearly new.  A single command headed by a four-star to focus on all of Africa except for Egypt.  And Egypt is essentially going to be in a unique position -- because of its unique position globally and in the international security environment in that it will remain underneath CENTCOM but it will have a relationship with the Africa Command as it relates to African security issues.  So it is essentially cross-hatched, but everything else will fall under the Africa Command to include combined joint task force more of Africa currently located in Djibouti.</P> <P>Another thing that is new is the integration as we say of skills of various US government agencies into the commands.  We have in our planning to have a very high percentage of civilians in this command as compared with other existing unified commands.  And we hope that there are a significant percentage of those civilians will actually be civilians from the inter-agency, from other US departments, from State Department, from Treasury, from Commerce, from USAid, et cetera.</P> <P>In fact, this command will be unique in that it will have a deputy - it has two deputies actually - and one of the two deputies will be a State Department official, a US ambassador, and responsible primarily for the theater security cooperation activities of the command.  So the command will also have a political adviser as all commands do.  So we will have both the political adviser and a civilian deputy from the State Department.</P> <P>We have several other senior executive service level, SES level, positions that have offered to other elements of the interagency as positions that they could nominate candidates to fill.  We also, below that level, intend and hope that we will have the interagency sending us appropriately skilled qualified people to service detailees to the command and serve with the command for a period of two or three years, bringing their skills sets, their knowledge base to the command.</P> <P>This does not represent an acquisition by the command of authority.  It represents simply an acquisition of knowledge.  We are not -- many people have accused us of attempting to use the Defense Department and this command to control the interagency and US foreign policy approach to Africa.  And this is not the case at all.</P> <P>The reason that we want these people into the command is that they will bring valuable skill sets and valuable knowledge that will help DOD do its mission, not Commerce s mission, not Treasury s mission, not USAid s mission, but its mission in Africa better.  And the reason that we believe that we need this knowledge base and these skill sets in order to do the DOD mission, is that increasingly we have found lessons learned through the decade of the 90 s in Africa, in the Balkans, even in the last years in Afghanistan, in Iraq, that you cannot promote stability and security successfully in a vacuum.  Stability and security are interlinked with other elements such as good governance, the rule of law, economic opportunity, et cetera.  Those things are not DOD s mission; however, if DOD is to be successful in carrying out its mission, it needs to be able to work in an integrated cooperative fashion with those agencies who have those missions.  And so the best way in our minds to achieve that level of integration and cooperation is to bring knowledge into the department in order to facilitate that, but not authority, just knowledge.</P> <P>Third bullet talks about a more holistic and streamlined approach and that goes to actually some of what I just mentioned in terms of integrating ourselves better, in being a better supporting element using the DOD terms of supported and supporting.  We see ourselves in the command as a supporting element of US Foreign Policy.  And through this single command for the 53 countries of the African continent and its associated island nations, we believe that we will -- our more holistic unified approach will make us more effective supporting player in the system.</P> <P>The other piece that is new is essentially the focus of the mission.  The nickname for the unified commands or the combatant commands has also been the war-fighting commands.  These commands were developed to fight and win the nation s wars, traditionally.  However, what we are doing with regard to AFRICOM is we are turning that mission statement upside down.  Instead of saying that war fighting is the primary mission of the command and that all other things, such as theater security cooperation and building partnerships, that all other things are subordinate to that war-fighting mission and must facilitate that war-fighting mission.  We are flipping the equation around and we are saying that the primary mission of this command is to focus on building security capacity in Africa so that Africans can manage their own security challenges and not essentially be importers of security from the international community. </P> <P> We want Africans -- ideally it would be great if Africans could join the international community and be able to export security.  But at a minimum, what we hope is that African nations will be able to manage security in their own territorial waters, in their own land territories, in their own regions and then also across the continent.</P> <P>So that is the primary objective of this command.  It is not to fight and win wars on the continent as many have accused us of having designs to do.  We do not anticipate having to do that on the continent.  And so that is why we are flipping this command s mission statement and putting theater security cooperation and capacity building as the number one mission for the command.</P> <P>So those are all the things that are different.  What are the things that are not different and that are going to stay the same?  The first thing that is going to stay the same our chief of mission authorities in the individual countries in Africa and the role of the ambassador as the President s representative in those countries.  The creation of Africa Command does not, in any way, subordinate US ambassadors to the command or the Department of Defense or put the commands in any position to be able to dictate to those ambassadors what they will or will not do.  The command, just like UCOM today, CENTCOM today, PACOM today, to the extent that PACOM does much in its part of the African AOR, but the command will continue to be a supporting element to those ambassadors as regards to our peacetime mill to mill relations with the countries in which those ambassadors serve.</P> <P>The second piece of that, of course, is foreign policy will continue to be executed through and led by the Department of State.  Again, one of the things we have been accused of is militarizing US foreign policy by the creation of this command, that this command will essentially begin to dominate US foreign policy on the continent.  The opposite is actually true.  If you look at the focus of US policy towards Africa in the last five to seven years, the bulk of our efforts on the continent are focused on non-security areas.  And if you want to look at it in numbers terms, the United States spends on average $9 billion a year in non-security programs in Africa.  We spend on security programs $250 million as compared to $9 billion.  That emphasis is not going to change.</P> <P>We will continue to see the bulk of our foreign policy in Africa focused on non-security issues.  However, as I said before, we have recognized that if you want, if countries in Africa are to be able to develop successfully, they must have at least some semblance, some minimal semblance of secure and stable environment that is sustainable over the long haul.  And so therefore, we believe that DOD has an important supporting role to play in that overall US foreign policy that is focused on economic development, good governance and promoting the rule of law.</P> <P>The other that will not change is African leadership on continental security issues.  That was the other thing that we were accused of.  They said we were going to come in and we were going to tell all the African countries how to do business.  And that is patently untrue.  And what we have tried to make clear in the consultations that we have done with the African countries in Africa and also in other venues is that we are very, very supportive of the leadership role that the Africans themselves are taking in trying to develop their own vision for their security in the 21st century.</P> <P>We are particularly supportive of the African Union and the African Union s vision for security in Africa in the 21st century.  And what we want to do actually is support that vision.  A core element of that vision on the security side is the development of an African standby force and supported by African standby brigades that are based in each of Africa s five major regions.  And we have made it very clear that our intent with the Africa Command is not to come in and reinvent the wheel or provide some American solution to the African security problems, but rather to take what the Africans have already built and essentially assist them in making it a reality.  So they will continue to dictate the course of African security priorities on their continent and our hope is that we can simply help them in achieving those goals.</P> <P>Other things that will not change - current programs, activities, bilateral relationships - all of that will remain the same, obviously provided that the countries that we have those relationships want to continue those relationships.  If they want to change, then we will change.  But if they do not want to change, if they like our current relationship, then we intend to maintain that.</P> <P>The other thing that will not occur and will stay the same is that we will have no bases with the one exception of our forward operating site in Djibouti, which has been in existence now since 2002.  We will have no new bases and we will not be deploying forces or basing US forces on the African continent.  We have been in the process, over the last 78 years of actually pulling US forces back to the United States from places that they had been based historically overseas.  There is no intent on the Department s part to reverse that process and start basing troops in Africa.  </P> <P>We will have a presence on the continent, but presence will be in some ways similar to our current presence on the continent in the form of staff officers.  We have defense attaches and security assistance officers that are located in a number of countries in the continent already, and we hope to increase the presence of those defense attaches and security assistant - and in particular the security assistance officers - on the continent.  We also intend that the command will have a staff presence on the continent in locations which would allow those staff to facilitate our working relationships with each different region and our support of the African standby brigade concept.</P> <P>We estimate that no more than 20 percent of the entire command will actually be physically present on the continent and maintain a presence on the continent.  Roughly 80 percent of the command will be off the continent.  So our presence will be small.  This is something that we have discussed with the African nations and they were very supportive actually despite what you read in the press of the concept of presence.  In fact, many of them reacted by saying, Well, maybe if you guys actually lived here on the continent with us you might start to understand what the challenges are that we face and not sort of bring your Western perspectives, but begin to understand a little bit better where we are coming from.   We sort of had to agree with them.  So, in any case, that is the purpose of the presence.</P> <P>The last thing which will not change in any significant way, shape or form, at least immediately, is that our security policy priorities vis-�-vis Africa will remain the same.  They are -- we take those policy priorities from NSPD 50, National Security Presidential Directive 50, which was signed up just this past year which outlined overall US strategy for Africa.  And there is a security component of that.  </P> <P>It has the United States focusing on developing capacity in Africa for secure and stable environments for peacekeeping, and also what we call an African Maritime Governance initiative to help African nations gain a control over their territorial waters and in order to be able to take advantage of the rich economic resources that come from them and also to stem the illegal activities that take place in African territorial waters.</P> <P>So I think I probably ran over my time just a little bit and I apologize.  I was not paying attention to my watch but anyway, I hope that answers some of the questions.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Thank you very much, Theresa.  That was an excellent framing discussion and it also makes me think that if I ever get in trouble with the law, I m going to ask you to be my defense counsel.  General Jamerson, over to you, sir.</P> <P>James Jamerson:  Okay, I ll try to put a little bit of historical context to maybe underline what Theresa talked about here.  I do not spend or labor that too much because we are where we are and some of that is not necessarily relevant but it is important that we move forward.  I think we have -- we should learn from history and we have a boss that said, You do not have to repeat but you should learn from it and sometimes we do not do that as well as we might.</P> <P>My connectivity, it was described, I mean I would have been honored if someone had said I was the commander of AFRICOM in its time.  Of course it was not AFRICOM and we did it out of the European command.  And as Theresa has described exactly, sometimes we worked well with our partners and sometimes we did not.  And it was kind of an individual thing, almost.  I mean, it was kind of that in my case.</P> <P>I was the Air Force commander in Europe when we had Rwanda 94.  We were obviously deeply involved.  I went down to the European command in 95 to 98 and we had what I had called Rwanda 2 the next cycle and then several embassy evacuations.  We used to claim probably one a week we were having, it seemed like.</P> <P>And in all that time it did cross not just my mind, but many others have said we are simply not paying enough attention to Africa.  We need to get more involved.  I was fortunate that I had a political adviser, Ambassador Joe Wilson, at the time who helped me and Bill Swaltel [phonetic] and others who helped a deputy commander of UCOM who knew very little about Africa.  I have learned a lot in three years, I ll tell you.  I was privileged to work with them and spend a lot of time on the continent for the three years I was there.  It did not make me an expert, but it made me, and I guess, among other things, I got to travel with the President when he made his trip to Africa because he claimed I knew more than any other military person.  I do not know if that is good or not good when they said, but it was an interesting experience to work from both the top end and then down to the operational level who were actually trying to get things done.</P> <P>In the same context of what is new, well, obviously AFRICOM is new.  What is not new is it is not a new idea, and we went through the Unified Command planned cycles repeatedly and people would bring up, What about an African Command, a sub-unified command, a separate command?   I will tell you I was not a fan of that in its day, not because I did not believe we did not need to have the focus but because I was worried then and I m still a little worried now as how are we going to resource this activity appropriate to the job.  That will be our challenge for the US government side.  Because at the time we talked about it in the past, every time it would come up we would be going through sort of a salami-sliced 15 percent cut in the Unified Command at the same we were talking about creating another command.  I mean, the logic kind of escaped me at the time.  I mean, we could not even keep the resource of our normal commands and then we are going to create another.</P> <P>That is really neither here nor there to a degree now.  I mean we have the command, I am all in favor of this command and what it can do its potential to do great things in partnership with our friends in Africa.  It makes me want to think just a second here; I have to give the AEI some credit here.  We are having a discussion of Africa in which we have included Africans.  You would be amazed how often in Washington you can have a gathering like this in which there will be nobody that represents the interests of Africa.  And if we make mistakes periodically, that is where we make them.  As we find ourselves sort of talking to ourselves about what is good for Africa and we forget that there are some other people that actually have an interest and a vote in it.</P> <P>The thread - one of the other comments made to me was to talk about the thread of history, how we got here.  So I will not, again, I will not belabor that.  But I positively think, to think in a positive vein, that we are on a track that is pretty healthy.  If you start back from the period of about Rwanda and then we went through what we call the Afri-crisis response force which got off to a rough start, turned it into the African Crisis Response Initiative and I m not going to deal in great depth in any of these things.  And we moved to the African center for strategic studies which was a bit of an output of President Clinton s trip to Africa.  We have a coda which is now sort of a lineal descendant of ACRI.</P> <P>I mean, in each of these cases - and now we have AFRICOM - in each of these cases I see a pretty positive slope.  Now is it as steep as some would like?  Probably not, but we are in fact doing things that will help us be more beneficially for both sides involved in Africa.  So I think it is pretty positive.  Sometimes we do these things well; sometimes we do not, by the way.  ACRI -- and it is ACRF and I will not dig too much in this but it is called Africa Crisis Response Force.  The term force did not sit well with Africans but we sort of roared in like we are wont to do, when the US side on occasion has said, Slam, bam, here is the plan.   We should be smarter than that.</P> <P>I m not saying that that is what has happened in this case.  I think Theresa, as she said, there has been an awful lot of bad information flowing.  So I caution everybody.  I learned this in the military, I learned it in the business world: Never believe the first story that you hear.  So when you read something about AFRICOM, be careful about taking that as the truth, in either side.</P> <P>So anyway, we have got these series of events that have taken place which I think are good.  I mean, I commend all the different people, Dr. Nancy Walker [phonetic] who did ACSS and did a great job in getting that thing moving.  These are all good things for this relationship with Africa.</P> <P>I guess my concern as a major comment for it is resourcing.  And thinking about what Theresa said, I went to General John Abizaid; he is here in town this week just recently the Central Command commander and he has had the challenge of Iraq and Afghanistan.  But John was on the track today as I listened to him.  His voice is exactly what I would be saying in front of this group of peers.  And I was looking through this -- you got a handout in here, the Brenthurst Report.  If you look at the different moving parts for things in Africa, it is exceptional.  And not withstanding Theresa s comments, I think we got half a grip on how to bring it together to the best benefits of everybody.  We have not figured out what I understand in Iraq, I have not figured it out quite in Afghanistan.  And it has to do with stove pipes in Washington and rice bowls and all the kinds of things that our great bureaucracy brings to the table.</P> <P>We had a briefing at the European Command when I was there that one of our young officers put together called the Lens [sounds like] Briefing.   I mean, people kind of bad mouth over this thing after a while but the functional part of the briefing was you need to bring all of these things together through a lens and get control of what is going on.  So we all know what the various interagency outfits and beyond interagency, World Bank and others.  What are people doing?</P> <P>I do not think we have solved that problem yet.  John obviously does not think we have solved it yet.  I know we are working around an AFRICOM concept.  This could be the incubation for doing this right.  But we have got a ways to go and this is a US national strategy issue in my view.  We do not know how to face the new world right now.  We are still configured a lot for the old world.  So that is another hope that I have that AFRICOM could help us begin to understand how you do bring these things together.</P> <P>Our question was where is the lens?  Is the lens at UCOM, in Stuttgart?  And I answered, no, it is not going to work that way.  Is the lens at the chief of mission?  It could be, maybe.  Is the lens in Washington?  It could be here; that is always a little dangerous.  So, where do you bring it all together?  So we get this synergy of all the different kinds of things.</P> <P>Now, I have been a participant in some exercises that the military has periodically done as we came through Bosnia and the first Gulf War and all these things.  And we began to incorporate in our military exercises, NGOs, private volunteer organizations, civil affairs, civil affairs being the part of the US military that works on nation building.  We began to incorporate those.  I was in an exercise this past fall in which there was actually a really high-end panel that participated in this air force exercise that was composed of interagency people that video teleconference with.  I mean, that is all sort technical magic, but the point was we actually had people talking about all the tools - treasury, commerce, other kinds of things that we could bring to bear on the problem that we were trying to solve.</P> <P>If we can -- now, this again was just an exercise.  I mean, it is easy to put a panel together and exercise and sort of fake your way through doing one of these things, harder to make it happen.  But the trend again is not necessarily in the wrong direction of this but we are going to have to keep working.  And so maybe AFRICOM can be the starting point for this.</P> <P>Let me just hit a couple of things and we will move on, keep this going so we can talk more about courses.  I m not, by the way, going to talk about location.  I think Theresa kind of dodged that one but I m sure it will come up anyway, but maybe we can all talk about it.  But the key to this thing is acceptance in Africa.  We have got to give -- we have to be on the ground working from the bottom up talking to Africans about this concept.  And I have just said I think we just do not do that well.  But it is a recoverable kind of thing if we just get out there and do it.  Did the explanation that I heard right now -- I mean it fits exactly with kind of what I think the concept as I have heard it about AFRICOM - what it can be, how it can work.  And it is pretty good.</P> <P>We are not going to be accepted universally across the continent.  I mean, there are currents that flow in Africa that say they are just not going to buy necessarily the concept.  But it does not mean you cannot work with the leaders of Africa.  It just means the public face, as is true in many things, is not going to be as positive as getting the work done.  But it does not mean you quit trying and hopefully, as I said, we do not pay too much attention to what we read in the media.</P> <P>The role of allies, and I want to say this, we have friends now and has been talking really about the European side.  I was a great believer when we were doing things in the mid- 90s.  One of the first phone calls I would often make would be to European countries who have relationships in Africa that are different than ours.  You then have to go back and talk to the African side to see what they feel about.  I mean, I was blundering around sometimes and said, You want me to go talk to people in country XYZ?   And they would say, Absolutely not.  We want to work with you.  In this particular case we want to work with you.  We do not want to work with them.   But there is an awful lot of positive financing sort of management firepower, if you will, logistics -- well, a lot of things should happen if we work internationally together, that we waste a lot of time and energy if we do not do that.</P> <P>Now we have to understand the complexities, the regional and the sub-regional structures, [indiscernible] all these things.  These are complex mechanisms under a complex mechanism of the African Union.  It is going to take a lot of time and energy just to understand it and understand how to work in there.  And much of that has been done but you will always have to keep working on it.</P> <P>Let me make one other comment that was -- it was in sort of my instruction coming here because I m ex-military now and an industry guy.  It said, Where might industry fit in here?   Again, because it seems to me that AFRICOM being a brand new concept, a bit of a [indiscernible], built it the way you want to build it.  This is a great opportunity to bring some of the aspects of industry and private - I guess they wanted to call it private business - to how AFRICOM could be put together and can work.  This could get at the resourcing problem.  Again, I m really worried that it is just within the budget, and the manpower ceilings and restrictions that the US government has, you can have a hard time doing this.</P> <P>One of these exercises we did not long ago that I was involved in, Treasury felt I was sitting on the team.  He told us how many people are in Treasury.  I mean it s mind-boggling.  It is like a platoon.  I mean, compared to -- which is one reason, I think everybody knows, but I mean it is one reason that the military becomes involved in all these things.  Because the military is manned to do things that the other departments of the US government simply are not put together to do.  I think that has to change.  I mean that is big high-level stuff but I think we need to work on that.</P> <P>So I guess I would say at the end of this, my principal concern of having watched through the time that I watched this, we have got to make sure we resource this organization to get the job done.  If not we are going to stumble around, not be nearly as good as we could be working with partners in Africa.</P> <P>Thank you.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Thank you very much, sir.  That is an excellent complement to Theresa s brief.  I m going to actually charge Paul a bit with further complementing our discussion.  Both the General and Theresa have talked about the organizations and what we sort of have to do to create an instrument to affect our policy towards Africa.  I m going to ask Paul a bit, in addition to his other subjects, to talk a bit about the substance of our strategic goals and aims on the continent.  And again, I cannot think of anybody better positioned or better qualified to do so.  So Paul, the floor is yours.</P> <P>Paul Wolfowitz:  Thank you.  It is probably -- I think it might be helpful to start by saying something which may surprise a lot of you.  And by the way, there are a lot of you.  I think that is a very interesting and good thing.</P> <P>The announcement of AFRICOM took me completely by surprise.  I had not heard a word about it when I was still at DOD.  I left in May of 2005; I was at the World Bank; I was very focused on Africa and I have to confess to Theresa when I first heard about it, I was not sure it was a good idea.  I m still not absolutely convinced it is a good idea, but it is there and I believe it can be made into something that can work and that can be useful.</P> <P>The main reason I was not sure about it when I heard about it was I think something that is on many people s minds, and that is the perception.  What does it mean?  What does it signal?  I think that is much more the issue than the reality.</P> <P>And I think the reality is better reflected by what I did hear about Africa when I was at the Pentagon.  And that was principally we focused on Liberia.  And let me just say because probably a lot of you know this history but if you do not, you should know it.  And if you do, it may be worth reminding you.</P> <P>The US was an extremely reluctant participant in the Liberian peacekeeping intervention.  The Pentagon had to practically be dragged kicking and screaming by the President to do what we did.  As someone who was there at the time and who thought the President was right, I m very proud of what we did, and also very pleased that the Africans kept their bargain and the UN kept its bargain and the US was not stuck with a permanent commitment in Liberia, which is what frankly terrified the Department of Defense.  So it stands as a true success story of which - I think I saw Ambassador Minor - the Liberian people today are benefiting.</P> <P>But the problem was getting the US to do something in the first place and without that initial commitment, I m not sure where we will be in Liberia today.  And if AFRICOM can help in managing that kind of situation or, more fundamentally, in creating a somewhat greater awareness among that huge American institution, the US military, then Africa is not insignificant.  Provided it does it the right way and I think Theresa has described it the right way, then I suspect over time the issue of perceptions will fade away.</P> <P>We might remind people here that we have something called the Southern Command which operates in a part of the world, that is to say Latin America, that is even more allergic to US military intervention probably than any place in the world.  Its headquarters, Theresa, are in Florida, not in Latin America.  Maybe that is a lesson; I do not know.  It has no committed forces.  I do not believe it has been I think a useful instrument for engagement in a positive way with Latin America.</P> <P>But let me next say, I think the fundamental American interest, and I can now speak as an American and not as a World Bank official.  But I could say the same if I were, even more so I guess if I were a World Bank official.  The fundamental American interest is in seeing sub-Saharan Africa turn the corner and stop being the hopeless continent that the economists described in a cover story four or five years ago and begin to be what I think it really is beginning to be: a continent of hope.</P> <P>One of the things, when I came to the World Bank, I was acutely aware of the fact that Africa had done very poorly in the last 25 years.  I say 25 years because that is the quarter century that has seen more progress around the world in the fight against poverty than any quarter century in history.  It has been led by the East Asian countries, particularly by China.  But we have seen half a billion people escape poverty during that time period, not only in East Asia but in Latin America and in South Asia as well.  And, of course, sub- Saharan Africa is the glaring exception to that story, where 600 million people have actually gone backwards, and today, roughly half of that 600 million live in extreme poverty.  That is not good for Africans and it is not good for the world and it is not good for the United States.</P> <P>What I also learned though when I came to the World Bank is that that is a slightly out-of-date picture of Africa.  And that in fact, in the last ten years, there are some 15 African countries, 17 I think to be exact, roughly a third of the countries and roughly, I think, a third of the population that are non-oil producers, that have been growing at 4 percent annually or better.</P> <P>Now one of the reasons you do not notice that is when countries are very poor and their population is growing at 2 percent, then subtract 2 from 4 you are down to 2 percent per capita annual growth.  That is not enough to really make an impact or to be noticed.  Although I would note that Rwanda is up there at 7 percent.  Mozambique is up there at 8 percent over a 10-year period.  It is stunning, actually.  And of course, it is only roughly a third of sub-Saharan Africa.</P> <P>But the fact that things are changing I think is noticed.  It is noticed by Africans.  Two years ago, Gallup did a poll on what Africans thought of -- I m sorry, what people around the world thought of their future.  Whether they thought -- I guess this was in 2005 or 2006 -- would be better or worse than 2005.  I will not tell you which countries were the most pessimistic but you can probably guess; the very rich ones.  The most optimistic region in the world was sub-Saharan Africa at 54 percent.  Now that is not high level, but it is only 2 percentage points ahead of East Asia.  It was noteworthy to me.  I thought, well, maybe this is just an aberration.  St. Paul was done a year later, basically the same result.</P> <P>There is positive change taking place.  Not uniformly, but there is positive change.  Of course, when I start to say things like this, people say, Well, what about Darfur?  What about Somalia?   And I think it is interesting that the really black holes, the really terrible spots in the subcontinent are places that are ravaged by conflict.  And I think one of the reasons we are starting to see progress is because we are seeing a reduction in the amount of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.  If you like statistics, I was given a statistic at the bank and I do not -- I should check on how this was counted.  Some international think tanks said the number of hot wars in sub-Saharan Africa decline from 16 ten years ago to 5 today.  I have not done the exact count but, of course, we know Mozambique has emerged from a terrible war, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone.</P> <P>I was the first president of World Bank ever to visit Burundi and I think the reason is because for most of its history, Burundi has not been a country where there was much hope for development.  Today, there is.  And even the Democratic Republic of Congo, which probably has suffered the worst war in the last 20, 25 years in terms of number of people killed has a measure of peace today.  It is a very imperfect peace but it is a lot better than the perfect storm that they had before.  Ethiopian and Eritrea, although we worry about it, that terrible war at the moment is behind us.  </P> <P>And I think this brings home that it is very hard to have development without security, without peace.  And for too long, too many parts of Africa had not had peace.  And even today, in a country it is important and critical to Africa s future is Nigeria, has severe security problems.  Ethiopia has severe security problems.  Dealing with those and a bit much smaller countries, Central African Republic and Chad have a very hard time developing because of the security threats they face.</P> <P>To me, one of the things this underscores is the critically important role that peacekeeping forces are playing in Africa today.  I do not have the numbers with me; somebody here may have them.  It is a truly staggering commitment.  I think 15,000 UN peacekeepers in Liberia country of - correct me, Ambassador, like 5 million people or less.  I think it is the highest ratio of peacekeepers per population of any place in the world.  And I think the largest peacekeeping force anywhere is in the Democratic Republic of Congo.</P> <P>And the cost, by the way, of sustaining these forces is significant and worrisome to me whether the international community will sustain those commitments.  And that is without thinking about quite a few other places including Darfur, where more peacekeeping forces would be desirable if agreement could be reached on their deployment.</P> <P>All of these, I think, emphasizes what, if you worked inside the Pentagon, you would realize the big concern in the US Department of Defense is not how to get involved in Africa but how to stay out of involvement in Africa and how they support others in doing the job.  And I believe that the job of peacekeepers extends beyond simply trying to maintain, if you like, externally imposed stability.  Peacekeepers can contribute directly to development.</P> <P>We found in Liberia when it was initially difficult to get any construction companies in to repair roads, we talked to the UN and asked, You have got engineering battalions.  Would you like some World Bank money for those battalions to build roads?   We did it experimentally, I think, with the Pakistani or Bangladesh brigade of engineers.  We gave them half a million dollars and it was so successful we scaled that up, I believe, six times.  And they are trying the same thing in DRC today.</P> <P>But even more important than this kind of use of peacekeepers as a kind of arm of development assistance, and it is a -- I grant you it is not the most desirable way to work, but it is a lot better than doing nothing.  But this absolutely crucial issue of what in the development business is DDR - the only place that has more acronyms than the World Bank is the Pentagon.  DDR, of course, Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration.  I got it, which is this terrible challenge of taking former fighters and convincing them that their future does not lie in taking up weapons again.</P> <P>It is not such an easy task.  In fact, it is an extremely difficult task.  John Regeno [phonetic] who is the Assistant Secretary General for the United Nations came to me early in my tenure at the World Bank and said it is going to be very difficult for us to do the peacekeeping mission if the World Bank and others cannot get development going to create jobs to get these people out of the war business.</P> <P>So I believe that helping, supporting what I think is I m hopeful is a new trend in Africa s development is not only the central interest in the United States but it is for better and for worse something that cannot be separated from security issues.  It is the case, in fact, that in development agencies including the ones I know best, USAid and the World Bank, there is a kind of allergy that even talking to military of any stripe, including even the ones with the blue berets, much less the evil United States, but I think it is something if we want to see development in Africa and recognize that development is going to depend on peace and stability, those barriers have to be broken down.  And I m happy to say I think they are being broken down.</P> <P>So also, though worth remembering - and I think it is one of the reasons why AFRICOM has been greeted at least by publics, if not by officials with a certain skepticism - that it was not Africans by themselves that brought all this horrible conflict to the subcontinent.  The US and the Soviet Union played a fairly big role in supporting their various allies in the Cold War.  We are still, or excuse me, the Congolese are still dealing with the consequences of what was -- well, I m not here to judge what decisions were made in the past, but clearly extraordinary support given to President Mobutu and the generals that he left behind are still a major problem for the DRC.  And, of course, it was not just the United States and the Soviet Union; Libya played its role.  South Africa played its role.  And I think the reluctance of Africans to see foreign militaries turn up is fairly understandable.</P> <P>So it is a matter in a way, I think, of balancing this need for security and the essential role of security with certain images of the past.  I hope they are just images of the past.  Certainly, I think from the US point of view, they are.  And after all, not all of that history is bad.  I just mentioned Liberia.  I personally was involved in early deployment in Somalia in 1992 and I still think that was something where the US military played an extraordinary role, positive role in saving some 200,000 people from what looked like imminent starvation.  It did not end quite right.  But I still think it was better than not intervening and it could have ended better.</P> <P>And, of course, Rwanda is an example of what happened when the US sat on its hands and did nothing.  Not only sat on its hands and did nothing but actually, through the United Nations, I believe, stopped other countries - or I m not sure they were ready to act - gave them an excuse for not acting.  And in fact, I do think today as I have said a couple of times now, I think the reluctance of the US military to even think about Africa is much more of a problem than the danger of so-called militarization.  And I think if AFRICOM -- as I say I was not there at the creation.  We have got it, though, and if it gives Africa a seat at the table when these issues are discussed, I think that is a good thing.</P> <P>When I was at the Pentagon, every two or three times a year, all of the four-star commanders would assemble for about a day and a half of discussions with the Secretary of Defense and the senior civilian leadership.  And there was a seat at the table for the Middle East, there was a seat at the table for East Asia, there was a seat at the table for Europe, there was even a seat at the table for Latin America.  There was no seat at the table for Africa, except to the extent that our commander in Europe would occasionally mention it at the tail-end of his comments.</P> <P>I think it is not a bad thing to have that big institution thinking about Africa especially if, as Theresa put it nicely, we are flipping around the normal way of thinking about it.  And thinking about the US in the role supporting the peacekeeping efforts of others we are thinking about the US strengthening the peacekeeping capabilities of Africans themselves.  We are thinking about how the US can contribute to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.  We are thinking about how the US can contribute to supporting military reform in a variety of African countries, which is just to pick the DRC, one of the biggest challenges the President [Joseph] Kabila faces is how restructure and reform a military that was not designed to protect the people but to oppress the people.</P> <P>I do not think there is a real danger that American policy in Africa will become militarized.  We do not have resources for it or I believe the attitude for it.  There may be a danger that people will perceive it that way.  And therefore, I guess my caution will be do not do things that create new divisions among Africans.  That is not going to be constructive.  Go slow.  If the headquarters are not in Africa initially, I vote for that.  But I m not voting.  But I do think AFRICOM is here.  It does I think represent a positive interest by the Department of Defense in, not in getting the US more engaged in militarily in Africa but helping Africans deal with those problems so that the US will not have to be engaged in.  I think that is a good thing for everybody.  Thanks.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Thank you very much, Paul.  That was an excellent conclusion to our set of presentations.  One point to tweak you about though, and that is the Southern Command benefits from the fact that Miami is a capital city in Latin America.</P> <P>And I will waive the rest of my moderator s prerogatives for the moment, but with the injunction to you guys for the Q&A session for which we have about 20 minutes, that you observe the AEI ground rules.  Wait for the microphone.  I think this transcript in particular is something that we will value highly.  Make your statement in the form of a question and please try to do it as briefly as you possibly can.</P> <P>So, with that we open the floor for your questions.  Yes, sir.</P> <P>Greg Simpkins:  Greg Simpkins with the Leon Sullivan Foundation.  I think that, certainly, Theresa has made a very good case for AFRICOM and certainly a lot of people in this room and in this town do agree to some extent that AFRICOM is a good thing.  But surely you have to acknowledge that some of what is going on in the horn [sounds like] of Africa does seem to contradict the points that were made, even if only in perception.  For example, we were -- the US government was involved militarily in Somalia at the same time you were saying it is not a war command.  And the US government has strongly supported a government in Ethiopia that by its own admission has arrested and imprisoned tens of thousands of people, and, by the State Department s analysis, is involved in serious human rights issues in its country.  So how do you counter this perception when these things are going on at the same time that you are making what is certainly a very logical case?</P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  Damn bad timing.  Well, you know, nothing is ever -- I do not disagree with you on your perception side, I mean.  And I think the facts regarding what happened in Somalia in January were related to a long-time and long-standing objective of the United States to attempt to, in some way, bring to justice the terrorists who had attacked the US Embassy in Kenya and also in Darussalam.  And we had intelligence that led us to believe that we could go after some of the perpetrators and those that had supported them in Somalia, which, as you know, because of the nature of the Somalia clan relationship having Somali supporters, if you are an outsider, is critical to being able to operate in that country.</P> <P>So that was a very narrowly focused event to address again a specific problem with regards to counter terrorism.  So I do not and certainly I mean I m not going to try and blow smoke at you and say that if the United States were confronted with a specific situation like that again where we had the ability to go after someone that had attacked and either capture them or in some way eliminate them, we are certainly going to do that.</P> <P>Now, we did do that, however, and this is not inconsistent with what, I think, we intend to do vis-�-vis the Africa Command.  We did do that in concert with the countries in the region.  We did not act unilaterally.  Yes, the specific kinetic action was carried out by a US asset; however, it was carried out in concert, to a certain extent, with our partners in the region who were working on the grounds.  The Kenyans were working on their border with Somalia because there were a number of bad actors that were attempting to flee.  The Ethiopians were also on the grounds and they were also trying to round up many of these bad actors.  </P> <P>So to a certain extent we are all working together.  And both the Kenyans and the Ethiopians were very concerned about the situation in Somalia at the time they remain very concerned about it.  And they may remain concerned about the fact that you had an entity in Mogadishu at the time that it was attempting to exert its influence and its governance in such a way that posed a threat that they believed to them and to the region.</P> <P>So I think that is kind of where we are in that particular region where those are specific sets of circumstances then and we reacted to them in that specific context.  I think it is difficult and it is dangerous to sort of take that and generalize and say that this would apply over the rest of the continent because each part of the continent has its own specific and unique circumstances.</P> <P>I think our support to the Ethiopian military is simply no different than our mill-to-mill [sounds like] relations with any of the other countries in the region and has been intended to build the capacity of those militaries in order to manage their own security situations.  The fact that Ethiopia made a national decision, and it was Ethiopia s decision to take action in Somalia this past December and January, that was their prerogative as a nation state had perceived a threat.</P> <P>So these things obviously are going to happen.  We cannot -- the fact that we have mill-to-mill relations with a country or diplomatic relations or bilateral relations does not give us control over their actions.  Hopefully, our relationships allow us to have dialogue and develop shared views of situations and act accordingly.  But we cannot -- we are never going to control countries but that does not mean that you do not try to work with their militaries and help them develop their competence to be able to manage security in their own backyard.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  I believe I saw a hand over here.  Yes, sir.</P> <P>Tot Ban:  Tot Ban [phonetic] Reserve Officer Association.  So my question deals with the implication of AFRICOM for the Guard and Reserve and two specific points for that.  One is in the Guard, there is the state swap program where each state has a foreign nation that they go and work with that foreign nation.  And I have read some things where they are thinking about, with the new AFRICOM, changing the focus of that where now it is European centric to more in a world wide, including Africa.  And second with something the general said about the Civil Affairs Units, where 90 percent of the Army s Civil Affairs lies in the Army Reserve.  A 100 percent of the Marine Corps Civil Affairs is in the Marine Corps Reserve.  Will the new AFRICOM create more missions for those units and will we see maybe more resourcing other civil affairs units in the reserve components? </P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  I think actually the state partnership program is starting to shift to Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, as you said.  And we hope, we think that that is extremely valuable program.  I think it proved its worth in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.  And, well, we are not intent on trying to achieve or get African countries ready for NATO membership.  I think the value of the state partnership program, in terms of helping to build capacity, developing long standing relationships I think is something that we really want to tap into with regard to the way we manage our mill-to-mill relations on the continent.</P> <P>As to resources for the program, it is a top priority of ours to ensure that we have the resources to utilize that program.  And I know that European command has been very supportive in terms of shifting resources as there really is no further requirement for a sort of the significant state partnership relationships.  And so we are hoping that we will be able to get more resources for specific Africa state partnerships programs and expand them.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  I cannot resist the opportunity to beat one of my -- push one of my favorite buttons.  I mean I would say that your anticipation of greater involvement is probably correct.  There was, and I think it still continues, a long tradition of particularly guard involvement in Latin America or in the SOUTHCOM region.  It is also a reminder as to why it might be important to get the reserve components less involved in day-to-day operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and restore them to their more traditional role of a strategic reserve and being able to conduct these kinds of measures which have actually great strategic value, but tend to be one of those things that is under resourced when the Pentagon builds its budget.  Okay, I thought I could catch you up.</P> <P>James Jamerson:  A comment I would make is this kind of speaks to continuity and engagement.  And I did not make the comment about engagement because sometimes I have also beaten past us.  But for the US government it is on occasion now.  I m a huge believer in engagement and that means you are always in there talking to people.  You do not have to love them and you do not have to agree with a lot of things they are doing.  But if you do not engage with them, you are guaranteed to have no influence on what happens.</P> <P>We periodically, in my experience, I just have to talk about my experience.  We would get mad at somebody, country or leader and cut off all communications or stop going to see them and it just is not the right way to approach the world.</P> <P>A classic example is Soviet Union.  We talked to them all through those years when they were our arch enemy.  Why would we not talk to other countries?  But this bit that the guard and reserve is continuity of that engagement which you miss sometimes with active duty.  I m talking military obviously now, but active duty forces because they come and go.  But you get this kind of engagement where people get to know each other, or better is a lot more productive.  I hope we can raise the resources for those kinds of organizations.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  The gentleman in the red tie right here.  And I see the hand in the back so I ll try to get to you as soon as I can.</P> <P>Herb Haw:  Thank you I m Herb Haw [phonetic] from the African Center.  And I would like to ask how AFRICOM sees working with Western allies in terms of developing peacekeeping and simple police capabilities in Africa, two points which the US presumably is not that strong on it.</P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  Actually, I think one of the major benefits of the command is going to be to rationalize to a certain extent our interaction with our allies and make it actually easier for them to interact with us and thus to interact with them in terms of cooperating in the continent.  I think we all have quite similar goals.  In fact, last week I was with our principal deputy armature secretary for policy, Ryan Henry, on a trip to Europe.  We went to UK, France, Belgium, and Portugal.  And in Belgium we also spoke with both the EU and NATO about the commands and the reaction was extremely enthusiastic on the part of all our partners.  And they felt that this was very, very positive and they were very much looking forward to cooperating with us and working with us.</P> <P>One of the issues that we did talk about and in a couple of places was the issue of police, and it is obviously something that US Department of Defense is prohibited by and large from becoming involved with.  I mean, there are some very, very narrow authorities that exist now in the context of counter-terrorism that allow a little bit of interaction, but for the most part, we do not play in that realm.  However, countries like Portugal, France, others have the capability to work and develop these capacities.  And this, I think, is the kind of burden sharing that we would hope that to be able to do and use the command to do in sort of our ideal approach.  We actually hope that at some point in time down the line to have foreign officers embedded not just as liaison but actually embedded into the command structures working in the command to ensure that not only are we synced up within the US government but that we are also synced up and burden sharing with those countries that are very active in this area in Africa.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Front, very front and then very back.  My only pleasure is in pulling your chain.</P> <P>Barry Jacobs:  I m Barry Jacobs from the American Jewish committee.  This is a bit of advertising.  We just established over the last year an African institute.  I have talked to some of your colleagues.  General Jamerson referred to this and I think Ambassador Wolfowitz had also, the question of where will the headquarters be.  I have heard that there will be four headquarters which means there will be no headquarters in Africa.  So it is not a question of bureaucracy but it really is a question of how you view or how the Department of Defense and how the US government views the situation in Africa.  What is the latest thinking rather than trying to pin you down on where and when there will be an on the ground headquarters somewhere, if not in multiple places in Africa?</P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  We always -- yes, exactly, got to find a good real estate.  Yes, headquarters a very popular topic.  We have -- that continues to be an active discussion within the Pentagon, but the principle of having some presence on the continent I think remains the same.  We intend for that presence to be discreet, as I said.  It would be staff personnel, not troops.  The purpose of having the presence and the purpose of trying to put the four-star General who will manage this command on the continent is partly in wanting to manage the tyranny of distance.  And Africa is a huge, huge continent; 5,000 miles wide, roughly 5,000 miles north and south.  And then you add to that, either locating yourself somewhere in the United States or locating yourself even somewhere in Europe, and you have got tremendous lines of communication issues.</P> <P>And there also is the issue of not necessarily looking at Africa through the lens that you get when you are 6,000 miles away and you are using the proverbial 6,000 miles screwdriver.  I have found over my years working in the continent and working on issues with the continent that if I do not pry myself out of my desk in the Pentagon and get my rear end to the continent on a periodic basis, it all starts to become almost like a video game.  And you really lose touch with the realities that are out there.</P> <P>So reality is very important and we think it is going to be very important to the people who are working this command.  So consequently, we want to have some presence.  But in order to make sure that that presence is not onerous, in order to make sure that we do not sort of build Camp Bondsteel [sounds like], for those of you who are familiar with Kosovo, I think the British said there were two things that you could see from outer space: one was the Great Wall of China and the other was Camp Bondsteel.  But in any case, in order to avoid that inherent tendency within the Department of Defense, we have tried to look for innovative ways of doing business.  And one of the things that we decided was to take a page out of sort of corporate America and look at the use of distributed headquarters model.  And that we have the technology, the communications technology is in a sense to allow us to not have to have our headquarters personnel all located, physically located in the exact same spot and in the exact same building.</P> <P>So this idea also lent itself to some of the feedback that we got from the African leaders that we talked to about the idea of presence and also about their priorities in terms of African security issues.  And one of the things that they told us was that if we were really serious about supporting the African Union and its African standby force concept, then we could show and demonstrate that seriousness by establishing our presence in proximity to the African standby brigades and in their region so that we could work more effectively with each brigade.</P> <P>They also emphasize to us repeatedly that one size does not fit all on the continent and that East Africa s problems and challenges are not the same as West Africa s, and West Africa s are not the same as Central s or Southern or North s et cetera, et cetera.  We heard that in each place.</P> <P>So the other advantage we saw in terms of trying to manage -- and again, it is an innovation.  We have not done it before, but we think it is worth a shot is that we hope that we will avoid sort of the tendency to use a one-size-fits-all approach by getting our staff the prospective of the region that they are in.</P> <P>So we are intent on moving forward with a distributed headquarters presence.  We have not, contrary to what is in the press, we have not actually spoken directly to any nation at this juncture about hosting.  We have had a number of nations indicate to us that they would be interested in hosting.  Most of those indications had been quite private.  What is interesting is the nations that have said no have done so quite publicly.  Obviously, they wanted to make some kind of domestic public point but that is fine.  We certainly do not want to be any placed that does not want us.  That is a very clear criterion on our part.</P> <P>So anyway, our hope is that within the next couple of months, we will be able to begin a dialogue with some countries and see whether or not they are still amenable and interested in talking to us about presence.  And that by at least by FOC, Full Operational Capability, which is a year from this October, that we will know how we are going to manage our presence and that we will be started in that process of managing our presence.</P> <P>Obviously, most of the work is going to remain in Stuttgart for at least the foreseeable future.  But our intent is to move expeditiously, shall we say, to be on the continent but we are not going to run hell-bent for leather.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  I would like to preserve a few minutes at the end for some closing comments on the part of the panelists, but I do want to get that lonely hand in the back so that we have time for one final question.</P> <P>Cano Joni Ganijap:  Lt. Cano Joni Ganijap [phonetic] from the Embassy of Rwanda.  I am an ardent believer of security and the initiatives put across by the United States government, especially on your issues to do with AFRICOM.  But the environment in Africa may not be so conducive as perceived.  They are conflicts already in existence.  In some of these, conflicts are caused by socio-economic and under development.  I had some comments about interagency development and I would wish to know what strings are you going to interagency development?  Why especially those consigned socio-economic development because that is where the issue lies, then we can go ahead with security initiatives in peacekeeping and otherwise.</P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  Well, actually, I m going to toss that to my colleague who I think is going to follow me here shortly, principal deputy assistant secretary in the African bureau, Ms. Linda Thomas Greenfield.  Because, since I m from the Department of Defense and we do not do development I do not want to step on Linda s toes on that.  So with respect I will defer that question.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Fair enough and very artfully done.  All right, I want to invite the panelists to make whatever concluding remarks they may have.  I would just like to say that I find this whole discussion, despite the difficult choices that the American government has to make, that the Defense Department has to make in order to begin to bring this idea into being.  And obviously the very strategic and even moral choices that we have to make through the course of engagement on the continent of Africa, I just would offer the observation that this is a conversation that has been long overdue and to simply begin it is a huge step forward.</P> <P>And I would also reiterate the point that I made at the beginning that so often, these kinds of major muscle movements or these organizational movements on the part of American government and the Defense Department tend to be in reaction to big bad things happening.  So it is the principle here that an ounce of engagement is worth several pounds of intervention in a conflict or combat engagement.  That is also a huge step forward, at least for the American government and I hope for those of us who will be -- or those African states will be our partners.</P> <P>But I would like to again, offer the panelists an opportunity to conclude and also to say, as a bit of administrative housekeeping, we have a panel that follows this one, so any reporters who would wish to ask follow up questions, I would ask you to do that in the lobby outside so we can have as orderly a transition as possible.  Anybody have any finals?</P> <P>Theresa Whelan:  I will just make a couple of real quick comments.  First, I think it is important for everyone to understand that we do not believe that we have gotten this right.  We are firmly convinced that we probably screwed up somehow but we are not quite sure exactly how.  And so we are also convinced that what Africa Command looks like on October 1st, 2008 when it stands up fully operational and unified command will be quite different from what it looks like five years down the line.  And we are deliberately building in to the command structure an organizational element that will focus on capturing lessons learned and it will be attached to the commander so that the command can essentially be a living organization.  So I think that is one important point.</P> <P>We are forging new ground, we believe.  We are trying to capture lessons, let s say, that have been observed.  They have not been learned because they have not put them into practice but had been observed over the past decade and a half as best we can in a new and different organizational structure.  So it will be a constant learning process.</P> <P>The second thing that I want to say just to get back to the first question which, of course, is it is always very difficult when occasionally - and I say very occasionally - I think it is quite rare when the United States actually has taken kinetic action on the continent and we would hope -- it is out intent that it remain as rare as possible.  In fact, it is really our intent that it would never happen that the continent and the countries on the continent would be able to manage their own security in a responsible way; in a way that would not post threats to either their neighbors or in their immediate neighbors - their regional neighbors or their global neighbors.  Because, unfortunately, in this environment, one of the things that I think 9/11 brought home to those of us in the Pentagon was that on that day, you had two dozen individuals operating out of a state whose development level was somewhere between the stone age and the middle ages, I think.  They, in a few hours, wreaked more damage on the continent of the United States than the entire Japanese Imperial Navy did in World War II.  That really changes your calculations when you are trying to figure out how to manage security challenges.  All of a sudden, places like Afghanistan which on September 10th was not really all that important to a lot of people in the US government, or places in continents like Africa where sometimes the governments and the capitals actually cannot exercise control of their territory more than 50 kilometers outside the capital, those places, all of a sudden, become relevant from a purely security standpoint.</P> <P>So how do you manage a problem like that?  Well, you sort of manage it the way that we have sort of managed or began to manage the economy.  It is you become -- you globalize it.  You utilize partnerships and everybody sort of works together, watches everybody else s back.  That worked for us in Europe and there is no reason that it cannot work for us in Africa.</P> <P>So that is our hope.  It is that African nations who share our goals and to -- and we think that for the most part, they do.  They simply want peaceful stable environments in which they can develop their countries and govern themselves as they see fit.  So all we want to do is just enable them to achieve those peaceful environments, and we really do not want to have to either intervene with a peacekeeping force, major humanitarian relief operations or have to intervene kinetically to go after individuals who have threatened the United States directly.  We would rather the African nations be able to take care of that themselves.  Thanks.</P> <P>James Jamerson:  The headquarters location, in my view, it is way overblown.  I m a great believer in make no decision before it is time.   We ought to study this thing in great detail for a long time; at working with our friends and sometimes, a decision may come -- I do not know, but I worry that we will make the wrong decision about where we stick something.  So I would like the thought that says we will work our way through this but there is no rush to do this.  It is a natural question.  Everybody asked it.  I have even thought about it but there is no rush.</P> <P>Paul Wolfowitz:  Well, I agree with that last comment especially since, as Theresa said, taking advantage of modern business methods, you can do an awful lot distributed and still be in Stuttgart for the time being, so I would not rush it.  But I just would say I think there are some very important signs of hope in Africa and in too many places.  It rests on peace.  It has been a hard one and it is still very fragile.  And I think in other places including Southern Nigeria as an example, there is no progress because there is no peace.  I think more attention, more engagement is needed by the US government from all the agencies.  </P> <P>The first question was, I thought, very thoughtfully addressed to the dilemmas and difficulties of dealing with Ethiopia, but I also believe that in that case, engagement is the answer and not disengagement.  And if the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense is engaged, I think that is a good thing.  I think we need more engagement across the board and more recognition that relatively small investment of US time and resources could make a very big difference for 600 million people and for us as well.  Thank you.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Thanks very much to the panelists for excellent presentations.  I ll remind everybody of our mutual interests and a smooth transition to the next panel, and please join me in a round of appreciation for the panelists.  Thanks.</P> <P>Theresa M. Whelan:  Thanks so much.</P> <P>Paul Wolfowitz:  Thanks.  That is good stuff.</P> <P>Thomas Donnelly:  Theresa, you have been great.  Hang in there.</P> <P> </P> <P>Panel II: African Security Priorities</P> <P> </P> <P> Mauro De Lorenzo:  I will ask you to start taking your seats because we are a bit behind schedule.</P> <P> </P> <P>[Audio gap]</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  I would like to begin.  We have a few more people who are going to trickle in.  Thank you.  I m Mauro De Lorenzo, a resident fellow here at AEI focusing on development issues but also on African affairs.  The next two panels will have more African focus.  We did an excellent job, I think, in the first panel of framing the discussion surfacing the important questions.  We now have a wide range of very experienced current and former African officials, and also some of the senior officials in the US State Department who have been working with the Defense Department on establishing AFRICOM.</P> <P>I think one of the themes which emerged, in fact, from this morning s discussion is that AFRICOM will succeed to the extent in which it aligns itself with African security priorities.  What are those priorities?  Those are -- our guests today will present their points of view from their national experience but also their significant experience in peacekeeping throughout the continent and, in fact, throughout the world.  But it is, I think, increasingly important that the United States articulate AFRICOM s purpose in terms of African security priorities.  One document which is pertinent and which might serve, in fact, as a guide is the African Union Zone Security and Defense Policy which was published, I believe, in 2003 or 2004, which contains, in fact, all of the tools that we need to explain what our purpose is on the continent.  We do not have to reinvent a new security strategy for Africa because the African Union strategy is, in fact, quite robust and complete.  I will not talk for long.  We are behind schedule.</P> <P>We are going to begin with -- I ll introduce each presenter as they speak.  We are going to begin with General Tsadkan Gebretensae who may be known to some of you.  He is legendary in some places.  He was the chief of staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces for 10 years from 1991 until 2001.  Previously, he was the military commander of Tigray People s Liberation Front and led the army into Addis Ababa in 1991 that chased Mengistu into exile in Zimbabwe.  He is also well-known for his work on HIV and AIDS in African militaries; a problem he tackled quite directly when he was still chief of staff in the Ethiopian army, resulting in the numbers of HIV infected soldiers in his army actually falling at the same time as the national average in Ethiopia was rising.  Lately, he has been heavily involved in the transformation of the Sudan People s Liberation Army - the SPLA in Southern Sudan in Juba.  You could call him an expert in the transformation of liberation forces international army since it is the process he managed in his own army in Ethiopia during the 1990s.  Thank you very much, General, for making the trip.</P> <P>Tsadkan Gebretensae:  Okay.  Thank you very much.  I think I would like to continue with what has been presented earlier.  With regard to AFRICOM, I would like to say, at first, I m very much familiar with the background development of the whole issue.  I was very much involved within the African Crisis Response Force -- Response Initiative when it was first initiated and was being pushed as far as I m concerned by the Central Command.</P> <P>At present, I see this as the development of all those processes that have been initiated a long time ago.  But now with AFRICOM, I would like to start at the establishment of AFRICOM has widespread skepticism well over Africa.  All countries have their own reasons for skepticism - Southern Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa - but the reasons vary, but the fact remains that there is widespread skepticism even in countries where the security policy of those countries are very much in line with the security thinking in Washington.  </P> <P>I think -- the way I see it is if there is a very much coordinated effort between the security challenges in Africa and the establishment of Central Command, there is a possibility of bringing some good development into Africa.  If this is not done, then this could have a potential to be a cause for many problems, some of them even undermining the push for democratization in Africa.  It could be a cause for undermining the push towards democratization in Africa and good governance.</P> <P>As far as I m concerned, the skepticism is legitimate.  There are legitimate grounds to be skeptics.  Number one: That the timing has coincided with a very heavy engagement of the Chinese in Africa for the scramble to energy resources.  In many parts of Africa, this has raised the question why is this -- might focus -- this might attrition now to Africa at a time when certain strategy cues are being raised.  The centrality of the issue for or against terror, war on terror, which is a central element in US security policy has raised some issues.  Yes, security concerns does not necessarily always coincide with the security concerns of Africa.  I will go a little bit down to what I think are security challenges in Africa, and when everything -- every policy is very much tied to the war against terror and all other issues that are pertinent to Africa are being undermined, the possibility of undermining the whole relationship, I think, is very high.  </P> <P>There is fear that US military will mainly focus on its own interests.  It could be security; it could be economic, but there is this fear as well.  I think it seems there is no enough consultation on the issue.  What happened this morning, as far as I m concerned, it makes a lot of sense, but the perception now in Africa on the establishment of AFRICOM is not in line what -- whatever.  So for me, it is on a crossroads.  There is a potential to have a very constructive engagement and there is a great deal of potential for a very negative effect in the relationship of Africa.</P> <P>After having said this, in my opinion, the most important security concerns in Africa are, number 1, there are interstate -- internal conflicts in Africa and civil wars and instability.  This is a central security challenge that we have had in Africa.  It is that there are internal conflicts or there are instability where there is no fully blown conflicts within Africa, and the main concern for those conflicts are social, economic and political.  Those conflicts and instabilities in Africa are caused mainly either by ethnic and religious diversities, and there is no proper way of managing those diversities within the Governance Agreement in African countries.  There is a great deal of denial of access to strategic resources and political power.  There are poorly developed state institutions and, generally, the root cause of -- those are the root cause of conflicts in Africa, and I think those causes could only be addressed by having sound social, political, economic programs and programs in place.  I think any security assistance in Africa should have conflict prevention, conflict resolution and managing conflicts as a central element in its program.  </P> <P>I know all those problems are not -- could not be solved by military means.  The main direction of resolving those causes of conflicts are social, political, economic.  But I think the military -- the security structure has a role to play, a very important role to play in creating a conducive environment for those causes of conflicts and instability to be resolved.  Any security assistance has, to a very great extent, take this situation in Africa into consideration and put it as part of its element.</P> <P>The other second challenge I see in the security environment in Africa is post-conflict reconstruction.  Countries, some of them are in a conflict situation or in a very unstable condition or some of them have just come out of conflict and they are trying to reconstruct their state structures to tackle the socioeconomic problems.  This is another very pertinent problem.  Post-conflict reconstruction shall have economic and social recovery, peace and stability, law and order, and predictable and stable government institutions as its objective.  One cannot think of conducting effective post-conflict reconstruction programs without a legitimate and popularly supported government and security structures in place.  This requires establishing effective security institutions side by side with other government structures of the state and establishing effective security structures and make those structures comply with acceptable democratic principles: civil oversight, transparency, accountability, all those very important principles.  </P> <P>At the same time, it is a very huge undertaking.  An institution where there are poorly developed state institutions to undertake such kind of activities is a very huge challenge.  This is in regard to the development of appropriate security policies which has been alluded earlier, and programs that could provide the necessary vision, direction and objectives is critical.</P> <P>Currently, I m very much engaged in assisting the SPLA in transforming themselves from an irregular force into a regular force.  I have done this in my country, and you cannot do this and you cannot achieve the necessary objectives without having a properly considered security policy in place, and developing this kind of security policy and programs takes a lot of knowledge, experience and it is not readily available in many African countries.  This could give guidance to designing structure of the forces.  Of course, designing and implementing effective security sector reform programs and DDR programs - Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration programs - create a stable and conducive political security environment for economic development.  AFRICOM should be prepared to assist in those challenge.  Those, I think, next to interstate conflicts and instability.</P> <P>Post-conflict reconstruction, in my opinion, is the second huge challenge that Africans face at present, and it has a multifaceted nature.  You have to have security sector reform.  You have to have an effectively working security structure in place in countries like South Sudan, for example.  You have to have a properly functioning security structure in place.  And at the same time, you need to do this in such a way that it will be gradually up to the democratic standards that are being discussed and being acceptable worldwide.  This is a very huge challenge.  At the same time, you have to right side your forces.  To do this would mean to demobilize ex-combatants and let them go to civilian life.  This demands not only huge resources but a lot of knowledge and input.  I m not saying all those things are programs and activities that have to be undertaken by the security sector alone, but this is the challenge that the security sector is facing, and it has to contribute its share for an effective implementation of those programs.</P> <P>The third important challenge as far as I see is peacekeeping missions and African Standby Force arrangement.  It is very clear that there are several peacekeeping missions in Africa.  There is a need for a peacekeeping mission in Africa, but there is no credible independent African peacekeeping operations capability.  In May of 2003, African Chief of Defense Staff produced a draft policy on the establishment of an African Standby Force arrangement which would be able to rapidly deploy when mandated to do so by the African Union Peace and Security Council.  I think these are very important defense architecture.  I see it as a work in progress.  It could develop through time, but it is a very important initiative.  I think AFRICOM should involve itself in creating the capacity of African Union on all those arrangements.  It is not only the African peacekeeping mission and the African Standby Force arrangement is not the only task that is being taken in Africa Union.  Conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict solution is another part of the African Union.  So this is then the security environment that African Union is operating.</P> <P>There are several critical challenges that range from logistics and management to operational planning, executing and monitoring.  AFRICOM can and should make a concerted effort to assist the African Union in overcoming those critical capacity gaps.  It could bring the various disjointed programs support the African Union into an integrated and properly planned program.</P> <P>Africa s principal security challenges are, as I indicated earlier, conflict prevention, managing conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction programs, and to be a credible player in peacekeeping missions in the region outside -- in the region and outside the region.  Obviously, it is not an activity that has to be undertaken by security sector alone.  The socioeconomic political component is fundamental.  For a security sector to play its share and contribute to the success, it requires the mobilization of sufficient resources and know-how to provide a secure, stable and well-governed environment characterized by the rule of law with emphasis on human security.  The contribution of the envisioned structural and strategic environment to international peace and security, including the fight against terrorism is enormous.</P> <P>In conclusion, I think the establishment of AFRICOM could enhance and contribute toward this resolving security challenges in Africa or it could be a negative factor.  It is understandable to adhere to US interests but it could take African interests and concerns onboard as well.  AFRICOM -- as a senior government official, I can understand that countries are very much concerned with their national interests.  And I can see from the regional perspectives that I m very much familiar with the Horn of Africa, there is an overlap of interests in both countries; both the national interest of, say, America and the national interest of, maybe - as far as I know - Ethiopia on matters of security issue could come together.  </P> <P>It is not because there is one particular government in place that this is happening.  It is because of the socioeconomic and historical factors that push this to happen.  The way I see it is it so happens that Ethiopia and, maybe, the Sudan are on, if I may call it, on the historical fault lines of where -- I know the Middle Eastern civilization and culture and African civilization and culture confluence.  I think this kind of historical fact is going to stay there.  Because of this, there are overlapping security interests, but from my experience, I do not see proper coordination and working together on interests that bring both together.  But in my perception, I think the issue has to go beyond that.  Beyond that in the sense that as much as African interests are not directly in contradiction with the national interests of the United States, they have to be seriously taken into consideration and planned and be part of the whole element.  </P> <P>If these are not taken, then I think the potential for AFRICOM to be a negative contributor factor is huge, and in fact, the fears of most Africans could be realized.  At the same time, I do really recognize that the engagement takes both sides.  It is not one side trying to attract the other side to be engaged.  I strongly believe that African governments and regional institutions like the African Union have to engage in the shaping and bringing together of these collaborative arrangement to be beneficial for both Africa and the United States.  This is regard, I think -- I will strongly advise to start the program with a very low level.  Start with common interests of Africa, and then develop the whole program with the development of trust and confidence between the two partners.  I think it has been clearly addressed.  I think it is good to avoid a very huge presence, particularly, a very huge military presence.  Not only it might be very costly and very expensive to manage, but I think it will bring the memories of colonialism to Africa as well.</P> <P>So I think starting with the capacity creating activities of African command and gradually develops the trust and confidence of the people of Africa on the basis of real concrete programs and activities will be the best approach.  This is my opinion, and thank you.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  General, thank you very much.  I want to turn now right away to the current Chief of Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces, Brigadier General Robert Winful, who in addition to his responsibilities in his own national army has very significant peacekeeping experience in Lebanon, in Cambodia, and is the head of Ghanaian contingent to the MONUC operation - the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Thank you, General, for taking the time to be here with us today.</P> <P>Robert Winful:  Thank you very much.  I think I have an equally difficult task, like AFRICOM.  Coming to speak at this time after so many brilliant expositions, and one from my fellow African.  And also looking around seeing certain heads nodding, honestly I have a very huge task to keep your attention.  Having seen the entire hall, let me lighten it a bit.  You will have to listen to me, and you will hear a lot of all these things I m going to say.  You would have heard of them already, but you still have to listen to me because the people, the same subject, people telling it in different tones, different languages and so on.  </P> <P>For example, people say terrorists and others say freedom fighters.  Back home, when a rich man drink so many he cannot control himself, they say he is an alcoholic, but when a poor man does, he is a drunkard.  I know from this part of the world, you have somebody like a domestic security engineer who is simply a watchman.  So that is why you should listen to me the way I say it.</P> <P>Ladies and gentlemen, I have this topic beyond the controversies on AFRICOM: Nature and forms of cooperation opportunities and challenges for US and Africa.  Being a serving military personnel, I would have loved the PowerPoint like Ms. Whelan.  But unfortunately, I came in a bit late yesterday in the flight, so I did not have.  Therefore, what I write down to keep within the time, I have put everything down like the obedient soldier.  So please, bear with me that I go right on.</P> <P>Let me first of all thank the organizers of this event for inviting me to share my thoughts on the ongoing debate on AFRICOM.  I do not wish to dwell on the purpose of AFRICOM because I assume that everyone invited to this forum is aware of its stated objectives.  Hence, what I would seek to do is to deal with two interrelated issues concerning AFRICOM and Africa.</P> <P>First, I will talk about the possible forms of cooperation that could benefit both Africa and the United States of America through the AFRICOM project.  Then I would discuss the opportunities and pitfalls it presents, and I will try to be very frank because in some of the issues, we were told that to be partners, let s be open to ourselves.  In Africa, we say that your best friend is the mirror.  It can never tell you lies.  It would not tell you, Darling, you are looking sweet when you are not.  So it is part of it to be very frank.</P> <P>In my frank view, there are three possible forms of cooperation that can be established between Africa and the US.  These are, first, support to assist in African common defense and security programs such as the African Union Standby Force, the ECOWA Standby Force, and many others on the continent.  Second, to complement assisting African security arrangements.  And thirdly, supplant and dominate African security affairs.  Frankly, I will opt for the two - the first two options - because they offer the basis for mutual and respectable security and defense relationship between Africa and America.  Why do I say this?  Let us be reminded that over the years, Africa has undergone changes, and the bet of the African Union is an example of this.  </P> <P>Within the framework of the African Union, African leaders have resolved to have a common defense and security policy with clearly defined objectives.  Without going into detail about these agreed objectives, I would like to highlight a few of the relevant points as the basis for our discussion here.  </P> <P>As outlined in the objectives, Africa seeks to first ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa in conformity with the principles enshrined in the constitutive acts.  </P> <P>Two: To serve as a tool for the simultaneous enhancement of defense cooperation between and among African states, and the consolidation of national defense.  </P> <P>Three: Provide a framework for AU member states to cooperate in defense matters through training of military personnel, exchange of military intelligence and information.  </P> <P>Four: To enhance AU capacity for and coordination of early action for conflict prevention, containment, management, resolution and elimination of conflict including the deployment and sustenance of peacekeeping missions and thus will promote initiatives that will preserve and strengthen peace and development in Africa.</P> <P>Five: Develop and enhance the collective defense and strategic capacity as well as military preparedness of member states of the African Union and the continent.  </P> <P>Six: Provide a framework to establish and operationalize the African Standby Force provided for in the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU.  </P> <P>Seven: Provide a framework for humanitarian action to ensure that international humanitarian law is applied during conflicts between and among African states.  It will further provide a framework for addressing the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons as the -- at the continental, regional and national levels.</P> <P>And eight: Provide a framework for post-conflict, peace building and reconstruction.</P> <P>In order to operationalize these objectives, Africa is also on the verge of creating this standby force for the purpose of meeting the collective security needs of the continent.  Further, through the NEPAD - that is the New Partnership for African Development initiative - Africa has also set agreed objectives on security governance and development.  At the sub regional level, those who are first in West Africa have already began preparations towards the creation of the ECOWA s standby force in order to cater for a peace and -- peace support operations.</P> <P>All these objectives and efforts have emerged out of the concrete security challenges facing Africa today.  Many of the objectives outlined for AFRICOM certainly concern us in the continent.  We are interested in addressing the legacies of armed conflicts, health and humanitarian challenges we are faced with.  While there is a willingness to seek African solutions to these problems, we are also faced with the reality of weak capacity to address them.  We need training.  We need resources including financial and material and other things that will enable us to carry out our set targets and objectives.  </P> <P>It is here that Africa could benefit from AFRICOM; through the provision of training, equipment, logistics, financial resources and other pertinent support in that direction.  I think that Africa could also benefit from AFRICOM s complementary role to assist in African security initiatives without undermining them.  This will require the direct involvement of AFRICOM in African crisis situations.  </P> <P>AFRICOM has the relevant technical expertise - yes, and that may be required in certain crisis situations.  If Africa can benefit from such expertise through collaborative work, then such form of cooperation will benefit both Africa and the US.  Now, if the security relationship between Africa and the US is to yield fruitful results, then we need to spend a great deal of time discussing these options.  </P> <P>As far as the last option is concerned, it is doubtful whether such form of cooperation will work.  I say this because it is not -- it will not only invoke nationalistic feelings but will verify the assumption by critics of AFRICOM that their ultimate objective is to pursue a new colonialist agenda.  That one is established, that once established it will be converted into an interventionist force that will dictate African security policy.  That it will also Americanize African security thinking and policies; that it is highly self-interested and that it will not contribute to peace and security but undermine it by pitting religious communities that once lived in peace and harmony against each other.</P> <P>Overall, US security cooperation with Africa should be located within a context of the existing situation in Africa and also within the framework of the African Common Defense and Security Policy as agreed by the African heads of states and governments.  Anything that goes contrary to such an agreement could evoke emotions and ultimately undermine the purpose for which AFRICOM has been conceived and is being designed.</P> <P>Dear colleagues, if the proposals I have just discussed offer the best options for Africa-US relationship, then I think we will be moving forward in a positive way.  For example, the provision of training, education, equipment, logistics, mentoring and other relevant support will certainly enhance the capacity of the African security initiatives I have just discussed.  In a continent faced with the challenges of addressing armed conflicts, health risks, declining economies and pervasive poverty, such support could lead to mutual cooperation between us.  AFRICOM could raise Africa high on the US security agenda by virtue of establishing AFRICOM.  The marginalization of Africa in US foreign policy at the end of the Cold War could come to an end.  Africa has become strategic in the eyes of the US foreign policy thinkers, and this could generate more US interest in the continent.  Whatever the case, such interests should be of mutual benefit to both of us.  It should never be a one-sided relationship that benefits the stronger partner.</P> <P>Having said all that, maybe the point should be made that by incorporating Africa into the US security strategy through AFRICOM, the continent could become a likely target of terrorists and extremists.  We are reminded of the bombings of Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.  Moreover, since the 9/11 attacks on America, the war against terrorism has gained increasing importance in different parts of the world.  The United Kingdom was also a target in July of 2005.  With the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the crisis in the Middle East, we should never forget that the entire world faces the challenge of dealing with terrorism and extremism.  Africa, by hosting AFRICOM could invite more terrorists, terrorist attacks.  And given our weak security infrastructure, this would have adverse consequences on our national security situations.</P> <P>There are many nonmilitary security concerns that face Africa, including high unemployment, health risks, evasive poverty, declining economies and social conditions.  Terrorist attacks could compound these problems by undermining national cohesion and development initiatives.  I say this because, given our recent history during the Cold War, it is very easy for AFRICOM and the war against terrorism to be used as a basis for undermining the needs and democracies emerging in Africa using terrorism as an alibi.  Some opportunists, political leaders could easily abuse the rights of their citizens.  As we have seen in the past, said behavior could lead to national tension and create the basis for more conflicts.</P> <P>I wish to also remind you that one of the potential pitfalls of AFRICOM is that it could make Africa become a theater for the new scramble for resources between China and the US, Japan and Europe.  More importantly, it is their relationship between China and America that worry most people in our continent.  What happens if the Chinese leadership decides to establish the abolition of AFRICOM in Africa?  The only victim, as was the case during the Cold War, would be Africa and its people.</P> <P>Ladies and gentlemen, against the backdrop of all these, I would like to conclude by saying that the establishment of AFRICOM presents both opportunities and pitfalls.  However, we can overcome these by crafting policies that will lead to a form of cooperation between Africa and the US that is mutual and cordial.  Only through such form of cooperation will AFRICOM become a useful tool in achieving its objectives.</P> <P>Finally, please permit me to end my submission with what Abraham Lincoln, a great president of this country, once said a long time ago but which is still relevant today, and I quote, The probability that we fail in the struggle should not deter us from the support of a cause we believe to be just. </P> <P>Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.</P> <P> Mauro De Lorenzo:  General, thank you very much for that exceptionally clear and engaging and thought-provoking presentation.  I am happy to turn now to Ambassador James Kimonyo, representative of a country which faced, and continues to face, unique security challenges and which, as Paul Wolfowitz reminded us this morning, was left in the lurch in the 1990s during the genocide.  I am particularly grateful to the Ambassador for stepping in at the last minute to replace his colleague from the Rwandan Ministry of Defense who was unable to travel at the last minute.  In addition to his service here in the United States, Ambassador Kimonyo has also been the Rwandan Ambassador in South Africa and has twice served as a governor of a province in Rwanda.  Thank you very much for being here with us today.</P> <P> Ambassador James Kimonyo:  Thank you, Chairperson.  Really, I have to thank the organizer for giving us the opportunity to be part of this process.  When I was invited to come and speak in this event, I was kind of saying -- looking at the profile of the people that were going to be part of the panel; I thought I was not the right person to be part of this panel that you are seeing here, being seated between two generals who have worked in defense and military activities and who are more experienced than me in the area.  I will probably share part of my knowledge and, probably, the government of Rwanda s experience in this whole process.  It is a pleasure and honor for me to say that as Africans we are proud to realize the fact that we have made progress for the last 10 years in terms of dealing with the issues of conflict.  And I was asked to talk about the priorities in the context of security in African continent; I was saying to myself that, probably, I was not going to be able to cover the whole continent and probably use Rwanda as a case study to be able to probably put across the required message.  </P> <P>As you are aware, our country went through the most horrible human tragedy in recent history where one million people were killed.  And these were just simple innocent civilians that were killed by the government that was otherwise responsible for their protection.  And there was completely nothing from international community, including the U.S., to come and take these innocent civilians from the hands of the perpetrators.  It was possible -- it was even possible by issuing a statement warning the perpetrators not to kill these people; nobody issued even a statement.  People spent time trying to define what was happening in the country; in the mean time, people are being killed during the broad daylight.   Now, that experience and other situations should be telling us something what should be done in terms of protecting human lives.  It has happened to Rwanda; it has happened in other situations; it is still happening in other situations.  Now the big question here is are we doing much in terms of dealing with these issues?  As international community, collectively, are we doing much in terms of stopping more killings on the continent?  It is a big question.  Whatever mechanism we are trying to establish, the bottom line is are we positioning ourselves in terms of protecting the innocent lives?  It is the bigger question.  We are going to have this debate, we are going to have another debate tomorrow, and other debates are taking place currently.  And probably -- and I am very sure so many people are being killed at the same time we are discussing the same issues.  And they are coming up with the different structures to deal with these similar issues that are already taking place.  </P> <P>I do not see -- and probably, Mr. Chairman, I have to admit the fact that we are probably dealing with the issues of perception rather than dealing with the issue of whether we need AFRICOM.  And, probably, I would ask the Department of Defense and the U.S. government [indiscernible] whether the naming of that particular structure increases the level of bad perception.  If you talk about command, what it means by -- according to the generals I think they will probably tell us better; commanding is commanding, yes.  And if you are commanding Africa, they automatically get the resistance.  But if it was branded different and probably call it military cooperation or defense assistance or support mission or mechanism or unit, probably, people would understand because when you are reading between the lines and probably understanding what people presented this morning, the purpose is not to go and command Africa and to make decisions for Africa and to fight on behalf of African forces.  </P> <P>The essence of creating this command is to strengthen and increase the U.S. government cooperation with the African government to ensure peace and stability in the region and eventually attain sustainable socio-economic development.  I think we are dealing with the issues of perception rather than dealing with what is the intended purpose of creating AFRICOM.  My understanding when I was trying to read so that I will be able to contribute to this meeting -- I was made to believe and understand that the purpose of creating the AFRICOM is to strengthen the position of the U.S. government to be able to cooperate with the African institutions that are responsible to ensure peace and stability to be able to work in a more proactive and a more effective way.  </P> <P>Now, if this is the understanding, I think we should move a step further and try to understand the detailed terms of reference of this force.  How will they work with the existing African armies from different countries?  If [indiscernible] the issue of peacekeeping mission, how do we then bring the African command into play?  Are we positioning African command somewhere in Miami [phonetic] or somewhere else to say if there is anywhere in DRC we are going to take our place [sounds like] and go there and fight?  Or are we sitting with the African Union and the concerned government and sit down together and agree on how we are going to deal with the issues?  </P> <P>Because when we are talking about the security issues in the continent, for example - I should have mentioned this before - in our case, we have people who committed the genocide.  There is no doubt about it.  You do not need to conduct any research; they are known.  We know where they are.  We know what they are planning to do is to do their unfinished agenda of killing more people.  They are known.  Their location is known; geographically it is known.  I think the military defense can locate even where the headquarters where those particular forces are, but we do not -- we are not talking of things in a theoretical manner.  We have such an example of the existing genocidal forces existing in DRC that have been killing people, that continue to kill people, but we have failed to uproot such forces.  </P> <P>And it is my feeling and in my view that - and I think I have -- my natural inclination is that what the U.S. government is trying to do is to come up with a structure and a mechanism that will actually help the government and the continent to precisely deal with such problems rather than being seen as a country that is trying to command the world.  This is my understanding; maybe, I am wrong.  It is my own opinion but I think if we are trying to establish this, whatever we say even without taking much of our time, is that why can we not continue with such kind of dialogue to be able to make people understand the essence of forming a partnership and cooperation in the area of defense to ensure peace and stability in the region?  </P> <P>I have not read anything; I have not been informed by anybody that the purpose of this whole process is to probably create three or five units in Rwanda and Kigali and whenever we have a problem with the Interahamwe, the U.S. commanders goes on the front line and start fighting.  I have not understood that.  My understanding is that they are trying to create an environment where we all come on board and discuss issues of peace and security and be able to attain that, and probably the issue that other people have raised, including what my defense attach� has said that we should be moving beyond the point of looking at each other if we are going to fight the war. </P> <P>We are building the institutions that are moving us toward sustainable development [sounds like] and therefore that is why other people are talking about integrating the element of socio-economic development into the whole process, rather than having a purely military organization or structure, which I think I concur with the people who have said it because I think what has happened in the past is to go and stop the sounds of the bullets and then people goes back.  </P> <P>But I think what the new approach -- the paradigm that we are seeing is that we are trying to build a more sustainable economy and social integration to be able to achieve sustainable peace rather than stopping the fighting only.  And I think we will move further and discuss the issues of poverty, HIV-AIDS and other issues that people have raised.  But I think this is a good concept because AFRICOM has existed; we are not inventing the AFRICOM but maybe it was in a different location.  What people are trying to do is to say that instead of calling someone who is located somewhere in Miami [phonetic], can we have a liaison officer in the Horn of Africa?  Can we have a liaison office in the Eastern African region whom we can discuss the issue of Interahamwe and see if he -- even though we have the diplomatic commissions that exist but can we have something that is more oriented into issues of security and defense matters? </P> <P>So I think this is my humble contribution to this meeting and based on the fact that I am completely not an expert in the area of defense.  But I think combining both the defense people and diplomats and the politicians, we shall probably come up with a hybrid that will take us to another level of understanding each country s issues and agreeing on common approach to the problems.  I thank you very much.</P> <P> Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much, Ambassador.  We are going to turn now to Linda Thomas-Greenfield; she is the second highest ranking official in the Bureau of African Affairs at the Department of State.  She has served in many places in Africa.  She also has humanitarian experience as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Population, Migration and Refugees.  She has a lot to react to.  Thank you very much for coming to join us today.</P> <P> Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  Thank you very much.  Let me start by thanking my colleagues here at the podium because they really did take my thunder.  The great part about going last is everybody takes what you have to say and you kind of have to start over from scratch and make it up as you go.  And that is all for me to say that, basically, everything that has been said at this table I subscribe to.  There were some minor areas of disagreement that we might get into in our discussions but I think we are really basically on the same sheet of music.  </P> <P>So let me talk very briefly about what we see as some of the security challenges and many of the same that you have mentioned here today; what some of the security priorities we see out there; how we in the U.S. government, particularly in the State Department in the Bureau of African Affairs, how we have responded to those challenges and those priorities.  And then I will only briefly talk a little bit about AFRICOM in response to some of the comments here.  I understand that Theresa left a question for me; I did not hear it so at some point somebody will have to repeat it so that I can give you an answer.  </P> <P>The threat in Africa I think we all agree is a multi-faceted threat; it is not just a security, military threat but there are many elements to the threats that we have -- we all agree to exist in Africa.  Terrorism is one of them but it is only one of them and it is a big one, but it is not a threat that exists all over Africa; there are certain pockets where terrorism is a threat.  There is a greater threat as we have dealt with many of the wars that occurred in Africa over the past decade.  </P> <P>There is a threat of internal instability and dealing with internal instability in the countries that we are working with.  There is somewhat of a threat of militia; very separate from internal instability but armed who are people who have an agenda that is not particularly in the best interest of the government and people.  I would add to that threat narcotics, looking at the situation that exist in many countries in Africa and the narco-states that we are seeing coming about.  Religious intolerance is a major security threat, and I think the general mentioned that in his discussion.  Corruption is a threat to the security of Africa, and you rarely hear of corruption in the context of the security threat, but it is a threat to security in Africa.  And I think most importantly - and this was mentioned here today - is the threat that poverty is exacting in Africa.  And I do not remember where I heard it; if I heard it from someone here in this room I give you credit for it.  But poverty is the biggest tool that terrorists have at their disposal because they can use poverty and discontentment against governments.  </P> <P>What are some of the priorities in dealing with the threats that we have identified here?  The priorities are good governance; that is a major tool for dealing with the threat because if you have a sound government that is working, that is providing for the needs of the people, many of the threats that we have here would not be a reason for concern.  Development related to good governments -- development is a tool.  It is a high priority for dealing with security threats that exist.</P> <P>Having universal health and universal education is an important tool for governance and should be a high priority for governments to use in dealing with the threats that poverty imposes on Africa.  And I think someone mentioned conflict resolution and finding ways to deal with disagreements that people have that suddenly become so big that they become a threat to a country; land disputes, for example, can become that kind of threat; fights over access to water and access to grazing land.  These things are things that can be dealt with in the context of conflict resolution that should not get out of hand and lead to major wars and threats to securities of governments that we are seeing today.  </P> <P>How are we dealing with some of these threats?  I think someone mentioned that Africa has been sidelined since the Cold War.  That is one of those areas where I would have a major disagreement with you on.  I think I agree that there were no advantages to Africa in the Cold War; it was the blade of grass caught in the battle between the elephants.  But now, if we would look at some of the policies that the U.S. government has -- and I would look at policies over the last decade and probably two decades.  But more currently looking at programs like MCC, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the kinds of aid programs that they have put in place and the amount of money that they have brought to the countries in Africa that have met the requirements and the indicators of good governance, investing in their people, promoting trade and business, these are wonderful tools to deal with the security threats that we have identified here.  </P> <P>The AGOA -- promoting trade -- because African governments through their budgets are not going to be able to deal with the threat of poverty.  What is going to deal with the threat of poverty is having investment, having businesses that provide jobs, businesses that produce products and businesses that provide confidence in the government because they are paying taxes and these taxes are going into providing infrastructure that they need to operate in Africa.  </P> <P>I would add to these programs like PEPAR, dealing with the threat that malaria and other health -- and AIDS will impose on African countries, I think I would add to that all of our development assistance.  And part of the reason that you hear so much about assistance programs now and how those programs are being implemented is because I think we have come very late to the understanding that if programs do not provide visible change in people s livelihoods, they will have no impact.  So I think we have learned from the lessons of the past.  </P> <P>Just very specifically on AFRICOM -- and I will be prepared to answer any of your questions.  I did not hear what Theresa had to say, so I hope Theresa and I are on the same sheet of music if she is here.  For us, AFRICOM has always existed on the continent of Africa; there were three combatant commands operating in Africa and they have been there - PACOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM.  And what AFRICOM does is it is basically an internal reorganization within the U.S. government of how we relate to Africans, military-to-military.  So instead of having three combatant commanders meeting with the AU, visiting Africa in separate parts, having three strategies for dealing with Africa, now there will be one commander, one combatant command, AFRICOM, that will be dealing Africa.  And maybe the name is a little bit of confusion but we have EUCOM and no one ever said that EUCOM meant that we were going to control things in Europe.  </P> <P>What AFRICOM is, it is a description of how we will relate to Africa under one combatant command.  I think I have heard -- and from the humanitarian side of my background, the idea is that we do no harm.  And if you do no harm and you continue to do the things right that you are doing, I think people should be a little more confident that AFRICOM is not about dropping military troops on the continent of Africa and having military troops fight wars in Africa.  I will not play down the importance of counter-terrorism; I think that is very clear -- clearly part of our strategy.  But there are many other components of our command structure that are there that I think need to be looked at before we come to the conclusion that AFRICOM is not in the best interest of Africa.  </P> <P>The Rwandan Ambassador talked about strengthening and increasing U.S. cooperation in Africa; I think that is where we start.  It is about strengthening cooperation.  It is not about competing with China.  I think this probably came up during Theresa Whelan s discussion.  The U.S. has been in Africa for a very, very long time and not as colonial power.  The Chinese are coming to Africa and there are some benefits that Africans can look to.  I think Africans learned from the disadvantages of the Cold War, and there are advantages that they can exact from us as well as from the Chinese.  And they need to see the advantages to this and not see it as a competition for African resources because you, Africans, control those resources and you can define how those resources are being looked at by the various countries that are there.  So it should not be seen as a competition with the Chinese; it should be seen as an opportunity for better cooperation between the United States and Africa and for a more cohesive approach to our military-to- military relationship with Africa.  </P> <P>I will end with just one comment on the role that the State Department and civilian agencies will be playing in AFRICOM.  We were honored that the military asked for our views and asked for our participation in AFRICOM.  We have always had some civilians attached to combatant commands in terms of political advisers to the combatant command, and we have seconded individuals over the years to the combatant command.  This will be a more formal relationship between the State Department and the military but it is not - and I need to be very clear on that - it is not the State Department allowing the military to take over our diplomatic responsibilities.  Bilateral relationships and our multilateral relationships with Africans on a diplomacy basis will continue to be led by the State Department in terms of setting the policy priorities and being in the front line of the diplomatic relationships with governments.  </P> <P>That said, we see some major opportunities for us to influence how the military interacts with African governments from the inside.  And I think that once the command structure has started and is implemented, you will begin to see the advantages to that.  I will end and I will be happy to take your questions.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much.  We are going to take a round of questions.  We are running a bit late but that is okay, as long as we finish by two.  Lunch is waiting for us.</P> <P>But I'm going to start actually with our first question for General Tsadkan.  I cannot resist since he is here.  You commanded Ethiopian forces in one of the largest conventional wars that ever took place in Africa between 1998 and 2000.  If AFRICOM had existed then, what should its role have been?  How should it have ever reacted to that situation?</P> <P>Tsadkan Gebretensae:  Well, I think this is a very difficult question because I would be forced to speculate what could have happened.  Honestly, I do not know --I do not know what could have happened.  But I think if AFRICOM had been in Africa at that time, I think the international community and maybe the United States government would have gotten more concrete and realistic information on the political nature of the whole thing.  I think your satellites might have controlled our tanks and artillery, but I think the drivers of the war were more than the tanks and the artillery.  There was this political -- the political nature of the whole thing.</P> <P>I think at present, from hindsight, what I could say is there could have been a better understanding of the political intricacies of the whole war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.  I m very clear that this could be one-sided that is [indiscernible] and their command is the forces from the Ethiopian side against Eritrea and the Eritreans might have something to say.  But as far as I'm concerned, we were invaded and we were invaded at a time when the situation in our country was extremely bad.  And we were begging the international community at that time to rescue the whole situation.</P> <P>The Rwandese and the Americans came with clear information on what happened in May 19, 1998.  And that was not accepted; then the whole thing went -- maybe, this kind of concrete information might have helped to assist the understanding of the whole situation; otherwise, I do not know.  The other things, I cannot say much because once the mediation between the militias that was headed by Rwanda and the United States was not accepted by the Eritrean side, then I think things took their own momentum and it was resolved the way it was resolved in 2000.</P> <P>Maybe there was a strong component, which I'm not sure whether there would be a military component -- I do not know what it could have done.  The way I envisage AFRICOM at present is a force that will help to create the state capacities, particularly, military capacities of primarily the African Union and then, next, the countries in the region.  If this is the mandate and the mission of AFRICOM, I think in a situation where you have like what has happened in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the best thing that this command could do would be provide the most realistic information for the decision makers, be it the Unites States or the U.N.  I do not see anything more than this.  Thank you.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you.  Questions?  Professor Wise [phonetic]?  And if you could identify yourself, phrase your question in a form of a question and keep it brief --</P> <P>Professor Wise:  [Cross-talking] Wise, I'm with the Woodrow Wilson Center here in Washington.  AFRICOM has been described as a U.S. internal reorganization, and, obviously, that is part of it, but also as a project to increase and develop military-to-military relations; at the same time, conflict prevention and especially conflict resolution has been mentioned.  My question is whether the anticipated greater intimacy between militaries has the potential of reducing the capacity of the United States to act as a mediator in intrastate conflicts in Africa.</P> <P>Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  I ll try.  Again, I do see this as an internal reorganization, but there are other parts of it as well.  So I do not want to play down the other parts of it.</P> <P>My view is, if in our mil-to-mil relationships with African countries in building capacity that not only includes military capacity, but also the capacity of the military and the government to reach out to these people in consort with our development programs in Africa, we are going to see the less of that kind of conflict coming about.  But I think on the diplomatic side where we are involved in political negotiations with governments, I do not see AFRICOM as having any negative impact on that because we already have these relationships with African governments.</P> <P>We have them in the various commands that we have right now that exist.  And those have not impacted on our ability to operate as an objective mediator or in our efforts to use diplomacy to influence change.  If I did not [audio glitch] please, come back. </P> <P>Male Voice:  Intrastate conflicts involve, on the one side, state armies, and on the other side, rebel groups or rebel --</P> <P>Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  Exactly, that is exactly what I understood.</P> <P>Professor Wise:  Okay.</P> <P>Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  Yes.</P> <P>Male Voice:  Now, if you are very intimate with one side, are you in a position to mediate between those two?  That is the question.</P> <P>Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  Yes, I do not think -- there are very few situations where we, the United States, have been involved in mediating in internal conflicts in Africa.  But the point that I wanted to make is I think there will be fewer of those conflicts as we work with governments to build capacity to deal with the security threat so that there will not be, in the long run, as many of those internal conflicts because the government s capacity to work with their governance, to work with people to build confidence in the government -- and in communities that are outside of the government these conflicts will be fewer.  So, I think I understood what you were saying in the beginning but what I'm saying is that I think there will be fewer of those conflicts.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  There is a question at the back.</P> <P>Doug Brooks:  I'm Doug Brooks with the International Peace Operations Association and my question is to the African panelist.  South Africa has come out fairly negative or hostilely towards AFRICOM and its creation.  I'm wondering how does that influence the rest of Africa in terms of -- the rest of Africa is taking the creation of this organization.  And do you feel that this is a serious threat to this new command and its effectiveness?</P> <P>Robert Winful:  Yes, let me start off this way.  I know that, initially, AFRICOM was being discussed on country-to-country basis.  Gradually, what we are saying is that if that moves up to the regional and sub-regional level, it would be handled better.  What is happening in South Africa is just happening with South Africa; it really has no influence in other countries as it is because what we are all seeing is that -- go to ECOWAS; go to AU.  And whatever happens there would be more or less binding on other countries.</P> <P>In ECOWAS, our chiefs of defense staff, they meet quarterly and all these things are discussed -- AFRICOM -- everything is discussed.  So whatever decision is taken will be more or less binding.  And it is the same sub-regional levels would go to the regional level.  We are saying that -- what is African Standby Force?  African Standby Force is made of eight brigades from SADC, South Africa, from West Africa; we are spread out North and the rest of them.  So, what is happening currently as we said -- it is country-to-country basis.  This is their feeling: Hey, when you come to Ghana, it is a different feeling that we have ; you know, that is it.  So it would be better to deal with it at that level, and then whatever answer you get there should give you the direction as to what the others are doing; this time, one group and not individual countries.  So, from my side, this is what I think is happening.</P> <P>Tsadkan Gebretensae:  Yes, concretely, I think South Africa is a major player in the whole of Africa and particularly in Southern Africa.  South Africa is not opposed only to the establishment of AFRICOM, but they are at the same time opposed to the trade expansion of China as well.  So I think from the information I have, this will have an influence in Southern Africa.  There will be properly hardened states in South Africa will definitely listen to what they say and there is -- southern part of Africa is one sub-region in the whole security arrangement in Africa.  In the whole of Africa I do not think it will have much influence.  The situation is completely different as the general has said.  But my opinion is when dealing with the establishment of AFRICOM, I think it will be better to approach the whole issue from the point of view of dealing with the African Union collectively, and then identify African security priorities and deal with the whole challenges of African security as it relates to Africa in relation with the African Union.</P> <P>I think bilateral relationships have been going on for quite sometime.  My understanding is the United States government would like to raise the partnership from bilateral relationship to a higher level, to the African level.  And the ideal forum for this, I think, is the African Union.  And I think at the same African Union should have been very much involved in the debate and in the whole evolution of the idea as well.  I'm not -- they should have been very visible.  This is how I see it.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  I have noticed there has been a slight modulation of the South African position at least in the past few days.  And a clarification of what Minister Lakota is opposed to is thousands of U.S. troops and a headquarters in Southern Africa and so forth, but that the idea and principle is good so long as it stays in Germany.</P> <P>Male Voice:  Thank you very much.  I'm ambassador of Burundi.  I would like to know how the Department of State and the Department of Defense will articulate your actions on African continent.  You have mentioned very clearly the problem we are facing, such as corruption, governance, and others.  So how do you plan to pave the way of the African actions on the African continent?  Are you going to review your policy towards  Africa in order to facilitate the work of AFRICOM on the continent?</P> <P>As you have mentioned, terrorists can use poverty to see how to do a very bad thing on our continent.  How are you going to do concretely for -- to African countries in terms of economic programs, project?  Are you going to increase them to facilitate the activity of AFRICOM?  And concretely, the ambassador of Rwanda had mentioned the problem of the prisoners in [indiscernible] and all the negative forces on our sub-region to the [indiscernible] region.  How will AFRICOM help us to address such issues?  We do know that we have another forum, the Joint Commission of Tripartite Plus, which is a very important forum for countries and with the facilitation of the U.S. government.  But we would like to see concretely what -- how we can address our security problems.  Maybe I'm anticipating on the next panel, but I wanted to take advantage of the presence of Linda Thomas to see if she can help in this.  Thank you very much.</P> <P>Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  I would just say that we have an African policy.  And that policy existed long before the concept of AFRICOM came about.  There is the strategic policy that -- you can go online and look at the strategy for Africa; it is there.  That is not changing in any way.  So I think there is some confusion because AFRICOM it is not a diplomatic arm of the U.S. government; it is not the policy arm for the U.S. government.  The policies are established at the level of the State Department.  I think in the case of the Tripartite, we are proactively involved in the Tripartite.  If there is some role that we see that might be played by the U.S. military, that is something that we will look at with the Africa Command, or if there was no Africa Command, we would be looking at with EUCOM.  </P> <P>So there are some possibilities there; we do see working more closely with the military and seeing how the military can support our policy priorities in Africa.  But I do not think that anyone should assume that AFRICOM is going to change policy in any way.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  We are going to take one more question from this gentleman [audio glitch] and then we are going to lunch.</P> <P>Don Kirsch [phonetic]:  I'm Don Kirsch from the Institute of Defense Analyses.  I do not know whether this is the leftover question from the previous panel, but I think it is a bit of a follow-up.  Much has been made about AFRICOM being a new kind of command and having a civilian deputy that will have special authorities, the presence of other agencies.  I just wanted to get a sense from the State Department s perspective what kind of authorities do you see these civilians having, and what kind of resources will they be given to execute programs and integrate them at the interagency level?</P> <P>Linda Thomas-Greenfield:  Truthfully, I think that remains to be seen.  One of the two deputy commanders to AFRICOM will be a State Department officer, and that officer will be directing the civil-military component of AFRICOM and using the resources that AFRICOM has at its disposal to do programs in Africa.  That person will be reporting through the chain of command back to the State Department, and that person will not have any authority -- direct authority or direct links with our embassies overseas.  But we do see it as an opportunity for us to be with the military in their planning process so that we can not only guide them but advise the military on civil military programs that they are looking at doing on the continent.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thanks very much.  We are going to reconvene here, I guess, about 20 minutes for our third and final panel on Models of U.S.-African Security Cooperation.</P> <P>We have a lot on Liberia but also on the rest of the continent.  The Defense Minister of Liberia will be with us, as well as the former Force Commander in Liberia.  In the meantime, in the lobby, we are going to have -- there is some food.  Thanks.</P> <P> </P> <P>Panel III: Models of U.S.-African Security Cooperation</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Time to start moving to our seats.</P> <P>Please take your seats.  Are there people in the hall?  I want to thank all of you who have stayed through lunch and after.</P> <P>Our final panel promises to be, I think, as stimulating as the first two.  We have three gentlemen with an incredible level or amount of on-the-ground experience, particularly in Liberia, a case that was brought up on earlier panels.</P> <P>We are going to begin with the Honorable Defense Minister of Liberia, Brownie Samukai.  He assumed his post in 2006 after the election, which brought President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to power.  He has previously served in a number of capacities with the United Nations throughout Africa and served also in ministerial capacities in interim governments in Liberia during the transition there.  We will then turn to General Daniel Opande, who I ll introduce more fully before he speaks and to Michael Smith, the AFRICOM coordinator in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs at the Department of State.  Minister Samukai, I invite you now to begin.  Thank you.</P> <P>Brownie Samukai:  Well, thank you very much.  I'm very glad to have been invited this afternoon to say a word or two.  I guess you will agree with me, with the wonderful lunch that all of us has already eaten, I'm sure many of you will start getting sleepy in the next few minutes.  I ll try to help you not to sleep by just saying just a few things.  A lot have been said about AFRICOM and I do think that the rationale of setting [sounds like] up the question of where they are going to be deployed, I think we will leave that to the U.S. to decide.  But again, it is very important for me to share just a few things.</P> <P>From the angle of the kind of cooperation that could take place with the U.S. under the AFRICOM arrangement, I think the two generals previously spoke very well on all of the challenges that have to be faced, the perceptions that people have.  But one thing that became very clear to me early on that the better communication strategy for Africans to better understand what AFRICOM is all about probably needs to be looked at more robustly.  I think there is a need for that strategy to be able to go out and see exactly what it is, and I think news [sounds like] regional organizations, regional bodies, regional meetings, and also on the ground to explain to our people back in Africa what AFRICOM is all about.</P> <P>That question was lingering until Monday.  This last Monday, just before my departure from [indiscernible] I printed out for AFRICOM what the answers that they have; invited journalists on the weekend for some discussions on AFRICOM and there were a lot of questions exactly [indiscernible].  And I gave them copies of what we understood AFRICOM to be all about; the question [indiscernible] and then, also, I gave them a copy of the opinion written by President Sirleaf in June to other journalists.  And then by the two-and-a-half hours of lunch, I think the work [indiscernible] some understanding of what it is all about.  And then on Monday, I think about six or seven of the newspapers in the country all wrote about AFRICOM and -- well, Liberia and all the African countries were talking about.</P> <P>So, I believe it will be extremely important for a better communication strategy on the whole AFRICOM concept to probably go one step or two steps beyond, and on to the continent itself to get the message out.  It is our thinking that there is a lot of partnership mechanism that can work with a group like AFRICOM.  For one example, we think that AFRICOM will be bringing some specific expertise, expertise for which we may not have or a comparative advantage for which they already have, given a year in other functions and other locations.</P> <P>Say, for example, responding to natural disasters; we probably could better plan on how we can clean up our drainages to make sure the water does it [sounds like].  You could have some simple knowledge as that, or maybe just the issue of malaria, another issue of HIV.  I mean they have better knowledge, better expertise with the kind of information available to them.  So, a mechanism that can provide some information of cooperation I think could be very, very helpful to Africans.  </P> <P>There will be some concerns, though.  And those concerns may center around past suspicions that statements are made and it takes a long time to deliver.  And it is not intentional but it is just the bureaucracy of getting what the policy maker have said, getting things delivered.  But on the other hand, if you have probably a joint cooperation with the military - like we have the Office of Defense Cooperation for an example - you can quickly get things done; you can get the facts much quicker, much sooner and it makes it easier and reduces apprehension.</P> <P>So I believe where you have that kind of partnership and cooperation, make sure there is a complete flow of information that allow them to understand the bureaucracy in getting things done from the time it is stated to the time of implementation.</P> <P>Secondly, there are also certain technical expertise that AFRICOM could bring to bear.  The other one has to do with -- a good example I was giving to my colleagues on the table: in 1990, when war was on in Liberia and ECOWAS was responding to the crisis, there were in Freetown [indiscernible] planning on how to -- kind of beachhead landing.  But the question was they had no maps as to where they were going.  And they turned to -- only one person around the table was an American, and he said, You know, you know this place much better.  Can you guys take a picture from the satellite and give us some maps?   That expertise will provide it and the maps were there, and I think it made it easier.  So, there is a lot of areas of cooperation that could take place in which a comparative advantage is there.</P> <P>The other one we think is also important is capacity building for crisis prevention, for example.  We talk a lot about responding to crisis but what if we try to intervene much earlier?  What if going through some analysis of the environment, assessing the environment, and ensuring there is democratic good governance, ensuring there is the rule of law, and then trying to see where the genesis of the crisis could be?  Maybe it could be a land dispute, for example; or maybe it could be an ethnic rift, for example.  So, an earlier intervention I believe; a mechanism in which you can intervene early by different approaches can help to minimize conflict and to the benefit of all of us.  So you have invested so much in trying to solve problems, but why not invest in trying to prevent the problems before it arises. </P> <P>Now, what are some ways you could?  Maybe some ways could be through democratic good governance - ensuring that you have a rule of law, ensuring that people s rights are being respected, ensuring that people have a recourse to redress where someone s rights or someone s land issue have been trampled upon.  So I think I believe, in my opinion, it is also important that we do that.  </P> <P>Capacity building is also not just from the military side because my understanding is that there is going to be a deputy who is going to be someone from state and then people from AID come with that kind of perspective.  So what it means is that most of the programs that are going on to today, particularly my part of the world, West Africa, have a combination [indiscernible] of the embassy but also of AID and also of the DA that are the defense attach�s, that are also of the ODC, Office of Defense Cooperation.</P> <P>If you look at most of the programs that I have seen listed here - about 12 or 13 different kinds of operations involving the U.S. military in Africa - it makes sense to anybody that while you have all these operations scattered all over the place under different commands, bring it under one roof and let s see how the Africans can quickly get the message out that we can get to help them, they can get to help us, and even deal with the question of terrorism.  Because if people are too poor in a very poor environment, it breeds the opportunity for people to be taken advantage of, and that is something that you probably know much better than we do.</P> <P>Secondly, you also have the issue of your capacity for collection, for example.  You have a better capacity and better knowledge because those actions are no longer tied to a single country or a single border; it is now more global.  Trans-border actions, these are the things that take place.  For example, the ECOWAS countries just had a meeting in Dakar, Senegal I think about a week or two weeks ago, and they were discussing the issue of narco-trafficking.  The drugs that are coming from Colombia, being dropped off the Guinea Coast -- West African Coast.  And there was a point of contact, picking up and distributing all along the coast.  And in recent times, you probably heard the reports that have been published of this huge quantity of narcotics and money.  And, again, behind it is weapons and then later on you find civil war beginning because somebody wants a political foothold.</P> <P>So, with assistance and building African capacities to manage the coast -- for example, in Liberia we do not have that means and we have been running for the past 15 years in conflict; we have no means to border our coastal areas.  Now, probably the interest is not Liberia but using Liberia as a transshipment point to wherever they would like to go.  So if that kind of cooperation and capacity building through this kind of AFRICOM arrangement, we believe that it is a win-win situation for all of us.</P> <P>Well, now, is there anything wrong with this whole concept?  Indeed, there is.  There is apprehension based on the people s different countries [indiscernible] experience in working along with the U.S.  You may have some policy maker that say, We do not have permanent friends; we only have permanent interests.   Now, for the local population, we begin to make those statements.  They tend to reflect when you come up with something positive; there are [sounds like].  He or she is going to abandon me whenever that interest goes another way.  So, that it is extremely important.  You have to provide the kind of confidence that it is not a wishy-washy kind of relationship and partnership you are trying to establish, but a partnership that has mutuality of interest, regional interest, as well as continental-wide interest so that it reduces the apprehension and it improves the environment for cooperation.</P> <P>I mean, at this point I would like to probably leave it there and other questions that may come over later [indiscernible].  But we think that countries will have their own views and objections but we should look at regional organizations, regional bodies - you have the AU, you have ECOWAS, you have the Mano River Union, you have the SADC countries.  These are mechanisms to try to get the message out because that is where the policy makers go; those are the environment they go to.</P> <P>You also have civil society which you talk highly about.  So it is about time you use the civil society in those African countries themselves to understand what AFRICOM is all about.  If not, you will have civil society challenging the status quo in our countries as to why you need such a cooperation.  So a better communication of the strategy I believe can get most of these messages out.  Thanks.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much, Minister.  Lieutenant General Daniel Opande is one of the most experienced African peacekeeping commanders.  He has twice commanded peacekeeping operations in Liberia; he has also been the force commander of the UN mission in Sierra Leone and played a critical role in the transition of Mozambique from war to peace in the early 1990s.  He has also in Kenya served as Vice Chief of Staff of the army and I m very happy that he was able to join us here today.</P> <P>Daniel I. Opande:  Thank you very much.  Ladies and gentlemen, I would want to just augment what the minister has stated here and try to focus mostly on the type of partnerships that I believe United States and African countries need to focus more on currently and in the future.  Each country and each region in Africa would expect to develop partnerships - military partnerships, security partnerships - you name it, whatever partnerships.  These really vary from country to country; vary from sub region to sub region, mostly because each country has different threats, different needs, and different vision.  Over the years, we have seen closer military and security partnerships being developed by various African countries with the United States to protect the interests of those countries; in most cases, sometimes to promote the United States national interest in Africa.  </P> <P>To be specific, we have seen in the recent past countries in West Africa sub region, as the Minister has stated, develop closer security partnerships to deal with the internal threats posed by civil wars.  This partnership ranges from enhancing individual countries abilities to participate in peacekeeping and to improve their own military capacity to deal with civil unrest within their borders and, also, to upgrade their military equipment.  These African countries have also benefited from leadership and other training opportunities which are given by the United States military institutions.  </P> <P>If we turn to the East African sub region, there has been a steady improvement in developing U.S.-African security cooperation over the last two decades.  Prior to this period, the influence of the British, French and others surpassed that of the United States in forging closer security cooperation within the region in East Africa.  At the end of the Cold War, individual African countries began to slowly develop partnerships with the United States to either upgrade their military capabilities or equipment.  </P> <P>An example is Kenya, which over the years has benefited in training its senior leadership in the United States and in maintaining closer military cooperation with the United States.  This has not only benefited Kenya, but has also to a great extent benefited the United States in many ways.  </P> <P>Ethiopia, on the other hand, has restored its military cooperation with the United States which had been at its peak in the 60s and 70s.  Within the last few years, the advent of terrorism, which does not respect national borders, has awakened many African governments to the necessity of international cooperation to fight this scourge.  We have seen a good example of this cooperation in the Horn of Africa where several countries have joined the United States in building a Coalition of the Willing to fight this threat.  </P> <P>In my view, most African countries are concerned with and would expect the United States to cooperate with them in eliminating or controlling the following security threats: international terrorism; cross-border trafficking of arms, persons, and drugs; environmental degradation; natural and manmade disasters and conflicts.  Consequently, I believe that both the United States and its African partners should recognize that peace and security in the continent would be better served and assured if the United States cooperates with its African partners to develop and cement their capacity to handle these key threats.  Areas of cooperation may include cross-border policing, environmental management, disaster management, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution.  </P> <P>Finally, on the issue of AFRICOM, I have mixed thoughts as I m uncertain as to the thinking of the United States military on the development of the concept and operational direction this organization is going to take.  I would have -- I hope that the cooperation would be mutually beneficial to both sides.  There is a need for in-depth discussions between the United States military, the African militaries, and the continental bodies concern to develop trust and closer cooperation in shaping the future of this very important organization and to ensure its relevance and impact in addressing some of the security needs of the continent.</P> <P>Africa is facing numerous challenges which can only be addressed through concerted cooperation with the developed world.  I think the time has come when the United States must encompass Africa in discussions, not provide food to Africa without having discussed with the Africans what type of food you want.  I thank you.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much, General.  I m going to turn now to Michael Smith, who is the coordinator for AFRICOM in the State Department in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which, as  I learned recently, is the part of the State Department that interfaces between the policy sides of the Department and the Defense Department and implements many of the security cooperation programs that we have been discussing.  He himself spent 24 years in the U.S. military.  He was a Foreign Area Officer for Africa, retired as a colonel, and has since served as a U.S. adviser to the African Union as well as to forces in Liberia.  I m very pleased to welcome you here today.  Thank you.</P> <P>Michael L. Smith:  I would like to be prescriptive about models of U.S.-African security cooperation.  Having looked at security cooperation that is on the continent now, I would like to provide a synthesis of what has worked well and why not, and what has not worked well and why.  This synthesis will offer seven possible characteristics of AFRICOM security cooperation programs as we move forward.  I would not want to get too much into specific programs now; I can answer some questions about those if they come up.  But I really would encourage us to look forward about what the potential is on the continent.  </P> <P>The first characteristic might seem to be a blinding glimpse of the obvious, and that is that effective security cooperation programs involve shared security interest and that is that cooperation programs should benefit the security posture of each country.  In fact, sometimes the partner who is contributing resources, whatever those resources may be - training or money or logistics or material -- sometimes, they are keener to maximize their own security interest than that of the recipient country.  Sometimes, the recipient country receives these wonderful things but they do not fall into a coherent security interest scheme for them.  So it should be a mutually-shared interest.  Now, United States has presidential determinations with a large number of countries already on the continent and with two multilateral organizations, the African Union and ECOWAS.  And so there is already established the ability to engage in security cooperation with those two organizations.  That is important because I think you have heard several speakers talk about their respect for the multilateral organizations on the continent, especially the African Union, and working through that in a number of ways.  ECOWAS, quite frankly, is quite strong and it is another one that United States works with.  </P> <P>The second characteristic is that the security cooperation programs should reflect true partnership.  This partnership usually comes in the form of collaboration which we sort of break down; if you will look at it closely on four levels -- a low level of collaboration to a high one.  At the low level, you are really just communicating with one another; you are discussing matters; your level of awareness of each other, security interests, needs, requirements, et cetera, is increased.  The dialogue is critical and is important and it should inform the other three levels.  But then you take it to the next level if you start actually cooperating in your approach to security programs.  </P> <P>The third level of collaboration would be coordination.  This would mean that you get together and before you actually even develop your programs that are on oriented on security, you actually work them together in the development so they complement one another, but still separate.  The highest level of collaboration would be co-working, and this is where you actually join together and accomplish that same objective by working together communication, cooperation, coordination, and co-working at the highest level.  </P> <P>The next is an effective security cooperation program between the United States and Africa should appropriately balance security cooperation activities with democracy development activities and development activities.  You heard Linda Thomas-Greenfield catalogue all of the security threats in Africa, and one of them is poverty, to state one example.  If that goes unabated, you can do everything you want with the security cooperation program but it will be outpaced by the challenges that are presented because of your neglect of the economic sector and other sectors.  If you can imagine this like a tripod with democracy, development, and security as the legs of the tripod, if any of those legs is imbalanced, the state does not benefit from that.  </P> <P>Associated with that same tripod concept as fourth point is that the Security Cooperation Programs should be appropriately integrated within the security sector.  And by that, I mean this: the security sector in countries, obviously, is more than the military.  Even the great thing is in the United States, our military is absolutely incredible.  I have had the great benefit of seeing most militaries in the world close and in important ways.  The United States military is absolutely incredible, but it is so incredible; it comes in and if it sees a problem, it tries to solve it and they put a lot of energy into it.  If you do that with the security sector of many African countries, they will get built up.  The police will not get built up, the border control will not, the immigration, intel services, and so forth.  You will wind up with a military sector - that portion of the security sector - getting back into internal security functions because the police cannot do it, et cetera, and we do not want this imbalance.  So there has to be an appropriate balance with all parts of the security sector in terms of security cooperation.  </P> <P>The fifth element, I would mention, is really important.  That is in the Security Cooperation Program that has begun between AFRICOM and its African countries or multilateral organizations, should be oriented on generating self-sustainment [sounds like].  Whatever proficiencies that they convey - AFRICOM to the recipient countries or multilateral organizations - there has to be a handshake; there has to be a glide-path [sounds like] for self-sufficiency, self-sustainment.  You do not want to build dependency.  One way to do this is by focusing on institutions.  Institutions are great repositories for the proficiencies conveyed through these programs.  </P> <P>The sixth item has been said, I think, by General Winful and the defense minister from Liberia and General Opande, and that is there are legitimate extant security concepts and organizations on the continent now.  Someone mentioned the Common African Defense and Security Policy, which is part of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture comprised of that policy; the African Standby Force, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System.  All of these things Peace and Security Council, even the AU commission itself - carries out some of these functions.  So it actually has a supportive orientation from the member states.  It should be used.  Currently, United States is doing that and should build on that.  There are some hearing [sounds like] difficulties when you go through a multilateral organization.  It is probably not the only thing one does but it is a key thing.  </P> <P>Lastly, as a seventh point -- and each of us has a -- we have been having old home week here and we were drawing diagrams and everything but -- and the minister said it so well.  We must complement and seek to not to be redundant to what other willing countries are willing to do.  For example, in Bamako there is a Peace Support Operations Training Center that just opened up.  They moved it -- at first it was in Cote d Ivoire, in Zambakro and then there was a bit of a problem there in September 2002.  So they moved it outside of Bamako.  Where was that?  Yeah, that is right [indiscernible] so now, they opened it up a couple months ago in Bamako -- beautiful facility.  Who is leading that effort?  The French.  And others are there - the Germans are there; the Canadians are there.  The budget that it runs on is several million dollars and United States gave US$100,000 to it for information technology equipment.  </P> <P>So people were asking us, That is all you are doing?  Can you not do more?   The answer is, Absolutely, we can do more but why should we?   It is already being done.  Let s go look elsewhere.  There is plenty of needs out there.  Let s go look elsewhere.  We are in partnership with everyone that wants to help.  Identify the requirement and we will all see who can respond to what parts of that requirement.  We should seek to complement and not be redundant to other partners efforts.  As regards to China, more specifically -- clearly, we have a mature relationship with France and the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and other donor countries.  China, we do not have a mature relationship but we are not in competition with them either.  </P> <P>So, ladies and gentlemen, what I tried to do is identify to you seven possible characteristics of effective security cooperation programs that AFRICOM might adopt or adhere to as it moves forward.  If it does, it will likely be more successful than if it does not.  Thank you.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much, Mike.  There is really no way to sum up all of the things which have come out of this discussion.  But before we move on to questions, I want to hone in on a few points, I think, that emerged.  One is that AFRICOM succeeds - I said this before; many others have said it in different ways - to the extent that it aligns itself with African security priorities as expressed in the AU Security and Defense document.  You heard some specific offerings from the generals and ministers whom you have heard from today.  Those of us, especially those of us who are, through AFRICOM, starting to get to know Africa for the first time, have to be careful of images from the past which may be lodged in our heads. </P> <P> Africa still has a lot of problems but has many fewer problems than it did 10 years ago, 20 years, and 30 years ago.  You have structures on the continent which, while not perhaps as robust as parallel structures in Europe or somewhere else, are nevertheless, very important developments.  The African Union -- some of the regional organizations are taking on some of these responsibilities in a slow but increasingly important way.  </P> <P>Second, in terms of bilateral relationships, what we should be trying to do through AFRICOM and through the whole panoply of the tools at our disposal is offer a security partnership to democratic allies in Africa and offer the kinds of things which are going to reinforce democratic governance; civilian control over militaries, for example.  On the first point, peacekeeping has come up a lot; we have a lot of peacekeeping experience here.  </P> <P>Peacekeeping missions are different than combat missions and they require different kinds of equipment, different kinds of logistics, different kinds of training, doctrine, and strategy.  Hopefully, the United States will be the partner that countries and organizations turn to for that kind of very focused training and equipment.  For those militaries which are interested in retooling themselves to participate more fully in the peacekeeping missions which will inevitably continue to be necessary on the continent.  </P> <P>Third, we have identified in a way of failure of strategic communication, whether it is on the part of the Defense Department or who can be discussed.  But there has clearly been a miscommunication from the beginning on the topic of AFRICOM; that the South African Defense Minister can believe that AFRICOM means thousands of troops descending on the continent suggests that something has not been communicated.  What we have noticed or, at least, what I have noticed from the discussions today - from what American officials have said and from what African officials have said - is that there is a lot less disagreements.  There are many more points of contact and points of agreement and overlapping where interests coincide than you will be led to believe from the way it has been portrayed in the media.  </P> <P>And finally, AFRICOM will obviously have unintended consequences.  As it gets established, as has been said, we should not expect it to be very different at the beginning than our relations have been with Africa under EUCOM and CENTCOM and PACOM, at least, for the time being.  Another conclusion, to echo General Jamerson, is that there is no reason to rush; we have a lot of time to think through these issues and we should be cautious and slow.  </P> <P>But I think the creation of AFRICOM -- because of the kinds of focused discussions it will force in Congress every time a budget comes up, there will be a seat for Africa at the table when joint chiefs meet.  It will inevitably force, or I hope it will inevitably force, U.S. government policy on Africa over time to become more normal, to take the phrase that Tom Donnelly used when he introduced the session this morning - a more normal foreign policy which covers the whole range of mutual interests and common threats that we engage with in all countries.  </P> <P>Our policy in Africa for good reasons has tended to be overwhelmingly humanitarian.  What we are learning and finding is that the only way you really cut off the things that cause humanitarian problems is to have a policy which engages on all issues.  So we have a lot of time for discussion and we will open the floor up to questions.  In the back there? </P> <P>John Gacinya:  I m Lieutenant Colonel John Gacinya from the Embassy of Rwanda.  From the discussion that has so far been going on, I learned that AFRICOM is not a new thing; it has been there.  It is something that has been working under the umbrella of [indiscernible] Command.  But the way it has been working, I m quite skeptical over the improvements that are going to be made as far as capacity building for African force is going to be because in terms of training and equipment, over time we have had forces and operations, for example, in Sudan.  Rwanda government forces actually had the problem of equipment.  The adversary who was against them had more superior arms than them.  So it was even very difficult for our forces to keep themselves and even protect the civilians they are supposed to protect.  Further, again, in terms of professional training, the funds have been so limited and up to this end I do not know how far -- if it is not a secret, how is the budget going to be in terms of peacekeeping and professional training on the African forces?  Can you give us how it is going to stand?</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Would you like to take that, Mike?  [Cross-talking/Audio glitch]</P> <P>Michael L. Smith:  Okay, it always works that way, does it not?  Okay, that was Colonel Gacinya, I think, back there, my dear friend who does not want to come to my office and ask me that question.  He always wants to know how may PKO dollars Rwanda is going to get.  But it is a good question because the question is we created AFRICOM -- are there more dollars available?  I can just say that through Fiscal Year 2008, generally, what the administration is requesting is higher and currently I do not know if there is going to be any special -- right now, there is no special plus-up [sounds like] with the establishment of AFRICOM.  So that is the aggregate number of peacekeeping operations dollars which I think many of you may know is one of the forms of security assistance that the United States extends to countries; I m trying not to get into the government-speak too much here but that is one form of it.  Now, there are number of factors that determine how much any given country gets and that continues to march in the way that it always has -- how those allocations are made.  </P> <P>So in summary, the critical thing is right now, with the establishment of AFRICOM, there is not a concomitant major increase in the security assistance dollars because that has happened.  Rather, it is there.  There may be more money that comes to Africa because of that -- I do not know.  But there is no one-to-one correlation between the two now - establishment of AFRICOM and the Security Assistance funding.  Does that answer your question?  Thank you.  [Audio glitch]</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Oh, here is General Jamerson.</P> <P>James L. Jamerson:  We talked both on the panel but, also, several times today about different ways AFRICOM can be successful or AFRICOM can be in trouble.  But I would be interested in the views of -- if you believe that you got to be successful early on or you are going to have difficulty, what should AFRICOM take on?  I know it is kind of a tough question but specific to perhaps a single event or -- we talked in a lot of generalities but if we want the command to be successful, I have always believed you plant a victory flag early and that helps you but then if you fail early, you will live with it for a long time.  </P> <P>Daniel I. Opande:  In my view, I think once it is established, it should go out there.  I m not saying that marshal the troops and go to Africa and show the flag, but they should go out there and engage themselves with knowing what Africa is all about.  What are the challenges that, perhaps, if better focused on would not only help them know what Africa is all about but also help Africa to move on with AFRICOM.  If they sit in Stuttgart for the next five years and they are not being felt to be part and parcel of our continent, then you will just have wasted those thousands of dollars if not millions of dollars.  </P> <P>Brownie J. Samukai:  If you want to probably get to know as part of the flag-winning situation - if you want to put it in that way - that you could arrive in country X and discuss at the policy level.  Whereas if you were to have further discussions if you went down to probably another suburb or another locality of the city and ask them, What are your concerns here, it might be different from what the policy people are talking about.  Maybe they are concerned with the illegal fishers that are out there, or maybe they are concerned with these new barrels of thing that are falling on the sea; that is talking more of narcotics.  Or maybe they are concerned with malaria.  There are comparative advantages that are available with this kind of partnership and cooperation.  But you have to be very clear and make sure you get that message out and get it out much early so that you can manage and contain expectations and perceptions and what have you.  The reality may be different but it is the perception that is now prevailing.</P> <P>Male Voice:  Maybe I want to contribute to specifically what he asked about what specifically we are talking about here.  I m happy Michael in his last statements mentioned about the peacekeeping centers and the fact that America did not do much.  If we are making friends or you are making partners, you must be ready to sacrifice maybe more or less.  Unfortunately, let me put it this way: America has come into - and if I can borrow that word - asymmetrical partnership.  America has so much; Africa has quite a little.  Therefore, through the partnership, we want a lot, but the little that you also want is so dear to your heart.  So you must be ready to contribute a thousand dollars while Ghana is going to contribute $10.  This is the partnership we are talking about.  </P> <P>You see, Africa started talking about Standby Force 40 years ago.  [Indiscernible] moved the idea 40 years ago for an African high command.  And still, we are attacked [sounds like] because there are certain inputs Africa is not getting.  Therefore, once you are ready to partner, this is what we are asking for.  We started peacekeeping long ago.  Ghana has been in peacekeeping for 40 years; I m citing an example.  Forty years -- and after about 10 years - 30 years ago - we started wanting to establish Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Center.  We called on our friends, partners, America included.  It took the Germans to build it for us.  It took the French to present an input [sounds like] into it.  It took the British to come a little bit into it.  As I stand and speak, America has put only ACOTA and where is ACOTA?  As we stand, ECOWAS has adopted the three levels of the peacekeeping institutes.  Nigeria, the strategic [indiscernible].  Ghana, the operational level at Kofi Annan and the tactical level is what has gone there.  ECOWAS -- this is the partnership again we are building with Africa, and ECOWAS has gone through all these.  </P> <P>So the common man in the street, the average person says, What kind of partnership do we have in America at the country level, the sub regional level, and the regional level?  I do not see it.   So if AFRICOM is coming, what is it bringing?  What are we talking about?  Our demands as partners may be huge in American eyes.  We are not expecting, maybe somebody says, shiploads of stuff but, at least, what will make us tick [sounds like].  </P> <P>In 1998 or thereabouts -- 97, when we were in Liberia as ECOMOG, we had a battalion; we were asked to put up a second battalion.  It was really difficult.  The will was there --  political will was there -- everywhere was there.  How do we go [sounds like]?  Fortunately, America came in and equipped a complete battalion of 850 completely, from boots to machine guns.  What was the result?  Excellent.  That accelerated the first solution to Liberian crisis.  This kind of help, assistance, or whatever is what we are talking about.  ACOTA has been there; I remember about six years ago, the question came up.  Say, training for logistics, so the question was asked, Can we not come up with some training package for logistics?   I said, My friend, we do not need the training in logistics anymore up to this date.  Well, we will need it but, I mean, for the moment we have had enough.  What we need is the logistics itself and not the training.   Thank you very much.</P> <P>Michael L. Smith:  Can I respond to that? </P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Please.  Please do.</P> <P>Michael L. Smith:  My dear brother, thank you so much for that.  I m not being defensive; I think it is instructive if I can disaggregate what he said and offer you some other perspectives on it.  First off, I did not mean to say that the United States does not want to support peace operations training centers.  We really love them because they are institutions and they are the very repositories I alluded to earlier.  It is true that in Accra, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, the United States amongst the donors is not high, but we would have been had there been a need to be.  I wanted to point this out now because this is an example of a partnership I talked about with our other partners.  We actually sat down and discussed the three levels you talked about.  The tactical level center and a peace operations training center in Zambakro - the French were going to do that.  Well, I said, okay.   The operational level center in Kofi Annan - there was going to be a hybrid approach to that.  A strategic level approach to a peace operations training center to be based on Nigerian National War College - the UK was going to do that and that is still developing.  We did a hybrid at the operational level as a partnership and we sought to be partners and not the big-shouldered Americans.  We are still comfortable with that approach, meeting the needs wherever they might be.  So that is that part of the discussion.  There is a lot peace operations training centers throughout the continent and we look at every single one to see what we can do to raise it up,  to do these very things that we have just talked about.  </P> <P>Now, as regards to security assistance in general which was part of your short presentation, I do not want to start citing a lot of statistics about what the United States does on the continent in terms of security assistance because I think pretty much everyone here is part of the informed public and they are aware of what we are doing in Darfur and what we are doing in southern Sudan and what we are doing in the Great Lakes area, on and on.  </P> <P>You mentioned ACOTA.  Just to take one sample for you - in Fiscal Years 2005 to present, we have trained almost 30,000 Africans for peacekeeping -- 30,000.  We have equipped them with individual equipment and unit level equipment but not major end items like trucks, et cetera, though we have done that, too, but not all of those 30,000.  And listen to this one.  Of that 30,000, 26,000 were deployed to current peacekeeping operations -- 26,000 out of 30,000.  That is not bad; that is making a difference.  I mean, that is really what you want in terms of security cooperation achieving that and forestalling the loss of life, destruction of property.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thank you very much.  We have time for a few more -- Ambassador Schermerhorn.</P> <P>Lange Schermerhorn:  Thank you.  I m Lange [audio glitch].  We have talked here about reorganizing the existing commands into a single command but in fact, each of those three commands has had a very different approach in what they have been doing in Africa.  In fact CENTCOM has, [audio glitch] various programs [audio glitch] and now they have in [audio glitch] [audio glitch]  tools of engagement [audio glitch] the lessons learned [audio glitch].  How do you plan to [audio glitch]?</P> <P>Michael L. Smith:  Thank you very much for the question.  In fact, there is an extensive effort to capture best practices and lessons learned.  The AFRICOM transition team in Stuttgart has done several things.  First off, they had lessons learned and best practices seminars in which the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, CJTFHOA, contributed to those lessons, but there is more.  They have actually contracted -- the Office of the Secretary Defense has contracted an organization to go out and do an extensive study of best practices, et cetera, that might be applied in humanitarian assistance areas, et cetera, such that they do not conflict with AID and remain subordinate to that and what is the proper balance and how could that best be done.  So they have got that going.  The Joint Forces Command has a J9 section to it that is also doing the same thing; it is trying to catalogue all the activities to include the Humanitarian Assistance ones, identify what has worked best and what has not and make recommendations to Africa Command.  The State Department has nothing to do with any of that.  I mean, AID is involved, et cetera but I mean -- what I m saying is the Defense Department has led that effort and we will see what happens.  Right now, the process is admirable.  I do not know what the end state will be.  Thank you.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Anything else?  Professor Wise [phonetic].</P> <P>Professor Wise:  In all of these discussions, the state and the government have been treated as a single entity, almost, as synonymous.  That is fine when you have a government that is responsible, hopefully, democratically elected, et cetera.  But realistically speaking, there are a number of historic situations and current situations where the notion of state interest and government interest are diametrically opposed or, in any case, very, very different.  I wonder whether you see a connection or a problem between the development of institutional relationships between the United States military and, especially, regional organizations which may include a mix of those kinds of situations and the commitment towards conflict resolution and democratization concern for the common man.</P> <P>Brownie J. Samukai:  As a full-package question, Professor, I will try to see how I can just give you just a couple of examples where that cooperation is working presently.  For Liberia, I would say that we have the U.S. military that is helping us to restructure the Liberian military under the SSR program.  We have a Defense Department person managing the State Department program with money coming from different [indiscernible] the U.S. government.  There is that kind of cooperation and we are in the middle.  When Defense Department wants something to go to State and then State say, Okay, we need to go back to Congress, and let s see if Congress can give something and maybe AID comes in.   Then, you have a regional hub of logistics for the ECOWAS Standby Force which is in Sierra Leone that they got them to provide some equipment until the U.S. can get the money.  There is that kind of cooperation now clearly visible to the benefit of Liberia under the SSR program.  It can be a combination of those institutions multi-faceted approach that, at least, can work to the benefit of the African country.  </P> <P>The other thing I will say is that on the ECOWAS side, I went to the ECOWAS Chief of Defense staff meeting in Nigeria.  At that meeting, in the closing session where all the advisers or what you call the representatives of the U.S., the French, the British, and everybody else -- so there is a partnership that people realize with regional bodies such as  ECOWAS that can work, particularly in the development of the ECOWAS Standby Force.  If you are going to have the ECOWAS Standby Force under the entire AU security arrangement for the continent that is supported, for example, by the AFRICOM arrangement, I believe it enhances not only the domestic interest of the ECOWAS countries but at the same time United States own interests and concerns, and at the same time, the partnership development to the AID programs.  So training leaders at the ACSS - for example, young African leaders - is one way the partnership can expand.  Supporting the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Center, for example -- well, a lot of African countries, particularly in west Africa and elsewhere, go regularly for training programs and short-term courses with sponsorships, say for example, by the British or sponsorship by the French or sponsorship by the U.S. -- all goes to show the kinds of partnership that Michael was talking about.  </P> <P>So we think, Professor, that it is challenging; it is evolving.  And if we can get that partnership across in a much clearer vision for people to see and understand, it will help.  But if we sit only in Washington and try to articulate what is to the benefit of Africans and wait only for [indiscernible] go back to Accra or to Monrovia or to Nairobi to explain, it is going to take a tough time to [indiscernible].  He is from the government side or they will say, He worked for the United Nation before, or they will say, He is from the military.   It is best that the policymakers who are helping to bring this concept together will need to get out of Washington and go maybe to Ethiopia and like.</P> <P>You had a meeting in South Africa --the meeting you had in South Africa -- we did not hear about it in West Africa until later on.  We read it in the paper.  There is a little column that shows up.  There was a meeting that took place in South Africa that has to do with AFRICOM.  It did not make any headlines anywhere.  We need to move now, beyond just a closed door discussion -- the discussion that is out there because you may have very good friends who are willing to partner with the U.S. under the AFRICOM arrangement.  That idea has to be sold just as it has been sold to policymakers and organizations here.  </P> <P>Similarly, it has to go to Africa in order to be sold at a continental level; that is, with the AU, and the regional level with ECOWAS, or the sub regional level with [indiscernible], for example.  Liberia gained [sounds like] in Sierra Leone, a country that have been in conflict over the past 17 years over a lot of investments by the US in supporting United Nations mission; investment by Ghana in helping to bring stability to Liberia [indiscernible] by Ethiopia who also contributed troops to bring peace to the region.  </P> <P>You will need to make sure that those sub-regional bodies are themselves well-informed to appreciate what AFRICOM is bringing as well as the regional bodies such as ECOWAS who is getting your support to bring the ECOWAS Standby Force up and ready.  Then at the same time, on the continental body that is the African Union that is working towards bringing the African Union AID brigades that the General talked about.  I think that there is a potential for great cooperation and partnership but we need to take that information out of this location and expand it on the continent sufficiently for our people to understand.  </P> <P>I will go back and see what I have to see with regards to the conference.  But it would be best if Michael was there and have discussions with civil society to let civil society know what is going on.  I m sure they have that in their plans but in our thinking, that is what is needed.  You need to get the message from here to there and then you have this kind of close interaction and I think it is going to really work and work much better.</P> <P>Daniel Opande:  I would just want to add one thing.  That the way you look at things in your governmental organization is slightly different from the way we look at it in the African context.  When we talk about governments that are responsible to the people and the governments that are [indiscernible]  not responsible to the people, you really have to go deep and find out.  Is it true that these governments are just wishy-washy?  Thank you.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Is there any other question?  Right here.  There is a microphone coming for you.</P> <P>Katy Gabel:  Katy Gabel with allAfrica.com.  I was wondering what would happen in case regional organizations that AFRICOM would be working with or through have a serious disagreement with the State Department.</P> <P>Michael L. Smith:  You have to work it out.  No, really.  Seriously, let s take a look right now.  You have UNAMID, United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur.  This has been a tremendous challenge from its inception.  It is ground breaking and innovative.  It is difficult.  But, for example, when the United Nations solicited pledges from countries to contribute troops and police, they got pledges.  And for example, they got 15 battalions worth and they only need eight.  They could not say yes to anyone until the AU approved that.  And even as I speak to you at this moment, there is a challenge because the United Nations has its slate of who they think is appropriate for the mission and they want to tell them you are good to go, let s get on with it.  And the African Union has its considerations and they are working it out; it will be worked out.  It is not efficient, but I would imagine as we move forward that as any interface in AFRICOM may have with this organizations, of course, will be from the State Department, quite frankly.  We will work it out; we just work it out as long as we have the shared mutual interest that got us into that partnership in the first place.</P> <P>Mauro De Lorenzo:  Thanks.  Any last questions?  Well, thank you very much for coming.  It has been a long day of AFRICOM.  Thank you in particular to our participants who have traveled from so far, and maybe you can join me in thanking them for coming.  Thank you.</P> <P> </P> <P>[End of file]</P> <P>[End of transcript]     </P> <P> </P></body></html>