

THE MEANING OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM DISPUTES OVER NATURALIZATION

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Reason and Emotion in Citizenship

During the past two decades, the idea of “constitutional patriotism” has been much discussed in European intellectual; and political circles. The core of this idea is the proposition that political attachment should focus on “the norms, the values, and . . . the procedures of a liberal democratic constitution.” So understood, patriotism steers a middle course between cultural and ethnic particularism, on the one hand, and cosmopolitanism on the other. It can help decouple the idea of national solidarity from that of adherence to a dominant majority culture, enhancing the possibility of inclusiveness in increasingly multicultural societies.ⁱ

Given the unhappy history of ethnic and cultural particularism in Europe (not least in Germany), it is not hard to understand why this approach has gained some traction. But many Americans wonder what the fuss is all about. As a nation of immigrants, we instinctively believe that while ethnic loyalties have a legitimate place in civil society, they cannot work as the basis of national solidarity. The idea of a unity that is creedal rather than ethnic is in our bones, even if we find it difficult to say exactly what that creed might be.

A moment’s reflection, however, suggests that matters are not so simple. Throughout American history, creedal and cultural definitions of national identity

have vied for dominance. Immigrants who spoke languages other than English, who came from non-European stock, or who professed religions other than dissenting Protestantism were viewed with suspicion and treated with oppression, especially in times of war. Recently, Samuel Huntington has challenged the belief that creed alone would suffice to maintain American unity. "History and psychology," he argues, "suggest that it is unlikely to be enough to sustain a nation for long. America with only the Creed as a basis for unity could soon evolve into a loose confederation of ethnic, racial, cultural, and political groups"ii The reason is this, says Huntington: "People are not likely to find in political principles the deep emotional content and meaning provided by kith and kin, blood and belonging, culture and nationality. These attachments may have little or no basis in fact but they do satisfy a deep human longing for meaningful community." Moreover, America's shared Anglo-Protestant culture created the "people" that claimed its right to separate from Great Britain, assume its equal station among other nations, and ordain a new constitution for the new nation. It is from this culture that the American creed first flowed, and upon which it continues to rest today. And thus, Huntington concludes, a multicultural America will inevitably become a multi-creedal America.ⁱⁱⁱ

The situation in Europe is no less tangled. Ethnic divisions stoked the tragic conflicts in the Balkans and have sustained the Basque insurgency against Spain. Czechs and Slovaks found it impossible to live together in a single political community, and Belgium is in danger of splitting up over ethnic and linguistic issues. In the Baltic states, divisions between majority populations and

Russian-speaking minorities have created instability (occasionally violence) and may yet serve as a pretext for Russian intervention. And even in Germany, the advocates of constitutional patriotism run up against very different understandings of national unity and identity. A personal story will illustrate my point.

A few years ago I was invited to a conference in Munich on the topic “Religious America, Secular Europe?” For most of the meeting, I did not understand why the title contained a question mark, because all the quantitative sociological evidence speakers presented suggested that Max Weber’s secularization thesis applied to Europe but not the United States. And then on the afternoon of the final day, a distinguished German law professor presented a talk on his country’s conception of citizenship. For half an hour his discourse travelled a predictable path. But then, out of the blue, he began talking about Turkey’s effort to join the European Union. “This is out of the question,” he declared. I expected him to cite the impact of Turkish accession on the political composition of the EU, or its financial stability. Instead, he said, the case against this step was cultural. Despite its secular constitution, Turkey is an Islamic nation, while the heart of European civilization was Christianity. The EU’s legal and economic unification rested on a broad cultural consensus, which Turkey would fatally disrupt. When there was a break in the proceedings, I walked around the hall and chatted with members of the audience. I could find no one who disagreed with the speaker.

None of this proves that Huntington is right about America, or that German (or European) identity is indissolubly linked to Christianity. It seems undeniable, however, that citizenship requires a measure of emotional identification with a particular community. While constitutional democracies may share some basic principles that command reasoned assent, citizens are members of, and are attached to, particular communities, not to constitutional democracies in general. In his first inaugural, Lincoln closed with references to civic friendship, to the “bonds of affection” that united Americans despite their differences, to the “mystic chords of memory” that would, he hoped, “swell the chorus of the Union.” This was an unabashed appeal to patriotic emotions and to the shared experiences that linked Americans, one to another. These commonalities did not suffice to avert separation and war, of course. But Lincoln’s appeal to them did illuminate the key role they play in real-world citizenship.

This points to a larger truth, obvious but sometimes overlooked and even resisted. Every political community is bounded, not only by geography but also by population and constitutive understandings, elements of particularity that citizens are called upon to accept and endorse. There is nothing anomalous about such a requirement. While we owe a general respect to age, for example, we are asked to honor our own fathers and mothers in a special way. Similarly, while we are not permitted to be indifferent to the needs of children, we are allowed, indeed expected, to give preference and special care to our own. While many local norms lack general validity, they may still be binding on us; we follow

long-established family traditions while recognizing that other families do things differently, and legitimately so.

It is easy to see what motivates mistrust of particular attachments. They can insulate us from, even render us indifferent to, wider obligations. They can foster mutual incomprehension and mistrust. At their worse, they can lead to violence and war. But cosmopolitanism is not a realistic remedy for these ills. Not only is there no cosmopolis of which we could be members, but if there were, we would quickly discover how a world-state could threaten liberty. The challenge is to combine what is valid in cosmopolitanism—the moral reality of shared humanity—with what is valuable in particularity—the satisfactions of communities of sentiment—into a sustainable practice of constitutional citizenship.

A leading American constitutional scholar, Sanford Levinson, has explored the analogy between constitutional communities and faith communities.^{iv} One of the many parallels between them is the commitment of their members to the interpretation of fundamental texts as a guide to practice. This commitment does not mean that members will agree among themselves. Indeed, each community typically contains leading thinkers who subscribe to varying methods of textual interpretation leading to divergent conclusions about the meaning of the text. In the case of Judaism, for example, views of the Torah run the gamut from literalism to existentialism – from understanding the words as literally dictated to Moses by God, on the one hand, to seeing them as a human response to the

overwhelming experience of divine presence, on the other. And even among literalists there is a range of interpretative strategies.

Nonetheless, the members of the community must have something in common beyond the text itself. They must be jointly and severally committed, first, to the interpretative process and second, to some authoritative mechanism for the resolution of disputes touching on belief and practice. In Judaism, as in many constitutional courts, controversies among those qualified by learning and experience to participate in them were settled in favor of the majority (with minority opinions faithfully recorded for future reference and possible use). Just as we can speak of the Talmudic tradition, we can speak of constitutional traditions within specific political communities, which Jan-Werner Muller has called a “constitutional culture.”^v

This source of civic unity and particularity is much cooler and more cerebral than the mystic chords of memory, for which it is no substitute. For peoples as for families, participating in a shared history, filled with tales of triumph and tragedy and depictions of virtue and vice, is the emotional core of the common venture. Another personal story will illustrate the point.

Although (or perhaps because) I was on the staff of Walter Mondale’s presidential campaign, I will never forget Ronald Reagan’s address on the 40th anniversary of D-Day. He spoke on Pointe du Hoc, a cliff overlooking one of the Normandy beaches and the site of one of the most heroic feats of that remarkable day. Under intense fire, with no cover, U.S. Army Rangers had scaled the cliff and seized the high ground, silencing the German machine guns

and clearing the way for the American forces who followed them. As President Reagan spoke, the camera showed grainy black and white military footage of the young, superbly conditioned soldiers as they made their way up the face of the cliff. As the film ended, the television camera panned around to the hobbled, white-haired survivors of that day, seated in rows of chairs in front of the president. He gestured toward them and said, “These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc.” As he uttered that sentence, tears welled up in my eyes. I was standing in a crowd in the Mondale campaign’s press office. I looked around me and saw that everyone was crying. I realized then that we could not win the election because we were up against a man with an unerring ability to find and tap the emotional core of his country. But I realized something else as well – that these emotions are as much a part of citizenship as are the shared principles we embrace.

This is a not altogether comfortable truth, in part because unscrupulous leaders can manipulate the emotional side of citizenship against its rational side. And it raises another set of troubling questions: Can adults who choose to join a community ever share fully in the constitutive experiences of those who were born and bred within it? And if not, can they be treated as full and equal citizens?

Here again, Levinson’s analogy between religious and political communities is illuminating. Ovadyah, a convert to Judaism, wrote to Moses Maimonides asking whether he was allowed to participate in prayers and rituals that appeared ethnocentric. Could he utter the phrase “God of our fathers?” Did

he have the right to claim to have been “chosen?” Could he say that God took “us” out of Egypt or that he was a member of the group for whom God had performed miracles? Maimonides replied that he could. Abraham had rejected idolatry and discovered monotheism through his own efforts and had persuaded others to join him. The founder of Judaism, then, was a convert and had converted others. As James Diamond puts it, Maimonides eliminates the gap between converts and the Jewish community “by replacing the biological father-son model with a pedagogical teacher-disciple one.”^{vi} In fact, Maimonides suggests, converts may be more fully Jewish than are many born into the community – if their decision to become Jewish rests on knowledge and reasonable belief rather than on (say) emotional ties to a Jewish spouse. This is not to say that a community one rationally chooses to join cannot also become a locus of sentiment. (Recall the book of Ruth.) Immigrants may come to America in search of freedom and opportunity, but their gratitude and loyalty often exceeds that of native-born citizens.

Maimonides’ rationalist account of community membership did not go unchallenged. Both Judah Halevy and writers in the Jewish mystical tradition propounded theories of an inherited spiritual property that distinguished Jews at birth from other peoples. It followed that converts, however knowledgeable and loyal, could never be fully equal to “native-born” Jews, an essentialist thesis has influenced strands of Orthodoxy down to the present day.^{vii} And many Jews who reject essentialism nonetheless believe that Judaism is more than correct belief, or even orthopraxy, but consists as well in an ensemble of cultural

assumptions, absorbed osmotically from birth, that structure a distinctive way of looking at the world and of treating other human beings. These culturalists suspect (even if they do not admit it) that converts are never quite at one with the people they have decided, however wholeheartedly, to join.

Similar considerations figured in the long-running American debate about Catholic participation in American life. There was a question of principle: was the Pope a “foreign potentate” allegiance to whom would require conscientious American Catholics to divide their loyalties and dilute their allegiance to the Constitution? But there were cultural issues as well. Didn’t “Americanism” embody individualism and suspicion of authority? Wasn’t Catholicism essentially communitarian, hierarchical, and dominated by authorities whose word was not to be questioned? It took more than a century, and important changes in both Catholicism and American society, before these divisions could be set aside.

Naturalization and U.S. Citizenship

I want to use the process of naturalization as a prism through which to view the American conception of citizenship. But as Aristotle argued in the *Politics*, we cannot understand competing views without first clarifying what we mean by citizenship in general. One of Aristotle’s key theses is that enjoying what we now call the “equal protection of the laws” is not a sufficient condition. Citizenship requires, as well the right and ability to engage in important public functions. In his view two were key—judging and deliberating; in our terms, participating as a juror in the administration of justice and as a voter in the

selection of officials who make the laws and decide questions of war and peace. Although it would be a stretch to describe Aristotle as a partisan of democracy, he acknowledged that his definition of citizenship corresponded most closely to the definition operative in democracies, where participation in judging and deliberating is most widely shared. The controversies throughout American history over voting rights and jury service attest to the continuing relevance of the Aristotelian framework.

Modern constitutional democracy is in many respects representative rather than direct. This raises the possibility that qualifications for “office” may not be the same as for citizenship in general. And indeed, there are special qualifications for most national offices established under the Constitution. To serve in the House of Representatives, non-native citizens must be naturalized for at least seven years; to serve in the Senate, at least nine years. And no matter how long they have been citizens, individuals who obtain U.S. citizenship through naturalization are ineligible to for the presidency – a restriction that now excludes two sitting governors and raises interesting legal questions about Sen. John McCain, who was born outside the United States.^{viii}

It is instructive to return to the constitutional convention of 1787 to find out why. The issue was most fully debated on August 8th. The draft before the body would have required members of the House to have been citizens for at least three years. George Mason objected on two grounds. First, he argued, citizenship for only three years “was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge” that each representative should possess. And second, a three-year

standard might not be enough to guarantee loyalty to the United States. Indeed, foreign countries could send emissaries to become naturalized as sleeper agents who would pursue “insidious purposes” against the interests of their adopted country. (216) Speaking the next day in support of Gouverneur Morris’s proposal to require 14 years of naturalized citizenship for senators, Charles Pinckney emphasized the special importance of loyalty for senators, who would after all have the power of ratifying treaties and helping the executive manage foreign policy. (235) Pierce Butler added a third consideration: people who come to the United States from other countries bring with them, “not only attachments to other countries, but ideas of government so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous.” (236)

Although there was general agreement that three years was too short a requirement for House members and that seven years would be appropriate, the proposal to require fourteen years for senators met significant resistance. Both James Madison and Benjamin Franklin objected to giving the new Constitution what Madison labeled a “tincture of illberality.” Besides, they argued, many foreign countries were sympathetic to the new nation, and many foreigners had rendered great service during the revolutionary war. They had proved their devotion and should not be discouraged from immigrating to the United States by public marks of mistrust. Even worse, argued John Randolph, overly lengthy exclusion from the possibility of office might strike erstwhile sympathizers as a breach of faith and drive them into hostility to the new regime.

Speaking as a non-native born citizen, James Wilson offered personal and heartfelt reflections. The fourteen-year requirement, he argued, would be interpreted as “degrading discrimination” and generate a sense of “discouragement and mortification” on the part of those excluded from high office for so long. Indeed, he himself had experienced the consequences of such legal incapacities. “To be appointed to a place,” he remarked, “may be a matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating, and mortifying.” (237)

Wilson’s remarks prompted a remarkable intervention from the sponsor of the fourteen-year amendment. “The lesson we are taught,” retorted Morris, is that “we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings, as possible.” Generosity was once thing, imprudence another. Experience shows that attachments to one’s country of origin are shed only with difficulty, and slowly. This is not to be regretted: “The men who can shake off their attachments to their own country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all governments.” It follows that the absence of such prejudices is inconsistent with the maintenance of order and good government. Cosmopolitanism is a political vice, Morris concluded, not proof of superior virtue. He did not wish to see any of those “philosophical gentlemen,” those self-styled “citizens of the world” in the public councils of the United States; their lack of attachment to a particular place meant that they could not be trusted. (237-38) The requirements for office that the constitutional convention ultimately adopted represent an effort to acknowledge the partial

validity of, and achieve a workable balance among, these competing understandings of membership in a political community.

Prior to the Civil War, the dominant understanding of citizenship ran along two separate tracks. On the one hand, for native-born Americans, citizenship in a particular state was the necessary and sufficient condition for being a citizen of the United States.^x On the other hand, Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to establish a “uniform rule of naturalization,” a power it exercised during the first congress in 1790 and ever since. No individual state can devise and employ its own standards for naturalization. Transforming an “alien” into a “citizen” is a national act. This represents one of the clearest instances of the differences between “we the people” and “we the states.” From this perspective, citizenship through naturalization has functioned throughout American history as a counterweight to local attachments; immigrants are “coming to America,” not to New York or Virginia. And it is through the requirements for naturalization that Americans clarify – to just to the world, but for themselves – how they understand the essentials of citizenship.

So let us look as these conditions, as laid down in the Immigration and Nationality Act and incorporated into the U. S. Code. They reduce to four essentials. After admission to permanent residence, applicants for citizenship must have resided in the United States for at least five years, and continuously after applying for citizenship. Applicants must be of “good moral character,” a criterion defined in legal terms as law-abidingness. They must be “well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States”; that is, they must

genuinely care about the well-being of the political community they wish to join. And finally, they must be “attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States.”

Let us dwell on this final, quietly paradoxical condition. On the one hand, it establishes beyond doubt that America officially understands itself as a creedal community unified by belief rather than blood. On the other hand, it does not specify the content of the creed. The Constitution itself does not set forth its principles, or even incorporate them by reference. We may infer some from the text. “We the people” are the ultimate source of legitimate authority, and only they may ordain and establish a constitutional order. The Constitution exists to further certain purposes but not others—for example, security and liberty, not virtue or piety. To guard against tyranny and safeguard liberty, powers are separated and distributed among competing individuals and institutions; there is therefore a powerful presumption against concentrated power. And the defense of liberty does not stop with the separation of powers. In addition, constitutional democracy both hedges its commitment to pure majority rule and spells out certain rights that majorities cannot legitimately invade.

To embrace these principles is not to endorse the letter of the Constitution, however, which leaves open the possibility that candidates for naturalization may conceivably favor radical changes in the existing constitutional order. Consider a scholarly applicant for U.S. citizenship who had written articles in favor of establishing a unicameral national legislature or electing the president

by direct popular vote. It is hard to imagine that such a candidate would be rejected for inadequate attachment to constitutional principles.

But how far can we push the distinction between the document's spirit and its letter? The case of *Schneiderman v. United States*,^x which Levinson discussed at length, raises precisely this issue. The petitioner was a member of the Communist Party at the time of his naturalization and thereafter. The government sought to revoke his citizenship on the grounds that it had been fraudulently procured: petitioner's communist affiliation and activities proved that he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution. A five-member majority of the Court disagreed. Article V, they pointed out, excluded almost no provisions of the constitution from possible amendment: "this provision and the many important and far-reaching changes made in the Constitution since 1787 refute the idea that attachment to any particular provision or provisions is essential, or that one who advocates radical changes is necessarily not attached to the Constitution." And they quoted from Justice Holmes's dissent in *United States v. Schwimmer*: "Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution that [one] thinks it can be improved." Our "primary attachment" must be to the right of "free discussion and free thinking," which the majority in effect specifies as the core principle of the Constitutional itself.^{xi}

It would seem to follow as long as an applicant is willing to obey the law and to change the Constitution through peaceful processes along, he has met the statutory conditions for citizenship. The counsel for the petitioner, one Wendell Willkie, the recently defeated Republican candidate for president, urged

just that position. The court declined to follow its logic to the end, arguing instead that if Congress had believed that belief in communism was ground for exclusion from citizenship, it would have said so. After all, it had specifically excluded anarchists and polygamists, among others. The statute's silence about communism, whose tenets were well-known to Congress, therefore had to be construed as leaving the question open, and there was insufficient reason to conclude that petitioner's personal mode of adhering to Marxist doctrine was incompatible with peaceful change in our constitutional order.^{xii}

Writing in dissent, joined by an indignant Felix Frankfurter as well as Justice Roberts), Chief Justice Stone, whose credentials as a civil libertarian were beyond reproach, professed incredulity. Congress had first used the operative phrase—"the principles of the Constitution"--in the Naturalization Act of 1795, and among its drafters were men who had participated in the constitutional convention and could be presumed to know what they were talking about. The Chief Justice proceeded to offer his own gloss, which diverged in some respects from the definition of constitutional principles the government had propounded in its brief. He discussed at considerable length the history, beliefs, and practices of the Communist Party, which in his view were not only incompatible with any acceptable account of constitutional principles but also revealed an intention to change the constitution by force and violence rather than peaceful amendment if circumstances permitted.^{xiii}

Reading the opinion of the Court and Stone's dissent *seriatim*, it is hard to avoid the impression that Stone had the better of it. Nonetheless, he did not

prevail, and his position has had rough going ever since. One reason for this is that the majority appealed to a classic American principle – freedom of conscience – that was enjoying something of a revival in the 1940s. Indeed, *Schneiderman* was handed down exactly one week after the more famous *West Virginia v. Barnette* decision overturning the mandatory flag salute and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance as applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses. In his majority opinion, Justice Jackson had declared, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.” For the government to do so, Jackson continued, would be to invade “the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”^{xiv} To be sure, Jackson was speaking of what government could not rightly do to *citizens*. It is not unreasonable, one might object, to impose standards at the threshold of membership in the community that one might not deploy against current members. Still, how a community understands the beliefs and practices required of citizens is bound to affect its standards for admission. The more capaciously (civil) libertarian the former, the more open and permissive are the latter likely to be.

We thus encounter a fact poised uneasily between anomaly and outright paradox. G.K. Chesterton once remarked that America is “the only nation founded on a creed” and is “a nation with the soul of a church.”^{xv} If the United States is a creedal community, if membership in the community is seen primarily

as assent to the creed and not the facts of descent or geography, then we would expect the creed to be clearly stated and fiercely guarded. But to judge from the authoritative pronouncements of our Supreme Court, we would seem to have shared procedures but no common creed, or perhaps a creed that gives pride of place to arguing about its meaning. From time to time, to be sure, we mount crusades against “un-American” activities and beliefs. For the most part, we espouse principles of civil liberty and freedom of conscience without worrying much about their limits.

Indeed, we seem not to worry much about the meaning of citizenship. We are notably ineffective in teaching our history and civic traditions to our children; we hardly try. Nor do we expect much of adult citizens – not voting, not military service, not paying taxes to defray the costs of government, not even showing up for jury duty. We are coming closer and closer to the view of citizenship that Aristotle dismissed as manifestly inadequate – the right to sue and be sued.

The jeremiad is a classic American literary tradition, and the reader may be forgiven for concluding that I have repaired to it without warrant. Americans’ ignorance about their country is matched only by their patriotic attachment to it. Despite the soft temptations of a wealthy commercial society, the United States has never been short of men (and now women as well) who are willing to fight and die for their country. And in the face of great challenges, Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing, as Winston Churchill once remarked, but only after they have tried everything else.

All true, and yet it is hard to avoid thinking that the ratio of light to heat in our national debates would rise considerably if we worked a bit harder to refine our conception of citizenship. Consider immigration policy. We lurch from a generous open door to fear-based restrictions and back again. We see languages other than English as threats in one generation, and in the next deplore our inability to speak languages other than our own. Despite oft-repeated platitudes about a nation of immigrants, we cannot seem to decide whether today's new entrants are strengthening or weakening us. Like citizenship itself, our policy disputes inevitably blend reason and passion. But understanding better why we expect from naturalized citizens, and why we have worried throughout our history that we might not get it, would be a large step toward a steadier and more sustainable balance.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

ⁱ Jan-Werner Muller and Kim Lane Scheppelle, "Constitutional patriotism: An introduction," I-CON 6,1 (2008): 67-8.

ⁱⁱ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 19.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Who Are We?*, pp. 339-340.

^{iv} *Constitutional Faith* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

^v Jan-Werner Muller, "A General theory of constitutional patriotism," I-CON 6,1 (2008): 80.

^{vi} James A. Diamond, "Maimonides and the Convert: A Juridical and Philosophical Embrace of the Outsider," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11 (2003): 127.

^{vii} On this disagreement see David Hartman, *Israelis and the Jewish Tradition: An Ancient People Debating Its Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); also Menachem Kellner, *Maimonides' Confrontation with Mysticism* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2006).

^{viii} To the best of my knowledge, there are no constitutional restrictions whatever for service on the Supreme Court, the only part of the judiciary established by the Constitution. In principle, then, statutes could open up the federal bench, including the Supreme Court, to non-citizens. Although I have not looked at the statutes of every state, I have found no evidence that any state requires U.S. citizenship as a condition of admission to its bar.

^{ix} The *Dred Scott* case represented a constitutional revolution in part because it challenged this understanding. According to Chief Justice Taney's majority opinion, "It does not by any means follow, because [an individual] has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States."

^x 320 U. S. 118.

^{xi} 320 U.S. 118, at 137-39.

^{xii} 320 U.S. 118, at 132, 140.

^{xiii} 320 U.S. 118, at 170-197. See especially CJ Stone's sketch of the principles of the Constitution at 181.

^{xiv} 319 U.S. 624, at 642.

^{xv} *The Collected Works of G. K. Chesterton*, vol 21 (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1990), p. 41.