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High-Skilled Migration and Publicly Financed Investments

Volker Grossmann* and David Stadelmann†

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes the interaction between migration of high-skilled labor and publicly financed investment, like infrastructure or R&D expenditure. We develop a theoretical model with multiple, ex ante identical jurisdictions where individuals decide on education and subsequent emigration. Migration decisions are based on differences in net income across jurisdictions which endogenously may occur. The interaction between income differences and migration flows gives rise to the potential of multiple equilibria: a symmetric equilibrium without migration and an asymmetric equilibrium in which net income levels differ among jurisdictions and trigger migration flows. In the former equilibrium, all jurisdictions have the same public investment level. In the latter one, public investment is high in host economies of skilled expatriates and low in source economies. The reason is that higher emigration reduces the impact of higher public investment on net wages. We empirically test the hypothesis that emigration rates are negatively associated with various kinds of publicly financed investment levels for OECD countries.

Key words: High-skilled migration; Human capital externalities; Publicly financed investment.

JEL classification: F22; H40.

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1 Introduction

Brain drain is not exclusively a developing country phenomenon. Although particularly some poorer regions like the Caribbean, Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa suffer from remarkable outflows of skilled labor, also policy makers from many advanced countries become increasingly concerned with preventing brain drain (e.g. European Commission, 2003). In 2000, there were 524,922 Britons in working age (25-64) living in the US; among those, 49.2 percent had enjoyed tertiary education and 3.9 percent held a Ph.D. (Saint-Paul, 2004). Among French, Spanish and Italian expatriates arriving in the US between 1990 and 2000 around 9 percent held a Ph.D..¹ The stock of expatriates of the tertiary educated from Finland, Portugal and Italy around the year 2000 amounted to a non-negligible figure of 7.2, 18.9 and 9.6 percent of educated residents, respectively (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).² Whereas many countries experience significant brain drain, high-skilled immigrants are concentrated in a few developed countries like the US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland. According to Docquier and Marfouk (2006), almost 4/5 of the over 20 million tertiary educated migrants lived in Anglo-Saxon countries in the year 2000. 11.7 percent of all doctorate holders in the US were foreign citizens in 2004 and 25.7 percent of the doctorate holders (368,800 people) were foreign born; in Switzerland, the respective figures were as high as 30.1 and 41.1 percent in 2003 (Auriol, 2007). In 2000-01, 9.2 million foreign-born professionals or technicians resided and were employed in an OECD country (OECD, 2007). 45 percent of those key workers for productivity advancements worked in the US.

In addition to the heterogeneity with respect to international flows of high-skilled labor even among advanced countries, we observe large variation in (potentially) productivity-enhancing per capita public expenditure levels, like public infrastructure investments, publicly financed R&D institutions, and public education spending. For instance, public investment in countries which benefit from high net immigration such as the US and

¹It is instructive to compare this with the fraction of working-age US citizens who earned a PhD degree, which is less than one percent.

²The gross emigration rate (stock of emigrants divided by sum of residents and emigrants) of tertiary educated workers from high-income countries was 3.5 percent in 2000 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). See also Dumont and Lemaître (2005) for an overview on immigrants and expatriates in OECD countries by level of education.

Switzerland is comparatively high, whereas public investment in countries which suffer from high net emigration like Portugal and Mexico is comparatively low.

As Figure 1a shows, in the year 2000 net emigration rates of the tertiary educated are indeed negatively related to (log) per capita public investment levels among OECD countries. Figure 1b considers the relationship of the changes between 1990 and 2000 rather than levels of the two variables, in order to net out omitted variables which are constant over time. It again suggests a negative relationship, which means that a larger migration outflow is associated with slower growth of public investment expenditure.

<Figure 1>

In our empirical analysis presented at the end of this chapter, we construct an instrument for the net emigration rate in order to establish that the relationships in Figure 1 represent causal effects. The particular interest in the link between emigration of skilled labor and public investment expenditure stems from the empirically well-supported notion that brain drain is largely triggered by low earning prospects at home, and may further reduce income levels, whereas publicly financed investments may increase output capacity and therefore boost economic prosperity. *Prima facie*, one may therefore suspect that economies experiencing outflows of skilled labor are particularly prone to invest in public infrastructure in order to mitigate or reverse brain drain. It is thus surprising, at the first glance, that empirical evidence suggests a downward rather than an upward adjustment of public investment in response to higher emigration.

To understand this empirical result, we develop a theoretical model with many *ex ante* identical jurisdictions, which shows that migration flows interact with optimal public investment levels. Interestingly, source and host economies of high-skilled expatriates can endogenously emerge despite symmetry *ex ante*, triggering asymmetry in public investment patterns. There are three key features of the model. First, migration decisions are based on differences in net wage rates for the skilled across jurisdictions.³ Second, not only do income differences trigger migration outflows, but also does higher emigration raise income gaps to host economies of skilled expatriates. This is implied by assuming

³See Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) for recent empirical support.

human capital externalities on productivity like in Lucas (1988). Such externalities give rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria: that is, in addition to an equilibrium without migration, there may be migration flows between ex ante identical economies. The identity of being a host or source economy depends on expectations, which are self-fulfilling. Third, we assume that higher public investments are productivity-enhancing and thus raise income per capita.

We show that, as a consequence of these basic premises and consistent with Figure 1, it is optimal for host economies to have higher public investment levels than source economies. Interestingly, according to our model, welfare-maximization is equivalent to minimization of brain drain in a source economy. Our analysis therefore suggests that it is indeed optimal to adjust the public investment level to mitigate the brain drain problem. However, for source economies, it is a low rather than a high spending level, compared to host economies, which achieves this goal. In host economies it is optimal to set public investment at a level which maximizes the number of high-skilled immigrants.

Our contribution shares several features with previous literature. For instance, as in our model, Miyagiwa (1991) and Grossmann and Stadelmann (2009) allow for socially increasing returns to scale. Emigration therefore potentially reduces wages for the skilled. However, these studies assume that income of the host economy is exogenous. In our framework, both emigration patterns and income levels are fully endogenous. This enables us to derive asymmetry of ex ante identical economies as a result of increasing returns. Second, similar to seminal papers like Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), albeit for different reasons, our framework emphasizes adverse effects of outward migration (and beneficial ones for host economies). This is not to deny the possibility of potentially beneficial effects of emigration for source economies. These may arise in low-income countries from higher incentives to acquire human capital as response to higher immigration quotas in rich countries (e.g., Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997, 1998; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001). However, empirically, this mechanism is supported only for poor countries with rather low levels of human capital (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008). We instead focus on ex ante similar economies in the theoretical part and provide evidence for OECD countries, where positive effects of

brain drain are unlikely to occur. Finally, our research is related to the by now large literature on the consequences of high-skilled labor mobility on the public sector. Many studies focussed on the implications of brain drain for the tax system (e.g. Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989; Wildasin, 2000; Andersson and Konrad, 2003; Bucovetsky, 2003), in view of the difficulty to tax mobile factors. Other contributions dealt with the implications of declining mobility costs for public education finance (see e.g. Justman and Thisse, 1997, 2000; Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann, 2007). In our paper, we do not analyze the consequences of increasing mobility on a possible “race to the bottom” with respect to tax rates or spending levels. Rather, we aim to explain how a negative relationship between high-skilled emigration and productive government spending may arise and to present empirical support for it.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 first derives the equilibrium level of migration in an economy as a function of its public investment level and of net income levels abroad. It then examines the international equilibrium, by highlighting the role of expectations for the equilibrium outcome. There we focus on the scenario where jurisdictions optimally choose their public investment levels. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on the predicted relationship between migration patterns and public investment levels by distinguishing various categories of potentially productivity-enhancing public expenditures. The last section concludes.

2 The Model

Consider a continuum of ex ante identical jurisdictions with unit mass. Each jurisdiction is initially populated by a unit mass of natives. There is perfect competition in goods and labor markets.

In each jurisdiction, there is a representative firm which produces a homogenous consumption good, chosen as numeraire. Output Y is given by the linearly homogenous function F , specified in CES-form:

$$Y = F(X, L) = A \cdot \left(\alpha X^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \alpha)L^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (1)$$

$\sigma > 0$, $0 < \alpha < 1$, where L is employment of low-skilled labor and X is the input of an intermediate capital good. Total factor productivity (TFP), A , depends on the number of high-skilled workers, N , in the economy.⁴ We have

$$A = a(N), \tag{2}$$

where $a(\cdot)$ is an increasing and concave function with $a(0) \geq 0$. Thus, a reduction in the skilled labor force, as result of emigration, reduces output for given input levels.⁵ A is taken as given by the representative firm. Our formulation thus captures human capital externalities on productivity like in Lucas (1988); there are socially increasing but privately constant returns to scale.

Production of the intermediate good is skill-intensive. For simplicity it only uses high-skilled labor. Output is given by

$$X = B \cdot S, \tag{3}$$

where S denotes the amount of high-skilled labor employed in the sector and B measures its productivity. Productivity is affected by the public investment level of a jurisdiction, G , measured in units of the final good. We assume

$$B = b(G), \tag{4}$$

where $b(\cdot)$ is an increasing and concave function with $b(0) > 0$; moreover, we assume $\lim_{G \rightarrow 0} b'(G) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\lim_{G \rightarrow \infty} b'(G) = 0$.⁶ According to (4), public investment G is a local public good (i.e., there are no spillovers to other jurisdictions).

Public investment is financed by proportional wage taxation. The tax rate is denoted by $\tau \in (0, 1)$. It applies to all workers employed in the domestic economy (natives and

⁴Such “scale effect” does not necessarily mean that more largely populated economies are richer than small ones. What may matter for TFP is the density of the skilled population in an economy rather than its size. Normalizing the area of a jurisdiction to unity gives equivalently rise to formulation (2).

⁵In our companion paper (Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2008), a similar property arises from a monopolistic competition model with endogenous R&D investment decisions of intermediate good firms.

⁶The boundary conditions ensure an interior solution for the optimal choice of G of local governments.

immigrants, but not emigrants).⁷

Individuals are endowed with one unit of time. They decide whether or not to become high-skilled, at cost of $e \in (0, 1)$ units of time. If not spending time e in school, an individual remains low-skilled. Time not used for education is inelastically supplied to a perfect labor market.

Utility of individual i is given by his/her consumption level (equal to after-tax wage income) $c(i)$ of the final good when working at home. If the individual works abroad, utility is a discounted measure compared to that of non-migrants; formally, utility is given by $c(i)/(1 + \theta(i))$.⁸ Mobility cost parameter θ is distributed according to a continuous p.d.f. $\varphi(\theta)$ with positive support; the corresponding c.d.f. is denoted by $\Phi(\theta)$. There are no immigration quotas. When deciding whether or not to become skilled, individuals take both migration incentives and costs into account. In order to focus on migration patterns of high skilled workers, as common in the brain drain literature, we assume that low-skilled labor is immobile.⁹

We close the model description with a remark on the role of public investment, G , for economic performance of a jurisdiction. Rather than assuming that an increase in G raises productivity in the intermediate goods sector, and thus is high-skilled labor saving, one may alternatively assume that TFP A in the final goods sector is positively affected by a higher G . It is easy to show that in this case, an increase in G would leave the educational choice unaffected. In contrast, in our formulation public investment will generally affect education decisions. Using (3) in (1) we see that σ equals the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Empirical evidence suggests $\sigma > 1$ (e.g. Johnson, 1997). As will become apparent, in this case an increase in G induces more individuals to become educated. This result is consistent with empirical evidence, for instance, in the case of public education spending (e.g. Egger et al., 2008).

⁷The assumption is made for concreteness. Results would be unchanged if immigrants were not be obliged to pay taxes or if emigrants still had to pay taxes at home, as will become apparent.

⁸See Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997), among others

⁹This can be motivated by the fact that migration costs are higher for people with lower education as they are more likely to have difficulties in finding a job, learning a foreign language and integrating in the foreign society. Furthermore, institutional barriers in potential host economies may prevent migration of low-skilled workers.

3 Equilibrium Analysis

In this section, we first analyze the education and migration decision in a single jurisdiction for a given public investment level and given the income opportunities abroad (small open economy). We then examine the international equilibrium where in all jurisdictions income levels and migration flows are endogenous and public investment levels are optimally chosen.

3.1 Small Open Economy

We start by deriving wage rates for high- and low-skilled labor, denoted by w_S and w_L , respectively. The wage rate per unit of high-skilled labor is given by its marginal revenue product in the intermediate goods sector, $w_S = pB$, where p denotes the price of the intermediate good. Price p is equal to the marginal product in the final goods sector (inverse demand for the intermediate good), $p = \partial Y/\partial X$. Consequently, we find

$$w_S = A \left(\alpha^\sigma B^{\sigma-1} + (1-\alpha)\alpha^{\sigma-1} B^{\frac{(\sigma-1)^2}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{L}{S} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (5)$$

according to (1) and (3). Moreover, combining $w_S = B \cdot (\partial Y/\partial X)$ with $w_L = \partial Y/\partial L$ and using $X = BS$, we find

$$\frac{w_S}{w_L} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} B^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \left(\frac{L}{S} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}. \quad (6)$$

for the relative wage rate.

In an equilibrium where at least some skilled natives remain in the domestic economy, individuals (which are ex ante identical) must be indifferent whether or not to acquire education. Thus, in view of time cost e , the no arbitrage condition

$$(1-e)w_S = w_L \quad (7)$$

must hold. Combining (6) and (7), we find that the ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled

units of labor is given by

$$\frac{L}{S} = \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{(1 - e)\alpha} \right)^\sigma B^{1-\sigma}. \quad (8)$$

Substituting (8) into (5) leads to

$$w_S = A [\alpha^\sigma B^{\sigma-1} + (1 - \alpha)^\sigma (1 - e)^{1-\sigma}]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (9)$$

Thus, the wage rate per unit of high-skilled labor, w_S , is increasing in B . For later use, also note that in the case where $\sigma \leq 2$, w_S is concave as a function of B .

We next derive the number of non-migrating high-skilled workers, N , when m workers migrate. High-skilled labor input at home is given by $S = (1 - e)N$. Combining this with (8), we obtain $L = \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{(1-e)\alpha} \right)^\sigma B^{1-\sigma} (1 - e)N$. Substituting the latter expression into resource constraint $N + m + L = 1$ and solving for N leads to

$$N = \frac{1 - m}{1 + \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \right)^\sigma [(1 - e)B]^{1-\sigma}}. \quad (10)$$

Hence, under optimal education decisions, an increase in the number of emigrants m lowers the number of high-skilled workers remaining in the economy, whereas the total number of natives who choose to acquire education, $N + m$, rises. Moreover, higher productivity $B = b(G)$, which may be triggered by an increase in the public investment level, G , raises the number of high-skilled workers in the domestic economy, N , if and only if $\sigma > 1$. As pointed out at the end of section 2, $\sigma > 1$ is the empirically relevant case. Also note that in the case where $\sigma \leq 2$, N is strictly concave as a function of B . Throughout we maintain the assumption

$$1 < \sigma \leq 2. \quad (A1)$$

Combining $A = a(N)$ with (10) and substituting into (9) leads to

$$w_S = a \left(\frac{1 - m}{1 + \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \right)^\sigma [(1 - e)B]^{1-\sigma}} \right) [\alpha^\sigma B^{\sigma-1} + (1 - \alpha)^\sigma (1 - e)^{1-\sigma}]^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \equiv \tilde{w}^S(B, m). \quad (11)$$

From the properties of expressions (9), (10) and function $a(\cdot)$, we find that $\tilde{w}^S(B, m)$ is increasing and strictly concave as a function of B under assumption A1 ($\tilde{w}_B^S > 0$, $\tilde{w}_{BB}^S < 0$). $\sigma > 1$ is also sufficient (but not necessary) for the cross-derivative of \tilde{w}^S to be negative ($\tilde{w}_{Bm}^S < 0$). This will turn out to be a key property of the model, which may be understood as follows. Due to human capital externalities, higher emigration lowers TFP and therefore reduces wage rates; in particular, $\tilde{w}_m^S < 0$. The decline in TFP lowers the marginal product of the intermediate good in final goods production; thus, an increase in the productivity of skilled labor B has a lower impact on wage rates if m increases. As B is positively affected by a higher public investment level G , this implies that an increase in G has a lower impact on net wages, if more skilled workers emigrate.

We now turn to the migration decision. Let the highest net wage rate per unit of high-skilled labor among jurisdictions abroad be given by \bar{w}_{net}^S . For the purpose of this subsection, \bar{w}_{net}^S is exogenous. In contrast, in an international equilibrium analyzed below, wages everywhere are affected by migration flows.

In view of disutility from emigrating for a given consumption level, individual i emigrates if

$$\frac{\bar{w}_{net}^S}{w_{net}^S} \geq 1 + \theta(i), \quad (12)$$

where $w_{net}^S \equiv (1 - \tau)w^S$ is the after-tax wage rate of skilled labor in the considered economy. Thus, if $w_{net}^S < \bar{w}_{net}^S$, the number of emigrants is

$$m = \int_0^{\bar{w}_{net}^S/w_{net}^S - 1} \varphi(\theta) d\theta = \Phi(\bar{w}_{net}^S/w_{net}^S - 1). \quad (13)$$

From the government budget constraint, $\tau[w_S(1 - e)N + w_L L] = G$. Employing no arbitrage condition $(1 - e)w_S = w_L$ and resource constraint $N + L = 1 - m$, we find that $\tau w_S = \frac{G}{(1 - m)(1 - e)}$. Thus, we have

$$w_{net}^S = w^S - \tau w^S = \tilde{w}^S(b(G), m) - \frac{G}{(1 - m)(1 - e)} \equiv W(G, m). \quad (14)$$

From the properties of (11) and function b , the net wage rate $w_{net}^S = W(G, m)$ is decreasing in the number of emigrants m , for two reasons. The first reason is that an increase in

m lowers TFP, as discussed above. The second reason is that higher emigration reduces the tax base, which means that for a given public investment level G , the tax rate τ has to increase in order to balance the government budget. Both effects go in the same direction. If we alternatively assumed that emigrants still pay taxes where they are born, such that the second effects would vanish, $W_m < 0$ would still hold.

There are two further interesting properties of function W , which give rise to our main results, as will become apparent. First, under assumption A1, after-tax wages are strictly concave as a function of G , $W_{GG} < 0$.¹⁰ Second, the effect of an increase in G on wages is smaller, if emigration is higher; formally, $W_{Gm} < 0$. The property also arises for two reasons: First, as discussed, gross wages are rising less as a response of an increase in productivity parameter B when m increases (recall $\tilde{w}_{Bm}^S < 0$). Moreover, it holds that the additional tax burden of an increase in G is higher, if emigration rises. Again the second effect would vanish if emigrants still paid taxes in the economy where they are born.

According to (13), if $\bar{w}_{net}^S \geq W(G, m)$, the number of emigrants $m \geq 0$ is implicitly given by

$$m = \Phi \left(\frac{\bar{w}_{net}^S}{W(G, m)} - 1 \right) \equiv RHS. \quad (15)$$

Figure 2 depicts *RHS* of (15), as a (*S*-shaped) function of m (given \bar{w}_{net}^S and G). An equilibrium is reached if *RHS* intersects with the 45-degree line. Figure 2 shows three equilibria, with migration levels denoted by m_0 , m' and m_1 . Multiple equilibria easily arise due to the following interaction: on the one hand, (after-tax) income differences trigger migration flows. On the other hand, higher emigration triggers income reductions, due to negative human capital externalities of brain drain; this gives further incentives to emigrate. Consequently, either emigration and the wage gap to the exogenous level \bar{w}_{net}^S is high or both are low. Figure 2 is drawn in such a way that at $m_0 = 0$ (no emigration or immigration in the considered economy) the net wage rate is the same as the highest one abroad, $W(G, 0) = \bar{w}_{net}^S$. As will become apparent, this scenario corresponds to a symmetric international equilibrium as derived below (recall that economies are ex ante

¹⁰Recall that $\tilde{w}_{BB}^S < 0$ and $b'' \leq 0$.

identical). The two other equilibria in Figure 2, m' and m_1 , feature emigration.

<Figure 2>

Throughout, we invoke the standard notion of *tâtonnement* stability; here, this means that we focus on migration levels where small perturbations of an equilibrium gives rise to a tendency of m to return to its initial level. In Figure 2, this is the case when RHS crosses the 45-degree line from above (i.e., $\partial RHS/\partial m < 1$). Thus, $m_0 = 0$ and m_1 are stable equilibrium migration levels, whereas at m' the equilibrium is unstable. For instance, suppose that the number of emigrants m would be slightly below m_1 . In this case, $RHS > m$, implying that emigration tends to rise. If to the contrary the number of emigrants m is slightly higher than m_1 , then $RHS < m$ and the number of migrants tends to fall.

3.2 International Equilibrium

We now turn to the international equilibrium, where all income levels are endogenous. Such an equilibrium could be analyzed for any given distribution of (local) public investment levels in the world economy. We focus on the particular case where all jurisdictions choose their public investment levels “optimally”.¹¹ As we are interested in the relationship between public investment and the pattern of migration, we need a plausible government objective function. In our context, with ex ante identical individuals, a plausible candidate is the utility of non-migrating individuals. For a jurisdiction which does not expect to have immigration, $m \geq 0$, this means that net wage rate $W(G, m)$ is maximized subject to the education and migration decisions as reflected by (15) and taking as given the after-tax wage rates abroad.¹²

So far we focused on emigration. Regarding immigration, suppose a jurisdiction expecting an inflow into skilled workers takes into account that the number of immigrants, I , depends on the domestic net wage rate of high-skilled labor and the income

¹¹Although this may not literally be the case, focussing on optimal choices is meaningful to explain empirical evidence if the basic economic trade-offs faced by governments, which we identify here, are taken into account in real life.

¹²Note that there is no strategic interaction in choosing public investment levels as each jurisdiction is infinitesimally small.

opportunities of high-skilled labor abroad. Formally, suppose host economies with $I > 0$ immigrants take into account schedule $I = \tilde{I}(w_{net}^S)$, with $\tilde{I}' > 0$. Analogously to the derivation of (14), it is immediate that $w_{net}^S = W(G, -I)$. Thus,

$$I = \tilde{I}(W(G, -I)) \tag{16}$$

implicitly defines the immigration level I as a function of G : we denote this level by $I = \hat{I}(G)$.¹³ Fortunately, as will become apparent, we do not have to know functions \tilde{I} or \hat{I} to characterize an international (perfect foresight) equilibrium.

We require the following equilibrium conditions to hold:

- Individuals optimally choose whether to acquire education and whether to migrate if educated, by taking wage rates at home and abroad as given.
- Representative firms in both the final goods sector and the intermediate goods sector maximize profits by taking factor prices as given.
- In all jurisdictions, public investment levels are chosen such that net wage rates of the non-migrants are maximized, taking into account educational choices, migration behavior, choices of firms, and taking as given wage rates abroad.
- Migration patterns are *tâtonnement*-stable.
- The number of immigrants in the world equals the number of emigrants.

We will now show that, despite symmetry of jurisdictions *ex ante*, there may exist an equilibrium where there is a group of host economies which have the same immigration level I and a group of source economies which have the same emigration level m . Denoting the fraction of host economies by λ , we then have

$$\lambda I = (1 - \lambda)m. \tag{17}$$

¹³The immigration level also depends on income opportunities abroad, which are suppressed in the formal representation.

What agents take as given must of course be correct ex post. For governments, this includes the expectation whether to be a host or source economy of migrating workers. Expecting $m = 0$, a jurisdiction solves $\max_G W(G, 0)$. As $W_{GG} < 0$, this leads to optimal public investment level G_0 as given by $W_G(G_0, 0) = 0$. Moreover, expecting $m > 0$, a jurisdiction solves $\max_G W(G, \hat{m}(G))$, where \hat{m} denotes the level of emigration which is implicitly given by (15).¹⁴ The first-order condition reads $W_G + W_m \hat{m}_G = 0$. Applying the implicit function theorem to (15) implies that

$$\hat{m}_G(G) = -\frac{\varphi\left(\frac{\bar{w}_{net}^S}{W(G, \hat{m})} - 1\right) \frac{\bar{w}_{net}^S}{W(G, \hat{m})^2} W_G(G, \hat{m})}{1 - [\partial RHS / \partial m]_{m=\hat{m}}}. \quad (18)$$

Thus, under stability ($\partial RHS / \partial m < 1$), the first order condition can be written as $W_G(G, \hat{m}(G)) = 0$. At the so-defined public investment level, we have $\hat{m}_G = 0$, according to (18). Thus, $W_{GG} < 0$ is sufficient for the second-order condition to hold. Finally, expecting $I = \hat{I}(G) > 0$, a jurisdiction solves $\max_G W(G, -\hat{I}(G))$.¹⁵ The first-order condition reads $W_G - W_m \hat{I}_G = 0$, where the implicit function theorem implies that

$$\hat{I}_G(G) = \frac{\tilde{I}'(W(G, -\hat{I})) W_G(G, -\hat{I})}{1 + [\tilde{I}'(\cdot) W_m]_{I=\hat{I}}}. \quad (19)$$

Under stability, analogously to (18), the denominator of the right-hand side of (19) is positive. Thus, the first order condition for a source economy becomes $W_G(G, -\hat{I}(G)) = 0$. Again, the second order condition holds.

It is interesting to note that, at the optimal public investment levels, emigration is minimized in a source economy of high-skilled expatriates and immigration is maximized in host economies. To see this formally, note that $\hat{m}_G = 0$ if and only if $W_G = 0$ for source economies. At the so-defined level of G , $\hat{m}_{GG} > 0$, according to (18). Similarly, $\hat{I}_G = 0$ if $W_G = 0$ and $\hat{I}_{GG} < 0$ at that level of G . These results are implied by the basic properties of the model. Recall that the government objective is to maximize net wage income of workers at home and that income opportunities abroad relative to those at

¹⁴We suppress argument \bar{w}_{net}^S in \hat{m} .

¹⁵Recall that \hat{I} is the level of immigration which is implicitly given by (16).

home form the basis for migration decisions. Both skilled workers and the government take net wage rates abroad as given. The government problem and individual migration decisions are thus based on the same variable, the wage rate for skilled labor at home, w_{net}^S . The question now is in which way the migration of skilled labor affects public investment levels.

In equilibrium, the expectation whether to be host or source economy is self-fulfilling. Any fraction of host economies λ is a potential equilibrium value. For concreteness, we focus on $\lambda = 0.5$. According to (17), this implies $I = m$. Let us denote by G_1^* and G_2^* the equilibrium public investment level of a source economy and host economy, respectively. In international equilibrium, the number of migrants in or out of a jurisdiction, $m^* \geq 0$, and investment levels (G_1^*, G_2^*) are simultaneously given by equation system

$$W_G(G_1^*, m^*) = 0 \quad (20)$$

$$W_G(G_2^*, -m^*) = 0, \quad (21)$$

$$m^* = \Phi \left(\frac{W(G_2^*, -m^*)}{W(G_1^*, m^*)} - 1 \right). \quad (22)$$

Let us write public investment levels defined by $W_G(G, m) = 0$ and $W_G(G, -m) = 0$ as $\tilde{G}_1(m)$ and $\tilde{G}_2(m)$, respectively, and define

$$M(m) \equiv \Phi \left(\frac{W(\tilde{G}_1(m), -m)}{W(\tilde{G}_2(m), m)} - 1 \right) [= RHS]. \quad (23)$$

As follows from the notion of stability of equilibrium emigration, we must have that $M'(m^*) < 1$ for $m^* \geq 0$. Note that $M(0) = M'(0) = 0$.

Property $M'(0) < 1$ ensures that there exists a symmetric international equilibrium, in which there is no migration ($m = 0$) and all jurisdictions choose public investment level G_0 as defined by $W_G(G_0, 0) = 0$. Moreover, there may be an asymmetric equilibrium with $m^* > 0$ (like m_1 in Figure 2), such that (20)-(22) and $M'(m^*) < 1$ holds. The key characteristic of this equilibrium is that $G_1^* < G_2^*$; that is, source economies have a lower public investment level than host economies. This important result follows from property $W_{Gm} < 0$ and the definition of $\tilde{G}_1(m)$ and $\tilde{G}_2(m)$, respectively; that is, $\tilde{G}_1'(m) < 0$ and

$\tilde{G}'_2(m) > 0$. Because the marginal impact of increasing the public investment level on the utility of non-migrants decreases with higher brain drain and increases when more skilled workers immigrate, the analysis suggests a negative relationship between net emigration of an economy and its public investment level.

4 Empirical Support

There are three main predictions of our model. First, the emigration incentive is an increasing function of relative income to potential destination economies. The prediction that income differences trigger migration flows has been examined empirically elsewhere. Recently, both Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) provide convincing evidence for the critical role of wage differences between country pairs on emigration rates of tertiary educated workers. Second, our increasing returns framework suggests that there is a feedback mechanism working from higher emigration to lower wage rates and income levels. Based on an alternative theoretical framework (with scale effects stemming from endogenous R&D of firms), this prediction is supported by evidence provided in our companion paper (Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2009). Third, and most important for the purpose of this study, we have highlighted the interaction between emigration of highly skilled labor and an economy's public investment level. We have shown that the marginal impact of an increase in public investments on income of domestic workers decreases with higher emigration. The novel hypothesis we explore in this section thus is that a higher net emigration rate of high skilled workers in an economy causes lower public investment levels, all other things equal. We test this prediction by focussing on OECD countries, for three reasons. First, our model has abstracted from the possibility that higher emigration may lead to economic gains in source economies, as discussed in the introduction (e.g. Mountford, 1997, among others). Such effects are likely to occur in poor countries. Second, we want to avoid large institutional differences of countries in our data set. Third, data from OECD countries typically are of better quality and more comparable across countries.

Examining the correlation between public expenditure and emigration cannot identify

the direction of causation between the two. We therefore construct an instrument for net migration rates of skilled workers and provide instrumental-variable (IV) estimations in addition to OLS. For this we use a measure of social networks of migrants and exogenous country characteristics, both potentially affecting mobility costs of individuals, to explain bilateral migration flows.

4.1 Data and Estimation Strategy

The first challenge is to find a measure for the net emigration rate of high skilled individuals for OECD countries. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) have established a dataset of (gross) emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment for the years 1990 and 2000. The authors count as emigrants all foreign-born individuals aged at least 25 who live in an OECD country and class them by educational attainment and country of origin. Thus, only emigration into OECD countries is captured, approximately 90 % of educated migrants in the world.¹⁶ Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) extend the initial dataset by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and provide bilateral emigration stocks of high skilled persons from country i living in OECD country j , denoted by M_{ij} . Furthermore, let \mathcal{S}_{All} denote the set of all 195 countries in the data set (each one is a potential source country) and denote by \mathcal{S}_{OECD} the set of OECD countries (each one is a potential host country).

We construct the net emigration stock of an OECD country j by aggregating its total emigration stock, $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{OECD}} M_{ji}$, and deducting its total immigration stock, $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{All}} M_{ij}$. The net emigration stock of OECD country j is denoted by

$$NetEmig_j := \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{OECD}} M_{ji} - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{All}} M_{ij}. \quad (24)$$

To adjust the emigration variable for the size of the skilled labor force, we divide the high skilled net emigration stock by the stock of skilled residents in country j , S_j , and thereby obtain a net emigration rate: $Mig_j := NetEmig_j/S_j$.

Denoting by G_j the public investment level per capita of country j we estimate for

¹⁶See Docquier and Marfouk (2006) for a detailed discussion concerning data collection and construction issues.

the year 2000.¹⁷

$$\log G_j = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Mig_j + \mathbf{x}'_j \boldsymbol{\alpha}_x + \varepsilon_i. \quad (25)$$

As the theoretical model predicts a negative impact of higher emigration on public investment, we expect $\alpha_1 < 0$. \mathbf{x}_j is a vector of other controls potentially affecting public investment in country j . We include (log) population size in order to control for economies of scale associated with public goods. That is, if anything, population size should be negatively related to public expenditure per capita. Moreover, to account for the age structure of a country, which may affect public investments, we include the fraction of population under the age of sixteen. Finally, we want to account for the possibility that governments' spending levels on both investment and non-investment expenditure categories are higher in some countries than in others for ideological reasons. Conversely, governments may substitute public investments for welfare expenses, the latter being more visible for many voters. To deal with spending determinants which are not based on the optimality criterion employed in the theoretical model, we also control for social spending per capita. ε_j is an error term.

We use different OECD measures of public expenditure, like government gross fixed capital formation, publicly financed R&D spending, public education expenditure, and government spending for “economic affairs” as dependent variable (all in logs). The first category is most suited in light of the theoretical model, as it represents public infrastructure structure spending. The latter spending category may be least suited, as it includes subsidies for various sectors in the economy and public consumption expenditure items.

To mitigate potential omitted variable bias, we also take first differences of equation (25) and regress the (approximate) growth rate of public investment per capita in country

¹⁷Alternatively, we considered productive public spending *as fraction of GDP* as dependent variable. This variable, however, is different to variable G in the theoretical model. A negative impact of a higher emigration rate on the fraction of public investment in GDP is less likely to hold than on public investment per capita, since both G and income change in the same direction as response to migration flows, according to the proposed theory. Nevertheless, for our preferred measure of public investment, public gross fixed capital formation, a negative relationship still holds for the fraction of G in GDP (not reported).

j on the change in the emigration rate of skilled migrants between 1990 and 2000:

$$\log(G_{j,t}/G_{j,t-1}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{DeltaMig}_j + \mathbf{z}'_j \boldsymbol{\beta}_z + \eta_j, \quad (26)$$

where time index t and $t-1$ refers to years 2000 and 1990, respectively, and $\text{DeltaMig}_j := \text{Mig}_{j,t} - \text{Mig}_{j,t-1}$. According to the theoretical model, we expect $\beta_1 < 0$. \mathbf{z}_j is a vector of other controls potentially affecting the rate of change of public investment over time. We include the difference of log population size and the growth rate of GDP per capita between 1990 and 2000 as controls. The latter accounts for adjustment in spending due to business cycle phenomena. η_j is an error term. The data sources and summary statistics of the employed variables are presented in Table 1.

< **Table 1** >

To deal with potential endogeneity bias regarding the relationships of interest, we construct an instrument for the net emigration rate of the year 2000 ($\text{Mig}_{j,t}$) as well as its change between 1990 and 2000 (DeltaMig_j) to estimate equations (25) and (26), respectively. To obtain our instrument for net emigration rates of skilled labor, we first estimate the (log) stock of skilled expatriates from i living in OECD country j in year 2000, $\log \text{Mig}_{ij,t}$, as function of variables which are supposed to capture migration costs: the total stock of emigration (sum over all education categories) in the year 1990 (in logs) migrating from country i to j , $\text{TotalMig}_{ij,t-1}$, countries' log geodesic distances, Dist_{ij} , a dummy indicating whether at least 9 percent of the population in i and j speak a common language, ComLang_{ij} , and a dummy indicating whether i and j were both transition economies in 1990, Transition_{ij} . The inclusion of $\text{TotalMig}_{ij,t-1}$ is motivated by the notion that a larger community of people from the same nation already living abroad create mobility-cost reducing network effects, as argued by Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2008), among others. Our indicators for geographic and linguistic proximity are also typically used in the brain drain literature. The dummy on transition countries is potentially important as well, since the time period we consider was shortly after the fall of the iron curtain. This event has newly created the possibility to emigrate from a former

communist country to non-transition countries, whereas migration between communist countries was already possible before 1990. The following equation presents the estimated value of bilateral migration stocks with 3515 bilateral observations (standard errors in parenthesis):

$$\log \hat{M}_{ij,t} = \underset{(0.375)}{-1.407} + \underset{(0.006)}{0.866} \times Total Mig_{ij,t-1} - \underset{(0.021)}{0.218} \times Dist_{ij} + \underset{(0.044)}{0.813} \times ComLang_{ij} - \underset{(0.092)}{0.836} \times Transition_{ij}. \quad (27)$$

All coefficients have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero at the one percent level. Moreover, the left-hand side variables explain about 92 percent of the variation of bilateral migration stocks ($R^2 = 0.917$).

We then recover \hat{M}_{ij} from (27) to construct a predicted net migration rate for the year 2000, \widehat{Mig}_j , analogously to the use of M_{ij} to construct Mig_j . Figure 3 is a scattershot of the true overall net emigration rate Mig_j against the constructed net emigration rate, \widehat{Mig}_j . The correlation coefficient of both variables is 86 percent.

< **Figure 3** >

In our instrumental-variable estimations we use \widehat{Mig}_j and $\widehat{\Delta Mig}_j := \widehat{Mig}_{j,t} - Mig_{j,t-1}$ instead of their actual values for estimating (25) and (26), respectively. The key identifying assumption for a causal effect of emigration on public investment is that the instruments are uncorrelated with residuals in equations (25) and (26).

4.2 Results

Table 2 presents OLS estimates of level-regressions (25) in specifications (1) to (4) and change-regressions (26) in specifications (5) to (8) using both OLS and IV. We use the official OECD measure for government investment (government gross fixed capital formation) in logs, $PubInv$, for all regressions.

< **Table 2** >

In specifications (1) to (4) the coefficient of interest, α_1 , is always negative and significantly different from zero at least at the 15 percent level. In column (1), we look at the effect of the net emigration rate (Mig) on public investment in 22 OECD countries using OLS without any controls. Column (2) uses instead the constructed net emigration rate (\widehat{Mig}) as an instrument for the actual net emigration rate. The results provide no evidence that ordinary least-squares estimates overstate the negative effect on public investment. The two coefficients in column (1) and column (2) roughly have the same size. The instrument itself proves to be highly significant when considering the first stage F-Test. Columns (3) and (4) represent OLS and IV regressions, respectively, when controlling for log population size (Pop), fraction of population under sixteen ($Pop16$) and (log) social expenditure per capita ($SocialExp$) in addition to the net migration rate. The influence of emigration on public investment remains negative when the controls are added and statistical significance increases. Quantitatively, the estimates suggest that effects of brain drain on public investment are non-negligible. With α_1 being approximately equal to -2 , an increase in the net emigration rate of one standard deviation (equal to 0.11, according to Table 1) triggers a reduction in public investment expenditure per capita of about 22 percent.

Turning to the estimates of change-regressions (26) confirms the results of the level-regressions. An increase in the difference of the net emigration rate between 1990 and 2000 has a negative effect on the growth rate of the public investment level per capita, where β_1 is significantly different from zero at least at the 10 percent level, according to columns (5) to (10) in Table 2. Again, OLS- and IV-estimates are in the same range. As expected, also the growth rate of GDP per capita ($DeltaGDP$) has a positive effect. Controlling for it as well as for the growth rate of population size ($DeltaPop$) reduces β_1 considerably. Still, the evidence from this estimate suggests that an increase in the change in the net migration rate over time ($DeltaMig$) by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate of public investment per capita by about $(0.05 \times 1.1 =)$ 5.5 percent. Like for the level-regressions, also for the change-regressions which give IV-estimates, in columns (6), (8) and (10) of Table 2, the F-Test shows that the first stage is always significant with the proposed instrument.

< **Table 3** >

In Table 3 we provide OLS and IV results of level-regressions (25) for other public expenditure categories than government gross fixed capital formation. These measure are for specifications (1) to (3) total government R&D expenditure per capita ($R\&DTotal$), for specifications (4) to (6) R&D expenditure in higher education per capita ($R\&DHigherEdu$), for specifications (7) to (9) public education expenditure per capita ($ExpEdu$), and finally for specifications (10) to (12) government expenditures for economic affairs ($ExpEco$). The coefficient of interest, α_1 , is negative and statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level for the first three alternative public spending levels. Coefficients are smaller for IV-estimates and reduced further, to figures comparable to the estimates of α_1 in Table 2, when controls are added. Turning to expenditure for economic affairs, however, α_1 is not significantly different from zero and for IV-estimation in column (12) even has the wrong sign. This suggests that public expenditure which does not primarily have investment character, and thus is not covered by our theoretical analysis, is affected differently to brain drain than public investment.¹⁸

< **Table 4** >

Table 4 presents OLS and IV estimations of equation (26) when growth rates of the same expenditure measures than in Table 3 are used as dependent variables. For both R&D measures, β_1 is again negative. The IV-estimates of β_1 are highly significant and quantitatively much larger (by a factor of about four) than in the case where the growth rate of government gross fixed capital formation is the dependent variable (Table 2). For public education expenditure, IV-estimates of β_1 are not significant but again negative and about the same size than the OLS-estimate (which is significant). The growth rate of public expenditure for economic affairs, by contrast, is either insignificantly or positively affected by the change in brain drain over time.

¹⁸We experimented with other public expenditure categories such as social spending, public expenditures for housing, and total government expenditures, which also do not reflect measures of public investment in spirit of our theory. For these measures, effects of an increase in the net emigration rate of high-skilled labor is either insignificant (for housing and total expenditure) or positive (for social expenditures).

5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we analyzed theoretically and empirically the relationship between migration of high-skilled individuals, income differences, and differences in public investment levels across jurisdictions. According to the theoretical model, migration of skilled labor may endogenously arise despite symmetry of jurisdictions *ex ante*. This possibility follows from the assumption of human capital externalities, which imply that outflows of skilled labor reduce wage rates in source economies whereas inflows raise them in destination economies. Moreover, and most importantly for this study, higher outward migration reduces the impact of an increase in productivity-enhancing public expenditure on both gross and net income levels of workers, whereas higher inward migration increases it. Consequently, governments who care about welfare of the domestic labor force adjust public investment levels downward when facing brain drain and upward when experiencing inflows of skilled labor.

We presented empirical evidence which is consistent with this main prediction of the theory. Constructing an instrument for the net emigration rate of a country, we showed that an increase in the net emigration rate causes quite substantial reductions of various measures of public investment levels per capita among OECD countries. Consequently, more pronounced international migration patterns for skilled labor are likely to aggravate differences in public investment levels across countries, along with income differences.

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
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Figure 1
Correlations between net emigration and government investment in OECD countries



Notes: rho represents the correlation coefficient. The p-value results from a test of the significance of the correlation. For the construction of the net emigration rate see description in subsection 4.1. Government gross fixed capital formation is taken for the years 1990 and 2000 from OECD (2008).

Figure 2
Migration in equilibrium for given public investment





Figure 3
Actual versus constructed net emigration rate



Notes: rho represents the correlation coefficient. The p-value results from a test of the significance of the correlation. The dotted line represents the 45-degree line.

Table 1
Data description and sources

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description and source</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>
<i>Mig</i>	Net emigration rate in year 2000. See description in section 4.1 for construction on basis of data from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007).	30	0.01243	0.10923
<i>DeltaMig</i>	<i>Mig</i> of year 2000 minus <i>Mig</i> of year 1990.	30	-0.02455	0.04885
<i>PubInv</i>	Log of government gross fixed capital formation per capita in year 2000. OECD (2008).	22	6.506	0.57332
<i>DeltaPubInv</i>	<i>PubInv</i> in 2000 minus <i>PubInv</i> in 1990.	22	0.1478	0.20903
<i>Re&DTotal</i>	Log of total government R&D expenditure per capita in year 2000. OECD Education Statistics Database.	30	5.807	1.00128
<i>DeltaRe&DTotal</i>	<i>Re&DTotal</i> in 2000 minus by <i>Re&DTotal</i> in 1990.	25	0.6278	0.34107
<i>Re&DHigherEdu</i>	Log of (publicly financed) R&D expenditure in higher education per capita in year 2000. OECD Education Statistics Database.	30	4.175	1.03412
<i>DeltaRe&DHigherEdu</i>	<i>Re&DHigherEdu</i> in 2000 minus <i>Re&DHigherEdu</i> in 1990.	22	0.6389	0.3128
<i>ExpEdu</i>	Log of expenditure per capita for education in 2000. OECD General Government Accounts Database.	25	7.201	0.40681
<i>DeltaExpEdu</i>	<i>ExpEdu</i> in 2000 minus by <i>ExpEdu</i> in 1990.	22	0.3254	0.32131
<i>ExpEco</i>	Log of expenditure per capita for economic affairs in year 2000. OECD General Government Accounts Database.	25	6.949	0.39381
<i>DeltaExpEco</i>	<i>ExpEco</i> in 2000 minus <i>ExpEco</i> in 1990.	22	0.0689	0.33444
<i>Pop</i>	Log Population mid-year estimate in year 2000. OECD Population and Labor Force Statistics Database.	30	9.617	1.55114
<i>DeltaPop</i>	<i>Pop</i> in 2000 divided by <i>Pop</i> in 1990.	30	1.075	0.06834
<i>Pop16</i>	Population under 16 as share of whole population in year 2000. OECD Population and Labor Force Statistics Database.	30	19.28	4.23753
<i>SocialExp</i>	Log of social expenditure per capita in year 2000. Government Regulation Size. OECD General Government Accounts Database.	30	8.007	0.66004
<i>DeltaGDP</i>	Log real GDP in 2000 minus log real GDP in 1990. Penn World Tables 6.2.	30	1.243	0.17745
<i>M_j</i>	Stock of emigrants of educational category “high” aged 25+ born in country <i>i</i> and living in OECD country <i>j</i> in year 2000. Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007).	3560	5.296	2.70399
<i>TotalMig_j</i>	Log size of total emigrant population from country <i>i</i> living in country <i>j</i> in year 1990. Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007).	3560	5.761	2.83947
<i>Dist_j</i>	Log geodesic distance in kms between country <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> . Mayer and Soledad (2006).	3515	8.476	0.92755
<i>ComLang_j</i>	Identifier if same language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the population in country <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> . Mayer and Soledad (2006).	3525	0.1231	0.32862
<i>Transition_j</i>	Dummy variable capturing if country <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> were economic transition countries.	3560	0.01938	0.13788

Notes: The range, mean and standard deviations are based on the respective number of observations.

Table 2

Effect of high skilled emigration rates on public investment and changes in public gross fixed capital formation (OLS and IV regressions)

Dependent Variable	PubInv		DeltaPubInv		PubInv		DeltaPubInv			
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	IV (6)	OLS (7)	IV (8)		
(Intercept)	6.5090*** (0.1068)	6.5090*** (0.1096)	11.9469*** (1.5138)	11.7402*** (1.6411)	0.0995*** (0.0473)	0.0928** (0.0517)	1.1545*** (0.5054)	1.0883** (0.5517)	0.8836 (0.6198)	0.5947 (0.5834)
Mig	-2.1590* (1.3304)	-2.1860* (1.3910)	-2.3280*** (0.8947)	-1.9221** (1.0186)	-1.8176*** (0.6688)	-2.0689** (1.1792)	-1.6010*** (0.5312)	-1.2474** (0.7370)	-1.1536*** (0.5471)	-1.1224** (0.5933)
Pop			-0.1430*** (0.0626)	-0.1376** (0.0713)						
Pop16			-0.0853*** (0.0275)	-0.0857*** (0.0323)						
SocialExp			-0.2984*** (0.1094)	-0.2782*** (0.1159)						
DeltaPop							-0.9673*** (0.4569)	-0.9064** (0.4975)	-1.0452*** (0.4588)	-0.9427** (0.4700)
DeltaGDP									0.2929 (0.2084)	0.4283*** (0.1807)
F-value (First Stage)	59.720	59.720	0.430	0.331	0.193	0.143	0.243	0.175	0.255	20.080
Adj. R2	0.138	0.094	0.430	0.331	0.193	0.143	0.243	0.175	0.255	0.279
N	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; ** indicates a significance level between 5 and 10 %; * indicates a significance level between 10 and 15 %.

Table 3

Effect of high skilled emigration rates on alternative public investment proxies (OLS and IV regressions)

Dependent Variable	OLS (1)		IV (2)		OLS (4)		IV (5)		OLS (6)		IV (8)		OLS (7)		IV (9)		OLS (10)		IV (11)		IV (12)			
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV		
<i>(Intercept)</i>	5.8720*** (0.1453)	5.8510*** (0.1662)	4.2160*** (0.1819)	4.2100*** (0.1810)	2.0159 (2.8938)	2.0159 (2.8938)	7.2320*** (0.0627)	7.2250*** (0.0715)	3.3130*** (0.9476)	3.3130*** (0.9476)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)	6.9600*** (0.0786)
<i>Mig</i>	-5.2180*** (1.4798)	-3.5750*** (1.6768)	-3.3570* (1.9897)	-2.8640** (1.6406)	-2.6240** (1.4049)	-2.6240** (1.4049)	-2.2510*** (0.7819)	-1.7150** (0.9547)	-1.5746*** (0.5154)	-1.5746*** (0.5154)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)	-0.8104 (0.9846)
<i>Pop</i>																								
<i>Pop16</i>																								
<i>SocialExp</i>																								
F-value (First Stage)																								
Adj. R2	0.300	0.082	0.097	0.095	0.089	0.089	0.263	0.197	0.647	0.647	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	
N	30	30	30	30	30	30	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5%; ** indicates a significance level between 5 and 10%; * indicates a significance level between 10 and 15%.

Table 4
Effect of changes in high skilled emigration rates on changes in different public investment proxies (OLS and IV regressions)

Dependent Variable	DeltaResDTtotal		DeltaResDhigherEdu		DeltaExpEdu		DeltaExpEco	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (4)	IV (5)	OLS (7)	IV (8)	OLS (10)	IV (11)
(Intercept)	0.5486*** (0.0633)	0.4980*** (0.0746)	0.5883*** (0.0714)	0.5272** (0.0760)	0.2098*** (0.0915)	0.2062** (0.1149)	0.0341 (0.0797)	0.1801** (0.0897)
DeltaMig	-2.8325*** (1.2773)	-4.6440*** (1.8638)	-1.8954* (1.1400)	-4.1850*** (1.3879)	-3.5534** (1.7572)	-3.6640 (3.0073)	-1.0707 (2.0320)	-3.4175 (2.4865)
DeltaPop		0.3600 (1.3250)		0.0099 (0.9443)				
DeltaGDP		0.0220 (0.3240)		-0.1073 (0.3956)				
F-value (First Stage)	21.870	10.260	20.850	23.850	11.090	7.141	0.012	11.090
Adj. R2	0.135	0.191	0.074	0.183	0.168	0.133	0.083	0.083
N	25	25	22	22	22	22	22	22

Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 %.