

THE FRONTLINE COUNTRY TEAM

A MODEL FOR ENGAGEMENT



Christopher Griffin

Thomas Donnelly



A Report of the American Enterprise Institute

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Foreword

For over sixty years, the United States has sought to build the capabilities of its allies and security partners. This is a mission that has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and it is one that any administration, be it Democratic or Republican, will inherit in January 2009. As a longstanding strategic goal, building partnership capacity has also dredged up a series of contradictions and conundrums for American policymaking, as officials attempt to foster governance without fueling dictatorships, engage “frontline states” without becoming enmeshed in their internal feuds, and manage the details of convoluted international partnerships from the confines of Washington. Resolving these contradictions—or at least mitigating them—is the principal ongoing challenge of American security cooperation programs.

In this report, we provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs, as well as a modest proposal for how they may be improved in the future. We find that many of the authorities and instruments for engagement already exist, but that they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the “frontline country team,” in

which the ambassador is responsible for coordinating and directing American policy. We argue that the country team is the point at which the rubber of American policy hits the road and where it will ultimately succeed or fail.

As we prepared this report, we benefited tremendously from the insight, advice, and support of several friends and colleagues. Our colleague Gary J. Schmitt both worked with us to develop the frontline country team concept and, in his capacity as director of the American Enterprise Institute’s Program on Advanced Strategic Studies, provided crucial support to get this project off the ground. Col. Robert Killebrew (USA, Ret.) was a key partner as we developed the “frontline country team” proposal, as well as the seminar game in which we tested it. A wide number of current and former U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and officials provided crucial input based upon their experiences in the field and in Washington. The Smith Richardson Foundation generously provided support for the Indonesia seminar game. This project could not have been completed without the tireless efforts of AEI research assistants Tim Sullivan and Catherine Hamilton. Needless to say, all errors and omissions in this report are those of the authors.

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American Engagement: Ends, Ways, Means

The first, the supreme, the far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

Carl von Clausewitz¹

Since the end of the Cold War, American statesmen and military commanders often have found this question too hard to answer. That is perhaps understandable. They faced a situation without precedent: the United States was, and still is, rightly regarded as a sole superpower, a globe-girdling presence politically, economically, militarily, and culturally. Absent a Soviet doppelganger against which to define themselves, Americans had no external yardstick by which to measure their security needs. The National Defense Panel, a committee of experts convened by Congress and the Defense Department could only see “a great paradox. On the one hand, we are in a relatively secure interlude following an era of intense international confrontation. On the other hand, we are uncertain about the nature and form of emerging risks.”² The world was said to be in a period of “strategic pause,” and the United States needed to “plan for uncertainty.”

Not surprisingly, planning for uncertainty proved to be difficult. It is difficult to organize for war or diplomacy without addressing Clausewitz’s first statement. The Pentagon chose to take a pass on the matter, declaring that developing the military in response to specified threats was *passé*, and adopted a “capabilities-based approach” that would result in “defense transformation.”³ But in the abstract, all capabilities are desirable, and change for the sake of change is process without purpose. This holiday-from-history approach was shaken to its very foundations by the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001. Suddenly, the danger was very real and all too certain.

The subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have seemed to clarify further U.S. strategic goals. What began as a War on Terror has been transformed into what is now known as the “Long War,” an effort to align better the political order in the Islamic world with the principles of representative government and international behavior that Americans regard as the universal norms. The effort is also often described as a “global counterinsurgency.”⁴ In its final years, the George W. Bush administration has begun to understand the implications of this task—that is, to wrestle with the nature of the war and thus organize for victory:

We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries and, most importantly, the people in between.⁵

Building Strategic Partnerships

So frequently accused of unilateralism, the Bush administration has made an extraordinary effort to

create new allies. The military, which has borne the burden of extended stability and counterinsurgency operations, has also organized a program to “build partnership capacity.” Beginning with the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), the Pentagon attempted to accelerate and expand the initiative. While the QDR acknowledges the efficacy of long-standing alliances and holds out the prospect that these partnerships “will continue to evolve, ensuring their relevance as new challenges arrive,” it argues additionally that “the United States must also work with new international partners in less familiar areas of the world”:

This means the Department must be able to develop a new team of leaders and operators who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and working with local networks to further U.S. and partner interest through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence—rather than through military force alone.⁶

Thus, the review emphasized the need to “transform” foreign assistance. Observing that during the Cold War, the purpose of foreign military assistance had primarily been to reinforce allies against external threats, the new goal was to help allies against internal challenges, too. This expansion of assistance would focus on improving the legitimacy of fragile allied states, their governance practices, internal security, the rule of law, and similar efforts. The Pentagon recognized that many of these initiatives were outside the department’s competence, and that just as the United States needed strategic partnerships abroad, the military required closer partnerships with the State Department and other U.S. government agencies.⁷

Since the review, the Defense Department has continued to develop the concept of building partnership capacity. The Pentagon has even released an “Execution Roadmap” for building partnership capacity, a sure indicator the defense planning bureaucracy has

begun to take the initiative seriously. The Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap is a “plan of action” that “identifies the tasks, offices of primary and coordinating responsibility, and due dates for the building partnership capacity objectives.”⁸ Indeed, the formal planning and doctrine-making apparatus appears to be fully engaged. For example, there is a formal defense policy directive for “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations.”⁹ Perhaps most importantly, the Department of Defense has started to program funds in its budgets. The justification materials submitted to Congress for the 2009 defense budget emphasize partnership-building efforts, identifying \$800 million, an effort to correct an “historic underinvestment.” It is clear that the military would prefer prevention to intervention:

Rather than ignoring problems or taking action on foreign soil, building the capacity of our partners to address their own threats provides an alternative that solves problems early, minimizes direct U.S. engagement, and over time builds a cooperative capability of like-minded forces that can mitigate potential instability and terrorism, reducing the long-term risk of costly military deployments.¹⁰

The Pentagon seems to have found an eager partner in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In January 2006, she averred that it was her department’s mission “to work with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”¹¹ The challenge in this mission is that the post-Cold War State Department did not reflect the “new front lines” of diplomacy, which had shifted to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and which would require a bold effort to shift resources to address these new challenges.

Building regional partnerships is one foundation today of our counterterrorism strategy. We are empowering countries that have the will to fight terror but need help with the means. And

we are joining with key regional countries like Indonesia and Nigeria and Morocco and Pakistan, working together not only to take the fight to the enemy but also to combat the ideology of hatred that uses terror as a weapon. . . . Our third goal is to localize our diplomatic posture. Transformational diplomacy requires us to move our diplomatic presence out of foreign capitals and to spread it more widely across countries. We must work on the front lines of domestic reform as well as in the back rooms of foreign ministries. There are nearly 200 cities worldwide with over one million people in which the United States has no formal diplomatic presence. This is where the action is today and this is where we must be. To reach citizens in bustling new population centers, we cannot always build new consulates beyond a nation's capital. A newer, more economical idea is what we call an American Presence Post. This idea is simple. One of our best diplomats moves outside the embassy to live and work and represent America in an emerging community of change. We currently operate American Presence Posts in places like Egypt and Indonesia and we are eager to expand both the size and the scope of this new approach.¹²

The State and Defense Departments appear poised to consummate their interagency partnership by putting their money where the rhetoric is. In a November 2007 speech, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reiterated Secretary Rice's comments, stating that "there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development." This increase is necessary, he argued, because

the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. . . . But these new threats also

require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America's non-military instruments of power.¹³

Terms of Engagement

If the Departments of State and Defense are to execute the missions described by their respective secretaries, they must hammer out a new relationship in the realm of security cooperation. Unfortunately, this is a policy area rife with jargon, legalisms, and other forms of bureaucratic claptrap. There is, however, a unifying logic: security assistance, foreign internal defense, stabilization operations, and counterinsurgency are not just iterations of a theme, but rather activities authorized by divergent legislation and conducted by disparate bureaucracies. The interaction among these various authorities, appropriations, and capabilities is the central issue this report addresses, and it finds many lacunas where they would seamlessly intersect in a perfect world.

As a heuristic device, we consider security cooperation occurring on a conflict spectrum that involves an imaginary tripwire: although many forms of security cooperation are conducted through traditional forms of civilian-led diplomacy or normal military-to-military engagement, once this tripwire is crossed, security cooperation on its far side requires the deployment of an American military force. The purpose of partnership-building initiatives is to limit American engagement to the near side of this tripwire, for if our strategic partners can defend themselves primarily on their own, American combat forces are unnecessary. Of course, broader security cooperation objectives should ensure that when the tripwire is crossed, the passage is as smooth as possible.

For our purposes, we can imagine that two forms of security cooperation occur on the near side of the tripwire: security assistance and foreign internal defense. Security assistance is exactly what it sounds like: the provision of either funding or equipment to a security partner for the purposes of promoting that

country's capacity for internal or external defense. In principle, security assistance can be managed by civilian agencies alone; if the United States wishes simply to write a check to each of its security partners to invest in its own defense, it can undertake this process without any input from the Department of Defense or the military services. In practice, the provision of security assistance works best when the military has a strong hand in the development and execution of programs and also when it monitors how assistance is used by the partner country.

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the second broad security cooperation activity that occurs on the near side of the tripwire. FID is a step beyond security assistance relationships, as it involves the provision of two additional activities: training and advising. These two forms of engagement are premised on the participation of military personnel: American soldiers cooperate directly with their foreign counterparts in programs that, in the case of military training, can be conducted either in the United States or in the host country, or in the case of advising, are conducted solely in the partner country. These programs involve the transfer of expertise and doctrine to America's security partners and can take a wide variety of forms.

This report is principally concerned with FID. We agree with Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice that the Long War requires a sustained American commitment to building partnership capacity in frontline states. A variety of restrictions imposed following the Vietnam War, among other factors, however, have rendered the United States particularly ineffective at FID operations. To be sure, there are reasons to be cautious in this realm. For example, FID activities can walk right up to or even cross our imaginary tripwire. If American troops are advising a military in the midst of combat, the United States can quickly find itself a combatant in another country's war. Most restrictions on security cooperation are intended to control this risk of escalation, but we find they have instead created a system that cannot manage a wide range of threats.

On the far side of our imaginary tripwire, we find two additional sets of military activities: stability

operations and counterinsurgency. These activities each require the direction of a military commander, even if the number of troops committed is relatively small. In Pentagon jargon, these operations would normally be conducted by a "joint task force" that incorporates elements provided by the Army, Navy, and Air Force under the direction of a joint commander.

The concept of stability operations is of relatively recent vintage, although it refers to the ancient tradition of stabilizing a territory that has been destabilized by conflict, a role long deemed "constabulary operations." The dual cause and cure during stability operations is the military occupation of a foreign territory, a field of military operations that has been of central concern to military planners following the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Counterinsurgency campaigns are often conducted in the context of stability operations but are a distinct mission in which the United States directly supports the suppression of an armed, organized movement that is challenging the legitimate government of a partner country.

The United States has conducted security cooperation under all four of these conditions—security assistance, foreign internal defense, stabilization operations, and counterinsurgency—in its history and has found that each poses unique challenges. Indeed, the American experience is so rich that the greatest challenge is to draw the right "lessons of history" in the face of perennial and difficult conflicts.

Learning from Experience

Returning to Clausewitz's dictum, it may be the nearly universal fate of statesmen and soldiers to fail to identify easily the nature of the war upon which they are embarking, but there is a modest recompense: most of their critics get it wrong, too. History mocks both her authors and her students. The former are almost universally weighed in the balance of her annals and found wanting, while the latter must decipher her lessons in the chaos of their own times. While it is thus the first duty of the statesman to study his predecessors and learn from their failures

and successes, the contingencies of history mean that no simple lessons are to be imbibed. Indeed, the misapplication of the lessons of history can be as dangerous as ignoring them altogether.

This study details six experiences with security assistance in American history: the Greek Civil War, the wars in Vietnam and Laos, the current struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, finally, the expansion of the Long War into Africa. We find that for all the differences among these conflicts, the American performance in each has been largely contingent upon a pair of tests: first, whether there is “unity of command” in American security cooperation activities, and second, whether the security cooperation programs evolve efficiently in response to the shifting circumstances that surround them. We find that the United States has generally performed poorly by both of these standards.

There are several obstacles to meeting these tests. Even in operations that are clearly on the near side of our heuristic tripwire, the chiefs of mission of American embassies find it a challenge to manage security cooperation activities that draw upon the resources of multiple government agencies. As security cooperation approaches the tripwire, the ability to manage interagency operations grows even more difficult as additional resources flow into the country and agencies stake out a larger role. When security cooperation occurs on the far side of the tripwire, there is no clear mechanism to manage relations between the civilian chief of mission and the military commander in the field. Security cooperation activities tend to experience their most acute stresses—and most disastrous failures—when fluid circumstances on the ground force the United States past the tripwire, striking each obstacle along the way.

Unfortunately, these obstacles have metastasized in response to previous, flawed efforts to learn from the lessons of history. After the Vietnam War, conventional wisdom dictated that the United States should never engage in such a conflict again, and American institutions for security cooperation were regarded as a principal cause of unnecessary involvement in another country’s internal affairs. Congress imposed a variety of restrictions on security cooperation,

distributing authorities ever more widely among agencies and earmarking appropriations into specific programs. For their part, the civilian agencies and the military turned away from security cooperation after Vietnam, focusing instead on traditional diplomacy, doctrinaire economic development aid, and conventional warfare. This atrophy of capabilities has proved disastrous in the years since September 11, 2001.

As the United States struggles today to learn from its experiences in the Long War, it faces many of the challenges and risks as American policymakers did after Vietnam. It is universally acknowledged that the government has performed disastrously in Iraq, but there is no consensus on how to fix it. Perhaps the most common phrase bandied about nowadays is the need to legislate a “Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency” that would restructure the whole foreign policy and defense apparatuses. Meanwhile, the State Department has added an extra layer of bureaucracy for managing reconstruction and stabilization operations as the military develops additional capabilities designed to support—but that risk supplanting—its civilian counterparts. Even for their merits, we find that these proposals miss the target. Security cooperation reform should prioritize the point at which the interagency converges and its operations are most important: the country team level.

Ground Truths

It might be said, with apologies to Tolstoy, that every unhappy state is unhappy in its own way. What makes states weak or deprives governments of legitimacy is usually the product of unique internal circumstances. The essential insight of unconventional warfare—that the local people are the strategic center of gravity—has a corollary in that those approaches which most give the closest regard to peoples’ particular needs should be given primacy. To take an example from Iraq, the confluence of factors that produced the Anbar Awakening could not simply be reproduced in cookie-cutter fashion elsewhere, even in that country. The commonality of interests between the United States and Iraqi tribal

leaders almost certainly cannot be exported wholesale to Afghanistan, where tribal traditions and divisions are different and stretch across the border into Pakistan. The victories in unconventional warfare will be accumulated, and more often than not, slowly.

Every partnering government in the Long War will have unique characteristics. Iraq and Afghanistan present profoundly different challenges. For example, governments in Kabul were often unable to extend their writ throughout the country. Conversely, the problem in Iraq was a murderously strong central government. Many of the new partners the United States seeks will have maturing state structures emerging from an entirely local and successful transition from autocratic to representative rule. Others will still be ruled by autocrats who may appear relatively benign or well-disposed to American interests, but whose unwillingness to share power is their deepest source of weakness. Whatever the particular circumstances in these partner states—or, as defense planners would say, “host nations”—it ought to be clear that the most effective tools of American engagement will be those most supple, adaptable, and easily tailored to a variety of local conditions.

As will be demonstrated in the following chapters of this report, there is a well-understood means of engagement that can meet these requirements: the traditional country team, headed by the ambassadorial chief of mission. At its basest level, the notion of the country team is simply the aggregation of personnel assigned to the diplomatic mission in a foreign country. As will be described in the following chapter, the concept of the country team took on a more sophisticated meaning during the Cold War, describing a management meeting in which the chief of mission interacts with the representatives of other agencies in his mission. In chapter four we describe an additional concept, the “frontline country team,” that we propose to drastically enhance the authority of the chief of mission to manage the various components of his embassy, as well as expand the range of security cooperation activities that can be conducted from under the chief of mission’s direction.

Creating more effective country teams will require reform as well as the commitment of new

resources, but it will not require a revolutionary restructuring of the government. If anything, this proposal should be understood as a complement to other reform efforts at other echelons of the Department of Defense and U.S. government. But it is also bound, if correctly structured, to be the tool most sensitive to the unique needs of partner states, the first line of a program of strategic engagement, able to act as “strategic scouts” that provide insights and intelligence while also shaping the attitudes and behaviors of our security partners.

The Case of Indonesia

In addition to setting forth the frontline country team concept in the abstract and with reference to past experience, this report offers a case study. We chose Indonesia as an example of the range of challenges that confront the United States in a strategically vital state in which the success or failure of any process of building partnership capacity will be measured.

To begin with, it was necessary to make some assumptions about both the geopolitical goals and the strategy of the United States. To test the approach in an Indonesian context, it was further necessary to imagine the role of Jakarta in this stipulated American strategic context. One of the compelling reasons for the Indonesia exercise is that it would provide a clarifying effect on both the ends and the means of U.S. strategy for the coming century. The United States lacks a coherent strategic approach to Indonesia or even a clear goal for what we would like to see Indonesia become. As the world’s largest Muslim democracy with a highly tolerant—if often volatile—culture, spread across crucial sea lanes and occupying an important position on the periphery of the traditional Chinese sphere of influence, the inherent geopolitical importance of Indonesia is clear. Yet, the United States has not been able to weave these various threads of interest into a consistent policy fabric.

We stipulated four benchmarks for U.S. strategy for Indonesia. First, it is in our interest to ensure that Indonesia remains a moderate society and a

democratic polity and that no further ground be lost on these fronts. Second, we should try to help Indonesian democracy thrive. It may be a new phenomenon, but it is one that has quickly put down roots, engages the hopes of an overwhelming majority of Indonesians, and is the key to expanded legitimacy for the central government. Third, the United States needs to assist the government in Jakarta in transforming TNI, the Indonesian military, into a force oriented on external rather than internal threats. Because TNI is such a fundamental part of the Indonesian state, a policy of long-term U.S. engagement is essential. To fail in this effort is to jeopardize all of U.S.-Indonesian policy. Fourth, we should encourage Indonesia to exercise what should be a natural role of leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group of countries currently contending with the rapid growth of Chinese influence. We should emphasize the needs

of the many maritime states in which they are at odds with “continental” interests. A strong, modern Indonesia is very much an American interest.

In sum, the Indonesia test recommends itself as a crucial test of the purposes and processes for American strategic engagement both now and for the future. The rewards of success and the risks of failure are both great. Indonesia is a frontline state in the war against Muslim extremists and an example of a pluralistic, tolerant Islamic democracy struggling to escape an authoritarian past. The future of Indonesia is also critical to the region and to other important allies such as Australia, Japan, and India, as well as to China. And the legacy of American policy in Jakarta is, to be kind, ambiguous, as it is in so many other states with which we intend to build new partnerships. Quite simply, the project of building partnership capacity will stand or fall based upon its effectiveness in countries like Indonesia.

2

Flawed at the Creation: American Engagement in History

Security cooperation has been a crucial element of American foreign policy since the early years of the Cold War, but it has always been a flawed instrument. For over sixty years, these programs have been handicapped by two recurring problems: the extension of interagency feuds into the embassy and the challenge of civil-military coordination in response to military threats. These problems for effective American policy were most pronounced during the conflicts in Vietnam and Laos, where bureaucratic and civil-military chaos at the country-team level repeatedly undermined American efforts to support allies that were fighting for their very existence.

Following the wars in Indochina, America's security cooperation programs were subjected to a withering period of reform during which Congress and a series of administrations dismantled and restructured them in an effort to avoid having to fight "another Vietnam." These reform efforts did not affect the global threats that require American global activism but rather constrained American options for responding to them. The obstacles to effective security cooperation—interagency squabbling and civil-military coordination—remain firmly in place today.

A New Diplomacy for the Cold War

President Harry S. Truman launched the modern American policy of security cooperation in March 1947, when he declared that the United States would undertake "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."¹⁴ Truman's clarion call transformed both the objectives and instruments of American foreign policy. The United States was no longer to be a passive observer of international affairs but rather an activist power that would intervene


globally in its standoff with the Soviet Union.¹⁵ The new instruments of American policy would be a combination of financial assistance and military advising, vastly increasing the official U.S. presence overseas.

To carry out its new diplomacy, the United States required new administrative instruments. As the first major Cold War recipient of American economic and security assistance, Greece acted as a proving ground. The economic assistance office in Athens would serve as the model for the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) that eventually took charge of economic assistance to European allies under the Marshall Plan. Meanwhile, General James Van Fleet established the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in Greece, which managed a combination of security assistance, training, and advising to Greek forces.¹⁶

The apparatus of the new diplomacy was almost immediately at odds with the traditional diplomatic establishment. As additional American agencies extended their reach overseas, they brought "overlapping jurisdictions, incompatible assignments, mutual jealousies, surplus staff, and the ruminations of innumerable committees" of Washington, all anathema to the genteel traditions of the Foreign Service.¹⁷ With no legal authority over the new American officials in his country, the chief of mission often found himself the unwilling participant in a diplomatic comedy of errors.¹⁸ In one instance, the U.S. ambassador to Greece discovered that while he was doing all he could to support the Greek government before an election, the ECA mission in Athens was bankrolling the leading opposition party.¹⁹ The American effort muddled its way to victory in the Greek Civil War, but at the cost of significant waste and lost opportunities.

Dismayed by the interagency chaos among the instruments of the new diplomacy, retired general

FIGURE 1
THE COUNTRY TEAM



Source: Christopher Griffin.

Lucius D. Clay stepped into the fray in 1951, hammering out a memorandum of understanding among the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the ECA. This agreement stated that the three organizations would henceforth “constitute a team under the leadership of the ambassador,” establishing the “country team” as an instrument of American policy.²⁰ Despite this initial agreement, the country team was still an informal concept with no legal standing. Described as “whatever group of United States officers a particular American ambassador chooses to select to assist him in meeting his responsibilities to coordinate American activities in the country of his assignment, it usually involved the senior diplomat representatives, as well as representatives from the ECA and MAAG.”²¹ A notional model of the country team is provided in figure 1.

Throughout the 1950s, the security cooperation system continued to expand. The Mutual Security Assistance Acts of 1951 and 1954 consolidated and codified the Marshall Plan, establishing the Mutual Security Agency and International Cooperation Agency to manage the international provision of security and military assistance.²² Under leadership of the Army and the Mutual Security Agency, there were soon sixty-three partnership organizations in almost every allied state during this period.²³

As the United States developed its capabilities for security cooperation, so too did the threat evolve. In Africa, Latin America, and especially Southeast Asia, weak postcolonial governments were beset by a range of internal threats, including Maoist-inspired guerilla insurgencies. Upon his inauguration in 1961, President John F. Kennedy declared it his priority to counter communist threats in what was then called the “third world,” and he ordered the military and aid organizations he inherited to reorganize themselves appropriately.²⁴

One of Kennedy’s first steps was to push through the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized a full panoply of economic assistance organizations into the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was instructed to focus its efforts on rural development and pacification efforts in the third world.²⁵ Despite this mandate, the newly created organization was largely staffed by former ECA bureaucrats whose formative professional experiences came through administering the Marshall Plan in predominantly urban and peaceful Europe. For the most part, these officials never fully embraced their new mission to support the internal defense of beleaguered, underdeveloped allies.²⁶

If the civilian aid bureaucracy was reluctant to take a major role in third-world counterinsurgency

operations, the military was openly hostile to the notion. The Cold War may have expanded to new theaters, but the Pentagon was focused on heightened tensions in Europe, where American and allied forces were facing off against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Expressing a preference for conventional operations that still echoes today, the military brass believed that adapting military training and doctrine to prepare American troops for counterinsurgency operations would not only distract from capabilities for conventional warfare but that it would also be extraneous. Army chief of staff Henry Decker captured this view when he told Kennedy during one particularly contentious meeting that “any good soldier can handle guerillas.”²⁷

The military services gradually developed counterinsurgency capabilities, but these were viewed as a distraction from their core missions. Under Kennedy’s orders to include counterinsurgency training in all of its schools, the Army taught its bakers the ingredients for exploding pies and its typists how to build exploding typewriters but refused to send its best officers to advise embattled allies.²⁸ Despite Kennedy’s efforts to prepare the military for unconventional warfare, it would remain the “satrapy of Special Forces,” regarded as an “oddball organization and a career dead end.”²⁹

Douglas Blaufarb, an administration official and eventual critic of American counterinsurgency capabilities, summarized how Kennedy assigned each agency a mission that cut against its institutional culture and expertise:

The army is called on to assist in a style of warfare that it did not normally practice; AID—the development agency—is pointed toward policy work and rural assistance; and [the U.S. Information Service]—which was chartered to project the American image and point of view—is required to assist beleaguered governments to improve their image among their own people.³⁰

These internal contradictions among Kennedy’s counterinsurgency strategy and U.S. capabilities were

left to be resolved at the country-team level under the leadership of the ambassador. Some diplomats relished the challenge, including U. Alexis Johnson, an architect of the strategy, who evangelized how a strong ambassador should coordinate the fight against communist insurgencies. Writing for the *Foreign Service Journal* in 1962, Johnson argued that Kennedy expected the “ambassador fully to assume leadership and responsibility for an integrated and coordinated program of assistance and cooperation in internal defense.”³¹ The chief of mission was expected to direct “a blend of military and non-military countermeasures and corrective actions” because, according to the “peculiar nature of internal warfare . . . there is no line of demarcation between military and non-military measures.”³²

In this ambitious assignment, the chief of mission’s strongest asset was the writ of a May 1961 letter from President Kennedy to all U.S. ambassadors. The so-called Kennedy Letter designated the chief of mission as the president’s “personal representative” and authorized him to “supervise and oversee all activities of the United States Government” in his mission.³³ Despite this seemingly robust language, the Kennedy Letter did not give the ambassador clear authority to direct other government agencies in his country whose officers were “expected to communicate directly with their offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington.”³⁴ The ambassador would have significant responsibility for the activities of other agencies, but little authority to manage them.

The Kennedy Letter also opened a broader and more important gap in the chief of mission’s authority in his relations with military commanders, clarifying that although the attaché and MAAG worked inside the mission, military forces in the field did not:

As you know, the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attachés, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and other Military components attached to the mission. It does not, however, include United States military

forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander. The line of authority runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field.

Although this means that the chief of the American Diplomatic Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless as Chief of Mission you should work closely with the appropriate military commander to insure the full exchange of information. If it is your opinion that the activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect our over-all relations with the people or government of ———, you should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander, and if necessary, request a decision by a higher authority.³⁵

This qualification to the chief of mission's authority reflected a combination of legal authorities and apparent practicality. As Kennedy pointed out, military commanders had a separate chain of command than the chief of mission, a distinction that remains to this day. Moreover, ambassadors are not expected to have the requisite expertise to organize or manage military operations in the field. Even if Kennedy's military chiefs viewed security cooperation and counterinsurgency as distractions from the true profession of arms, they were still the business of soldiers.

Nonetheless, Kennedy's delineation of civil-military authorities left dangerous vagaries for all security cooperation activities. The ambassador was delegated responsibility for coordinating "internal defense," but this mission was—and still is—defined by the fluidity of circumstances that surround it, an ebb and flow of civilian and military operations in support of beleaguered allies, and countervailing efforts by the enemy. When combined with the incentives for both the military and other agencies to operate under the direction of their own leadership rather than the chief of mission, this fluidity was bound to challenge even the most talented ambassadors.

Security Cooperation on Trial: The Wars for Southeast Asia

America's nascent capacity for security cooperation faced its greatest test in the crucible of Southeast Asia. Between 1962 and 1973, the stresses of war in Vietnam and Laos transformed organizational lacunae into fatal flaws: the gaps in ambassadorial authority over other civilian agencies and the military presented nearly insurmountable barriers to effective management of the U.S. effort. American civilian and military leaders in both Vietnam and Laos eventually resolved many obstacles, but these ad hoc solutions were not developed into American interagency doctrine and would later be largely legislated out of existence.

The gradual escalation of the war in Vietnam was uniquely corrosive to the gaps the Kennedy Letter left in the ambassador's authority over American operations. Although the Defense Department identified the country as a war zone in 1958, large-scale American combat forces did not arrive until 1965. Over the seven-year interim, the United States conducted a foreign internal defense operation, supporting the embattled Republic of Vietnam with assistance, training, and advising for its government and military. This growing operation challenged what limited authority the ambassador in Saigon possessed, as civilian agencies continually requested additional resources and guidance from Washington, and the military expanded advising efforts for its Vietnamese counterparts. The chief of mission was simply overwhelmed by the tidal wave of American activity.

The growth of the military advisory mission was particularly daunting for ambassadorial management. A MAAG was established in Vietnam in 1955 and complemented by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in 1962, which took over combat advising. MACV's growing activities in the field eventually tore open the civil-military lacuna in the Kennedy Letter. Combat advisors quickly took on the appearance and capabilities of a force in the field, and it was not clear under what circumstances American ambassadors were authorized to interfere

in, let alone direct, its operations. MACV incorporated the MAAG in 1964 and was placed in charge of large-scale combat operations under General William Westmoreland the following year.

Faced with this growing civil-military gap, American ambassadors failed to assert leadership. Robert Komer, who later took charge of counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, assigned particular blame to ambassadors Maxwell Taylor (1964–65) and Henry Cabot Lodge (1963–64, 1965–67), who “clung to a traditionalist view of civil-military relationships” and committed a “near-abdication of any executive responsibility for the U.S. effort.”³⁶ This criticism was reflected in the Pentagon Papers, which found the embassy in Saigon to be a source of confusion rather than leadership during the advisory phase of the war:

The pressure of events, the tension, the unprecedented size of the agencies and a host of other factors made the system shaky even under the strong manager Maxwell Taylor. Under the man who didn't want to manage, Lodge, it began to crumble. Each agency had its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communication channels with Washington, its own personnel and administration structure—and starting in 1964–65, each agency began to have its own field personnel operating under separate and parallel chains of command.³⁷

After these setbacks, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program established during 1967–71 what we would now call a “whole-of-government” strategy. The CORDS program merged the pacification efforts of the military, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and USAID and established a mixed civil-military command structure that started with Robert Komer as deputy commander of MACV for pacification, with alternating civilian and military leadership down the chain of command.³⁸ The problem of civil-military coordination in Vietnam was gradually “solved” when the military devised a robust civil-military strategy for conducting counterinsurgency operations and then

took responsibility for the conduct of whole-of-government operations from the embassy, which was instead refocused on political engagement with the Vietnamese government.³⁹

The new division of labor reflected upon the inability of the chief of mission to manage a counterinsurgency campaign, a task that was handed to the military commander while the ambassador focused his efforts on diplomatic engagement with the South Vietnamese government. This new division of labor was clearest under the overlapping tenures of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker (1967–72) and General Creighton Abrams (1968–72). The Vietnam War thus epitomizes both the challenges for civil-military management under Kennedy's counterinsurgency strategy and how they were ultimately resolved as the military undertook ever greater responsibility for directing whole-of-government counterinsurgency operations.

Even as the Vietnam War raged, the United States was engaged in a “secret war” in Laos, supporting the Laotian government against the Pathet Laos Communist insurgency. Diplomatic arrangements prevented Washington from conducting a full-scale counterinsurgency, so American efforts in Laos were an internal defense operation in which the United States supported the Royal Lao Army and Hmong guerillas.

This secret war was conducted as an interagency effort that combined military, intelligence, and development instruments, all under the firm leadership of the American embassy. In Vientiane, powerful ambassadors such as William Sullivan and McMurtrie Godley organized an “efficient, closely controlled country team” in which the ambassador exercised authority over all military personnel, military assistance requests, ground rules for advisory personnel activities, and advance approval for the rules of engagement and targeting for American military operations.⁴⁰

The principal source of ambassadorial strength in Laos was the 1962 Geneva Agreement, which banned a formal American military presence in the country. With no military commander in the field with whom to contend, ambassadors to Laos enjoyed authorities exceeding those described in the Kennedy Letter. These ambassadors also benefited

from a degree of benign neglect in Washington, as the tremendous focus on Vietnam left them relatively free from interference from Washington. The most unique aspect of the country team in Laos was the manner in which military assistance was incorporated into it. Exiled from Laos proper, the military operated surreptitiously under the auspices of the MAAG in Thailand, where a “deputy chief” was responsible for assistance to Laotian forces.

The American mission in Laos established a circuitous but effective system for managing security cooperation with the Laotian government that deeply enmeshed the different elements of the country team and enhanced the requirement of ambassadorial management. Without a formal MAAG organization in Laos, the deputy chief in Thailand funneled resources to the Lao Royal Army through a Vientiane-based USAID front organization, while the CIA supported Laotian paramilitary forces.⁴¹ USAID supported both the military and the CIA missions in Laos, sharing aircraft, personnel, and logistical support to guarantee that the family members of regular soldiers and paramilitary fighters were supported during combat missions.⁴²

This arrangement among the de facto MAAG, USAID, and the CIA was facilitated by a variety of cost-sharing arrangements among country team members. Although growing political opposition to America’s involvement would eventually end the American foreign internal defense campaign in Laos, the case study is a powerful example of the value of close civil-military cooperation and the unity of command during such operations.⁴³

The experience in Laos thus presents an alternative solution to the civil-military gap, but its successes could not make up for the far larger failures in Vietnam. Although the wars for Indochina fostered sophisticated military and civilian counterinsurgency strategies, they ultimately ended in failure as political support for the conflicts dissipated. Eventual defeat in Vietnam left the United States exhausted and disillusioned, and Washington stumbled away from the conflict with little interest in picking another fight with insurgents and little capacity to manage another such conflict.

Security Cooperation “Reform” after Vietnam

As the war in Vietnam wound to a close, the United States entered a long period during which both presidents and Congress viewed strong security cooperation capabilities not as a means to support friendly states but as a slippery slope that would lead to another Vietnam. The net result of these efforts was that American capacity for security cooperation and counterinsurgency operations suffered a Lilliputian demise: constrained by countless restrictions, it was gradually starved of resources and governmental interest.

In 1969, President Richard Nixon demarcated America’s post-Vietnam security cooperation policy in the so-called Guam Doctrine, which emphasized allied self-reliance. Nixon pledged the United States to defend its allies against other nuclear powers, but stated that “in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”⁴⁴ Simply put, there were to be no more Vietnams.

Throughout the 1970s, presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter reaffirmed Nixon’s objective of avoiding direct American engagement in further counterinsurgencies in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. As the policy of détente calmed relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, security cooperation was increasingly viewed as a vestige of the hottest part of a cold war—a useful tool, perhaps, when necessitated by U.S.-Soviet competition, but increasingly out of fashion. Then-candidate Jimmy Carter took this logic to its natural end during the 1976 presidential campaign, when he called for a withdrawal of American forces from South Korea, where he argued they were a prop for Park Chung-hee’s military regime and no longer necessary to prevent a renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

If Nixon and his successors intended to reduce America’s commitments to its allies’ internal defense,

Congress demanded they do so. During the twilight years of the Vietnam War and throughout the 1970s, Congress imposed a large number of restrictions on the war power of the president, constrained what it regarded as the “rogue elephant” operations of the CIA, and overhauled American security assistance legislation in an effort to avoid future Vietnams.⁴⁵ Although Congress failed in repeated efforts to abolish security assistance programs altogether, it succeeded in shifting most funding for these programs from the Pentagon to the State Department, banning assistance to human rights abusers, and cancelling USAID and MAAG programs that supported foreign police forces.⁴⁶

As Congress revised American security assistance capabilities, the MAAG system was a particular target of criticism. In 1976, for example, Clement Zablocki of the House Committee on International Relations warned administration representatives that the MAAGs “were not worth their salt” and should be dismantled.⁴⁷ During these hearings, members of Congress aired a litany of complaints: MAAG activities tended to promote both international conflict and American participation therein. MAAG assignments were merely sinecures for the officers who joined them, and MAAGs supported corrupt and abusive regimes.

The International Security Assistance Act of 1976 placed significant restrictions on MAAGs, prohibiting any “military assistance advisory group, military mission, or other organization of United States military personnel” from providing military advisory functions overseas without specific congressional authorization.⁴⁸ A later revision to the Foreign Assistance Act further clarified congressional intent, stating that “advising and training assistance in countries to which military personnel are assigned under this section shall be provided primarily by other personnel who are not assigned under this section and who are detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks.”⁴⁹

Faced with new presidential direction and congressional restraints, the American military and civilian agencies gradually dismantled their ability to manage the lower end of the security spectrum.

Foreign internal defense and security assistance were confined to policy ghettos inside the Pentagon and State Department.

The American military stumbled out of Vietnam into a period of crisis. Budget cuts and the end of the draft required the Pentagon to do more with less. While détente meant the supposed improvement of Soviet-American relations, Moscow was rapidly modernizing its vast military forces in Europe.⁵⁰ As the military grappled with new threats in Europe, it excised counterinsurgency from its official doctrine in favor of a new focus on high-technology conventional conflict.⁵¹ The mission of foreign internal defense was placed on the shoulders of Special Forces, an unwanted mission for an unloved piece of the Army.⁵² Although later U.S. manuals introduced doctrine related to low-intensity conflict, “Big Army” was out of the counterinsurgency business after the Vietnam War.

The State Department meanwhile emerged from the Vietnam era with budgetary responsibility for most American security assistance programs, a capacity in which it relied heavily on the Department of Defense for technical expertise. The Camp David Accords two years later solidified the shape of American security assistance programs, which have been dominated for decades by aid to Israel and Egypt in support of the peace process.⁵³

For its part, USAID almost forsook all security assistance programs following the Vietnam War. Barred from providing assistance for foreign policy programs, USAID quickly “reverted to economic development as its primary task and gradually subordinated or dropped entirely its interest in the problems of rural environmental improvement for the sake of cementing popular loyalties.”⁵⁴ Although USAID continued to manage the economic support fund, which targets allies and transitioning democracies, the agency all but abandoned its role in foreign internal defense or counterinsurgency.

The cumulative consequence of the post-Vietnam reforms was to reallocate responsibilities for security assistance, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. government effectively divested itself of any ability to conduct—indeed, any

interest in conducting—counterinsurgency operations. Security assistance and foreign internal defense were marginalized, and stability operations were viewed only as a follow-on mission to major conventional warfare. This reallocation created artificial barriers among the agencies and their missions in the field and did nothing to resolve the weaknesses of the U.S. government in managing security cooperation at the ground level. It might be said that post-Vietnam America tried to make a virtue of its own incapacity.

Contemporary Structure for Security Cooperation

The Vietnam legacy endures, and the contemporary structure for American security cooperation is characterized by the division of authorities and capabilities across government agencies in a poorly coordinated manner. The State Department, which is principally responsible for security assistance, has a minimal role in foreign internal defense, and there is no established structure for stability operations. Although counterinsurgency is principally a military activity, there is little systemic capability to integrate civilian capabilities in support of the mission.

The State Department enjoys statutory responsibility for most American security assistance programs and foreign military sales programs through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export and Control Act. It devolves principal responsibility for developing security assistance programs to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (Pol-Mil). Because the State Department does not have the requisite expertise to manage fully security cooperation, diplomats from Pol-Mil work with the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ASD-ISA) and the Joint Staff's Plans and Policy Directorate to develop weapons, training, and other requirements for America's security partners.

Once the State and Defense Departments agree on a security assistance program, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the military departments have principal responsibility for executing it.


DSCA, a separate defense agency that receives its guidance from ASD-ISA, negotiates the terms of sale and logistics support and coordinates with other government agencies as necessary.⁵⁵ The military departments support the security assistance process by providing technical input regarding both price and availability of weapons systems, as well as to the appropriate doctrinal, training, and logistics requirements for foreign security partners to receive transferred weapons systems.⁵⁶

There remain three additional vital actors in the security assistance process: the ambassador, the combatant commander, and the security assistance organization inside the country team. The ambassador remains the sole head of the country team and is responsible for drafting the mission strategic plan, which is "the primary planning document that defines U.S. national interest in a foreign country and coordinates performance measurement in that country among [U.S. government] agencies."⁵⁷ The ambassador's authorities are largely based on an updated version of the Kennedy Letter, which establishes the chief of mission's status as the personal representative of the president and also relative to other members of the country team. The current president's letter retains similar language to that in the 1961 Kennedy Letter and leaves the same gap for civil-military confusion between the ambassador and his military counterparts.⁵⁸

While chiefs of mission have retreated to their core role as diplomats, the authorities and influence of regional combatant commanders have grown rapidly after the Vietnam era. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, combatant commanders have enjoyed such a combination of influence, information, and authorities that they are now central actors in American foreign policymaking and are often more prominent in "their" countries than the American ambassador.⁵⁹ They have become American "proconsuls," particularly in frontline states.

The combatant commanders are uniquely placed in security cooperation because they are involved at all stages: they provide policy input into the determination of security assistance programs; they are authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code

FIGURE 2
SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION



SOURCE: Adapted from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Green Book.

to organize most training and advisory programs to foreign militaries, as well as joint exercises; and if American support to a friendly government shifts from foreign internal defense to counterinsurgency operations, they are responsible for military task forces.

Under normal circumstances, combatant commanders are responsible for drafting a theater security cooperation strategy that identifies priorities for security assistance, as well as training and advisory missions to allies and security partners.⁶⁰ Combatant commanders are also responsible for personnel who visit allies and security partners to conduct advising and training assistance and for conducting exercises with friendly militaries. Retired general Norman Schwarzkopf once described the combatant

commander's role in security cooperation as "overseeing the advisors' work, administering \$1.6 billion a year in military programs, and solidifying relations with rulers and generals."⁶¹ The combatant commander is the bureaucratic *primus inter pares*, the only actor in the security cooperation process who enjoys direct access to every actor in the decision-making process.

The final crucial actor in the security cooperation process is the security assistance organization (SAO), the country-level team of military officers who are responsible for working with the host government, coordinating security assistance efforts with country team objectives, and representing the combatant commander and DSCA. Although SAOs

are referred to by a variety of terms,⁶² most are joint organizations whose chief must “accept direction from multiple ‘bosses,’” including the chief of mission, combatant commander, and DSCA director.⁶³ American SAOs have a wide range of responsibilities for managing security cooperation programs and are expected to be the lead staff for informing and coordinating the chief of mission’s strategic plan and the combatant commander’s theater cooperation plan.

In the years since Vietnam, American security cooperation programs have served as a conduit of security assistance to vital allies and security partners in the context of the peace process between Israel and its neighbors. They have supported partners through foreign internal defense operations, particularly in response to Soviet aggression during the 1980s. And the system has adapted to the post–Cold War era, working through United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations in support of peacekeeping and security operations, especially during the 1990s. The system suffers, however, from several key liabilities that are apparent when local security conditions demand deeper American engagement but do not merit a large-scale American intervention. For example:

- Civil-military relations are not clearly delineated by presidential directives that describe the authorities of the chief of mission. The historical division of responsibilities between the chief of mission and area commander in the field does not effectively address a wide range of missions, especially if the United States engages in a foreign internal defense mission.
- At the same time that the traditional civil-military gap has not been resolved, the growing influence of combatant commanders has diminished the relative authority of ambassadors, both within the countries to which they are assigned and the interagency

process. Both foreign actors and American policymakers often look to combatant commanders rather than chiefs of mission as the front line of American activities overseas. In effect, the gap is widening.

- Since Vietnam, the American military has emerged as the world’s most proficient conventional force, as well as the most “can-do” instrument inside of the American government. Meanwhile, civilian departments and agencies have generally become more risk-averse. The result of this shift is that if something needs to be done, it will more often than not fall upon the military’s shoulders.
- Because the capacities of the chief of mission to organize security cooperation efforts are so limited, and he has no capability to lead foreign internal defense efforts, the threshold for direct American military intervention has been set too low. As a result, American policy too often requires intervention by American military forces under the combatant commander, which puts a highly visible American face on efforts that should be led by allies and security partners.

These accumulated weaknesses have resulted in a system that breaks down when it is most needed. The fundamental problem remaining for American security cooperation is that it is designed to divide rather than unify responsibility. The result is that what should be related efforts—security assistance, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency—are managed as separate policy categories by disparate actors and authorities. This outcome reflects an intentional effort by post-Vietnam legislators and policymakers to prevent conflict escalation, but this effort has instead crippled the American capacity for conflict management.

3

Security Cooperation in the Long War

Since 2001, the American apparatus for security cooperation and counterinsurgency has been placed under a degree of strain not experienced since the Vietnam War. The transformation of the War on Terror into the Long War reflects the growing realization that the United States will be committed both to fighting jihadist extremists and improving the quality of governance throughout the Islamic world for the foreseeable future. In addition to its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is also engaged in an ongoing struggle against a panoply of groups who seek to exploit instability in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia in order to establish new bases there.

The early years of this struggle have seen several breakthroughs in American security assistance and counterinsurgency capabilities. Indeed, many of the problems of civil-military coordination in Iraq and Afghanistan have been resolved through methods that are eerily similar to those discovered in Vietnam and Laos forty years ago. These breakthroughs, however, are neither optimal nor easily replicable.

The War for Iraq: Another Vietnam?

In hindsight, the breakdown of interagency relations prior to the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq appear to serve as a model of how the U.S. government should *not* prepare for future conflicts in the Long War. A range of institutional failures recall Vietnam-era disasters in which the defense establishment ran roughshod over its civilian counterparts and the State Department abdicated responsibility for policy coordination.⁶⁴

The inability to coordinate civil-military operations in Iraq further implicates the post-Vietnam reorganization of the U.S. government. The only

body that could effectively plan for the war and its aftermath was the staff of General Tommy Franks of Central Command, but the general did not think he was responsible for postconflict reconstruction.⁶⁵ Although the State Department and the Pentagon were tasked with coordinating their postwar planning under the National Security Council, each undertook largely independent operations detached from actual military planning. The postwar Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and military commanders were forced to play catch-up once they hit the ground in Baghdad, and they never effectively reined in the competing civil-military fiefdoms.

If anything, civil-military coordination in Iraq deteriorated rather than improved during the early years of the occupation, when CPA director L. Paul Bremer and General Ricardo Sanchez were on such bad terms that they were reported to be unwilling to speak with one another.⁶⁶ One stark measure of these failures is that, in 2004, operations in Iraq were managed by three uncoordinated chains of command—two leading back to the Defense Department and one to the National Security Council—without any one commander beneath the president.⁶⁷ The blame for early American failures can be shared at many levels of the U.S. government, but the locus of failure was between the civilian and military commanders in the country, the point at which interagency cooperation should come to a fine point.

Although the civil-military breach was vast during the early years of the Iraq occupation, there were notable accomplishments even in this period. Perhaps most important was the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was developed in response to the discovery of billions of dollars stashed by the Saddam Hussein regime. The Defense Department dedicated this cash to reconstruction efforts and disbursed the funds to be spent as operations and

maintenance funding by Central Command. Pentagon rules permit such funds to be spent at the battalion and company levels, which permitted colonels and captains to use these moneys to invest in short-term, high-yield reconstruction projects.⁶⁸ CERP would eventually become the basis for the “Global Train and Equip” program authorized in the 2006 Defense Authorization Act and discussed in further detail in the final section of this chapter.

In the past year, American operations in Iraq have again followed the familiar pattern set in Vietnam, as the military has assumed ever greater responsibility for a range of security cooperation activities that, in principle, rest under the authority of the State Department and other civilian agencies. Since early 2007, the country team in Iraq has been under the leadership of Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus, commander of Multinational Force–Iraq. Petraeus previously oversaw the drafting of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual, and it is no surprise that operations in the country have followed the document’s suggested lines of operation:

Political, social and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian governments and expertise; however, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. If adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces fill the gap.⁶⁹

In February 2007, the Departments of State and Defense reached a memorandum of understanding in which provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), joint civilian-military teams responsible for rebuilding Iraq, are now attached to brigade combat team staffs. Under the new structure, the PRTs will receive guidance from both the embassy in Baghdad and General Petraeus, with the military commander responsible for security and movement and a seconded diplomat for political and economic issues.⁷⁰ Although the reorganized counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq is still young, its success or failure will principally reflect on the wisdom of military leadership of the country team.

An Integrated Country Team in Afghanistan

As in Iraq, the initial invasion of Afghanistan was surprisingly successful, with a nearly immediate rout of the Taliban government and the al Qaeda operatives who fought along its forces. Despite initial success, however, the provisional Afghan government found itself unable either to control its Northern Alliance partners or contend with a resurgent Taliban. By mid-2002, the security situation had seriously deteriorated throughout the country, and reconstruction efforts ground to a halt as development agencies and nongovernmental organizations ceased operations in southern Afghanistan.⁷¹ As a new Afghan crisis mounted, the Bush administration doubled U.S. aid to the country and dispatched Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to overhaul reconstruction efforts, leading to a new model for the country team’s leadership of security assistance efforts.⁷²

In Kabul, Ambassador Khalilzad formed an intimate partnership with Lieutenant General David Barno, who commanded all U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. The two established what one senior officer in Afghanistan described as “an integrated civilian and military team—senior leaders who made it their business to be in continual dialogue and discussion with Bush administration policymakers, with members of the international coalition and even with nongovernmental organizations.”⁷³ Khalilzad and Barno organized U.S. operations in Afghanistan through the embassy, creating an array of interagency working groups at the country-team level to combine civilian and military expertise in formulating policy, advising the Afghan government, monitoring reconstruction efforts, and managing communications between the field and Washington.

The Khalilzad-Barno partnership was buttressed by a capable support staff that developed around the ambassador and general, eliminating the civil-military lacuna that characterizes most country-level counterinsurgency efforts. Khalilzad and Barno shared a chief of staff who oversaw civil-military coordination and such specialized groups as the “Integrated Planning Cell,” which was responsible for devising measures of effectiveness and monitoring reconstruction

efforts in Afghanistan. The team likewise maintained a separate capability to evaluate reconstruction, allowing the Afghan country team to enhance oversight and devise new means for monitoring the effectiveness of American operations.⁷⁴

At the ground level, the country team in Afghanistan was represented most effectively by PRTs, especially in regions where the Karzai government could not exercise authority. Although PRTs were company-sized military units under Barno's leadership, they included representatives from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture who were responsible for coordinating efforts with overall U.S. political and economic goals for Afghanistan.⁷⁵ In effect, the principal field agent for reconstruction at the provincial level mirrored the intensive collaboration at the country-team level, achieving a degree of unity of command that has not been seen since the CORDS program in Vietnam.

Civil-military coordination in Afghanistan was further facilitated by a series of cost-sharing arrangements coordinating funding efforts among the departments and agencies represented in the country team. This maximized the strengths of each agency and worked to cover gaps in capacity. CERP was particularly useful in this regard, as it allowed PRT leaders to infuse cash quickly into reconstruction projects while their USAID counterparts organized larger and more closely monitored investments.⁷⁶ The use of these reconstruction funds was monitored by the country team's Interagency Resources Cell, which functioned as a chief financial office to the country team and cleared finances with the Office of Management and Budget, as well as various departmental comptrollers.

The integrated country team in Afghanistan formed a strong model for civil-military coordination, but it also reflected long-term weaknesses in the civilian capacity for managing counterinsurgency operations. The most effective elements of the operation were either largely staffed with or run by the military. The embassy's Integrated Planning Cell, for example, was filled with seconded military officers, while the PRTs made civilian reconstruction capacity effective by subordinating it to military control.

These ad hoc constructions were not only extremely effective and buttressed by strong cooperation between Khalilzad and Barno, but they also replaced capacity that, in a perfect world, would have been integral to the civilian country team.

If the intensive civil-military coordination of the Khalilzad-Barno country team was uniquely effective, it was also short lived. Without a clear legal basis or bureaucratic mandate, the relationship was not dismantled when the two leaders were rotated out of the country in 2005 and would almost be impossible to reproduce under the current NATO-centered military structure in Afghanistan. If coordinating and unifying the efforts of many U.S. government agencies is a challenge, unifying the efforts of agencies and armies across the entire Atlantic alliance is an exercise in futility.

An Expanding Front: The Long War in Asia and Africa

Although the small scale of other U.S. operations during the War on Terror has kept them off the front pages, the efforts to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa still reveal some successful efforts and raise troubling questions. Despite notable progress in these theaters, the United States is not well-equipped to manage the possible escalation of hostilities in these regions if the global jihadist movement reallocates resources there.

Although the Long War began for most Americans on September 11, al Qaeda has long viewed Asia as a theater ripe for terrorist operations. Some ten thousand Southeast Asian Muslims joined the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and tens of thousands more have since sought to travel the Middle Eastern way of jihad, establishing connections between indigenous Muslim extremists in the region and such international "force multipliers" as al Qaeda.⁷⁷ Throughout the 1990s, al Qaeda maintained active relationships with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, both of which sought to establish Islamist states in the region.

Since 2001, the United States has dramatically increased counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia, where it has taken a minimalist posture while offering technical and training support to such security partners as the Philippines and Indonesia. This cooperation has resulted in several major successes, such as the killing of Abu Sayyaf commander Aldam Tilao in the southern Philippines and the arrest of over four hundred JI members.⁷⁸ The region, however, is still highly vulnerable to Islamist penetration, as demonstrated by both the resilience of the Moro Independence Liberation Front, which recently increased numbers of ceasefire violations, and the highly adaptive JI movement, which has recreated itself in a combination of militias and charity organizations to perpetuate its radical message.⁷⁹ The United States may be making gains in the Long War in Southeast Asia, but it still faces challenges.

The Horn of Africa has also long been an area of al Qaeda interest. Somalia once provided refuge to Osama bin Laden and was the scene of al Qaeda's first perceived victory against the United States in 1994. When Ethiopian forces were battling the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia in late 2006, al Qaeda deputy Ayman al Zawahiri called upon Muslims around the globe to join the struggle against "crusaders" there.⁸⁰ So long as jihadists can couch their message in terms of local self-empowerment against corrupt regimes and American imperialism, there are many reasons to think the Horn of Africa will continue as a fecund operating environment for terrorist actors.⁸¹

In response to the Islamist threat in Africa, the United States has vastly increased its operations in the region. In 2002, the Pentagon established the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which is responsible for "detecting, disrupting, and ultimately defeating transitional terrorist groups operations in the region."⁸² CJTF-HOA divides its energy among training security partners in the region, civil affairs operations, and counterterrorism activities. One example of the latter activity was the use of AC-130H Spectre gunships to attack jihadists pinned down by Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in early 2007.⁸³

Not surprisingly, while the military has expanded its operations in the Horn of Africa in every field from digging water wells to attacking jihadists, the State Department is unable to oversee military resources and activities. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has found that several ambassadors in the Horn of Africa are "overwhelmed by the growing presence of military personnel and insistent requests from combatant commanders."⁸⁴ The same report found that one ambassador whose country was receiving "global CERP" funds was not even familiar with the program and felt the most he could do was review choices that had already been made by the combatant commander. If the United States expands its activities in Africa, this type of civil-military disintegration bodes ill for its efforts.

The U.S. military is currently planning an ambitious increase of security cooperation with the formation of Africa Command (AFRICOM), a new, unified geographic combatant command that will take over what were previously rump portions of European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command responsibilities. One senior Defense Department official described the security cooperation as the core mission of the new command, stating that its goal is "supporting the indigenous leadership efforts" already occurring on the continent.⁸⁵ In this effort, AFRICOM will be heavily staffed with civilians and has been described as a planned "combatant command plus" that will be able to address security challenges on the continent in an interagency manner.⁸⁶ This effort to build civilian capacity into the military risks supplanting, not supporting, the civilian-led country team.

Frustration and Reorganization

The United States again finds itself debating the future structure of U.S. security assistance and counterinsurgency programs. It is unclear, however, whether the current debate will lead to effective, enduring reform. As in 1973, many in the military believe too much emphasis has been given to irregular warfare and

that the force should be refocused toward conventional operations.⁸⁷ Even if the commitment to building partnership capacity outlives the Bush administration, the concept remains ill-defined and heavily militarized.

A helpful start is that the current senior leaders “get it.” Both Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates are directing their departments to enhance civilian capacity for managing security-cooperation programs. The discussion in Washington on how to implement these ideas, however, is based on misunderstanding regarding the target and purpose of reform. Most prominent reform efforts are focused on the interagency process in Washington, learning the lessons of post-Iraq occupation planning rather than precrisis security cooperation and expanding the capacity of the combatant commander to take the lead in security cooperation operations. The inside-the-beltway conversation is dominated by preparations to refight the last war rather than anticipate the next one.

The impact of the war in Iraq on discussions of reform for security-cooperation mission is demonstrated most clearly by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which, in December 2005, instructed the State Department to take the lead in establishing an “interagency management system for reconstruction and stabilization.”⁸⁸ The memorandum instructs the secretary of state to establish the office of a coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization (S/CRS) assigned to “develop and approve strategies, with respect to U.S. foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation, for reconstruction and stabilization activities directed towards foreign states at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”⁸⁹

Although the Bush administration denies that NSPD-44 is simply a lessons-learned exercise from Iraq, the proposed management structure of the system is only well-designed for similar operations. In its planning documents, for example, S/CRS proposes that its “interagency management system” will respond to emergencies through a triumvirate of bodies: the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group will coordinate policy from the National

Security Council in Washington, the Integration Planning Cell will establish a civilian liaison to the geographic combatant commander’s headquarters, and the Advance Civilian Team will be dispatched from Washington to support the chief of mission in the field.⁹⁰ The unifying principle among these proposed bodies is that they are inherently short-term instruments that will only survive as long as a crisis in the field compels Washington policymakers to oversee them—an inherently unsustainable basis for long-term engagement.⁹¹

For its part, the Department of Defense is executing policy directive 3000.05, which requires the development of “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.”⁹² This directive recognizes that “[m]any stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” but nonetheless instructs that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish and maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” The range of tasks the military is instructed to be able to tackle includes building security forces, correctional facilities, judicial systems, the private-sector economy, and representative government institutions. There is little wonder the Pentagon recently issued a press release denying the “unfounded myth” that departmental proposals are a “DoD [Department of Defense] power grab.”⁹³

The key difference between the efforts by the State Department and the Pentagon to establish capacity for security cooperation is that the latter is receiving support from Congress, while the former is not. Congress has not passed a Foreign Affairs Authorization Act in over a decade, meaning that even when it has requested State to propose reforms to American security cooperation legislation, these proposals go ignored.⁹⁴ In contrast, the Defense Department received significant legislated increases to its authority for security cooperation, principally through the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which established two additional authorities:⁹⁵

- **Global Train and Equip.** Section 1206 of the 2006 NDAA authorizes the Department of Defense to train and equip foreign

military forces for the purposes of counterterrorism or stability operations, a policy frequently referred to as “1206” or “Global CERP.”

- **Security and Stabilization Assistance.** Section 1207 of the 2006 NDAA authorizes the Department of Defense to transfer “defense articles and funds” to the Department of State for the provision of “reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.”

According to officials responsible for managing them, the section 1206 and 1207 authorities have facilitated enhanced cooperation between the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom. The actual weight of capabilities conveyed in these authorities, however, heavily advantages the Department of Defense. For example, the authorized limit for 1206 funds has expanded from \$200 million to \$300 million in two years of reauthorizations, while the 1207 funds remain at their initial authorization of \$100 million.⁹⁶ In short, although the Departments of State and Defense are building their own capacity for security cooperation, it mostly involves an expansion of the capability of the Pentagon rather than the whole of the U.S. government.

While the Departments of State and Defense have grappled with the dilemmas caused by interagency management for the Long War, they are receiving input from Washington’s community of think tanks. Unfortunately, most of these proposals are aimed at complete restructuring of interagency relations and do not necessarily meet the immediate requirements for cooperation on the ground. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has proposed a “Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency,” which would restructure a whole array of authorities among the State Department, Pentagon, and National Security Council, as that law did among the military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1986.⁹⁷ Even less modestly, the Project on National Security Reform suggests that even a new “Goldwater-Nichols” will not go far

enough and is working to “draft a New National Security Act” for the whole of national security management.⁹⁸

We suspect these proposals for interagency revolution will simultaneously do too much and too little. They will require the government to learn entirely new ways of conducting its business but are not focused at the level where the interagency rubber hits the road: in the partner country. If the interagency process in Washington is a “5,000-mile screwdriver,” most of these proposals strike us as debates about the ergonomics of the handle: they will do little good if we continue to force a slotted blade into a Phillips-head screw.

Fortunately, for all the effort spent on interagency coordination in Washington, there is a simultaneous debate on shifting responsibility back to the field, and specifically, on what role the country team should play. A December 2006 study by the Department of Defense proposed that the country team should be reinforced as the locus of security assistance and counterinsurgency efforts.⁹⁹ The key conclusions of this report emphasized that such a transition would require not just enhancing the authorities of the ambassador, but also preparing more competent ambassadors and support personnel within the embassy.¹⁰⁰

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee report from December 2006 reached similar findings as the Defense Department study, recommending that the ambassador be given greater authority over assistance to security partners engaged in antiterror campaigns.¹⁰¹ The Senate report argued that ambassadors need greater capacity to balance the de facto policy-making authority of combatant commanders in their countries, a sentiment was echoed in a recent National Defense University study that concluded “the ambassador should have authority over not only civilian agendas, but also civilian functions carried out by the military” under its Global Train and Equip and civil affairs operations.¹⁰²

If the United States is going to engage its allies and security partners effectively in the Long War, that capacity will not be led from Washington, but in frontline states themselves.

The Frontline Country Team as Command Post

Although a series of reports from both Congress and the Departments of State and Defense have called for establishing the embassy as a “command post” in the Long War, they have all highlighted obstacles to doing so. The State Department has neither the proper culture nor the command structure to assume leadership in the Long War. Although the Department of Defense claims it is eager to support the State Department’s leadership in this field, it is instead investing in additional capabilities that will usurp the State Department’s traditional role.

The principle challenges the two sides in this equation face are long-lasting ones: managing civil-military relationships and integrating government agency operations at the country-team level. We propose that the most effective instrument for carrying out these functions is the frontline country team. The frontline country team can be created through piecemeal reforms intended to enhance the authority of the ambassador, provide greater coordination to interagency efforts overseas, and integrate security cooperation activities under the leadership of the country team.

The essential role of the frontline country team in the Long War is to integrate interagency efforts at the level at which it most directly affects the conduct of the Long War. The success of the frontline country team should not be contingent upon strong interagency relations in Washington, but should be facilitated by establishing unified leadership and purpose inside of the American mission to a beleaguered ally. Establishing this leadership is dependent upon developing a clear definition of roles and responsibilities for the frontline country team, enhancing the authority and capabilities of the chief of mission so that he may direct it efficiently, and establishing the necessary instruments inside of the American embassy.

The Frontline Country Team

Simply stated, the frontline country team is the command post for managing relations with American allies and security partners on the front lines of the Long War. The principal responsibilities of the frontline country team are to build, maintain, and manage security partnerships with these countries, as well as to support American military operations. The success of the frontline country team depends on the strength of the chief of mission, the development of a common terminology for managing security cooperation activities from the permanent American mission, and the creation of sufficient military structures to support security cooperation activities. The frontline country team reflects an approach grounded in the truth that every partnership challenge is unique. Its structures can be tailored to meet the needs of the host nation. It is intended to fill the gap between the capabilities of the “normal” U.S. diplomatic mission and the “tripwire” point at which larger U.S. combat formations must be employed.

The frontline country team is the necessary response to the challenges that have long bedeviled American security cooperation efforts. As the United States conducts operations that fall between traditional security assistance and full-scale counterinsurgency operations, it is necessary that the senior American representative possess the capacity to manage interagency operations and civil-military relations. In practice, most of these efforts will be targeted at a fairly small number of frontline states in the Long War and other failed or failing states where the United States has a direct interest in supporting stability. The states that immediately deserve enhanced American engagement are well known: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the states of the Horn of Africa, and some states in Southeast Asia. The list will

no doubt be adjusted over time to meet the evolving geography of the Long War and to balance American interests and capabilities.

The operational principle of the frontline country team is to maintain a constant unity of command in American efforts throughout the security spectrum. Under this proposal, the chief of mission will be empowered with authorities, institutions, and resources to manage security assistance and foreign internal defense operations. These same capabilities will allow him to serve as a competent partner in support of direct military operations as they occur. As discussed in the preceding two chapters, American capacity to manage these varying operations has been dispersed across departments in agencies over the past sixty years, and it is necessary to integrate them where they can do the most good: at the country-team level.

Let us return to the tripwire metaphor: On the one side of it, American operations are conducted under the aegis of the chief of mission and the American embassy. On the other side, the military establishes a joint task force to conduct operations in the country. In the past, as we have seen, American security cooperation on both sides of the tripwire has been beset by inefficiencies and confusions. Historically, when the chief of mission is responsible for operations, he does not possess sufficient authorities or resources to manage them fully. When a joint task force is established, any coordination that occurs between the chief of mission and the military commander is ad hoc and, more often than not, insufficient.

The frontline country team enhances interagency coordination at the country-team level when the chief of mission is responsible for American overseas operations. A corollary to the first objective is to shift the tripwire that necessitates the establishment of a joint task force. If an ever greater number of security cooperation activities are executed under the aegis of the ambassador, the need for direct military intervention will be lessened in many frontline states that require security assistance and cooperation for internal defense, but do not necessarily justify direct U.S. counterinsurgency operations. Finally, once the

tripwire is crossed and the United States conducts counterinsurgency operations, the frontline country team will coordinate with the military commander to deconflict civil-military operations and enhance whole-of-government effectiveness.

Considering this spectrum of command arrangements, the frontline country team will be responsible for three broad strategic functions in American security cooperation policy:

- **Anticipation.** The frontline country team is designed to allow the chief of mission to anticipate deteriorating security conditions in countries on the front lines of the Long War or otherwise vital to American interests. Identifying these states will set in motion an in-house planning apparatus to address the urgency and importance of the situation and develop a response plan that integrates whole-of-government capabilities.
- **Management.** The second strategic function of the frontline country team is its true *raison d'être* and the bridge between the two sides of the tripwire. Managing the development and execution of American security cooperation programs will allow the frontline country team to serve as a one-stop shop for American efforts to build partnership capacity. Moreover, it will provide a degree of oversight for both the president and Congress that currently does not exist in overseas operations.
- **Coordination.** The third strategic function of the frontline country team is to provide a hub of coordination between the combatant commander and his civilian counterparts as the United States expands its activities in support of an ally or security partner. If a foreign internal conflict escalates and the United States intervenes to conduct stability or counterinsurgency operations, the frontline country team will

provide a partner for coordinating the military activities.

The country team is built upon two essential planks: First, the authorities of the chief of mission will be enhanced, and he will be provided with a robust staff that can support his efforts. Second, the current country team structure will be supported with the establishment of a joint military advisory and assistance group (JMAAG), which would supplant the security assistance organizations that exist in most embassies and greatly expand the role of the embassies in providing security cooperation to frontline states in the Long War.

The Chief of Mission as Executive


In the frontline country team, the chief of mission would be given enhanced authorities for managing interagency operations in the country to which he is assigned. These enhanced authorities would provide the chief of mission with insight into the two principal instruments of bureaucratic power: information and funding. By enhancing the chief of mission's ability to monitor the activities and budgets of the agencies in his mission, the frontline country team would establish the common working ground upon which integrated operations can occur. The key instrument of the ambassador in this function would be an expanded personal staff.

In stark contrast to the support enjoyed by military commanders from the battalion level upward, the chief of mission does not have a personal staff, a dedicated set of personnel whose sole function is to develop operational guidance and monitor mission performance. Without such a staff, the ambassador is left with nominal responsibility for managing the operations of the mission, but little capacity to do so. The "country team meeting" has thus long served as a forum for embassy personnel and agency representatives to report and discuss cooperation toward common objectives, but the ambassador has few additional tools to monitor and assess independently his nominal subordinates.

The frontline country team would make up for this lacuna in the chief of mission's capabilities by providing a staff that allows him to serve as the executive responsible for all U.S. operations in his country. The chief of mission's staff will extend the ambassador's purview into the operations that occur under his nominal direction, give him stronger control over policy communications between Washington and the field, and build a more robust reachback mechanism into the interagency process. We propose that the staff roles in the embassy include at least the following three positions: a chief of staff, a Programs Coordination Office, and an Interagency Resources Office. Their functions are described below:

- **Chief of Staff.** The chief of staff is responsible for organizing all staff work in support of the chief of mission and serving as a personal advisor to the ambassador in the planning, organization, and administration of interagency operations conducted by all U.S. personnel in the country. The chief of staff would serve at a rank equal to the deputy chief of mission, but unlike the deputy chief of mission, would not have any line authority over other embassy staff offices such as the political, economic, or consular sections. In the event a military commander is conducting operations in the frontline state in question, the chief of staff would be assigned to liaise with his military counterpart on the commander's staff.
- **Programs Coordination Office.** The director of this office supports the chief of staff and chief of mission by providing independent assessments of operations of the country team. This office is responsible for providing the chief of mission with a degree of insight into the effectiveness of operations conducted by various agencies represented in the country team, as well as providing direct assessments of security conditions in the frontline state. This office

FIGURE 3
THE FRONTLINE COUNTRY TEAM



Source: Christopher Griffin.

would also be responsible for preparing assessments of program feasibility for the chief of mission, incorporating its own analysis of previous efforts, and coordinating with other sections and agency officers inside the embassy. If there is a military commander in the country, this office would principally liaise with the operations section of the commander's staff.

- **Interagency Resources Office.** The director of this office supports the chief of staff and chief of mission by serving as the chief financial officer for the country team. He is responsible for monitoring the various accounts that support U.S. activities; no dollar is spent in the country without appearing on his ledgers, providing vital information in support of the Programs Coordination Office as it evaluates the effectiveness of U.S. operations. Moreover, the Interagency Resources Office provides vital leverage to the chief of mission throughout the funding process. The office serves as an instrument to monitor and coordinate the requests of the various

governmental agencies throughout the budgetary process. The office is also the natural counterpart to the Office of Management and Budget in Washington, with which it communicates the chief of mission's instructions regarding priorities while ordering the annual appropriations request. Last, the office would serve as a counterpart for various agency comptrollers, conducting requests for national security funding waivers either to support operations otherwise prohibited by law or to coordinate shared resources among country team members.

Establishing these offices inside of the embassy would introduce a new set of staff relationships. The ambassador would have a committed staff responsible for supporting interagency operations under his direction.

With new capabilities come new responsibilities, and to the degree that building a personal staff inside of the embassy would increase the ambassador's ability to direct interagency operations at the country-team level, he would be expected to exercise greater leadership in doing so than has been the

historic norm. The chief of mission of the frontline country team is responsible for developing and executing an Interagency Mission Strategic Plan that articulates the full range of American interests toward his country and establishes interagency goals for building partnership capacity there.

The principle instrument for coordinating the chief of mission's plan for developing partnership capacity will be conducted at the country-team level. The frontline country team is distinguished from the traditional country team meeting by its organization into functional working groups that develop strategy and operational guidance to direct interagency operations on the variety of challenges for frontline states. The reorganization of the frontline country team carries direct implications for the traditional security assistance organization: more will be done inside the embassy, requiring additional personnel and an expanded mandate.

The Joint Military Assistance and Advisory Group

In addition to supporting the ambassador through an enhanced staff, the frontline country team also comprises a JMAAG. The JMAAG serves as the lead agent for building a long-term security partnership with the host nation and provides Department of Defense support to the chief of mission. Essentially, the JMAAG is a security assistance organization with an expanded mandate, to the degree that it conducts a range of functions not normally executed from the embassy.

The JMAAG provides three essential security cooperation functions: security assistance, military training, and military advising. The first of these roles is already present in most security assistance organizations, which, as described above, play a vital role in linking the chief of mission and the regional combatant commander in the execution of security assistance. The additional functions of military training and advising are what distinguish the JMAAG from its counterparts in most countries and are also the source of its unique strength. The JMAAG is intended to provide security assistance during


foreign internal defense operations without requiring direct intervention by the combatant commander, thus accelerating, enabling, and shaping the partnership-building effort. The advising mission is especially valuable and most crucial: it involves a variety of American missions conducted in the field, but not under the direction of a joint task force.

The JMAAG is also the vital link between the chief of mission and the combatant commander. Personnel and resources for the JMAAG are to be provided by the combatant commander in accordance with the requirements of the chief of mission, a function for which JMAAG guidance will be vitally important. In contrast to the current arrangement of relations between security assistance organizations and the combatant commander, however, the officer efficiency reports for the personnel at the JMAAG will be written by the chief of mission under which they serve, providing a direct impetus for loyalty to the ambassador's vision for the country team.

The JMAAG must be tailored to the chief of mission's guidance for security cooperation based upon the needs of the partner nation. Although there is no single model for how the JMAAG would be structured in any country, it would differ from most security assistance organizations today in its flexibility. The essential purpose of the JMAAG is to provide a skeletal structure that can be expanded or collapsed to accommodate any influx of officers who must meet the requirements for the organizations assistance, training, and advising functions. In addition, the JMAAG will take operational control of any mobile training or civil affairs teams temporarily attached to the country team to meet temporary, narrowly defined capabilities. It can in this way improve the theater commander's security cooperation program.

The JMAAG's success would not be dependent upon the number of security assistance officers, as is the case today, nor upon the establishment of an "advisory corps" of officers who make a career out of advising foreign forces. The JMAAG would draw upon a combination of general-purpose force officers and special operations forces to provide trainers and advisors who are experts in their own fields. It is

FIGURE 4
NOTIONAL JMAAG ORGANIZATION



Source: Christopher Griffin.

crucial to understand that allies accept advice in proportion to its military value, not because it is given in the local language. The defense ministries of security partners would receive training from American staff officers, the flag officers from their American counterparts, and field-grade officers from American soldiers, airmen, and sailors. The purpose of this organization is to transfer expertise and develop robust security partnerships.

Recommendations and Obstacles

The key advantage of the frontline country team as an instrument of security cooperation is that many of the legislative authorities this proposal relies upon already exist. The proposal principally requires the Departments of State and Defense to undertake a series of updates to the policies and directives that guide security-cooperation activities. In short, this is a piecemeal, incremental set of reforms that would lend themselves to application to a limited number of test cases followed by broader incorporation into interagency procedures. This section describes

notional steps to be taken in this process for the Departments of State and Defense, as well as legislative proposals for facilitating the process.

State Department. As stated above, many of the nominal authorities required by the secretary of state and his chiefs of mission to establish the components of the frontline country team already exist in relevant U.S. legislation, presidential directives, and the Foreign Affairs Manual, which describes the “basic organizational directive” for Department of State operations.¹⁰³ We propose that the president and secretary of state clarify how these authorities should be applied to the requirements of security cooperation with frontline states, and both provide personnel and appropriate training for establishing these institutions.

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 establishes the ambassador’s basic authorities relative to other members of the country team, stating that the chief of mission “shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision” of all officials in his country, and “shall keep fully informed with respect to all activities and operations” within

that country, with the exception of authorities under the direction of the military commander.¹⁰⁴ The Foreign Affairs Manual clarifies this language, stating that the chief of mission is responsible for supervising the activities of all U.S. diplomatic and executive branch agency personnel, as well as “integrating the activities of all posts under that officer’s supervision.”¹⁰⁵ The Foreign Affairs Manual specifies the authorities enjoyed by the ambassador in his effort to integrate and manage operations in his post:

The precise structure of a mission is determined by the chief of mission in the light of local circumstances and the specific nature and scope of function assigned to the post. The chief of mission may, for example, at that officer’s discretion, establish one functional section for both political and economic activities; structure consular establishments to suit local needs . . . and initiate requests for the consolidation of all administrative activities at post. *Submit requests for organizational changes requiring an increase in staff, or affecting large specialized subordinate missions . . . in advance for appropriate Washington, DC headquarters review and concurrence.*¹⁰⁶

In short, chiefs of mission currently enjoy the authority to establish, with headquarters approval, the personal staff we have proposed. They are not, however, directed to do so by the Foreign Affairs Manual or other State Department policy, and there is little capacity or institutional culture for developing these managerial roles inside of the embassy. We thus propose that the Department of State expand its policy guidance to chiefs of mission to include direction to establish personal staffs with the approval of the secretary or, alternatively, at the direction of the secretary. Additional language that would serve to meet this objective would be to add a paragraph to the Foreign Affairs Manual’s discussion of the organization of the embassy that states:

The chief of mission, with the approval of the secretary of state, may establish an embassy

staff with sections for providing personal advice on U.S. policy and operations, conducting assessments and programs for interagency cooperation among executive agency representatives in the mission, and monitoring interagency programming and expenditures by executive agency representatives in the mission. The structure of this staff is to be determined at the discretion of the ambassador.

Such language would establish the slots to be filled, but not necessarily the trained and motivated personnel to fill them. For the frontline country team to work, the State Department must develop a cadre of personnel capable of executing its functions. The first basic step would be for the secretary of state to request a study of which country teams would benefit most from the addition of direct support staff to the ambassador and what size such staffs should be. We suspect that although this number of foreign service officers would be measured at an annual requirement of dozens rather than hundreds of officers, the perennially undermanned Foreign Service would be hard-pressed to fill the positions. This is an initial dilemma that requires congressional authorization and appropriations for a larger Foreign Service to remedy.

The State Department’s diplomats require training in managerial and analytic skills in order to assume the responsibilities of interagency oversight. The secretary of state should direct the Foreign Service Institute to build training programs for embassy staffs with a focus on management, security cooperation, quantitative analysis, and interagency funding authorities. Such programs will train a cadre of officials competent at interagency coordination and will introduce country team management to lower and midlevel officers, making it integral to their cumulative professional development.

Even with additional personnel and training opportunities, perhaps the most obvious challenge with reform for the State Department is the bureaucratic culture in Foggy Bottom. Today’s foreign service officers were not raised in a tradition of accepting responsibility for managing complex interagency

operations overseas, particularly in the field of security cooperation. One useful indication of this fact is the emphasis by Ambassador Ronald Neumann, Khalilzad's successor in Kabul, in dismantling the innovative country team components he received and the subsequent restoration of a "normal embassy" in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷ Such objections to the frontline country team concept recall problems some ambassadors had with the original concept of the country team during the Cold War:

Within State, opposition reflected various considerations. There was some bureaucratic reluctance to formalize a system for inter-agency communications and shared responsibility. Secondly, there was a sense, on the part of some ambassadors, that the device was a constraint on their freedom of decision making. Some ambassadors were simply not interested in the activities of many of the non-State elements of their missions and did not want to be forced into a regular forum where State and other agencies met as peers.¹⁰⁸

The key to rooting out such abdications of leadership is to redefine the metrics of success in the Foreign Service. The Department of State can create simple but powerful incentives for rising Foreign Service officers to seek out staff positions and develop a culture of interagency leadership. The most basic such incentive is to make promotion to the Senior Foreign Service contingent upon having served as either a staff office director or chief of staff. If the only path to advancement is to accept greater responsibility, the ambitious and the talented will do so.

Defense Department. The JMAAG is at its essence an upgrade to the security assistance organization that exists in almost every global country team. The JMAAG is designed to meet mission requirements by introducing greater capabilities to the portion of security cooperation under the direction of the chief of mission. Fortunately, the Department of Defense already enjoys many of the authorities required to implement this portion of the frontline country

team. American security assistance offices already encircle the globe and provide the building blocks for the JMAAG. The Department of Defense is establishing an array of capabilities under the agenda of building global partnerships to enhance security cooperation assets. The key step will be for the Department of Defense to clarify the role of the JMAAG and its relations to other portions of the defense bureaucracy.

The basic change to establish the JMAAG would be to modify several Department of Defense directives to place greater responsibility for security cooperation under the direction of the JMAAG chief. For example, the Department of Defense currently identifies "advisory and training services" as "secondary functions" of the security assistance organization that are only to be filled when they do not interfere with the "primary functions" of providing security assistance.¹⁰⁹ We recommend the Pentagon update relevant directives and designate the training and advising of host nation forces as a primary function of the JMAAG.¹¹⁰

As the JMAAG assumes greater responsibility for additional forms of security cooperation, the military will have to address several questions of doctrine and organization. First, the bureaucratic wiring diagrams and authorities for security assistance officers in the Security Assistance Management Manual will require updates to reflect the modified structure and additional responsibilities for training and advisory duties. Corresponding to this assumption of responsibility by the JMAAG, the combatant commanders will also require clarification for their modified responsibility to support rather than direct these activities.

The growth in security cooperation activities conducted at the country-team level will require personnel to execute them. Counterinsurgency expert Robert Killebrew suggested in a recent study on the expansion of MAAG activities that the principal demand for personnel would fall upon "well-trained mid- and senior grade officers and [noncommissioned officers (NCOs)]," and he proposed that an enhanced JMAAG capability would require "about 1,000 additional mid- to senior grade officers,

and about double that number of senior NCOs (Sergeant First Class/Gunnery Sergeant and above).”¹¹¹ In short, the military would be required to retain a larger class of senior officers and NCOs relative to the conventional forces than currently to fill adequately the requirement for trainers and advisers, but in numbers measured in thousands rather than tens of thousands.

Finally, implementing JMAAGs as an integral component of the frontline country team would require a shift in the training and institutional culture of the military no less profound than that required of the Department of State. Killebrew recommends the Department of Defense “establish a system of schools to train and educate officers and NCOs” for service in JMAAGs, describing a two-tracked system that would prepare some officers for a multiyear hitch before returning to their mainstream military specialties and others for careers as security assistance officers. These steps would develop a professional competency in these activities, but they must be backstopped by reassurances to military officers who conduct security cooperation activities that they will not sacrifice their careers by leaving the mainstream of their military specialties.¹¹²

A last point to note is that the frontline country team requires the military to subordinate itself to State Department leadership on the near side of our heuristic tripwire to achieve unity of command. By shifting activities inside the embassy and under the chief of mission, the military would be surrendering operational control over a wide set of activities, particularly training and advisory missions, that are principally conducted under the authority of the combatant commander today. Secretary Gates has already said he would be happy to sacrifice some of his budget if it would increase State Department capabilities, but the key consideration for this proposal is whether he can convince his department and military commanders to sacrifice their authority.

The President and Congress. The frontline country team proposal was crafted with the objective of minimizing the need for presidential or congressional intervention. This report provides a set of piecemeal

reforms that may mostly be executed by the Departments of State and Defense and are premised on the ability for coordination at the country-team level without extensive legislative or interagency restructuring. We have identified points at which pressure and oversight may be applied to significant advantage.

President Bush has already expressed his objectives for interagency collaboration for security cooperation in National Security Presidential Decision 44, which set clear objectives and established the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction operations in 2005. Because the frontline country team has direct impacts on reforms both within and among the Departments of State and Defense, as well as other departments and agencies involved in security cooperation activities, even this modest set of reforms may benefit from presidential guidance to establish priorities and objectives. For example, a National Security Presidential Decision regarding interagency cooperation in the frontline country team or identifying the need for enhanced State Department leadership at the country-team level would prod the agencies in the right direction.

There is also a useful role for Congress to play with regard to these recommendations. The annual authorization and appropriations process for defense and foreign affairs provides an excellent opportunity to provide guidance to the Departments of State and Defense. If the two departments were directed to explore the requirements and feasibility of this proposal, for example, it would force officials to consider reform while leaving it at their discretion. Moreover, it is worth noting this proposal requires Congress to provide the State Department with the resources to expand and train the Foreign Service to meet its new responsibilities in the frontline country team concept. We share many legislators’ concern about the State Department’s reputation for fecklessness, but believe it can be remedied through reform.

Finally, we recommend Congress revisit Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which places unhelpful restrictions on the management of security cooperation programs. The “sense of Congress” that advising and training assistance be

conducted principally by personnel who are only temporarily detailed to partner countries undermines the basis on which a lasting security partnership can be built.¹¹³ Not only is effective security cooperation premised on long-term engagement, but we have also found that placing training and advisory efforts under the direction of the combatant commander has heightened rather than lowered

the profile of America's overseas presence. Moreover, the limitation that no more than six personnel be assigned to conduct security cooperation activities in any country team without a presidential waiver is at best an obstacle to flexible management of overseas posts. Congress should consider updating this language to be a reporting requirement rather than a restriction.¹¹⁴

5

The Case of Indonesia: An AEI Seminar Game Report

On November 8–9, 2007, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) held a seminar entitled “Building Partnership Capacity: The Case of Indonesia.” The conference was led by AEI resident fellow Thomas Donnelly, AEI research fellow Christopher Griffin, and AEI resident scholar Gary J. Schmitt. This exercise was designed to serve as a test case for the frontline country team proposal by presenting a scenario that required enhanced American engagement, but ruled out direct military intervention.

The seminar brought together twenty-three experts, ranging from area specialists who study Indonesian politics, to counterterrorism experts, to former officials with direct experience building partnership capacity in the Long War. The seminar was international as well as interdisciplinary and included experts from Indonesia as well as Australia, reinforcing the premise that no American effort at engagement will succeed without host nation partnership and allied support.

During two days of discussion and sometimes-heated debate, seminar participants identified a clear set of goals the United States would seek if it were to enhance its security partnership with Indonesia, as well as obstacles to achieving them. A consensus emerged on several key points:

- Indonesia is a model frontline state. The country is penetrated by the al Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist organization that has already killed hundreds in a series of bombings. Senior al Qaeda leaders have identified Indonesia as a theater for future operations, and the country is also home to an array of indigenous extremist organizations. Moreover, Indonesia is vital to the balance among Asia’s great powers: instability in the country would affect American,

Chinese, Japanese, and Australian interests and disrupt global shipping routes.

- The United States must balance an array of sometimes-contradictory interests in its relationship with Indonesia. The ongoing consolidation of Indonesian democracy is of vital importance, a process requiring Indonesia’s military to dismantle its vestigial political and business activities. American engagement must neither inadvertently cripple Indonesia’s capacity for government nor create an excuse for actors within the military to subvert democratization.
- Security cooperation with Indonesia will succeed or fail upon the subtlety of its execution. The Indonesian people are proud of their nation’s postindependence accomplishments and have little patience for foreign meddling in its internal affairs. The United States must craft any security cooperation to maintain an Indonesian leadership in the relationship and minimize the ability of JI or other extremists to propagandize against perceived neocolonialism.

Based on these points of consensus, which are further discussed below, we believe this case study demonstrates that the frontline country team is a compelling model for building partnership capacity among allies and security partners in the Long War.

Why Indonesia Matters

Indonesia’s importance is demonstrated by a simple aggregation of facts: The country is the world’s fourth

most populous nation, third largest democracy, and largest Muslim state. Indonesia comprises some 17,500 islands along the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, linking the economies of East Asia and the Americas to their commodity suppliers in the Middle East and Africa. Indonesia has been the target of al Qaeda's most ambitious efforts to globalize its operations, suffering a string of terrorist attacks. Indonesia is also the traditional leader of ASEAN. In short, Indonesia is a keystone of stability in the Asia-Pacific.

From an American perspective, these varying interests may be summarized by describing Indonesia as a firebreak against the spread of Islamist extremism and the expansion of Chinese military power. Indonesia can serve as what one analyst has called "a beacon of moderation and prosperity on Islam's eastern flank," providing a clear ideological alternative to al Qaeda's revolutionary ideology.¹¹⁵ Similarly, Indonesia can be a model for political pluralism within Southeast Asia, serving as a regional pole that balances China's support for undemocratic regimes.

For Indonesia to play the role of a firebreak against such destabilizing influences, it must continue to consolidate its democratization, a process that began with the toppling of Suharto's "New Order" autocracy in 1998. Indonesia's democratic transformation has been anything but smooth, and it was even marked by communal bloodshed in its early years. In our judgment, the eventual success of democracy in Indonesia will hinge upon two elements: the military's continued exit from everyday politics in the country and whether civilian governance can fill the gaps left before Islamist extremists fill the void.

From *Dwifungsi* to Democracy. The armed forces of Indonesia (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) took on a preeminent role in Indonesian political life during the 1945–49 struggle for independence. During the final year of this conflict, the military continued fighting after its civilian leadership had been captured, defeating both the Dutch military and communist rebels and establishing the country's independence and unity. The Indonesian military

stepped into the political fray again in 1965–68, when Suharto pushed aside the country's founding president to establish his New Order regime. Having arrived in power at the head of a *de facto* coup, Suharto sought to shore up his support by increasing military influence at every level of Indonesian social life.

The military's role in politics was consolidated under Suharto's policy of *dwifungsi*, or dual role, in which military officers filled legislative seats and civilian posts throughout the government. The military also established a territorial military command system under which two-thirds of the country's soldiers were distributed throughout the provinces and established a presence all the way down to the village level, where a noncommissioned officer was posted to keep tabs on political life. The territorial forces also established a network of business enterprises that allowed it to sustain itself with minimal reliance on public funds, provide a livelihood to underpaid soldiers, and gather domestic intelligence. Of course, the territorial forces were also prone to endemic abuses and corruption, and any soldiers dedicated to running businesses were not able to train for warfare.

The territorial forces are backed up by two additional armed army branches. The Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) is a highly mobile force that forms the nation's second line of defense, deployable at short notice to support the territorial forces in the event of an internal disturbance or to defend the heartland of Java against a foreign aggressor. Kostrad troops are significantly better trained than their territorial counterparts and are trained to fight at higher levels of organization. Finally, the country's elite troops fill out the Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus), a highly trained corps of troops used to suppress rebellions on the island. Kopassus forces are considered Indonesia's most effective military unit, but also its most brutal, with a long history of human rights violations.

The New Order came to an end in 1998, when the popular *reformasi* movement forced Suharto's resignation over his government's inability to manage the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and myriad

abuses of power. In the decade since, the TNI has sought to sort out a role for itself in newly democratic Indonesia. The military has surrendered its seats in the legislature and acquiesced in efforts to decentralize governmental power both from Jakarta to the provinces and from the military to civilian leadership at every level of government. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former officer, has advocated a “New Paradigm” for the TNI in which it redirects itself from internal to external defense, a project involving supporting the establishment of an independent national police, dismantling the military’s business networks, and pulling the territorial forces out of political life.

The process of democratization has encountered significant difficulties. Simultaneously moving the military funding to official budgets while retraining it for more professional military operations is expensive: in 2006, the TNI was estimated to receive some 70 percent of its funding from off-budget business sources. Moreover, removing the territorial forces that once served as police forces, built roads, and managed health clinics requires a dramatic expansion of civilian governance, an effort in which Indonesia has often been lagging. In short, Indonesia’s march toward democracy has faltered and consistently opened gaps in legitimate governance.

The Islamist Challenge. The rise of radical Islam is by far the most pressing challenge to this transformation and, in addition to the strengths of this worldwide movement, Islamism in Indonesia has benefited from the weaknesses of the recent transitional governments.

While the moderate Islamic beliefs of the majority provide a robust basis for Indonesian civil society and a wide range of groups and militias with differing agendas exists, Indonesia has also been a home to JI, which has ties to al Qaeda, and Laskar Jihad, a militia that has resorted to intimidation and violence. Finally, the Indonesian military has had an ambiguous relationship with Islamic groups, and in the past aided or even employed Islamist militias for its own political ends. The Islamist movement in Indonesia is dominated by three interwoven sets of actors:

- JI is the most notorious organization in Southeast Asia, established in the early 1990s with the goal of turning Indonesia and the rest of the region into a unified Islamic state. The organization received training and support from al Qaeda and attained international prominence following the Bali bombing of October 2002, in which more than two hundred people were killed. JI has conducted bombings on an almost annual basis since, including the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy.
- The *laskars* are a set of militias principally concerned with domestic affairs, and they have proliferated since Indonesia’s democratization loosened former dictatorial restrictions on such organization. The most notable of these organizations, Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jihad, were established by JI to conduct sectarian violence in the Maluku islands and Sulawesi after the fall of Suharto and have fueled conflicts that have claimed some ten thousand lives. There are additional *laskars* throughout Indonesia, although most have not achieved the same level of violence as the JI-affiliated movements.
- The Indonesia Mujahidin Council (MMI) is an Islamist charity organization that provides an overt organization in support of JI’s covert activities. The MMI is headed by JI founder Abu Bakar Bashir and staffed by many of his former lieutenants who were captured and released by the Indonesian government. MMI principally conducts so-called *da’wa* social outreach activities that, much like Hezbollah’s welfare programs in Lebanon, proselytize to mass audiences without visibly breaking the law.

The Indonesian government has found it very difficult to win on the multiple fronts on which it

faces this multifaceted Islamist threat. Before the 2002 Bali bombing, the government was reluctant to admit JI even existed, but it has since arrested hundreds of members. The various *laskar* movements are allowed to operate with virtual impunity, with military and police forces arriving to restore order between attacks but not to roll up the organizations themselves. The MMI is reportedly closely monitored by the government, but it has not been subject to any crackdown.

The greatest successes against JI have been at the hands of a police counterterrorism unit called Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88). Densus 88 is an Australian- and U.S.-supported organization that is operationally independent from both the other national police forces and the TNI, thus providing a barrier against endemic corruption. Highlights in this effort have included the capture of Riduan Isamuddin—better known by the *nom de guerre* Hambali, JI's chief operational planner and intermediary to al Qaeda—and the seizure in March 2007 of a huge cache of explosives and weaponry. International cooperation with Densus 88 has been credited with major victories over JI but has not addressed underlying questions for the Islamist offensive in Indonesia.

Even as the Indonesian government has struck repeatedly against JI terrorists, the organization has leveraged its *laskar* wings to fuel communal violence in the Maluku Islands and Sulawesi, where Christian and Muslim communities remain in a virtual state of war. Even more problematically, the Indonesian government has not cracked down on MMI's efforts to replace the country's nascent governance with de facto Islamist rule. For example, following the 2004 tsunami disaster, MMI secured a World Food Programme contract to deliver assistance in devastated Aceh, a move that was overturned only when the United States and Australia complained that MMI leadership was proscribed as terrorists by the United Nations Security Council. Indonesia has not attempted to freeze assets or ban fundraising by MMI, effectively permitting this organization to operate.

Imagining the Future of a Frontline State

For the purposes of the exercise, we constructed a scenario in which the trend toward democratization was not matched by a strengthening of Indonesian governance, a development Islamist extremists sought to exploit. To be clear, the purpose of this exercise was not to “predict” the future direction of Indonesia, but to imagine a realistic set of circumstances that would stress the Indonesian government and justify enhanced American efforts to support the government in its struggle with Islamist forces. We found several reasons to believe such an outcome is plausible and indeed justifies greater engagement by the United States today.

In the scenario, we postulated four “drivers” propelling Indonesia toward a governance crisis by 2012. First, we assumed the current trend in improved U.S.-Indonesian security relations would continue unabated in the foreseeable future. Second, the improvement in U.S.-Indonesian relations would be bolstered by the continued democratization of Indonesia, as the military dismantles its business relations and seeks to minimize its role in local politics. Third, Islamist actors would seek to exploit the gaps left behind as the military leaves behind its traditional governmental role and the civilian government attempts to expand its nascent role. Fourth, we assume Indonesia is uniquely vulnerable to otherwise unpredictable events.

The last of these drivers is perhaps the most problematic one. Whereas the other three are mere extrapolations of current trends in Indonesia, the fourth driver cuts to an essential challenge of working with such frontline states such as Indonesia: their weak governance renders them highly vulnerable to exogenous events. We built several specific developments into the scenario, but it is only necessary here to point out the categories we recognized and how significant and unpredictable their effects may be:

- No matter how the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan turn out, they may create new dangers for Indonesia. Al Qaeda has

declared its intention to extend operations into new theaters, and an infusion of international jihadist resources to Indonesia could quickly replace the terrorists and bombmakers who have been captured and killed by Densus 88.

- The Indonesian economy is highly vulnerable to disruptions arising out of China, the destination for some 15 percent of the country's exports. An economic crisis in China could launch a new round of sectarian violence or public disorder, much like that which followed the Asian financial crisis.
- Indonesia is at constant danger from natural disasters, which could provide Islamist groups with more opportunities to undermine the legitimate government and establish their own humanitarian operations in affected territories.

In short, it is by no means obvious Indonesia is on the road to destabilization or has to contend with a significant Islamist insurgency. The country faces a set of unique challenges, however, that merit additional American engagement. For the purposes of our seminar, we presented the participants with a presidential guidance that formed the remainder of their discussion:

The United States has a vital interest in supporting Indonesia, and I want to do so effectively. But I want our assistance to have an Indonesian "face," with the United States and Australia as supportive partners. I want Indonesia to continue its evolution toward a strong, democratic state and a security partner. I expect this to be a cooperative effort with Australia, and I want Chinese sensitivities taken into account, particularly with regard to ethnic Chinese minorities in Indonesia. Advisers and offshore naval forces are acceptable, but not combat units.

Defining Strategic Objectives

The first task for seminar participants was to identify U.S. strategic objectives in its relationship with Indonesia. Throughout the discussion, it was emphasized continually that the primary goal of the United States should be to reestablish the legitimacy of the Indonesian government. To do this, the United States would first look to reaffirm the credibility of the Indonesian government, then discredit the Islamists, and finally address the other political parties in the country. It would not be in the U.S. interest for Islamist ideology to make further inroads or pose a credible alternate basis for governance.

The goal of supporting legitimate Indonesian governance necessitates that the United States support Jakarta's efforts rather than take the lead. One participant summarized this requirement neatly: "The best way to put things back together is not to look like we are putting things back together." The key would be enabling Indonesian capabilities to the greatest extent possible without engaging U.S. forces in combat, a challenge since the Indonesian government would only overtly request American assistance once a crisis had erupted. Any limited commitment or halfway posture from the United States to keep an Indonesian face on responses could end up not being enough to quell the violence and return stability to the area.

Participants also addressed the inherent contradictions in Indonesia's current dilemmas. Although the TNI presents perhaps the easiest partner with which to work in the country, the Indonesian government is committed to its program of developing civilian leadership and minimizing the role of the military in local security and politics. A security cooperation program with Indonesia must be developed with an eye to balancing expedient measures to bolster TNI internal defense capabilities with long-term measures to enhance civilian governance and policing. In this regard, we discussed the importance of building a broader, sustained national relationship addressing issues of governance and civil society.

The last strategic objective participants identified was developing support in the United States for the

long-term partnership-building process. The only way to accomplish this would be through a gradual bolstering of political support both domestically and internationally. The U.S. government would have to argue the need for increased international engagement and shore up support in Congress prior to approaching the Indonesian government with any sort of preparatory plan.

Organizing the Frontline Country Team

Participants began their discussion of how to implement American strategy by addressing current arrangements at the embassy in Jakarta. One former official described that embassy as managing a “hodgepodge” of programs, with coordination contingent upon the leadership style of the ambassador and the management abilities—or lack thereof—of the deputy chief of mission. Another participant noted that, in his experience, the U.S. military service representatives in the embassy rarely coordinated their efforts with one another or U.S. Pacific Command. Other agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, work independently. Simply put, no participant in the seminar believed the existing country team as it is currently resourced and constituted has the capacity to execute an expanded program of engagement.

Participants then discussed the relative merits of the frontline country team versus possible alternatives. For example, one participant said this scenario would fall under the aegis of the State Department’s proposed interagency management system for reconstruction and stabilization, in which case a policy-coordinating committee would be established in Washington and an advanced civilian team dispatched to assist the ambassador. Several points were raised in this regard: Washington policymaking is too crisis-driven to anticipate rather than react to any potential destabilization in Indonesia, a National Security Council–chaired committee is not an efficient mechanism for sustaining long-term engagement with a security partner, and the temporary

secondment of officials to the field would not create the necessary capabilities for sustained management of the country team.

In contrast to the proposed interagency management system, participants noted a key advantage of the frontline country team: it did not require interagency management from Washington. The frontline country team would allow the relationship to be managed locally, where the requirements for cooperation among different elements of the U.S. mission to the country would be clearest. Several participants noted, however, that incorporating the frontline country team into American regional strategy would require clear communication with and among the State Department’s regional assistant secretary of state and the geographic combatant commander. Participants discussed the need to institutionalize additional communications among the chief policymakers in regard to Indonesia, but did not find it necessary to restructure traditional chains of command among them.

Participants were concerned about a pair of issues concerning the management of the country team. They were not certain the embassy’s senior leadership, including the chief of mission and deputy chief of mission, would be professionally competent enough to assume the responsibilities assigned in the proposal. It would be necessary to develop additional professional training before they could assume such prominent leadership roles. In addition, participants were concerned about tensions the frontline country team would create inside the embassy. For example, they wondered whether the deputy chief of mission and chief of staff would have a dispute over their relative authorities, or if there would be dissatisfaction among embassy personnel who might feel displaced or marginalized as new structures exerted leadership over issues in which they were previously paramount.

The topic most discussed during the seminar was the structure and nature of the proposed JMAAG. One participant noted the president would likely support the JMAAG model because it is merely an expansion of a government instrument that already exists, not the creation of a new system of security cooperation management. A qualification that immediately

rose, however, was that the terminology regarding the JMAAG would necessarily be flexible: the generic “security assistance organization” or even more innocuous “liaison group” may be a more useful title for the sake of host-nation sensitivities.

A second question that arose was whether the proposed JMAAG would be what one participant described as a “highly visible, deep penetration” model of engagement with Indonesian forces. Several participants pushed back on this criticism, pointing out that the size of the organization would not likely require much more than several dozen members, although it could be expanded to accommodate more in response to a host-nation request. Other participants argued that the JMAAG would be far less visible than the current system of flying organic military training teams in and out of the country on a regular basis. A consistent partnership with the TNI by means of the strategic placement of several individuals would be far more advantageous both to American and Indonesian interests than a mobile team flown in to train a company or battalion over a period of weeks. Indeed, the JMAAG approach would be far better suited to building the trust needed between allies.

The participants also debated the optimal rules of engagement for JMAAG personnel at great length. They agreed that a mission requiring personnel to assist, train, and advise Indonesian forces necessitated that American officials have clear rules regarding their participation in TNI operations up to and including combat. If JMAAG advisors conduct combat-advising missions, participants agreed they must be properly trained and equipped for the task. In addition, the JMAAG would require the capability to reach back to forces under the direction of the U.S. Pacific Command in the event they became engaged in combat with hostile forces, a support relationship that could be based offshore.

Overall, participants agreed the frontline country team would provide a more useful model for leading security cooperation efforts, but one that would require additional definition on the ground under the direction of the chief of mission in cooperation with his State Department and Defense Department counterparts.

The Challenge of Building Partnership Capacity

If the United States were to upgrade security cooperation with Indonesia, the first step would be to launch a bilateral dialogue as to what that relationship should entail and what ends it would serve. From an American perspective, there are several objectives we have already identified—namely, to support the Indonesian military’s transformation into a more “normal” force in which the military and police forces divide responsibility for external and internal security, respectively. With that long-term goal in mind, the United States would be required to engage the military already existing in Indonesia, support its efforts to maintain the strength of the legitimate government, and develop its capabilities progressively. But it is important to note these U.S. goals align well with Indonesia’s own objectives.

The JMAAG would be the primary instrument for security cooperation with the TNI, supplying military equipment, training, and advice on operations, and perhaps establishing a school to train members of the TNI. The purposes of these efforts would be capacity building and facilitating technology transfers compatible with long-term self-sustainability. In addition to providing assistance, training, and advice to TNI forces, the United States can also provide vital planning assistance to the civilian leadership at the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, helping to improve civilian oversight of the military and engaging in sustained dialogue on Jakarta’s strategic objectives.

Participants also suggested the JMAAG could be responsible for coordinating offshore and aerial support for Indonesian forces in their combat-advising capacity. Participants argued that the Navy and Air Force could both organize any operations with a focus either on supporting near-term objectives (such as targeting intelligence for locating terrorist operatives) or for long-term capacity building (such as training the Indonesian air and naval forces better patrolling techniques). They argued it would be possible to organize any American maritime security operations in order to train and enhance gradually Indonesia’s indigenous capacity for taking over such missions in the future.

Looking at the territorial forces, participants discussed such options as an effort to reform, retrain, and redeploy the troops to higher-echelon bases, the separation of some troops to join police forces, and, most likely, some combination of the two. Participants emphasized the benefit of severing the military's security presence from its political presence while also supporting the development of capacity for civilian governance. Nonetheless, if the immediate goal is to support an foreign internal defense effort in Indonesia, the territorial forces would play a vital role in holding and building government authority in contested areas.

The Kopassus units proved another area in which the United States would have to balance conflicting priorities. Kopassus is Indonesia's best trained force, but it has a very poor human rights record. The United States would likely be very reluctant to aid or train these forces, even if the legislation preventing it were lifted or waived. One participant compellingly argued that the United States should shape its engagement with Kopassus as a monitoring effort. He argued that posting U.S. advisers to Kopassus would provide additional opportunities to monitor their human rights conduct and reassure American legislators and policymakers that Indonesia is meeting its obligations.

The third target for American security cooperation would be the Indonesian police forces, a vital piece of Indonesian civilian government that needs to fill the gap between *dwifungsi* and democracy. Although all participants agreed supporting the Indonesian police forces would be a priority, they were concerned the United States has a particularly bad track record of managing the authorities and funding for doing so, reflecting post-Vietnam security assistance restrictions. This was also an area in which cooperation with international partners, as discussed below, was identified as an essential requirement.

The last area discussed was the role of *Kostrad*, Indonesia's principal conventional military force. Participants agreed *Kostrad* would likely not be the principal instrument for responding to internal destabilization in Indonesia but that it was nonetheless the essential building block of the future

Indonesian military. Combined with support for Indonesia's navy and air force, the United States would seek to engage *Kostrad* in a long-term effort to develop the force's capacity for external defense, a mission requiring a smaller but more effective military.

A final but crucial element in the U.S. role in a foreign internal defense operation is nonmilitary assistance. Participants recommended the country team aid the Indonesian government in helping local communities identify their priorities, develop civil society initiatives, and gain support from segments of the population that have lacked social services. In sum, the efforts of other U.S. government agencies must serve a strategic interest just as military assistance does. Participants mentioned working with and supporting moderate Islamic groups, as well as providing assistance and oversight to the government's ministries. The country team and Indonesian government could promote this work through strategic communications, which would demonstrate Indonesian leadership in the country and undermine efforts by Islamist actors to present an alternative form of governance.

The Need for International Partners

One immediate issue participants in the seminar faced was the requirement that the United States attain cooperation from international partners with an interest in Indonesia's future. Australia has developed close military and police ties with Indonesia in recent years and has a vital interest in the country's continued democratization and economic prosperity. Japan, Korea, and Singapore are all deeply affected by developments in Indonesia and are each important donors of development assistance to Jakarta. Quite simply, internationalizing a cooperation program would make it far easier for the Indonesian government to work with Washington.

Moreover, the United States lacks certain capabilities only international partners can provide. Australia's diplomatic mission to Indonesia is not only the largest in the country, but indeed the largest Australian embassy in the world. The Australian military

is also engaged in joint training with Kopassus, a role prohibited by American policy and law. Australia can fill many gaps in American capacity for training foreign police forces, as the Australian federal police, for example, share a nationwide structure with the Indonesian national police forces. Cooperation to train the Densus 88 force provides a useful model for future cooperative U.S.-Australian engagement with Indonesia.

As an organizational matter, participants observed that enhanced U.S. engagement with Indonesia would require the State Department to coordinate its efforts with regional allies and security partners at higher levels than the country team. Once the respective regional strategies of the United States and its allies are aligned, participants agreed the frontline country team would provide a robust instrument for coordinating American policy in Indonesia with its allies. Indeed, one Australian participant with experience in Indonesia mentioned how frustrating it is to work with the poorly coordinated American embassy.

Anticipating the Enemy's Response

The final topic seminar participants discussed was the anticipated response by Indonesia's Islamist forces to enhanced American engagement. Indonesia's Islamists have proven themselves resourceful and adaptive, and there is no reason not to anticipate they will continue to be. Participants agreed that virtually all Islamist actors in Indonesia would conduct an information campaign to portray an enhanced U.S.-Indonesian relationship effort as neocolonialism, an unwelcome meddling in the country's internal affairs—hence the need to structure any engagement as a truly equal partnership in pursuit of shared goals.

Participants noted the social wing of the Islamist movement would be quick to take advantage of any

instability created by reforming the TNI, an effort that would require simultaneous efforts to enhance civilian governance and civil society as part of a foreign internal defense operation. JI, its affiliated *laskar* militias, and the MMI would be expected to respond to any attempt to discredit Islamist ideology with acts of targeted violence—their way of enforcing and communicating *sharia*—as well as undermining civilian governance. Publicly, MMI would eschew any devolution toward anarchy and argue that they strive for positive objectives, a new and more stable Islamist order.

Al Qaeda would also likely respond to any effort to roll back Islamist forces in Indonesia. One participant identified likely steps in this process. First, al Qaeda would mount a media campaign linking U.S. involvement in Indonesia to prior American “crusades” in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and East Timor. Second, al Qaeda would declare a jihad in Indonesia, announcing a new front in their war against Western crusaders. Third, it would likely urge Islamists in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines to travel to Indonesia and foment insurgency. Lastly, al Qaeda would attempt to redirect funding from its other campaigns to its partner groups in Indonesia so as to focus on this front of its battle.



The United States and its security partners face dedicated and imaginative enemies in Indonesia and elsewhere in the Long War. Engaging new allies, building partnership capacity, and enhancing security cooperation are all vital instruments in this campaign. The seminar discussion on how the United States can enhance its partnership with Indonesia did little to resolve the participants' concerns regarding that country's future, but the frontline country team provides a strong means to manage this vital relationship.

Notes

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28. The typist and baker schools anecdote is recounted in Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 71. For Army personnel decisions, see Brian M. Jenkins, *The Unchangeable War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970), 7.

29. Brian M. Jenkins, *The Unchangeable War*, 7.

30. Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance*, 64.

31. U. Alexis Johnson, "Internal Defense and the Foreign Service," *Foreign Service Journal* (July 1962): 22.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Additional Material on Administration of the Department of State* (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 1962). The Kennedy Letter has been updated and issued by all subsequent presidents to all incoming ambassadors.

34. In fact, the Kennedy Letter was arguably less ambitious than an executive order issued by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, which gave the ambassador the authority to intercede between other government agency representatives and Washington. The Department of Agriculture went to the courts to overrule Eisenhower's executive order, and Kennedy decided not to challenge the decision in his letter to ambassadors. See Erasmus H. Klorman, "The U.S. Ambassador as Coordinator and Manager: The Kennedy Administration Initiatives," 126.

35. *Additional Material on Administration of the Department of State*.

36. R. W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1973), viii, 61–62.

37. Quoted in *ibid.*, 87.

38. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 164–66.

39. R. W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam* 110–18.

40. Douglas Blaufarb, *Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962–1970* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972), 56–58; and Timothy N. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955–1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 78.

41. Douglas Blaufarb, *Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962–1970*, 53, 85.

42. *Ibid.*, 42–43.

43. For additional details, see Erin M. Simpson, "The Country Team in Laos, 1965–1973," in Robert Killebrew et al., *The Country Team in American Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of State/Department of Defense, December 2006), 5–21.

44. Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam November 3, 1969," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 425–26.

45. See, *inter alia*, the War Powers Act of 1973, the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee), the House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee), and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.

46. Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen, *Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1974), 14, 27; Elmer B. Staats, "Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons" (Washington, DC: Comptroller General of the United States, 1976), 1–2.

47. Committee on International Relations, *Hearings of the Committee of International Relations of the House of Representatives on To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act, to Authorize International Security Assistance for Fiscal Year 1976, to Provide for the Termination of Grant Military Assistance Programs at the End of Fiscal Year 1977, and for Other Purposes* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 147.

48. *Ibid.*, 899.

49. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Legislation on Foreign Relations through 1999*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 272–73. The revision was in the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1971.

50. Richard Locke-Pullan, "'An Inward Looking Time': The United States Army, 1973–1976," *Journal of Military History* 76, no. 2 (April 2003): 498–99.

51. Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 55.

52. *Ibid.*, 99.

53. In fiscal year 2000, for example, Egypt and Israel together received 86 percent of total worldwide U.S. military assistance and 35 percent of total worldwide U.S.

economic and military assistance. See USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 20, 2006,” available through <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/> (accessed April 8, 2008).

54. Douglas Blaufarb, *Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962–1970*, 289.

55. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “The DISAM Online Green Book: The Management of Security Assistance,” 3–11, available through www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm (accessed May 30, 2008).

56. *Ibid.*, 3–13.

57. *Ibid.*, 4–10.

58. The letter President George W. Bush sends to his chiefs of mission states: “You have full responsibility for the direction, coordination of all Department of Defense personnel on official duty except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander. You and the area military commander must keep each other currently and fully informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest. Any differences that cannot be resolved in the field will be reported to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.” See *ibid.*, 4–33.

59. Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 71–77. The regional combatant commands are European Command, Southern Command, Pacific Command, Northern Command, and Central Command. In September 2008, an additional regional combatant command will be established: Africa Command. The functional combatant command Special Forces Command also exercises operational control over specialized assets that may be deployed as forces in the field.

60. “DISAM Online Green Book,” 4–10; and Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, “Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?” *Parameters* (Spring 2000): 69–81.

61. James S. Robbins, “U.S. Central Command,” in *U.S. Viceroy: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Derek S. Reveron (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 170.

62. The phrase “security-assistance organization” (SAO) is a generic one, and various American SAOs have different titles, e.g., Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Office of Defense

Cooperation, Security Assistance Office, U.S. Military Group, and so on.

63. “DISAM Online Green Book,” 4–1.

64. Criticisms of the prewar planning for Iraq are numerous, but three useful sources are Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2004); and Michael Rubin, “Iraq in Books,” *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2007), available at www.aei.org/publication25733/.

65. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*.

66. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 324.

67. Bing West, *No True Glory* (New York: Bantam Books, 2006), 23.

68. Mark Martins, “No Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan,” *The Army Lawyer* (February 2004): 10–11.

69. *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 54–55.

70. Robert Perito, “USIPeace Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” U.S. Institute of Peace, February 2007, available at www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0220_prt_iraq.html (accessed April 11, 2008).

71. Hal Bernton, “Aid Agency Withdraws Its Workers, Cites Taliban,” *Seattle Times*, April 18, 2003.

72. For further details, see Christopher Griffin, “The Country Team in Afghanistan,” in Robert Killebrew et al., *The Country Team in American Strategy*, 22–37.

73. David Lamm, “The War We’re Winning,” *Armed Forces Journal* (November 2005).

74. Former USAID official, personal communication with the authors, October 6, 2006.

75. U.S. Institute of Peace, “Interview 8,” *Oral Histories Project on Stability Operations: Afghanistan Reconstruction Teams*, available at www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/afghanistan/gov/8.pdf (accessed November 27, 2006).

76. U.S. Institute of Peace, “Interview 5,” *Oral Histories Project on Stability Operations: Afghanistan Reconstruction Teams*, available at www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/afghanistan/gov/5.pdf (accessed November 27, 2006).

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78. Mark Bowden, “Jihadists in Paradise,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 2007): 54–75; and Seth Mydans, “Indonesia Redefines Itself by ‘Rolling Up’ Terrorists,” *International Herald Tribune*, June 18, 2007.
79. Zachary Abuza, “Mindinao Muddle,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 5, 2007.
80. Ayman al Zawahiri, “Rise Up and Support Your Brothers in Somalia,” audio message, January 2007.
81. Oriana Scherr and Christopher Griffin, “Terrorist Threats in the Horn of Africa: A Net Assessment,” *National Security Outlook* (July/August 2007), available at www.aei.org/publication26568.
82. Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 16, 2007), 5–6.
83. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Americans Have Landed,” *Esquire*, June 27, 2007.
84. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign” (December 15, 2006), 10.
85. Ryan Henry, “DOD News Press Briefing,” April 23, 2007.
86. Sean McFate, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm,” *Military Review* (January/February 2008): 17.
87. Jim Hoagland, “War at the Pentagon,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2008.
88. George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive 44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stability,” December 7, 2005, available at www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html (accessed November 4, 2006).
89. Ibid.
90. State department official, personal communication with the authors, November 4, 2007.
91. Even this conclusion may be too optimistic. According to one official, the State Department sought to use the December 2006–January 2007 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as an opportunity to launch the interagency management system and dispatch an “Advance Civilian Team” to the field, only to be told by the department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security the country was too unstable to send in a reconstruction and stabilization team.
92. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005.
93. Department of Defense, “Building Global Partnerships,” undated fact sheet.
94. See “Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, July 3, 2007); and S.600 (109th Congress): *Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007*.
95. *National Defense Authorization Act for 2006*, Public Law 103-163 (January 6, 2006).
96. *National Defense Authorization Act of 2007*, §1210.
97. Clark A. Murdock and Michèle Flournoy, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2005), 26–54.
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102. Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” *Strategic Forum* 227 (September 2007): 8.
103. *Foreign Affairs Manual*, 1 FAM 011.1(a).
104. *Foreign Service Act of 1980*, Public Law 96-465, §207(a)(1-2), Congress.
105. *Foreign Affairs Manual*, 2 FAM113.1(a, c).
106. Ibid., 2 FAM112.1(b). Emphasis in original.
107. Interview with former U.S. official in Kabul, November 9, 2006.
108. Erasmus H. Kloban, “The U.S. Ambassador as Coordinator and Manager: The Kennedy Administration Initiatives,” *Appendices: The Committee on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 127.
109. Department of Defense Directive 5132.3, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance,” 7–8.
110. Specific directives that may require updating are Directive 5105.75, “Department of Defense Operations

at U.S. Embassies”; Directive 5132.3, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance”; the joint Army, Navy and Air Force regulation “Administrative and Logistical Support of Overseas Security Assistance Organizations,” and manual 5105.3M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*. These various regulations are overlapping and inter-referential, so it would be necessary to coordinate any modifications among them.

111. Robert Killebrew et al., *The Country Team in American Strategy*, 14.

112. Ibid.; and Rob Thornton, “To Be or Not to Be,” Small Wars Council, February 12, 2008.

113. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2000), 272–73.

114. Ibid., 273.

115. Sadanand Dhume, “Step Up the Fight against Islamism,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July/August 2007): 7.