

American Enterprise Institute
Election Demographics: What We Learned in 2008, What It Means
for 2010 and 2012
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Karlyn Bowman: Good morning. My name is Karlyn Bowman and I'm a senior fellow here at AEI and I'd like to welcome you to our discussion this morning. On behalf of Ruy Teixeira and AEI and the Brookings Institution, I'd like to welcome you to Act II of the AEI-Brookings Election Demography Project. It has been a great pleasure to work with Ruy on this project, whose enthusiasm for additional work in this area I share.

At our conference in February 2008, Ruy and I enlisted some of the nation's leading demographers and social scientists to examine the demographic and geographic trends that we believe would affect the 2008 election. We do not believe that demography is destiny but we do believe that understanding demographic occurrences is essential to understanding our politics.

Demographic and geographic changes drive policy changes. To mention just one very prominent one, the wave of soldiers returning home after World War II led to the passage of the GI Bill which helped to pay for higher education and provided returning soldiers low-cost loans to make down payments on their homes. Many of them moved to the suburbs and that helped promote the development of the Interstate Highway System.

There are many other examples of demographic and attitudinal changes that have reshaped our politics and our polity.

Demography may not be destiny, as Ruy says, but it is very hard to ignore.

In our meeting last February, our panelists identified key trends they felt would influence the 2008 election. You can read their papers in full by ordering this Brookings Institution Press Book, *Red, Blue, and Purple America: The Future of Election Demographics*. Today, we're going to bring you up to date on what happened in 2008 and how that may affect the 2010 and 2012 elections. After all, there are only 508 days remaining until the 2010 election.

Our panelists were remarkably prescient last February. Short bios are on each table but let me say a word or two about each of them. This is the order in which they will speak this morning. Rob Lang is a professor of urban affairs, a Brookings Institute senior fellow, and co-director of the Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech. Last February, he and his coauthors argued that Democrats had dominated central cities and urbanizing suburbs and that their future success would come from pushing out beyond these areas. That is just what they did in 2008.

Bill Bishop is a writer living in Texas and he and his coauthor, Robert Cushing found a large popular audience for

their recent book, *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-minded America is Tearing Us Apart*, a look at increasing political homogeneity. We're living with and voting like people who are more like us. The election data confirmed their thesis.

Bill Frey, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, took a close look at the changing racial and ethnic composition of the electorate. In the 1976 exit poll, the electorate was 90 percent white. In 2008, it was 76 percent white. Frey argued that Hispanics had begun to translate their growing demographic clout into electoral clout and the election results confirm this.

I mentioned Ruy but I haven't properly introduced him. He is a senior fellow at both the Century Foundation and the Center for American Progress and a fellow at the New Politics Institute. He has been doing some fascinating state-by-state demographic work and he has also recently been part of a project called the New Progressive America Report and I urge you to visit -- I think those are on the Center for American Progress' website and Ruy has brought a prop. Last February, he and his coauthor, Alan Abramowitz looked at class and especially white working class defections from the Democratic Party. Remember Joe the Plumber. Al Gore and John Kerry, of course, lost them by large margins and Ruy and his colleagues

argued that the Democratic candidate would have to do better among them to win. Obama did.

Scott Keeter of the Pew Research Center looked at the distinctive views and values of the millennial generation and argued that they would be a big plus for the Democrats in the fall. They were. Today, most of these young people describe themselves as Democrats and Barack Obama has the opportunities to cement a significant generational allegiance among them.

Finally, we have with us today Ron Brownstein, the political director of *The Atlantic* and the *National Journal*. This year, Ron has written a series of in-depth analyses of the electorate for the *National Journal* and we're delighted that he's here to discuss them today.

Before turning to our panel, let me also thank Adam Foster, who helped us organize today's conference. Adam will leave AEI this year to go to graduate school and he will be sorely missed. Let me quickly discuss the ground rules. Each of our panelists will speak for 15 minutes. If everyone keeps to time, we will have a five-minute break after they finish and then Ruy will introduce our discussants, Michael Barone of AEI and Mark Schmitt, formerly a research associate at AEI and now a senior fellow at the New American Foundation. They will each speak for 20 minutes then we'll turn to your question. Think-tanks in Washington are very busy places these days. We need

to finish up before noon as there is another event in this room soon after it. Let's begin. Rob.

Robert Lang: Thanks for following up. It was a fun wild election. The big picture, you know those 3D movies that kids love? I know my kid loves that 3D stuff. He'd walk around with the 3D glasses. He won't give it back after the movie is over. I don't know what he's seeing beyond the 3D movie that's in 3D. I'll have to figure that out. But there is a new "3D politics," as I would argue, which is Density + Diversity = Democrats. Now, again, there are all sorts of exceptions to this and this is the basic structure. There are lots of regional flavors to this. There are changes in politics. There are failed administrations, let's say. But the way I see it setting up is that the denser parts of America, which is more of America, America's in-filling, it's not spreading so much into the excerpts as it was in the past and maybe perhaps Bill Frey could speak to that.

It's getting more diverse, obviously, and that combination, that metropolitan structure, and this is where most Americans live; more than four in five Americans live in metropolitan areas, over 50 percent of people live in suburbs; the denser suburbs, Fairfax County, Arlington County, locally, places like that, are the part of that sort of dense belt of suburbs around the country there, our local example, and that's

where the Democrats seem to win and as I note, in election 2008, the suburbs ruled. There are states where the suburbs made the difference. For example, North Carolina, the suburbs handed North Carolina to Barack Obama.

Looking ahead, Demographics = Destiny, well, no, it does not but it sure helps. It's better to have a kind of undergirding, the way the Democrats do at the moment, where you're looking at consistently up-ticking representation by minorities in terms of their vote as opposed to the shrinking base that the Republicans have. This could be reversed. Republicans could offer candidates that speak very much to the politics that Latinos, for example, would be interested in. Actually, that looked like the trajectory they were on and I think that was part of the intent and I think even folks like Karl Rove understood that politics and certainly, George W. Bush, as former governor of Texas, had a good sense of that. They've gotten off track and at the moment, the tracks got even worse. They've got a Hispanic Justice potentially, someone who has been nominated and instead of going immediately at her merits as appropriate appointee, they sort of went at some of the ethnic politics. That is not smart politics and I think they know that internally, even within the Republican Party.

This is just a quick look at some of the dynamics of the last elections since '88. What's interesting is that the

Democrats have had this slow steady rise. The Republican politics have been more volatile. Of course, in the case, in some elections, there has been, for example, a third party candidate in 1992 in Ross Perot, that dampened the Republican vote, '96, but the interesting thing is here, year in, year out, Democrats keep gaining. Sometimes it's enough to win, sometimes it's not. They have won also. There is this sense that the Democrats have been hanging in by a thread. But really, since 1988, they've won the Electoral College vote and they have won in blowouts where since, really, George H.W. Bush. George W. Bush only won by two very narrow margins on the '00 and '04 elections. Other than that, the Democrats have had a string of impressive victories. Now, some of that is structural. They had good candidates in those years. The politics favored them in those years but again, you do enough of these in a row and it starts to be the pattern.

Obama won, of course, the most affluent states, Alaska being the exception. Of course, the vice presidential candidate came from Alaska. The old reliable affluent state for the Republicans was Virginia down there at ninth but Obama managed to flip that and even then, the Republicans were losing the affluent parts of Virginia. When they won Virginia, it's that the affluent part of Virginia, Northern Virginia, the close-in suburbs, where a smaller fraction of the total state

of Virginia, Southwest Virginia, Shenandoah, places like that, Tidewater. Now, in balance, they have grown so tremendously and they've gotten denser and more diverse in the process. That is the state that was really a primary target for Obama, that and Colorado, which really have a very similar profile, and he won both and by doing that, pulled one more affluent state in.

He also won the biggest states, the two big states now that remain for the Republicans that are reliable, Texas and Georgia. Look out. Those are two big states and they're big because they've got big metropolitan areas. And if you have big metropolitan areas, from Houston to Dallas to Atlanta, you're looking at trouble in the long run in those kinds of places. In fact, George Bush returned home to Dallas County. The Republicans lost it. His father lives in Harris County. The Republicans lost it. The Republicans lost metropolitan Atlanta. They won the state. What they're looking at is a place like Georgia maybe ten years behind Virginia in that process of change. And as I noted, they lost North Carolina. There are a lot of Yankee expatriates in North Carolina, places like Cary. "Containment Area for New Yorkers" is the joke in the acronym of CARY, North Carolina. The whole Piedmont, the whole arc that goes from Charlotte, where they have light rail now and an international airport that reaches Europe, all the

way through to Raleigh-Durham with its Research Triangle, that whole part of the state delivered for the Democrats.

Also, the most educated and least educated, and Ron Brownstein will speak to this, I'm sure, again, are where the Democrats are getting the vote and that a postgraduate white male, who, in let's say just based on ethnicity or based on gender, would be trending or leaning Republican. Throw a Master's Degree on that person and the next thing you know, I don't know what they're doing in those schools, I hear all kinds of rumors. Being that I teach, maybe I can also address that but yes, seriously, once you get that credential, there's some sort of magical transformation occurs and the big change, though, in this, and Ruy can speak to this, I'm sure, is that the difference between Kerry and Obama in terms of no high school, which, part of that being the Latino shift that you'll see as well, and in terms of race, the Latino shift at +14 was the most impressive gain. This is the fastest growing minority in the country and at +14, that was Obama's biggest score. Whole states are delivered through that, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico. If it were not for that fact that the presidential candidate in the Republican ticket came from Arizona, I suspect Arizona would have been, if not a victory, more like Missouri, in play, down to the wire.

Now, I just want to briefly remind folks who were here last time and bring people up to speed who weren't here at that time the Brookings typology that we're using to look at these county types based on commuting patterns, land uses. What we've looked at is the biggest 50 Metros, the 417 counties, and put them into a categorization scheme on where they are in terms of the type of suburb they are.

And what we have is, from examples around the country, a core suburb is a place that's the District of Columbia, or pardon me, it's not a suburb; it's the core of the region. The District of Columbia here would be the core. A place like, for example, Arlington with DeKalb County, Georgia, which went Democratic, would be an inner suburb. A mature suburb would be Fairfax. What a lot of people call the exurbs we call emerging suburbs, Louden County here. Prince William County in this region would fit in that category. Finally, exurbs, like Fauquier County here or Pinal County, Arizona, would go in that category.

Now, by location, most people live in -- first off, the majority of Americans live in the biggest 50 metros and that number is ticking up, not down. As far as the core areas, they are relatively modest. The core centers of Boston, Chicago and so on, Cook County, they're relatively small. The inner suburbs and mature suburbs, and you see it in this region; the

District of Columbia, as large as it is, is smaller than the largest suburban big counties like Montgomery or Fairfax so the pattern you see in the D.C. region very much replicate around the country. You see it in Atlanta. You see it in Dallas and places like that.

The inner suburbs, the mature suburbs together comprise a really large share of the population. The emerging suburb is fast growing but still relatively modest. Other metros, smaller metros, and micros are a smaller share and then non-core area counties, this was the Sarah Palin vote, by the way, Palin, who, I noted the last time, is a metro resident of Greater Anchorage, and so counts in that number about how many people live in metropolitan areas.

Just quickly, county characteristics, the cores are the densest and they are the most diverse and they are actually losing population in this decade. The inner suburbs and mature suburbs are growing much slower than the emerging suburbs but they are so large and their absolute population is keeping up. So a place like Fairfax County may not grow much but if you have a million people and you add five percent, you've added 50,000 people and that might be as much as a bunch of exurban counties.

Now, there are really three parts to the big metropolis, cores, which have always been Democratic-based, the urbanizing

suburbs, the inner and mature, which are clearly trending Democratic now, and then finally, the emerging suburbs and the exurbs, still Republican in most of the country, although Democrats are making gains. And just to give you a kind of quick look, 64 percent of folks are in urbanizing suburbs when you look at the top 50 metros.

Now, finally, sorry for the Snellen Eye Chart quality of this slide. I'll step you through it quickly though. So what happened in this election when you look at 2004 and 2008? What's the difference between the two elections? Well, Barack Obama outperformed Kerry across the board but what's interesting is that he really did well in the inner suburbs and emerging suburbs and just generally did better in the kind of space that was traditionally Republican than he had done in the past, than Democrats had done in the past, and made impressive point gains, I mean, especially in those inner suburbs, the Fairfax County, or rather, the Arlington Counties of the country. The suburbs where, if you want to know what the characteristics of them, they had some building before World War II. They had an old strip of development in the early auto era and then were really built up '50-'60s post-War boom. Levittown, Long Island, places like that, that kind of suburb is really now the majority catchment area in the country for the new immigration to the U.S.

The best ethnic restaurants in this country are not in downtown. They are in dead strip malls from the 1950's. They are in San Gabriel -- you want Chinese food in Los Angeles? Go to the San Gabriel Valley. If you go to the full, little, fakey developer-driven Chinatowns of the country, you're not going to get P.J. Changs or whatever the local chain is. If you want the real stuff, go after dead strip malls.

These were the old space that everybody criticized as the homogenizing, bland, 1950's space but given enough time and enough decay and enough downward filtering of housing stock, it turns out that this is now -- this is the new Mulberry Street in Lower Manhattan. This is the now where people, at the turn of the last century, had pushed carts and were in the lower east side of Manhattan. This is our pushcart space of the beginning of this century. And what it reflects is that change shows that these places have changed quite dramatically in how they're voting, in their demographic profile.

Now, in 2008, the Democrats built on gains that they had made in 2006. The actual turnout in the suburbs here looked not unfamiliar because it looked like the Congressional generic vote in 2006. That's why when I predicted this, and this is February 2008, I said if the Democrats can replicate that pattern, that gains in the suburbs that were the fringe but more importantly, the solidifying, going from just the majority

in the inner suburbs to 66 percent, 2/3 of the vote, there is no reversing it. There are just not enough rural folks and small city people left in America, in the key states that would determine the Electoral College to offset that difference. You're out of people, basically. You'd have to add another country on top.

And the Democrats now dominate the urbanizing suburbs and they are at least competitive at the metropolitan fringe. And that's just the Blue State-Red State map metro shown and you see at the hearts of all these metros a kind of blue dot at the center of all them and then increasingly, the kind of darker reddish colors, heavy Republican, the dark blue are the Democrats, and you see in North Carolina, even in a place like Atlanta, you see a few counties picked off there that are the Democratic counties and if you have enough density and enough population in those counties, they can offset a whole metro.

Now, Dallas County alone in the Dallas region went for Barack Obama. It's not enough to change the profile of all of Dallas metro right here but you're really at the edge of a place like Houston already and certainly, San Antonio and Austin were enough to be delivered for the Democrats. Enough time and then add this Hispanic rural vote down here and you're looking at Texas at 2016 or 2020 trending this way or enough counties added or neutralized voting 50-50 Democratic and

Republican in the next elections and add some African-American-dominated counties downstate and you're looking at Georgia, the two anchors that remain for the Republicans.

And then look through the I-4 Corridor. You have not just the Hispanic vote but often Puerto Rican-Hispanic vote, very different than the Cuban vote, much more liberal, and you now have a Supreme Court Justice potentially from that same ethnicity who is being pummeled by Republicans and you do that enough and you can write Florida off. And Florida is about to get a bundle of electoral votes added to it in the 2010-2011 adjustment.

This just shows, at the micro level in St. Louis, how the votes spread from 2004 to 2008, how the Democratic vote spread into much more of the metro region than it was previously. About 2008, you start to see precinct by precinct changes here and again, you've got some of these suburbs out there that have now Clayton to the West. They have rail service. They are building little mini-downtowns. They are becoming more urban.

And I'll just wrap this up quickly. What do I have left?

Karlyn Bowman: You have no time.

Robert Lang: No time left. I'll wrap it up quickly.

This is just the Virginia presidential vote. Again, you see the suburbs and Northern Virginia switch. Just a brief comment here, Northern Virginia came through so heavily for Barack

Obama that no matter what happened downstate, it was irreversible and again, it went into those very suburbs. So just conclusion, Density = Democrats, nearly all the population gains to mid-century are likely to occur in metro, in the denser part of the metro areas, not enough rural vote. Can the Republicans come back? Anybody can come back, of course, but the key issue here and the takeaway is that the structural problems remain. You're starting to see the sort of tide of change occur and if it's not reversed by 2020, even Texas could be gone. Thanks.

Bill Bishop: When we last got together more than a year ago, we talked about this phenomenon of political sorting, the increasing geographic concentration of like-minded people in communities and so basically, from 1976 to 2004, 2/3 of American counties tipped. They became either increasingly Republican or increasingly Democratic. People increasingly lived in communities with strong partisan majorities, and Bob Cushing and I looked at landslide counties where one presidential candidate or another won with 60 percent of the votes so here's in 1976, Carter vs. Ford. About a quarter of the people lived among these landslide counties. Black is Democratic; gray is Republican.

By 2004, however, we have half the nation live in a landslide county; actually, 49.2 percent, again, D's in black,

R's in gray, and then we had, in the 2008 election, which we all know was transformative except when it comes to the sorting of voters. Here's the map for Obama and McCain. There was a slight drop in the percentage of people who lived among these landslide counties, to 48.7 percent of the population, so really, the best way though of measuring this segregation isn't through looking at landslide counties. Bob Cushing came up with a landslide county scheme because people have trouble with numbers and by people, I mean newspaper editors.

The more accurate way of measuring this phenomenon is determining whether communities are moving closer or further away from the national average, and if you're measuring the standard deviation of votes, at the county level, we weighed the counties for their population, we'll show you whether counties are getting closer together or they're moving towards the national average.

People who are moving towards the national average are moving away so as the standard deviation goes down, as it went down to 1976, people are getting closer and communities are getting closer to the national average and then you'll see that from -- this are all the elections since post-War, from 1976 through 2008, you see the steady increase as counties were falling away from the national average.

And from 2004 to 2008, you see that same steady movement toward a more politically polarized country, and this wasn't just in Appalachia, by the way. The standard deviation of the presidential vote at the county level increased in seven out of ten states between 2004 and 2008, so you've got L.A. goes its merry Democratic way and down where my relatives live in Tom Green County, San Angelo, Texas, even though the nation as a whole moves Democratic, the margin in Tom Green remains the same.

Now, it's never been our contention that people check out a place, its politics and move to be around others who think like they do about policies or issues. We see that politics these days is really defined by lifestyle and most of us have some kind of cultural literacy that tells us whether we're with our group or cultural or political tribe. I was on this talk show in Minneapolis and in one hour, three people called to say that they knew that they lived in a politically wrong neighborhood because their neighbors use lawn chemicals and they didn't. And in my 110 percent Democratic painfully hip neighborhood in Austin, when you go to the polling place and you take a picture of a smiling brown Lab dog, you're not surprised when the owner tells you the dog's name is Che [phonetic] or that the weekend after this vote, my neighbors went to the junior high school and did a thorough feng shuing

of the junior high, including a rice blessing of the principal's office and the official color of the local elementary school is tie-dye.

So we're moving to be around others who live like we do and it's lifestyle and these days, lifestyle is political. That's why the same divisions that appeared in 2004 general election cropped up again in the Obama-Clinton '08 Democratic Primary. Obama and Clinton voters came from two different Americas. Forget them easily. Forty-eight percent of the people live in a landslide county. In the Pennsylvania Democratic Primary in '08, 60 percent of voters lived in a county where either Obama or Clinton won by 20 percentage points or more. In Virginia, it was 72 percent. In November of '04, only 43 percent in the general election in Virginia lived in a landslide county.

There are lifestyle differences from place to place that then appear in election results and there is probably no better example of that than spanking. Marc Hetherington at Vanderbilt gathered polling that showed differences in parenting styles. Some parents spank, others don't. It turns out that spankers live in some states, non-spankers lived in other states, and that this difference shows up in election results. The states that voted most heavily for John Kerry had the lowest percentage of people who favored corporal punishment and those

states, they are the top of the graph, both voted heavily for Bush and they whipped their kids.

So there are all sorts of examples of this. Party choice now aligns with family formation. A demographer friend found that one of the best ways to predict how a state voted in '04 was to count the percentage of people who have lived together before marrying, before they marry. A high shacking rate correlated with high Democratic vote. The more of the family formation in the place was like that of Denmark than the bluer the state and those relationships between family formation and the vote increased at the county level from '04 to '08, even though '08 was supposedly the election that was post-partisan and all about the economy.

We've divided physically in the neighborhoods not necessarily where we look alike but where we think alike, live alike, spank alike, shack alike, and every four years, vote alike and those differences are also educational. Here, we can see the straight line relationship between percent of adult population with BA degree and the vote in '08. Democratic landslide counties, they're on the left. You can see we have 32.7 percent of the population, adult population with BA degree.

As the vote gets more Republican, the percent BA goes down, and Bob Cushing found that these differences continue to

be reinforced by migration. You can see that the average personal income of -- this is the average personal income of the people who moved across state lines from '03 to '07, essentially between the last two elections. The more Democratic the vote, the higher the incomes of very recent migrants. They're on the very left. The darkest blue are the group of counties that voted Democratic in '04 but moved, became more Democratic in '08, and the average income of migrants moving into the darkest red counties on the right, those are the counties that voted Republican in '04 and got moved further to the right in '08.

Now, it's true that Democratic voters are more urban, Republicans more rural, but even these kinds of income differences hold up even when you hold geography constant. People who move to Democratic rural counties make more than people who move to Republican counties.

Now, how about the flippers? These are the counties that flipped between '04 and '08, blue, Democrat, red, Republican. People who migrated into those counties between the last two elections, people who moved into the counties voting Democratic earn about 50 percent more than those who have moved into counties that flipped Republican. So migration is creating a county that is polarizing by way of life, education, earning ability, and finally, politics.

But I think it's important to understand that more than migration as it worked here, we continue to organize our institutions around like-minded groups, which makes this man the most influential campaign consultant in both the '04 and '08 elections. His name was Donald McGavran and John Green is not here so I'm holding up the religion aspect of this deal. But before he passed away, McGavran's ideas helped create the megachurch.

We learned this from our friend, Rick Warren, who was a student at a seminary in 1974, a time when mainline churches were losing membership and as he tells it in his book, *A Purpose Driven Church*, he was on a mission to Japan when he picked up a Christian magazine and he began reading about Donald McGavran, who wrote books about how to grow churches. He wrote, "God used the writings of Donald McGavran to sharpen my focus from pastoring an already established church to planting the church that I would pastor." So Warren took what he had learned from McGavran and used it to build the Saddleback Church we all know about in Orange County, and Warren's success was copied, first, by other people building megachurches then by mainline churches and now, by political campaigns.

What did McGavran say? McGavran was a missionary who studied how churches grew. He traveled the world looking for

the key to church growth and he found that good works, hospitals and schools didn't bring people to Christ. "A church grows," McGavran wrote, "when it is based within a homogenous unit of people." People live in groups. They "think of themselves as a separate tribe, caste, or class." McGavran believed that any church that asked people to abandon their tribe, caste, or class would fail. He wrote, "Men do not join churches where services are conducted in a language they do not understand or where members have noticeably higher degree of education, wear better clothes and are obviously of a different sort." He would say over and over again that "men like to become Christians without crossing racial, linguistic, or class barriers."

Now, McGavran was writing about how to build a church in India but what happened when his notions of a homogenous unit were applied to the fast-growing suburbs of the 1970's, where Rick Warren and his fellow megachurch creatures did what McGavran said? They built churches for a like-minded group that thought like anthropologists and they really thought like marketers. They had a target audience and Rick Warren's target was Saddleback Sam and he set about building the church that will allow Sam to become a church member without crossing any cultural, social, or political barriers. Now, you can see, you can read those signs. It says, "Saddleback Sam is self

satisfied. He obviously wears Dockers. He doesn't like big institutional religion. He doesn't like to wear a tie," which is why Rick Warren always looks like an activities director on a cruise ship. But the Saddleback Church megachurch is catered to a lifestyle and Saddleback Sam gets what he wants. When McCain and Obama came to Saddleback, they knew what not to wear.

And so Warren and a generation of megachurch preachers showed that like attracts like. It works. People like to see themselves in the institutions they join and the candidates they support. When Billy Graham would hold his altar call at the end of his revivals, he made sure that people coming to be saved would be met by people who looked just like them. Young women would meet young women. Your first vision in your new life would be someone who looked like you. This was basic salesmanship. The insurance industry did a study in the 1960's that found that tall, college-educated male insurance agents sold best to tall, college-educated male clients. The highest rate of sales was between people of the same political party.

So this technique, done through evangelists and insurance salesmen, finally made it to politics in 2004. The Bush campaign in '02 had experimented with different techniques to increase turnout, from door-to-door knocking to the noxious robocalls, and their test found that personal contact worked

best but that an appeal coming from a friend or a neighbor, someone who looked like they came from the same social hive, when that happened, when that knock came on the door, then turnout really jumped, just like Donald McGavran said.

The strategy was to reflect voters' beliefs and ways of life back onto themselves so that the campaign, all campaigns now, wasn't as much about the reelection of a president and his policies as it was an affirmation of a local way of life. The point isn't transformation now but encouraging a particular kind of behavior. We're not into changing minds but feeding into these polarized communities. Obama did this in '08.

Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill told a group of people being trained to work for Obama, "The message you've got to send more than any other message is that Barack Obama is just like us." And that sounds remarkably like what Donald McGavran wrote 50 years ago when he said that people would come to Christ when they saw that, "The messenger of the Christian religion is one of my own family, my own people, one of us."

So elections and government are polarized because that's how we settle. It's how we build our churches. It's how we organize our political campaigns. Division and misunderstanding are woven in. Rep. David Price in North Carolina told me recently that he and his colleagues now are reluctant to hold open town hall meetings because those who

come, come from such different and unconnected communities that the events too often turn into bitter confrontations between people who have little in common. When polling earlier this year found record levels of polarization between the parties, most of discussion was about Republican and Democratic leadership. Another part of this continuing story is how and where we live.

William Frey: Well, I want to thank Karlyn and Ruy for convening us again, what is it, 15 months after we were here last time, and when we were here last time, Barack Obama was just about ready to become nominated, at least, in terms of winning the number of primaries he needed to, and John McCain was already the candidate for the Republican Party, and we were speculating about what race might mean in the next election.

Some of the things I said then were that certainly, Obama would pick up the black vote. We weren't so sure about the Hispanic vote because Hispanics tended to go with Hillary in the primaries. We weren't sure what was going to happen in the general election. We thought maybe older white people might be a little bit resistant to voting for this kind of exotic young fellow, who the Democrats were likely to nominate. And geographically, we felt that perhaps the what I would call "the fast-growing purple states," places like Nevada and Colorado, New Mexico, and so forth would be picking up these new

minorities and maybe the older battleground states, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and such might be open to John McCain.

Well, this was before Sarah Palin rose and fell. This was before Lehman Brothers came into the news. It was before the Dow Jones dropped to 40 or 50 percent. It was before John McCain made a few stumbles on the campaign trail. And of course, Obama won and I guess the question is what role has race played in the results of this, in terms of at least how racial groups have voted and how well did they fare in bringing Obama the presidency?

So I'm going to discuss a few things here. One, we know there's been greater minority turnout and a share of the voter population, I'm going to talk about that a little bit, and then what are the race demographics of the fast-growing and slow-growing purple states? And third, we're going to talk about where didn't minorities win the election for Obama and finally, what role will race play in future elections, at least, in the near term?

Just to recap, Obama did win. He won blacks. He won Hispanics. He won Asians. Those are the Democratic margins for those groups and they basically did much better in 2008. Democrats did much better in 2008 than Kerry did in 2004 and whites, though went Republican, much less so than was the case in 2004. [Audio glitch 0:39:06-0:39:10]

When we look at the number of voters, that was just the margins, but when we look at the number of voters, the base of the population, two million more blacks voted in 2008 than in 2004. Almost two million more Hispanics voted and close to a million more Asians voted. There were actually fewer whites voted in 2008 than in 2004, about a half a million left, so the composition of the voting population shifted a little more to minorities as well.

Nonetheless, there still is translation gap. In other words, when you have 100 whites in the population, 77 of them are going to be eligible voters. The rest of them will be either too young to vote or maybe non-citizens. But when you have 100 Hispanics in the population, only 42 of them are going to be eligible voters because they have a much higher share of people who are under 18 and a significant share who are not voters. So the translation between what the racial composition of the population on the whole and the racial composition of the voting population makes it much more -- gives Hispanics and Asians a smaller share.

But countering that has been an increase in the turnout rates of Hispanics, blacks, and Asians in the 2008 election and in fact, 26 states had higher Hispanic turnout in 2008 than in 2004. Thirty states had higher black turnout in 2008 than in 2004, with notable big increases, like Georgia, North Carolina,

and Florida for Hispanics, Nevada and Georgia for blacks. There's actually a slight decline in the turnout rate for whites in 2008 compared to 2004. And as a result, we had a much higher rate of growth in voters for these minorities than we did in eligible voters, simply because more of them turned out to vote and actually, a smaller growth in the rate of voters for whites than was the case for eligible voters.

So what does this all mean? Well, if we look at the racial composition of the voting population, there is now about almost one in four voters are minority, with a significant increase in Hispanics, who have about a 7.4 percent share of the voters compared to six percent in 2004; similarly, increased Hispanic representation among eligible voters, as we see. And of course, as changes with states, here are the states that have the highest Hispanic shares in the 2008 election in terms of their total population, and that's a green bar, and in terms of their share of the voters, which is the pink bar, and some states do a better job of translating their Hispanic population representation into their voting representation. They tend to be states like California and New York and Florida, where Hispanics have been around for a long time and fewer of them are recent immigrants. On the other hand, states like Nevada and Arizona and Colorado, the population representation is much higher than it is in the

voting representation. Nonetheless, it's a fair share of all those states that have a significant number of Hispanics. So that's the increase in the population, the increase in the voting representation of minorities.

Now, I want to get into the idea of purple states, fast-growing purple states and slow-growing purple states. I have re-imagined what purple states are for this map. You may be surprised to see that the Dakotas are purple states, for example, or South Carolina or Georgia, but I simply used the yardstick of whether or not there was a margin either way of ten for one candidate or ten or less for one candidate or the other and then, for good measure, I threw in Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin because I thought they were purple states anyway.

Ruy Teixeira: That's why we call it a science.

William Frey: Yes, exactly. So anyway, I classified these into fast-growing and slow-growing ones, getting back to my hypothesis that it would be the fast-growing ones where the minorities would do the most for Obama, and those are the ones that you see. They are those ten states in the Intermountain West and in the Southeast and six of them did go for Obama, as you can see there, and then these are the slow-growing purple states. Seven of those ten went for Obama and if you look at the racial composition, those first two pies there, about 72

percent of the fast-growing purple states are white. The rest, more than a quarter, are some minority, whereas, 88 percent of the slow-growing purple states are white and could have conceivably, if McCain was a stronger candidate, done a little better for the Republicans. The minorities though are growing much more rapidly in fast-growing than in slow-growing purple states, as we show there.

And let's focus in on a few. Here is Nevada and New Mexico, which increased significantly. There, Nevada increased its Hispanic representation among voters, somewhat its black representation among voters. New Mexico, about a similar representation of Hispanics and other races, including American-Indians. But if you look at Nevada, what you see is there has been a shrinkage of the Republican margin and big gains in the Hispanic and black margins in Nevada, as the state went from Republican to Democrat between 2004 and 2008. We look at New Mexico, even actually a bigger Republican margin among whites in New Mexico, but on the other hand, a significant gain in the Hispanic margin in New Mexico. Immigration was a big issue there, leaning New Mexico more towards the Democrats, going from Republican to Democrat.

Here, two other fast-growing purple states, Florida and Virginia. Florida, the Hispanic population as part of the voters, representation of voters, is significantly bigger,

blacks somewhat bigger, and in Virginia, the black representation among voters is significantly bigger. But once again, the whites do go for Republicans a little bit less in Florida but big gains for blacks and a turnaround for Hispanics in Florida, which is important for that state's vote. In Virginia, a much less Republican margin in 2008 than in 2004 that Rob was talking about, especially the Northern Virginia component of what was going on, but big increases of blacks, and we don't have a data point for 2004 for Hispanics but we suspect that probably increased too, turning Virginia around. So in all these fast-growing purple states, minorities had a big impact about what was going on, even though the white margin for Republicans decreased in many of them.

Here are two slow-growing purple states, Ohio and Pennsylvania, where it's still largely white voting population, and you can see that in Ohio, there is a discernible decrease in the Republican margin but a big increase in the black margin, which had a lot to do with that turnaround, and in Pennsylvania, again, a discernible decrease in the Republican white margin and big increases in blacks and a very high and continued Hispanic margin in Pennsylvania helping to turn that state around.

So what does all this mean in terms of how minorities have affected the election? In 2004, John Kerry took 20 states.

Ten of them were states where whites voted predominantly for Democrats. The other ten, the whites voted for Republicans so minorities had to carry those states. We move to 2008, Obama took 29 states. He took 19 states where whites made up, went for Democrats, again, ten states minorities went for Democrats while the whites went for McCain, and there are different ten states in 2008 than in 2004 the states were minorities took so I put some maps together here.

Here's the 2004. Those green states are the -- all of the states that are colored are the ones who went for Kerry. The green states are the ones where whites went Democrat. The orange states are the ones where the whites went Republican but they won anyway, Kerry won anyway because minorities were enough to counter the whites' impact. And you see those white states; those white Democratically-voting states are basically New England, Minnesota, Washington. Throw in Hawaii, which, of course, the Asians had a lot to do with anyway, and Delaware, and those other states won largely because minorities countered the Republican vote of whites.

Here is 2008. Many of those states which relied on minorities to win the Democrats got the white vote, especially the western part of the Great Lakes, California, Oregon, as well as Washington, and even Colorado now. But the new states which are relying on minorities to take for Obama to take are a

lot of these fast-growing purple states; Nevada, New Mexico, Virginia, North Carolina, Arizona, Florida you see there in orange. So this idea that minorities had had a big impact on a lot of these states that have this fast population growth is important. On the other hand, minorities were also responsible for taking Ohio and Indiana and Pennsylvania, states that we just showed had -- where whites went, continued for Republicans but in a much lower margin.

So if you look at all these states, these states, North Carolina, Florida, Virginia, Nevada, Ohio, Indiana, Maryland and New Jersey, and those states that combined black and Hispanic margins were bigger than the overall Obama's margin. He owes those two groups, those states because they overcame any of the other negative votes that went from other groups. This is important because most of those states are -- many of those states are fast-growing purple states but even Ohio and Indiana are in there.

So what do we make of this? Did minorities really win the election for Obama? Well, to some extent, they did because they took a lot of these fast-growing purple states. But on the other hand, we had slow-growing purple states where the Republican margin shrunk enough that even a small minority population can help push them along. So you really needed two things to happen there. You need a shrinking white margin for

Republicans and a big minority margin for Democrats and this has happened. It may not happen again. It's not something that I predicted and it meant that there was a weaker support for Republicans among whites in these slow-growing purple states which we may or may not have in the future.

So what about the future? Here are projections up to the year 2020 of 18 to 29-year-olds in the United States. These are the hot, fast-growing, young voters that everybody was focused on in the last election. Well, by 2020, they are going to be about half minority and they're already moving in that direction in 2012 and 2016 so one might expect that, especially in the fast-growing parts of the country but also in other parts of the country. These are groups who are going to kind of swing Democratic.

On the other hand, this is the 65 and over population, which the big bulging Boomers are moving into in the next several decades, and they're solidly white age groups until as far as the eye can see, up to 2020. Those are the folks that are going to still be occupying the slow-growing purple states and I think there is still going to be a controversy between how many of these people the future Democratic and Republican candidates are going to be able to win over to sort of either add to or subtract from the impact that minorities are going to have in the future. So that's it.

Ruy Teixeira: Okay, boy, this is a sort of cornucopia of data here. I think, Karlyn, maybe we should put up these slideshows on the website at some point so people can perhaps peruse them at their leisure and fully absorb each and every piece of data. Well, my piece with Alan Abramowitz for our volume and for the conference was about the decline of the white working class, which may kind of give away a little bit where I'm going with this presentation. But let's take a look, shall we, at what happened with the white working class in the 2008 election.

First of all, let's look at the fact that realistically, the white working class was probably not the big contributor to Barack Obama's victory. Other things were going on that were quite important and this was just a very broad-brush way of looking at that. This is the share of the minority vote from 1988 to 2008. It's gone up from 15 percent of voters in 1988 to 26 percent of voters in 2008, according to the exit polls. That's an increase of about half a percentage point a year among this group. And how does this group vote? Well, it's not a total shocker, I'm sure, to these people at this conference, heavily Democratic, 75 percent in 2000, 71 percent in 2004, then going up to 80 percent, 4/5 of the vote for Democrats among this group, which is now a quarter of the electorate in 2008, so that's obviously a huge significance.

Now, another thing that doesn't get as much attention but is quite important as well is what's happening with white college graduate voters in this country. White college graduate voters, of course, include many professionals. They are growing pretty solidly in most dynamic metropolitan areas of the country and back in 1988, when Michael Dukakis lost to George H.W. Bush, the Democratic deficit among this group was 20 percentage points, which is quite a big deficit. Now, this was down to 11 points in the 2004 election, where Kerry lost, and Obama actually brought that deficit, getting close to even, only four percentage points.

Now, let's look then, which is a contribution to Obama's victory, let's look now at the Democratic deficits among the white working class over the same time period. Now, notice that in 1988, that 20-percentage point deficit is exactly the same as the Democratic deficit in that year among white college graduate voters so no difference whatsoever. But unlike white college graduate voters, over time, the white working class hasn't warmed too much to the Democrats. As you see, in 2004, there was a 23-percentage point deficit for John Kerry among the white working class voters and Obama needed to do better than that in 2008. He did but he only managed to bring that deficit down to 18 percentage points so a relatively modest contribution to Obama's victory.

Now, this did vary by state. If you look at some of the contested states that were close in 2000 and 2004 particularly, I think, in Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon and Wisconsin, there was actually a fairly significant shift that white working class voters toward the Democrats, I think, from about -8 on average to +6 so that was a success story for the Democrats in the white working class in 2004. Now, in Pennsylvania, where the white working class loomed quite large in the run-up to the 2008 election, we obviously remember it was a big deal in the primary between Hillary and Barack. Actually, the Democrats did a little bit worse. They were -10 in 2004 among that demographic. They were actually -15 in 2008 so they actually did a little bit worse.

Then, you look at those states that the Republicans -- very close states that were contested heavily in the last three elections but the Republicans won in 2000 and 2004, which would be Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, -- I'm leaving somebody out -- and Florida, of course. How can I forget Florida? Okay, so they were, on average, a -13 in 2004 among those states. The Democrats, actually, the Democrats did slightly worse in those states on average in 2008 among the white working class but it went down to -14 so that wasn't the action there, at least in terms of relative support rates.

What was important in those states was, for example, increase of the minority vote, very important in these states typically, and also, white college graduate voters and a lot of these states really shifted sharply toward the Democrats. Just a couple of examples would be in Pennsylvania, white college graduate voters had a 17-point shift toward Obama between the two elections. Another example would be Ohio, where there's a 15-point shift of white college graduate voters toward Obama. So these are all examples of how the Democrats, even though they got only a modest shift toward their candidate in 2008, or in some cases, in some particular states, no shift at all, they still managed to overcome it.

But here is where white working class' big contribution to Barack's victory and to Democratic fortunes in general over time, and this is a fact that, as hinted in the title of my earlier paper, there are just less of them. They are kind of going away. So you look at this, this is the exit poll shares of voters from '88 to 2008, the shifts, -15 for the white working class over this 20-year time period. That's a decline of 3/4 of a percentage point a year in this key demographic, balanced on the other side by a four-point increase among white college graduates, which, as we saw, are trending pretty strongly toward the Democrats, and then an 11-percentage point

increase in the minority vote over the time, which, as we know is quite heavily Democratic.

Now, you take any contested state, really, any other state you want to name, but look at the contested states and you see the same story replicated in state after state over this time period, which tells you a great deal just in and of itself of how the politics of these states are changing. Look at Pennsylvania. Remember how the white working class didn't really come through for Barack Obama in 2008? Well, their contribution, again, there is just a lot less of them. Twenty-five percentage point decline in Pennsylvania. But then a 16-point increase among white college graduates and eight-percentage point increase among minorities, the blue bar.

Look at Ohio, a 15-point decline in the white working class over this time period, balanced by increases in white college graduates and minorities. And then Nevada is at the same kind of level of decline as Pennsylvania, 24-percentage point decline among white working class voters but a 19-point increase, a percentage point a year over that time period among minority voters, a little bit of an increase among white college graduates.

And I could have thrown a number of other states out there but you look at any state that was important in the 2008 election and the story is always the same. Over time, a rapid

decline in the level of white working class voters balanced, depending on the state, by a mix of minority and white college graduate voters.

Okay, so where is all this happening within states? This kind of touches a little bit on the territory that Rob was getting into. These patterns of declining white working class vote, increasing white college graduate minority vote are particularly salient in the large metro areas. This is about 54 percent of the population of the United States and as you can see, the Democrats, from '88 to 2008, 21-percentage point increase in the large metros over that time period, 15-percentage point increase in the medium metros, which is another 20 percent of the population, so that's 3/4 of the U.S. right there, then a smaller seven-point increase in small metros, and two-point in small town rural or micropolitan areas.

And then the only place where the Republicans have done better over time is in the deep rural areas, the non-metro, non-micro, non-metropolitan, non-micropolitan areas of the United States, at least densely populated where the Democrats actually lost ground over the time period but that's what, maybe six percent of the population, so those patterns are pretty clear.

Now, let's take a look at how this works out and these patterns are really strongest in most -- they have the most effect in the most dynamic metropolitan areas of various states. So this looks at four key swing states and looks at the most dynamic large metropolitan areas within each of those swing states. So take a look at Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, a 32-point swing toward the Democrats led, of course, by the Philadelphia suburbs over the time period.

Look at Columbus, the only metro area practically in Ohio that's growing, definitely the driver of Ohio's growth, such as it is, a 31-point increase in the Democratic margin over the time period, driven both by Franklin County and by the Republican-leaning suburbs of that area that are becoming increasingly less Republican.

And look at Orlando, Florida. I don't know what they're putting in the water down there at Disney World but it seems to be having an effect on their politics. Orlando metropolitan area has just been changing like crazy in terms of its demographic makeup and here, so that's one of the reasons for this dramatic result, the 48-point swing toward the Democrats between 1988 and 2008 in the Orlando area.

And then of course, Las Vegas, which is a driver of Nevada growth, about 70 percent of Nevada's population, a 35-point shift in Las Vegas toward the Democrats from 1988 to 2008, so

again, this is the pattern. I could throw up a lot of other metro areas up here but they all show the same thing.

Typically, when large and the larger metro areas, the most dynamic ones, the ones that are growing the fastest where these patterns of change that I alluded to are really having their biggest impact, that is exactly where we see the biggest shifts toward the Democrats and away from the Republicans.

Now, where is all this going in terms of the white working class? Well, as I said, decline is kind of the theme for the white working class and this tells you one reason why this is likely to continue into the future. These are the population projections by race. From 2008 to 2050, I guess there'll be a new set of projections coming out sometime soon, which might moderate these changes a little bit but it's not going to change things much. Right now, we're about 66 percent white. That's going to be down to 46 percent white by 2050. Hispanics are going to double from 15 to 30 percent, blacks up just slightly, and Asians almost double also from five to almost ten percent.

So this is the race ethnic future of the United States. At some point in the 2040's, maybe early in the 2040's, we'll reach the tipping point and we'll become a majority/minority nation. Of course, that means that, as this trend continues,

the white working class logically will also continue to decline as a percentage of the population or the voters.

Also, there is, at least for the next five, ten, 15 years, it's a little bit -- the educational projections are much trickier. There is some evidence of a slowdown in educational upgrading but my read of the data is I think white college graduates are going to continue to at least hold their own as a percentage of the population and that'll be another figure and probably grow some and that'll be another figure crowding out white working class voters over time.

What the exit polls say, as I have and as I said, been showing a 3/4 of a percentage point decline per year in the white working class vote. The CPS, the Current Population Survey Voter Supplement typically has it a little less, maybe around half a percentage point a year but that does mean then that by the time we reach 2020, we're going to have at least another six-point decline in the white working class voters in the United States and again, that's something that based on current voting patterns should be very much to the advantage of the Democrats.

But just to kind of make it even more compelling and sort of a crisp case about the political implications of this, not all white working class voters are the same and there is evidence starting to emerge that the younger generation of the

white working class, the ones who are part of this Millennial Generation, are actually pretty different than older members of the white working class and they seem to be moving rather sharply in the direction of the Democrats, according to these data. This looks at 25 to 29-year-old white working class voters because if you look at the 18 -- throw in the 18 to 24-year-olds, you've got a fair amount of folks that are on track for a four-year college degree or maybe shouldn't be included. This just looks at the 25 to 29-year-olds. There is a 28-point deficit among this group in 2004. Obama actually carried this group by 12 percentage points, so like a 40-point shift during Barack Obama among these younger white working class voters in 2008.

And looking at other data from a survey I did at the Center for American Progress, we measured the sort of ideological predispositions of the population and we looked at younger white working class voters and it is remarkable how much more liberal or progressive or however you want to put it these voters are than older white working class voters, particularly on cultural issues, they really just look quite a bit different. But it's also true on role of government issues as well. They tend to be much more open to the potential of government to do things.

So as these white working class voters start replacing and continue to replace older white working class voters in the population, there is some reason to think that the white working class demographic, which, as we can see, is propping up, to some extent, what's left of the Republican coalition at this point, unless they change their tune, and we can get into that in the question period, that this demographic, which has been helping the Republican Party stay afloat to the extent it has, may actually be moving in a direction that's going to make that more difficult, that the white working class, as a whole, may start leaning more toward the Democrats over time, thereby diminishing the deficit the Democrats experience among this group.

Now, what does it all mean in terms of politics? Well, I think it's kind of implicit in the statements I've been making. It's "change or die," to some extent, for the Republican Party at this point. But also, I think it's important to reflect on the policy implications just a little bit of what this means. As implied by this last slide and a lot of other data besides, but certainly, you can find a lot of it in here, *New Progressive America*, available now in the Center for American Progress website. I think there's a lot of evidence that the culture wars, as a defining issue of our politics, are in a state of terminal decline. Cultural conflicts aren't going to

go away but it's their ability to shape U.S. politics and the conflicts between the parties to define them, I think, is going to go away as an issue that drives politics and drives voting.

I also think that based on, again, some of these changes that are taking place at the younger end of the age distribution, looking at the way the U.S. public opinion has evolved in general and the shifting demographics, as I say, I think that the role of government is going to be increasingly not controversial in a sense that I think a role for government in dealing with problems like health care, dealing with problems like clean energy and education, I think the issue is going to be less whether the government should do something in these areas but how it should do it and I think the pressure is going to be on for the Republican Party to reshape itself, not exactly as a party of government but not as a party that just says no to government but as a party that has better solutions and more market-oriented solutions, perhaps different solutions than the Democrats do.

But I think if they're going to compete at the center of this demographically changing electorate, we're going to see less of a culture wars Republican Party and more of a solutions-oriented Republican Party that does involve some kind of role for government. So let me stop it right there, I see

I'm a little bit over time, and turn it over to the next one.
Thanks.

Scott Keeter: Good morning and thanks to our hosts here, Karlyn and Adam at AEI and Ruy and Karlyn for putting this conference together. It's been a great collaboration and I enjoyed working on it last year and I think we have come up with some very interesting observations about a truly momentous election.

The focus that I have is on young voters and I'm going to talk about young voters and the Millennial Generation interchangeably. Generational change is a very difficult topic to get your arms around anyway. It's very hard to know when a new generation is here. You often don't really know that it's here until way down the road when you can look back and say yes, they really were different and they're still different. We can say that about the Baby Boom generation and have some confidence that Baby Boomers really were different from people who had come before them and they were different from Generation X that followed them but you don't know that for sure and we don't know for sure that the kinds of generalizations that I might make today are really going to persist over time but I have a reasonable amount of confidence that something is different about young people today.

We're talking about young adults, 18 to 29, 30, 31, depending on where you want to put the junction point for Generation X and the Millennials. The borderline is not particularly critical to anything that I'm going to say. First of all, just a little recap about the election. First of all, Barack Obama could have won the election without young voters. What I mean very specifically is that if somehow, people under the age of 30 have been prohibited by law from voting and everything else was the same, then Obama would have still won the election. He would have lost a couple of states that he won on the strength of young voters, North Carolina and Indiana, if my calculations are correct. But otherwise, he would still have won the election. It would have been closer. We would have all been up a lot later on election night than we were but he would still have won.

But saying that you can hold everything else constant and take young voters out of the picture is a little artificial because young voters provided a lot more than their votes. They provided a lot of the muscle and energy. They did a lot of the foot soldiering. As Sarah Silverman encouraged, they may have taken part in the "Big Schlep" that helped Florida to go to the Democrats. Who knows? But certainly, young voters did a lot more than simply vote and so it's a little crazy to

just take the exit polls and take the young voters out and say Obama would have won.

Still, the margin by which Obama carried young voters, 66 to 31 or 32 in the exit polls, represents an enormous sweeping victory with this particular demographic. And as far as I can tell, looking back at the history of exit polls back to 1972, this is the biggest age disparity; that is, the biggest difference between young voters and other voters of any election in that period. That, if you think about patterns being set and then perhaps repeating themselves in the future, should be truly frightening to the Republican Party because that suggests that this group of young voters is very different and they're very Democratic in their orientations.

Now, was this about Obama? No doubt about it. Young voters liked Obama. They liked him a lot. That was apparent in the primaries, where he beat Hillary Clinton by an average of about 60 to 65 percent of the vote every time. But this really is not about Obama. Young voters were John Kerry's best age group. They were the Democratic Party candidates' best age group in the 2006 elections and they were the best age group for other Democratic candidates in 2008 and not just Obama.

If it's not about Obama, then what's it about? Part of it is demographics. As has been mentioned already by a couple of speakers, young voters are very diverse demographically.

According to the exit polls, only 62 percent of young voters identified as white. Just eight years earlier, that number was 74 percent, so 74 percent down to 62 percent over the course of just two elections and if the projections that we saw hold up, then that number is going to steadily dwindle, that is, percentage wide among young voters.

Young voters were less religious than other voters. They are more likely to identify as secular or simply not having a religious affiliation. The actual number depends a lot on the kind of question that you ask. In the exit polls, 16 percent identified as secular or nonreligious as opposed to 12 percent for other age groups. The Pew Research Center's question which actually offers an explicit option to people to be either atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular actually is getting about 25 percent among young people these days. But however you look at it, young people are more secular than older people and they are more secular than young people were 15 or 20 years ago or especially 40 years ago. That is, there is a generational shift occurring. Young people are coming in to adulthood less likely to take a religious affiliation than was the case in the past.

Now, both of these things contribute to some ideological differences and also to some partisan differences but I think a third factor, obviously, is what have young people absorbed

during their years of coming of age to politics? What have they been confronted with in terms of the images of the political parties? They have come of age either in the latter years of the Clinton administration when Bill Clinton was popular and the economy was booming or they have come of age during the Bush presidency, about half of which went pretty well for the Republicans and for Bush but about half of which went very, very bad for the Republicans and for Bush. And so their image of the Republican Party is a very, very negative one and while the image of the Democratic Party may or may not be all that good, the Democrats are the alternative.

What I want to do with the remainder of my time though is look off to the future and to do that, I wanted to take advantage of a survey that we at the Pew Research Center just completed a couple of months ago and reported on last month. It's our Periodic Survey of American Political Values. This is a study that was begun in 1987 that has been repeated at irregular intervals but now, about 12 or 14 times over that period. It includes a withering barrage of 80-something questions of agree/disagree format, about every conceivable idea in politics that you can imagine, and from all of that, tries to distill down about a dozen different dimensions of political values. And we have found these questions to give us remarkably stable numbers over time.

Just to give you an example, in the midst of all of this turmoil in the American marketplace and in the business sector, attitudes about business changed very little from the last time we did this survey a little over two years ago. These questions are very good at tapping fundamental orientations that people have about politics and not just attitudes about the moment.

So what we've done here to try to look at the generational story is to break our respondents into four groups. And so on the first one I'll show you here is an item -- it's a selection of three items asking about the role of government. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good. When something's run by the government, it's usually inefficient and wasteful. The federal government controls too much of our daily lives. We've distilled this into an index and I've plotted it across time here.

You can't see the bottom but it's 1987 all the way to 2009 and then we've divided people into four different age cohorts or generations with the Millennials in the orange up there at the top. Generation X is the next group down. The Boomers are here and the Silent Generation and earlier is on the bottom in gold and the scale over here is higher numbers are pro-government and lower numbers are more anti-government.

So you can see immediately that over time, generations have tended to hold on to whatever orientation towards government they had when we were first measuring them and the Millennials are the most liberal in terms of orientations towards the scope and the role of government. They became more negative from when we first were polling them in 2002 to 2007, but then they have snapped back somewhat. But they are more liberal than Gen-Xers, more liberal than Boomers or the Silent Generation.

Another one where you see a big difference is on social conservatism. This is a collection of about five questions that ask about different aspects of homosexuality, women's rights, banning of books from schools, clear guidelines to good and evil and so forth. Here, the liberal view is at the bottom and the conservative views are at the top. The Silent Generation, somewhat less conservative, I guess you'd say, very slight downward slope but pretty flat, same with the Baby Boomers and with Gen-Xers and again, the Millennials come in, the least socially conservative and if anything, are becoming less so over time.

So here, we've seen in two very signature aspects of how people are organized into the political party system, opinions about the scope of government and opinions on social issues. The Millennials are liberal on both of them and very

distinctive from the rest of society and don't show a lot of signs of changing.

Here's religiosity, three measures that capture that, again, the Millennials the least religious, the Silent Generation the most religious.

On questions having to do with equal opportunity, either explicitly race-based or not, again, young people are the most liberal. Gen-X started out much more liberal and has become more conservative over time. That might be something that will happen with Millennials but right now, they're significantly more liberal on this dimension than the rest of the population.

Now, we get into some places where the distinctiveness of the Millennials is not so apparent and in fact, these are areas where you might argue that they are contested terrain for the parties. On national security, they are, at this point, the Millennials down here, again, the orange line, are less assertive in their approach to national security issues, with the Silent Generation being the most. You have your peak here of assertiveness in the aftermath of 9/11. But for much of this period, the Millennials have not been distinctive on national security.

On the social safety net, liberal views at the top, conservative views at the bottom. Everyone has turned a little more conservative in the past two years, according to our

survey. The Millennials did stand out in 2007 as more supportive of a government safety net for the poor but now, they're really indistinguishable from other people.

On environmentalism, a surprise, no real distinctiveness in terms of views on protecting the environment. A couple of these questions bring the economy in and I think that cross-pressuring in the way the questions are phrased has effects on the Millennials as well as other groups.

In terms of business, we have documented for a long time that young people are not pro-government and anti-business. They're pro-government and pretty pro-business and they do not stand out at all on our index of attitudes about business.

Then, the final scale is on political engagements. A very long pattern in American politics that young people are less engaged, less interested. This is something that does tend to change. If you look at the Generation X, you can see the line going up as they have gotten older, the '90s when we first started to measure them and up until now, and the Millennials are also engaged more now than they were but there is still a pretty significant gap and while they accounted for a lot of the increase in voter turnout from 2000 to 2004 and again, some of what happened in 2008, they still fall below and it's an open question as to whether they're ever going to be

participating at the levels that Silent Generation, the greatest generation or the Baby Boomers are participating at.

And then my last slide is party affiliation. This is just straight party, Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other, No Preference. Big jiggly lines here. This goes from age 18 to the oldest respondents in the survey so you see this big yawning gap of Democratic identification among the youngest people but then, by the mid-20's, Democratic identification is not so hot and it's higher than Republicans but it's not way up there. You got a lot of independents. It's a little easier to see it this way. If you take the "leaners," the people who were not Democrats or Republicans in the initial question and say, "Which way do you lean?" then you see the size of this gap that the Republicans are having to face in terms of initial partisan preferences for this young generation.

This is what I think would be keeping Republican strategists up at night and probably giving Democrats some very misleading false hope; misleading in the sense that the fact that Democrats are not particularly liked or loved by Millennials but that they are the default and they are the ideological default right now is helping them and helping their candidates but I don't think I would want to argue that this is the way it's going to look 20 years from now if the parties don't perform and make efforts to try to attract these voters.

This might be the way it will look if the Republicans do nothing and the Democrats do a good job, but I don't think this is set in stone. Thank you.

Ruy Teixeira: Well, shockingly, we're actually on time. It's unbelievable. And we're going to have Ron kind of bring in the ship here. Take it away, Ron.

Ron Brownstein: Well, following five such estimable analysts, I certainly feel that I am in the position of the speaker who says that everything has been said, just not everyone has said it. I guess I will start by ending the hegemony of the points so I'm going to be operating on my own.

One of the kinds of the first threshold questions here is what have we been looking at in terms of this Obama victory in 2008? And by historic standards, you would have to say it was a very solid win for the Democrats. Obama became the first Democrat since Lyndon Johnson in '64 and only the second since World War II to exceed 50.1 percent of the vote, as Robert Lang indicated.

Also, he got the 365 Electoral College votes, won nine states that voted for Bush last time, seven that voted for Bush both times, and four that have not voted Democratic more than once since 1964.

And along the way, he became the first presidential winner since Ronald Reagan in 1980 to sweep in a substantial number of

his own party into both the House and the Senate, to the point where, and I think this is not appreciated enough, that the Democratic majorities today in both the Senate and the House are substantially larger than the Republican majorities at any point during their 12 years of control. And in the House, they're over 20 seats larger than the high point for the Republicans.

And so kind of the first question, I think, that many people are kind of wrestling with is to what extent was this simply a short-term reaction to the country's rejection of President Bush, who faced the longest period of majority disapproval in his second term of any president since Truman, and to what extent was it a function of longer term factors that are going to outlive the voter verdict on the Bush presidency?

Well, there's no question that -- I think it's hard to deny that the rejection of Bush was a factor here, an important factor here. If you look back on American history, there are almost no examples of an outgoing president facing the level of discontent that Bush did and his party winning the election to succeed him, even when they leave. Johnson in '68, Truman in '52, Woodrow Wilson in 1920, I got to say Grover Cleveland in 1896, James Buchanan in 1860, John Tyler, 1844, almost always, if the outgoing president is as unpopular as Bush was, the

voter instinct is they want change and their reflex is to believe the out party is more likely to give them the change than the party of the president. And in fact, if you look at the exit polls from 2008, you can say that is at the core of what happened. An incredible 71 percent of the people who voted said they disapproved of Bush's performance on Election Day and 2/3 of them voted for Obama. That was a hill that was too big for, I think, McCain to overcome and certainly, I think it would have too big for any Republican nominee to overcome.

But in other ways, I think it would be a mistake for Republicans to look at this solely as a repudiation of Bush. You can look at this election from a variety of angles and in many of them, what Obama did, in most of them, what Obama did was the continuation and not even necessarily the culmination of longer term trends, many of which have been addressed in one way or the other by the previous speakers. But let me try to kind of give you my take on how they come together.

Obama won this election, I believe, by assembling what you could call a coalition of the ascendant. And by that, I mean that he did best among groups that are themselves growing in society and the implications of that are obvious, which is that unless Republicans can reverse some of those trends, these groups will provide a widening advantage for Democrats over time because their share of the vote is going to grow.

So what is this coalition of the ascendant? Well, the first piece of it is non-white voters. As we've noted, I think along the way, this was the first election in American history where whites cast less than 3/4 of the vote, if you look at the exit poll, at least. Non-white voters were 26 percent of the vote and Obama not only won 95 percent of African-Americans but he also won, as we've said, 2/3 of Hispanics, nearly 2/3 of Asians, and nearly 2/3 of everybody else.

This advantage, Ruy's number, 80 percent cumulatively of the non-white vote, this advantage will become more valuable to Democrats over time unless Republicans can chip away at it because that non-white share of the vote has been increasing by about three percentage points as a total share per election going back to the early 1990's, and many of the trends that Obama, many of the groups that Obama performed well with in 2008 had already begun moving toward the Democrats in 2006. We saw the Hispanic vote. We mentioned Bush getting around 40 percent in 2004 after the Republicans, in the House particularly, sank immigration reform in his second term. The Democratic share of their vote moved up to 60 percent in the 2006 election. Obama takes it to 67 percent in 2008.

Same thing with young voters, the Millennial Generation, and we've talked about them a lot but let's just quickly. In 2004, John Kerry wins 54 percent of voters under 30. In 2006,

the Democratic vote among voters under 30 goes to 60 percent. In 2008, Obama reaches 2/3 among them. And it's worth noting that even when George Bush was having trouble with voters under 30, particularly in 2004, he still won white voters under 30. He won 55 percent of white voters under 30 in each of his two elections. Obama won 54 percent of white voters under 30. And as Ruy has calculated, but thankfully for me he did not mention, the number of Millennials, and this will not be a surprise to any of you shepherding teenagers to driver's ed, the number of Millennials who turn 18 and will become eligible to vote is expected to increase by four million a year between now and 2018, so that means in 2012, there will be 16 million more of them eligible to vote than were eligible in 2008 and Barack Obama's approval rating among voters under 30 is consistently running in Gallup at 70 percent and above. Again, if he can maintain the level of advantage with those groups, with that group that he had in 2008 or even expand it, it would be worth even more to him than it was then because there will be more of them in the electorate.

The third piece of the coalition of the ascendant is these college educated white voters and in many ways, this is the most important transformation of our politics over the last 40 and 50 years. We are living through what could be call a class inversion in the basis of each party's support. If you go back

to the middle of the 20th century, you could draw a line somewhere in the income ladder and most people above it reliably voted Republican and most people below it reliably voted Democratic and one way to measure that is in the University of Michigan's NES data. If you go back through the '50, '60s, and '70s, every Democratic presidential nominee, Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Jimmy Carter, every one of them ran significantly better among white voters without a college education than among white voters with a college education, people who work with their hands.

This political order began breaking down in the 1960's and it was Republicans who began breaking it down. First, they began to chisel away at the Democratic strength among the non-college working class white voters, initially, around racially tense issues, like civil rights and busing, later, social issues like gun rights, gay rights, abortion. National security was important. Blue collar voters tend to be more responsive to a Peace through Strength argument, taxes and all these ways. Republicans began to erode the Democratic advantage downscale until you get to '84, the phenomenon of the Reagan Democrat. Ronald Reagan wins 1/4 of self-identified Democrats in the country, many of them blue collar voters who grew up in a house over the picture of Franklin Roosevelt and

probably Walter Reuther on the mantel and found themselves voting Republican.

Well, with much less fanfare, and again, Ruy and John Judis have written about some of this in their book a few years ago, with much less fanfare, the reverse began happening in the '70s and '80s, which is that Democrats began to run better among upper middleclass, white collar, college educated white voters who tended to take the liberal positions on all of the same issues that were moving the blue collar folks toward the Republicans. So these were voters who tended to be pro-choice on abortion, pro-gun control, who tended to see diplomacy and alliance rather than unilateral force as the best way of protecting the country, and the Democrats began to kind of creep along with these voters.

When Bill Clinton came in, Clinton closed the door on some of the economic concerns that had held these voters back from moving toward the Democrats. He talked about a balanced budget. He talked about personal responsibility, with the result that the most important thing that happened in American politics under Bill Clinton was the movement of a procession of affluent white collar suburbs outside of the South from the Republican to the Democratic Party. And so I'm thinking about places like Montgomery, Delaware, and Bucks outside Philadelphia, Bergen in New Jersey, Fairfield County in

Connecticut, the suburbs of Cleveland, Chicago, Oakland County, Michigan, Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties in California. All of these places shifted under Clinton from Republican voting in '68 to '88 and have remained there since, with the result that, as I mentioned a moment ago, Democratic candidates, from Stevenson through Carter, all of them ran better among white voters without a college education than with white voters with a college education. Those lines converged under Clinton, who ran about the same among both groups, and now, have crossed in the other direction with a class inversion. Al Gore ran four points better among whites with a college education than those without, John Kerry ran six points better among those with than without, and Barack Obama ran seven points better among those with than without.

And geographically, you can see this manifest in the expanded margin for Democrats and for Obama in the places that switched in the '90s, like Montgomery County, Pennsylvania or Bergen County, New Jersey, but also, the spread of this phenomenon into the Outer South and the Mountain West so Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties, the suburbs of Denver vote Democratic in 2008 for the first time since 1964. They begin to behave, as thus Mecklenburg and Wake in North Carolina, the way we saw the suburbs of Philadelphia and Bergen County behave in the '90s.

Recently, with my colleague, David Wasserman, who I think is in the back there, we tried to look at this phenomenon more systematically. We examined the 100 large counties in America with the highest proportion of college graduates. Obama won 78 of those 100 counties and a cumulative 62 percent of their vote. In 1984, Reagan won 82 of those same counties and a cumulative 56 percent of their vote so you can see enormous movement.

Well, this demographic coalition that the Democrats have assembled has clear geographic implications. The Democrats have now won 18 states in each of the past five presidential elections. That is the most states they have won that often since Roosevelt and Truman from '32 to '48. These 18 states have 248 Electoral College votes, which is 90 percent of the total of what you need to win. I have called these states "The Blue Wall." They are not a random assemblage of states. They tend to be states with lots of the sort of people who turn up in the coalition of the ascendant. Thirteen of the 18 rank in the top 20, for example, in the highest proportion of college graduates. Twelve rank among the top 20 in the percentage of foreign-born residents and almost all of them, according to another study by Pew, the Religious Landscape Survey, are below the national average in the percentage of evangelical Christians and regular churchgoers.

It is difficult to overstate the extent of the Democratic advantage today in these 18 states. The 18 states have 36 Senate seats. Democrats have 34 of them. The Democrats hold 70 percent of their House seats, 2/3 of their governorships, every state house chamber, and all but two of the state senates. And at the presidential level, John McCain did not finish within ten points of Barack Obama in any of those 18 states. By October 2nd, he had written off all of them except Pennsylvania, which he ultimately lost by 600,000 votes. And the fact that he was in Pennsylvania in late October was an indication that in many ways, Republicans are now in the situation that Democrats were in, in the '70s and '80s, when we talk about the Republican Electoral College lock. There were so few plausible ways for McCain to get to 270 because so many of these states were out of reach that he was forced, as Democrats were with Ohio in the '70s and '80s, to contest a place where he had very little chance of winning.

One other quick way of measuring this is to look at the Republican reliance on, and definition of, by the South today. If you define the South as the 11 states of the Old Confederacy plus Kentucky and Oklahoma, Republicans are still in a very strong position inside the South. They hold 56 percent of the House seats and 73 percent of the Senate seats. But if you look at the non-Southern states, the other 37 states,

Republicans today hold just 33 percent of all the House seats and just 28 percent of all the Senate seats in those non-Southern states. That is the smallest percentage of seats Republicans have ever controlled outside of the South, except at the high point of Franklin Roosevelt's popularity in 1934 and 1936.

At the presidential level, the story is even more striking. I'm running out of time but I want to try to get through this. The Republican nominee has beaten the Democratic nominee in the popular vote in the South in every election since 1972, except for '76 when Jimmy Carter ran as a native son in the first time. From '72 through '88, the Republican nominee also won the popular vote in the non-Southern states in each of those elections as well. Since 1992, the Democratic nominee has outpolled the Republican nominee in the non-Southern states each time, even in the two elections that Bush won.

In 2008, Obama beat McCain outside of the South by 56 to 42. That margin of victory is virtually identical to Ronald Reagan's margin of victory over Walter Mondale in 1984 in the non-Southern states and the magnitude of that, I think, is somewhat clouded or eclipsed by the fact that McCain continued to win in the South. It is the third largest margin of victory for a Democrat over a Republican outside of the South in the

history of the Republican Party, exceeded only by Roosevelt in '36 and Johnson in '64. In fact, over these past five elections, the Republican presidential nominees have averaged 41.9 percent of the cumulative popular vote outside of the South. That is the party's worst performance outside of the South in any five-election sequence since its founding.

Likewise, over these past five elections, the Republican presidential nominees have won 21 percent of the Electoral College votes, on average, outside of the South. Even Bush in his two victories never got past 30 percent outside of the South. That is also the worst performance outside of the South in any five-election sequence since the party's formation in 1856 or first presidential race.

Now, to me, very quickly, all of this suggests that we are looking at changes that go beyond any one election. In fact, you may be able to go back, historians may go back and look at 1992 as the beginning of a distinct era in presidential politics in the same way that we look at the 1968 as the beginning of an era that lasted from '68 to '88. Nothing in -- there are no final victories in American politics. Democrats have the risk of overreaching because in many ways, the partisan changes in the electorate are larger than the ideological changes that we're seeing, but there is no question that right now, the Democrats, I believe, have the upper hand

because they are capable of appealing to a broader range of voters and regions and the Republican Party is becoming dangerously monochromatic, overly dependent on conservatives, overly dependent on non-college white voters, who are shrinking as a share of the electorate, and above all, overly dependent on the South, which now provides the highest share, almost half of the Republicans in the House, almost half of the Republicans in the Senate, and about 60 percent or more of their Electoral College votes going back through 1992. So with that, I will stop. Thank you.

Karlynn Bowman: I'd like to thank all of you for terrific presentations. We're now going to take a five-minute break to regroup, bring our next panelists up, and we'll go from there. Thank you.

[Break 1:41:15-1:50:22]

Ruy Teixeira: I think we're just going to get started. We have two commentators on the presentations who are, in and of themselves, fabulous analysts and we're going to start with Mark Schmitt, one of the very good reasons that he is here. Mark Schmitt has been many things to many people over the years. He is a fabulous writer and analyst, I love his stuff, and now, he is editor of *The American Prospect*, probably I think the leading center left magazine. Some people would say it's the new *Republic* but you wouldn't say that, right? I

mean, *American Prospect* is more solidly on the left. But we don't want to start any fights. We don't want to start any fights. Anyway, it's a great magazine.

Mark Schmitt: They should read them both.

Ruy Teixeira: They should read them both. Get subscriptions today but start with *The American Prospect* and we're also going to start with Mark, editor of *The American Prospect*. So Mark, hit it.

Mark Schmitt: Thank you, Ruy. I'm really glad to be here. I learned a ton at the session a year plus ago and a lot today, not being really a demographer but fascinated by these data, and I guess what I want to talk about is the ways in which demographics is not necessarily destiny and I think the way I would put it is that it's sort of like the stock market where you could look at the stock market in terms of the inherent value of given companies on the stock market or you can understand it, but all that really matters is what people think they were is basically the intersection between perception and reality is kind of where politics happens, so the perception of the demographics is as important as the actual demographics. And I guess I want to say a few things about the ways in which I think our understanding and thinking about these demographic trends has shaped politics and we'll go forward.

Some of the biggest changes in American politics happened not just because of demographics but because of somebody not getting a demographic change or potentially getting a demographic change, with sort of the paradigmatic example of that being the demise of liberalism in the late '60s, 1970's being intricately related to a failure to understand the white working class, white ethnic politics, and the fact that the New Deal coalition was a lot less resilient than a lot of Democrats assumed so the choices that were made caused certain aspects of the demographics.

I think a far greater misunderstanding, a far greater "not getting it" has been the choices that the Republican Party made over the last couple of decades, which led to things like the loss of the classic, what both Ron Brownstein and Ruy talked about, the heart of the Republican Party in places like the suburbs of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the suburbs of Columbus, Ohio. This is the core Republican Party, the kind of, "It's my party too," segment of the Republican electorate after Gov. Whitman's kind of plaintive book of a few years ago and that heart of the Republican Party being sort of, again, the Republican strategists either didn't get or couldn't do anything about the fact that that was not a group they could take away, even though these are folks who had been Republican since the founding of the party.

But I think the larger not getting it is really brought out by the death of Former Representative Jack Kemp a couple of weeks ago and really a reminder that there was a possibility there in the strategies that Kemp laid out of a much more complex and multiracial Republican coalition that, had that path been taken, would certainly have been potentially more resilient.

There is obviously a lot of cultural conservatism in the African-American community, not necessarily that you're ever going to get to a majority of African-Americans voting Republican. But if you tap into some of that so that you're getting 20 percent of the black vote, particularly in the South, a larger reliable share of the Hispanic vote, you got a much more -- and those choices, it's not a choice you can make by Michael Steele going, being the hip-hop chair of the Republican Party in 2009. It's a choice that would have to be made a long time ago. You'd have a much more resilient Republican coalition.

So the question why that path wasn't taken is a fascinating one to me. Was it did people not get it? Was it perceived that you would kind of lose more of the white vote if you did so? I think that's one of the most interesting questions for historians to answer.

And then I think a paradigmatic example of actually getting it and really understanding the demographics and where they were going was in the Obama campaign. Everything that was laid out a year ago, everything that was laid out today, that campaign understood in a way that Hillary Clinton's campaign did not understand, John Edwards' campaign did not understand. There was a uniquely perceptive understanding of how you put together that coalition of the ascendant that rested in the Obama campaign to a greater degree than most. They were ahead of where even pretty savvy Democratic strategists were so that you had, I think, last year, kind of the biggest gap between getting it and not getting it that you've had and I think that gap, as well as the underlying demographics themselves, had an enormous amount to do with the difference.

I want to talk for a second about one of the most interesting things I've read in the last -- well, I read it yesterday but most interesting things I've read in the last week, which was a piece by Ron Brownstein in the journal *Democracy*, and he did a wonderful thing and I'm glad he didn't talk from that paper so that I can riff on it a little bit. He did a great thing, which was to look at some of the books that came out in 2005, 2006 that were essentially liberals looking at Karl Rove and the Republican strategy and the degree of awe and intimidation that that brought out, books like *One Party*

Country by Tom Hamburger and Peter Wallsten of the *L.A. Times*, a couple of other -- Tom Edsall's book that came out at the same time, and it drew out the degree to which only four years ago, people had, in a sense, almost dissimilar perception of Republican demographic clout that at that time.

Male voice: [Indiscernible]

Mark Schmitt: Not Ruy. We have here, and obviously it looks very, very -- it's certainly, in retrospect, and even at that time, it looks very different. One was a picture that was in the -- this is a picture that was in the ascendant. That was a picture on decline. But it's interesting to see how people perceive -- people within the Republican coalition obviously perceive that to be a very powerful strategy partly because they felt they were tactics that would allow them to kind of get the most out of it and liberals certainly saw it as a very overwhelming topic and generally, they thought that the only way to deal with that, most liberals thought the way to deal with that was A) you've got to bring the same tactics and tools to the game of aggressively polarizing politics, and B) you've got to get back to that white working class with a strongly populist message. And as Ron points out in that piece, that populist message never really clicked, never really worked that well.

And in the end, it was pretty apparent that a lot of that was sort of a bluff -- the Karl Rove, "We're going to rule for 30 years," is another interesting historical question. Was that just wrong or was it actually kind of a bluff from a position of a party where they understood that the window was closing very rapidly and so you kind of had to bluff as aggressively as possible and get as, milk as much out of that moment that you had in power as possible and I think that's probably the answer to that. But again, that had demographic consequences that didn't do anything to help you get out of that Democratic -- to help the Republicans get out of that Democratic demographic hole.

What Ron points out in the piece is that what you know understand, what Ruy had been talking about for a couple of years, and what's evident from this data is you can put together a pretty resilient coalition without the white working class and that's going to be increasingly the case in the future and of course, the Millennials, where -- I mean, I think one of the most important slides today was Ruy's pointing out that among the 25 to 29-year-old white working class, it's a much more Democratic group and I think the Millennial, having looked at some of the data on Millennials, it's interesting how hard it is to find the weaknesses in that, like traditionally, you'll see a younger group that looks pretty liberal if you're

looking at college and not so liberal when you're looking at non-college. I think the gap, Scott maybe can say more about that, I think the gap between non-college and college twentysomethings is a lot smaller than it used to be.

You've got this coalition that Obama put together that doesn't require you to either deal with the cultural values of the white working class or the part of the white working class that's not voting for you because you don't need them, which is a significant freedom, actually, and that allows you to kind of end the culture wars. There are certain things you're going to put off. You're not going to put gun control on the table. For the most part, you don't need to worry about, you don't need to kind of tie yourself in knots over the cultural gap with the white working class.

The challenge is what if you also don't worry about the economic needs of the white working class? Are we going to wind up with a white collar, highly educated, plus minorities, plus young voters party? That's a party that doesn't actually have to care about the manufacturing future of the United States, for example. So as a liberal who does want to care about those things, it's a little worrisome, in fact. Again, this is where perception feeds into politics. If the perception among Democrats is we don't really need to worry about the white working class because we've got a coalition

that doesn't need them, how does that play out in policy and then what happens with that?

I mean, I find all this data compelling. I find all the projections compelling. It is noteworthy that it's a real shift from the general consensus just four years ago so I'm not -- I saw arrive in our office the other day James Carville's *How Democrats are Going to Rule the Next 40 Years*. It might be a great way to sell books. It's not a great way to think about politics at all. And to me, what's really interesting is that unlike -- for Democrats during the years out of power, there were a lot of ways that were both correct facts, like Ruy's emerging Democratic majority, and kind of illusions, like, well, we control the House of Representatives for a while. I mean, there were a lot of ways in which the Democrats were never really forced to confront the situation.

The interesting thing for the Republican Party is once it all kind of sinks in, there's no escaping the situation so there are no illusions here and the party will have to adjust to that and it will adjust to that. And I think the things that will change, obviously, we're heading into a period where big things will be happening in government, health care, potentially cap and trade, a lot of things that create a lot of opportunity for flux, a lot of opportunity for factions that

are part of this coalition of the ascendant to peel off in certain ways so I think kind of anything could happen.

I think where it will happen, obviously, as I think it was Ruy who said at the end of his presentation, it has to happen kind of in the Republican Party putting forward kind of practical governance. I mean, I think the next Republican coalition will be built by governors, in many ways, which was the case also in the mid-1990's, the big state governors who were perceived as successful, Tommy Thompson in Wisconsin, Whitman in New Jersey had a lot more to do with the perception and success of the Republican Party than did the Congressional majority and those governors were the kind -- that's kind of what made people comfortable with George W. Bush. They kind of felt like he is kind of one us, a consensus-building successful governor, not really a polarizer.

And I would imagine that over the next couple of elections, you will begin to see some folks, Crist is a potential good example, Pawlenty, as well as folks who haven't been elected yet, begin to preside over states on the economic upturn and be perceived as successful and show that kind of governing ability that begins to rebuild a kind of Republican Party around a different kind of coalition. If every time somebody does that, they are like Mitch Daniels and they're sort of shot down because that is likely to involve, in certain

cases, raising taxes, if they're destroyed at the first turn, that's not going to happen. But if that's allowed to play out in a reasonable way, that's the comeback of the Republican Party and potentially, the opening for some different coalitions around a different party.

What won't happen is it won't be a matter of "the big score" and I think the temptation to go for "the big kill," there are very few opportunities right now for the Republican Party to really get into a debate. Most of the culture war issues are softened. The economic issues are -- these are kind of practical pragmatic issues. Obama puts something on the table. He says to the Republicans, "Give me your ideas," and he gets a budget that's really a cartoon slideshow rather than an -- it's really hard to engage in that debate.

Judicial nomination is a very tempting target. It's that rare moment where you have no obligation to put some other idea on the table. You just oppose, oppose, oppose. So the temptation to do something like go for the big kill on a judicial nomination is very high but that's not the way, that's not the kind of thing that's going to shift these demographic trends. It's a long -- or these political/demographic trends, it's a longer transformation. Thank you.

Ruy Teixeira: Okay, now, we're going to turn to another of my favorite analysts, Michael Barone. I guess the

proverbial chap needs no introduction but I'll just mention he is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the founder of the *Almanac of American Politics*, and I'd say he has forgotten more about American politics than I'll ever know except I'm not so sure he's forgotten anything. So Michael, take it away.

Michael Barone: Around my age, I'm starting to forget a few things but in response to any queries that may come up about this in the latest edition of the *Almanac of American Politics*, I finished my part at Wednesday at 6:17 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time and with the first write-up that we've ever had of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, and if you'd like me to go on for the trends there, then it's a whole lot different than you think, Ruy. Well, Guam is central. They were both north and south of Guam.

Any case, gee, I'm coming after seven excellent presentations and I've learned a lot too. I did not know about the influence of James McGavran and Bill Bishop's suggestion that the template for a successful organization in the United States is India strikes me as a very interesting one. I mean, we live in our different little cultural islands here in the United States. India is a country where they have a caste system and where they have religious literal warfare every so often with a bunch of Muslims or a bunch of Hindus being

massacred by each other and where I'm told that if a Brahman family is maneuvered somehow into serving a meal to a caste, somebody from another caste, they will naturally destroy all the dishes because that's not their -- so it's even a little more separatist than naming your dog Che here and it brings to mind Robert Putnam's conclusion, which he suppressed for several years, which was that when you have this ethnic variety, heterogeneity in neighborhoods, you have less social connectedness than anywhere else, which suggests to me that many of America's strengths are also, to some extent, our weaknesses or the obverse side of them is.

But let me just introduce here a couple or three numbers, which I want to introduce in view of taking a little bit of a cautionary approach about the first six presentations and I'm fascinated to see that Mark Schmitt, I think, also, from his different vantage point, exerted a cautionary note and reminded us that we were talking about an emerging Republican majority four years ago or some of us were, at least as a possibility, and that doesn't seem very likely right now. And the three numbers are 105, 122, and 131. And those are the turnout numbers. Add a million to each one of them, round it off. We've increased in turnout from 105 million in 2000 to 122 million in 2004 to 131 million in 2008. That's tremendous. That means that there was a difference of 26 million

individuals voting in 2008 that did not vote in 2000. That's a whole lot of people. And if you go back through the presidential elections and look at turnout, the last three elections, the last time that you could get a set of three consecutive elections in which you added up the percentage increase of turnout from the last time and get a higher number is the elections of 1928, '32, and '36.

A lot of things were happening there that aren't happening now. Women were still gradually entering the electorate during those years. We don't have any group that's been excluded in some theoretical or practical way that's [audio glitch] the electorate now. You had the crisis of the Great Depression. We have 9.4 percent unemployment. They had 25 percent or so. They weren't able to measure it very well in those days. So this is an unusual decade and an unusual time. Why have we had this big increase in turnout?

Well, it has been driven in part by the political tactics of the two parties, by the perception going into the '04 election of both Karl Rove on the Republican side and the strategist for John Kerry and the other candidates that the key was not to appeal to a dwindling number of people in the center but to get more people on your side out. That campaign was very much fought on that basis. And it was based in '08, we also had an effect on the part of particularly the Barack Obama

campaign, as Mark Schmitt said, very shrewdly enlarging the electorate. I mean, and a barb in that winning question is which state had the highest increase in turnout between 2004 and 2008, the answer is North Carolina, 20 percent. It wasn't the fastest growing state, although it did have rapid growth, but it did have the biggest increase in turnout and Obama carried it by one percent. Those are not unrelated data that was clearly a targeting by that.

And I think what has driven this though, I think even beyond the organizational efforts of the two parties and their advocates, which have been substantial, has been changes in the balance of enthusiasm, at least, that's the best phrase I've been able to come up for. Not only do we have people moved and prompted to vote by the organizational efforts of the parties but I think we can perceive also that we've had new people enter the electorate just because of their own strong feelings that one or the other side should either be elected or be defeated, in some case.

This balance of enthusiasm favored the Republicans on balance in the '02 and '04 elections, both of which we saw big turnout increases from the previous side. But there was also substantial balance of enthusiasm on the Democratic side. Most of us in the press covered the balance of enthusiasm on the Democratic side very well and we picked up a lot of that. Most

people in the press did not figure out the increase of enthusiasm on the Republican side in the '02 or '04 cycles and were surprised by the results because it turned out to be a little greater.

In '06 and '08, the balance of enthusiasm worked on balance in a stronger way I think for Democrats. In other words, the Republican enthusiasm levels dwindled down towards zero and the Democratic enthusiasm levels at various ways and in particular, with the Obama campaign, and with them shrewdly exploiting it, increased very substantially and we saw at the results that we've seen on election night. Interestingly the difference, the rise was 17 million people between '00 and '04, nine million people between '04 and '08. If you look at the returns in some of the states, I think both parties are running out of people in states pretty previously targeted to bring out a vote. I mean, Ohio had an increase between '04-'08 of one percent. Both the Republicans and the Democrats have already located every live and available dead body they can get to vote in that state and there's not much more to be had. There's no population increase so that has been there.

What this tells me is that all these data may prove to be a little more volatile in operation than they seem when set down on the table and in hard bold face PowerPoint numbers because the balance of enthusiasm can go up and it can go down.

We've had recent examples of turnout going down. Between '92 and '96, the presidential turnout went down from 104 million to 96 million. Eight million fewer people bothered to vote. Between the '94 off-year elections and the '98 off-year elections, turnout went down from 71 percent to 66 percent. I think you could take those declines, at least partly, as a result of a diminishment of enthusiasm, a blowing out of the air of a balloon for two individuals, Ross Perot and Newt Gingrich in those four-year intervals. At least, that's sort of a cartoon replica of a larger argument about what that was about.

And so what I think what goes up can go down on both sides and I think the Republicans, and those of us who thought that there was some possibility of Republicans building on Bush's 51-48 victory and getting more enduring Republican majorities, that turned out to be very much not what happened, as the enthusiasm for the level for the Republicans, which was quite high in '02 and '04 fizzled down towards zero. So I think that what can change that balance of enthusiasm, well, I think Mark Schmitt suggested some of the answers there, which are new issues. We're talking about different things now. We're talking about a very different level of government finance and public policy programs.

People are starting to consider seriously things that were just sort of the Democratic Party's boilerplate proposals that nobody thought about very seriously. And we've seen some evidence of what results from that in Capitol Hill on the reception of the Card Check Bill, the labor unions' bill, to effectively abolish the secret ballot in labor elections and submit people to mandatory federal arbitration. Every Democrat in the Senate, '07-'08 cycle, just about every Democrat, certainly a majority in the House, lined up to vote for it. When they actually started thinking about what might happen if this became law, suddenly, you heard various individuals, including Arlen Specter, then the One Republic and then it was four and now, one of several Democrats was maybe against it, changed his mind. You heard the newly-appointed senator Michael Bennett didn't like it. Senator Nelson from Nebraska said it was -- he said basically the card check, that he was not for getting rid of the secret ballot and not for mandatory arbitration and there wasn't much else to the bill, which is kind of a damning statement. So we're all considering these proposals anew and in an atmosphere of a financial breakdown, which, obviously, nobody predicted.

So let me just conclude on that note, that I think that we've been given -- let me conclude on one other note, one other data point, and that is this, that last Saturday in the

Wall Street Journal, there was an article, and I'm trying to track down the actual official report, but the government of Mexico reports that 2,000 more people moved from the United States to Mexico than from Mexico to the United States in calendar year 2008.

It strikes me impressionistically that the government of Mexico may have well better statistics on this than we do because we're trying to track people who are moving here illegally against our laws and they're trying to track people who are doing things that are legal under their laws. So one of the things that I've been looking at a long-term book project is a book on migrations in the United States, immigration, the vast interim, the surges of migration, lasting about a generation, which, in large part, peopled our country.

One of the things that fascinates me about this is that for the most part, nobody predicted that these surges of migration would happen, just as very few people predicted the surge of Latin-American and Asian migration that starts in the '70s, accelerates in the '80s, and continues at a great pace in the '90s and almost nobody predicts when they end. I think there is at least the possibility that we're going to see a big diminution of Latin-American and Mexican migration. About 1/3 of the foreclosures in this country involve Hispanics. That's a big number. Fifty-seven percent of foreclosures, California,

Florida, Nevada, New Mexico. We may be seeing projections that show Hispanics as 30 percent of the electorate by 2030 are correct if current trend lines go on forever in the same direction but the data I brought up raised the possibility that that trend line might be changing sharply before our very eyes, so these are all things to keep an eye on as we try to digest the terrific material that we've heard today.

Ruy Teixeira: Well, thanks, Michael. A lot to ponder there and also from our earlier presentations, so we're going to throw the floor open for questions. You can ask the folks up here. You can ask our panelists who appeared at the beginning of this show. So I guess Jo?

Jo Freeman: My name's Jo Freeman. I'm a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and Ruy, I have a question for you. On the white working class, can you distinguish a difference in voting patterns between those who are unionized and those who are not unionized?

Ruy Teixeira: Well, typically, there is quite a difference in voting patterns. Unionized white working class voters typically give some sort of a majority to the Democrats. I don't know the exact figure in this election because the micro data have not been archived yet by the National Election Pool and I'm told that any second -- I had actually hoped they'd have some data from that for this presentation but in

their infinite wisdom, they have not yet archived it at Roper. But I will get to that and I predict it'll show pretty much what I said, that unionized white working class voters still tend to give a slight majority to the Democrats. It's not very strong though.

Michael Barone: A point of information, Ruy, what percentage of union members are college grads now? I mean, we've got teachers, for example. We have public employees being almost half of union members. A lot of them are college grads. Do we have a number on that or [cross-talking] --

Ruy Teixeira: I'm sure we do. I don't know the data point. I mean, my guess and over time, there has clearly been a mixed shift among unionized workers towards college educated just as there's been in a population as a whole. Whether that's been less or more than among the population as whole, I don't know, but I think that clearly changes the characteristics of the unionized voting pool as well. Well, that's just a subject for more research, I think, I'd have to say, so we'll get at that one down the road.

Kyle Southern [phonetic]: Good morning. Kyle Southern from Vanderbilt [phonetic] University and my question will be directed to Dr. Keeter but first, I wanted to say that as a 24-year-old Obama-voting, North Carolinian, college-educated male, I appreciate how much time you spent talking about me this

morning. Dr. Keeter, in your presentation, which I enjoyed, what this does not reflect, I think, is the sort of coming of age time of the Baby Boomer generation and so that's where 18 to 24-year olds spread and I'm wondering what effects, you or others might want to comment on that particular period of time obviously influenced the political attitudes, attitudes towards government, culture of that generation and I'd like to compare that with the experience that, say, a 24-year-old now has experienced, say, late '90s to the present day. What effect, the historical implications have had on attitudes toward government and culture and how you might see those impacting political attitudes for my generation as they have for the previous?

Scott Keeter: Thank you. Having grown up in North Carolina, I feel an affinity with you. And also, I think you're asking about my generation of the early part of the Baby Boom Generation. As you could see in some of the graphics that I put up there, the Baby Boom Generation is not distinctively liberal as it's often painted to be. It is a little more Democratic in its orientation. So this little bump right here is Democratic and Democratic-leaning identification among people in their sort of early 50's and so this is actually part of the group that you're talking about.

It actually may be a little bit younger than my part of the generation but it definitely shows up in terms of partisan affiliation. But in a lot of those other graphics that I showed you, you don't see a hugely distinctive liberal leaning to the Baby Boomers. Part of that is because the [audio glitch] is I think it's sort of too broad because it includes both the older Baby Boomers of my era and younger Baby Boomers who are a little more like Gen-Xers and a little bit more conservative.

But there are a lot of misconceptions about young voters even during my era. It's not well known that young voters in the 1960's, late 1960's were more supportive of the Vietnam War than were older voters. For example, Gallup Poll showed that very clearly. All age groups became more negative about the war during that period but even after several years of the war, young voters were still more supportive than older voters of the war. So it's very hard to give you a good generalization about that group. It's distinctive in some respects [audio glitch] across the board, not in terms of all kinds of issues. Everybody loves that.

William Frey: I just turned 50 this year so yes, I'm in that 50 thing. Now, people don't realize that the later part of the Baby Boomer, the really big numbers, and Bill, of course, knows this, that the peak year is 1957 and the big

numbers are '57 to '61 and it's really after Vietnam and it's kind of this late '70s disco-ey Carter decadence, I call it, and by the way, my generation is why you have to be 21 to drink again. When I turned 18, you could drink. Now, you can't drink at 18 anymore. I must have had something to do with that. That kind of late '70s period, just all hell broke loose and it's more liberal if you look at that than the earlier part, the Hillary Clinton-Bill Clinton part of the Baby Boom. And that doesn't surprise me in a sense. And then of course, you get the Reagan children after that in the '80s and all the rest of that that sort of constrained the exuberance of the late '70s, let's say.

Ruy Teixeira: Actually, we're going to move to our own Karlyn Bowman for the question.

Karlyn Bowman: I have a quick question for Frey. I'd like you to react to Michael's thoughts about possible change in Hispanic in migration. This is part of just a very interesting point and I'm wondering about your reaction to it.

William Frey: Well, I think it's an interesting speculation. It's a speculation that we're going to stop having as much Latin American immigration to the United States is I think what you were saying or at least, it's at least possible. I'd prefer to see what's happened in the last year as more of a short-term blip. I think that there are all kinds

of draws here in the U.S. that bring people here, economic draws and may not be from Mexico but from other parts of Latin America.

I think the real issue politically is if they do come, where are they going to land? What parts of the country are going to be affected by not just the new immigrants but now, the second and third generation who are already citizens and sort of bubbling up? Are they going to stick in these Southwestern states, some of the big cities in the Northeast, or are they going to start spewing out to other parts of the country? And I think that is a real issue for both parties if that occurs because clearly, this last election has shown they moved very much toward the Democratic column. But I'll leave the door open. You may be right. There may be some slowdown. We don't really know.

Michael Barone: We are seeing, where you see lots of Hispanics, whether it's Inland Empire, Las Vegas, Phoenix, even the peripheries, Carlisle, Gwinnett County, Georgia, parts of North Carolina, high rates of foreclosure, high rates of unemployment. We see that month to month.

Cynthia Stinger [Phonetic]: Hi, I'm Cynthia Stinger with URS Corporation. And I have a question regarding Mr. Barone's comments on card check. And if we look at the current pace of the Congress in moving forward with health care reform and the

complexities of that, do you see some similarities in the way we may see members voting on that as realities of changing the current system become known?

Michael Barone: I think I may have ventured too far out of psephology in my comments on card check so I'll just basically reference Mark's comments, which I think, in some ways, echoed mine, which is, that is, if I'm interpreting you right, as new issues come forward, we may see different responses in different opportunities for both political parties and the voting behavior.

Mark Schmitt: Right. Yes, I mean, that's the sort of general statement. I think on the analogy between card check and health care, I would say, from the liberal point of view, I think that -- I've seen so many liberals who have not actually heard, have no idea what the positive case for card check is. If you basically favor EFCA, it is one of the most profound malpractices of public communication that's ever occurred and I think that has a lot to do with even Democratic senators defecting. It's not that there is a mass backlash against it. It's they don't actually know really why they should be for it and I think that's very different from health care, where the positive case is very strong and very clear. There's going to be all kinds of attempts to undermine -- like, it's not going to be a giant battle but there's a very strong positive case

for universal health care which is shared by employers, a coalition that's much broader than the kind of special interest coalition that's pushing EFCA. And I say that favoring EFCA.

Ruy Teixeira: Yes, and health care is clearly an issue with has much more salience, people care much more about and moreover, in terms of some of these rising demographics we were talking about, it's typically an issue that has special appeal to these groups that are growing. And actually, the Millennial Generation is unusually supportive of health care reform. According to National Election Study data, they are the most pro-health care reform, universal health care generation than we've ever seen so that's kind of important and it'll be interesting to see how that shakes up. But let's go to another question here.

Tanya Snyder: Thank you. I'm Tanya Snyder with Pacifica Radio. The first panel made a pretty convincing case for an ascendant Democratic Party and I just wanted to ask about the policy implications of that projecting forward, whether you see kind of a strengthened Democratic -- whether that means really more liberal policies coming out of a strengthened Democratic Party with a bigger base or whether it's a Democratic Party really trying to hold on to the center and really afraid of losing that bigger base by doing anything really dramatic.

Ruy Teixeira: Well, fortunately, I think Ron Brownstein has exactly the answer to that question. Is that right, Ron?

Ron Brownstein: Well, I think that as I said, I think that if you kind of look at the parties today and their circumstances, the Democrats are in an ascendant position because they are speaking to -- it's almost a syllogism. They are speaking to a broader range of voters and they are competing across a broader range of terrain than Republicans. Democrats are having more success at winning in places that might be slightly right of center than Republicans are at winning in places that might be slightly left of center and Democrats are certainly dominating among voters who call themselves moderates and independents. I think the last two elections has disproved the Karl Rove theory that I think Michael was speaking positively of, that there are essentially no swing voters left in American politics.

On Election Day, this is a big advantage. I mean, Democrats are -- one way to measure this, I mentioned that if you look at the 18 states that voted against Bush both times and in fact, have now voted Democratic five straight times, Republicans have been able to win only two of those 36 Senate seats. If you look at the 29 states that voted for Bush both times, Democrats now hold 22 of those 58 Senate seats, which suggests, as you look at the House and at the voters

themselves, Democrats are, as I say, competing across a broader terrain.

The implication of that though is that in government, they have to manage a more diverse coalition. I mean, one of the reasons there is this enormous frustration on the left of the Democratic Party that Democrats are not falling in step behind Obama with the lockstep precision that Republicans did behind Bush through the first portions of his presidency, I think that misses two big facts. One is that Democrats, in fact, are unifying behind Obama more than they did behind Clinton. You can look at the stimulus vote compared to the budget vote in '93 to see that. But second, the reality is that Democrats are operating with members with a broader range of electoral incentives. I mean, they simply have a more diverse party, Boxer and Schumer, say, have very different incentives than some of the folks from these red-leaning states.

So I think if you look at the base of the Democratic coalition, the challenge is how do you move forward an agenda that satisfies the base but ultimately doesn't do what Bush did, which is basically shear off everybody who is not part of that? I mean, Bush governed in a way that, too often, left him governing as a president of half the country, and I don't think Obama wants to do that and that is going to mean that at points, he is going to have to say no to the most ardent voices

in his own party and I think already, he has shown a willingness to do that, for example, on cap and trade, moving away from auctioning off the credits, supporting Waxman as he wants to allocate the credits for 15 years.

On health care, I think they're going to be open to challenging the labor unions by taxing some of the value of employer-provided health care. He has already moved by indicating he would accept an individual mandate, which many in organized labor oppose. So I think that even if there is a Democratic advantage here, it will require them to speak to a broader range of voters and that will require them to balance a broader ideological perspective than Republicans were willing or able to do when they had the majority.

Ruy Teixeira: I think Mark has something to say here too.

Mark Schmitt: Yes. I just wanted to pick up on that and note Ron alluded to the Karl Rove theory that there are no swing voters, kind of one extreme, and the other extreme of that would be what I would call the Mark Penn theory that there are only swing voters. And where you are on that spectrum and how you shape strategy on that spectrum has a huge amount to do with policy outcomes so that in 1996, which was the lowest, the only election where turnout was below 50 percent, everything was built around the assumption that there's no payoff to

adding new votes. You're not going to do it. It's not worth it.

You get two for the price of one when you swing somebody so everything's focused on the narrowest swing and you would see polls that had two percent of Republican-leaning pro-choice women in Ohio and so the Democratic Party kind of went straight at these very narrow targets, a kind of micro targeting but also a kind of something that creates a lot of kind of inherent cautiousness. You're trying to pick off those Republican women based on choice alone so you're hitting the abortion button really, really hard. You're not raising fundamental economic issues, things like that. It has very specific consequences. The Rove extreme, and neither went totally to the extreme, leads you to something different where you're really trying to build your base.

I think what's interesting where we are now is because of Obama both expanding the base and focusing on bipartisan outreach -- and he put new swing voters on the table, in addition to the fact that he's expanding the party's base by bringing in new voters. That totally changes what a party can do. It can both be a little more ambitious about its own agenda but also be kind of chastened about the fact that there are voters at play so you're not pursuing a purely polarizing agenda.

And if the parties keep going with that attitude that there are swing voters and you can expand the base, that has very interesting, I think, positive policy consequences where you're going to have good actual movement on policy that doesn't move too far away from the median voter.

Karlynn Bowman: Why don't we take a few questions and then we'll have various people answer them?

Will Amatruda: Will Amatruda, Catholic University. Much has been said this morning about the Republican leanings of rural areas and yet, if you look at the two most rural states in the country, according to the Census Department, they are Wyoming and Vermont, one deep Red, one deep Blue. What's the explanation?

Lea Lebreska [Phonetic]: Hi, and I'm Lea Lebraska from Yale, and I suppose this question is mostly for Mr. Frey but when we're discussing the Hispanic shift, one thing I'm actually interested in is how you model what the demographic changes are going to look like in terms of opinion when you're working with a group that was much more first generation now than you'll expect it to be in the years that you're projecting? I'm wondering what efforts are made to correct for that and if there are any big policy differences as the generations assimilate.

Allan Rivlin: Hi, I'm Allan Rivlin with the Peter Hart Research and centeredpolitics.com. And as much as I've really appreciated this panel, I think I'm somewhat disappointed in the fact that I came to the American Enterprise Institute hoping to hear the counterargument to the Obama won big and I go back not -- there has been some skepticism expressed because of Karl Rove but in some sense, not enough and it's not grounded. I'm looking for the Ruy Teixeira of the center right because I fear the Democratic overreach and think that this whole presentation could have been done following Clinton's first victory and we'd be absolutely convinced that there was a strong shift in the Democratic direction then. So who has the substance behind or is that next conference to give us the counterargument why this is an overreach and there is an emerging center right coalition?

Barbara Whitman [Phonetic]: Barbara Whitman. There are two points. One, a key swing state is Virginia, which has no party registration. So when we look at wonderful charts of how people have registered, you're ruling out data from a place that you clearly want to measure. But the other thing is that the last time I heard anything so gloomy for Republicans and so rosy for Democrats was probably 1964. I think '64 was a lot worse than today for Republicans and I'd like the views of whichever panelist wants to chime in on that.

Karlyn Bowman: I think we have enough questions on the table for this round and then let's just take whoever would like to answer them among our panelists or Mark or Michael.

Michael Barone: Well, Allan Rivlin wants an optimistic scenario for Republicans. What's yours?

Allan Rivlin: I have one.

Michael Barone: Okay. Well, I think the answer is that the numbers are fairly daunting, 53-46. I would ask Ruy what he came up with after Michael Dukakis lost to George H.W. Bush by 53-46 and said this can all be turned around in a thrice and within a cycle and we can have an emerging Democratic majority. I think it took a lot of thinking by a variety of people in the Democratic Party and officeholders to move things in another direction.

And one of the situations the Republican Party faces right now is that, which was alluded to by a number of the speakers, is that they've got a culturally and religious conservative base, which is very important to the party, which has great force in the primaries, which tend, in the last caucus, cast 60 percent of the votes in the Iowa caucus, where self-identified religious conservatives, median age about 64, and the obvious deficit for the Republicans is a 66-32 margin among young voters who don't share those cultural attitudes at all.

So the step, the key to reconciling that was provided at Mark Schmitt's talk when he talked about, and others have basically said look, those issues are going to be less important. The issues that are emerging now are going to be more important. The Republicans need to figure out and to find candidates who can figure out some avenue beyond that.

To the question of Vermont and Wyoming are both rural and they're very different politically, with Vermont being the number two Obama state and Wyoming being the number 50 Obama state, I would recommend spending five minutes in either state and I think you've got the answers.

Karlyn Bowman: Bill, do you want to take a whack at the question about Hispanics and generations, generational change?

William Frey: Yes. I'm not a political consultant so I wouldn't take my advice and take it out there too soon before consulting some others but I do think, first of all, the Hispanic population is a very diverse group. As we saw in Florida, they went Republican four years ago. They went Democrat now. It's changing. It was much more dominated by the Cuban population and now, it's much more folks from other parts of Latin America, Puerto Ricans and so forth so there is a lot of factions within the so-called Hispanic population.

The Mexican part, which dominates a lot in the Southwest and in California, is increasingly becoming second generation

and beyond and I think it's a good question from that perspective. I think the old attitude was that new immigrants would be tending to more the knee jerk Democrat voters and as they got into the second and third generation, the Republican message being perhaps more aspirational in some ways, might appeal to them. But this has varied from state to state and election to election. The Hispanic vote toward Democrats is not nearly as monolithic as it is for blacks and I would just say that you really have to take the local context into perspective rather than just deal with generation.

Robert Lang: I wanted to quickly address the rural question too. I did a piece back called *Cowboys vs. Cappuccino* about the Intermountain West and I looked in this election and I noticed that Moab, Utah voted for Barack Obama and Park City, Utah voted for Barack Obama. The reality is that the rural areas, if they are amenity-based, are liberal. If they're resource extractive base, they're conservative. Here's the bottom line. There is more resource extractive rural space than there is amenities space so that's the big difference in those votes.

Ron Brownstein: The '64-'68 question and the what could happen to the Democrats question because I think they're similar. I agree that the trends in American politics are not self-perpetuating. Demography is not destiny. But something

usually has to happen to arrest the trends or break them and there are two large categories of things that can happen, one of which is the example of '64 to '68. Events happened. The country tore itself apart in a variety of ways between '64 and '68 and the Democratic coalition sundered. And you could see it literally in George Wallace's vote peeling away white conservative Southerners and also ethnic Northerners, blue collar Northerners, and the Democratic coalition fell apart and when it was reassembled and the pieces were out there on the table and in 1972, it was the Republicans who reassembled it as a lasting majority and from '68 to '88, they won the popular vote in five presidential elections.

The other way parties can change is the answer to Michael's question, about what happened between 1988 and 1992 and why I believe that we may look at '68 to '88 as a distinct political era and may believe that another one began in 1992. The other way that things change is when parties change. And after losing three straight elections in the '80s, '84 and '88, Democrats won a smaller share of the available popular vote than they did in any three-election sequence in the history of the party. And what happened in 1992 was Bill Clinton came along and said we've hit a dead end and we have to explicitly reformulate our agenda in a lot of ways to win back people who

have abandoned us. They talked about balancing the budget, talked about personal responsibility, and so forth.

So where are we now? I mean, I think that we are -- events could obviously take apart this Democratic coalition if the economy falls off the cliff, if Obama is unable to protect America. But short of that, I think that it will have to be a combination of decisions by Democrats and reactions by Republicans. The two big things that have happened that have taken us from the world of '68 to '88 of the Republican lock to today is the growth in the non-white vote and the Democratic improvement in upper middle class white America. They do not have the same perspective on government. I think the young people and the minority part of this coalition of the ascendant are very comfortable, as Scott showed, with a more activist government.

In that upper middle class white America, they are still more ambivalent about it and it is possible that Obama could go too far and that he could overreach and create an opening for Republicans. But to take that opening, Republicans are probably going to have to reformulate themselves as well. Palinism, kind of the, and Michael -- she is, in some ways, a reflection of the nature of the primary coalition of Republicans. Seventy percent of Republican voters, 70 percent of self-identified Republicans are now conservative. Unless --

that is a formula to further these trends and I think that if the Republicans put up a nominee of that kind, you would see Obama become the first Democratic candidate in the history of modern polling to win a majority of college-educated whites in 2012.

So I think it would be either events, failure on the part of the administration, or alternately, an overreach by the party that has the advantage but also requiring a response. And I think that is the real lesson and the answer to your question from '88 to '92. Bill Clinton basically tried to reformulate the Democratic agenda in a way that spoke to new people. I don't see -- right now, the Republicans seem to be earlier in that cycle. It took several defeats before you had a party that was willing to accept that. Don't forget, in 1984, between '80 and '84, the dominant response among Democrats was Carter lost because he was too moderate and that we needed "a real Democrat" in order to win. I think Republicans are pretty close that right now, where the dominant view is they lost because Bush spent too much and McCain was too moderate and we need "a real Republican." And it's just worth noting that the real Democrat lost 49 states.

Ruy Teixeira: Well, I'll just make a short comment on basically just following up on Ron's thing. I mean, I think it's pretty simple. When you have the kind of shifting

demographics you have in our country today, the formula is not too complicated. You have to move to the center to take advantage of those new demographics and you have to figure out ways to break in to some of the rising demographics and reposition yourself to be appealing to those and also take advantage of areas where you're already strong. I mean, the Democrats in 1988 moved, changed in such a way that after that, they were able to break into the college-educated white vote in a pretty big way. That was important and of course, they didn't give up or ignore the constituencies that were just flat out growing and growing fast and it was a formula for success. And it doesn't seem to me the formula is too different now.

If there's going to be a resurgent rebuilt Republican majority, it has to be based on taking, being fully cognizant of these demographic trends and figuring out how to break in to some of these rising demographic groups and refashion their image in such a way that that will make it possible. I mean, if you have enough study and research is always good might find parts of this seemingly Democratic majority that much more open to Republicans than other parts of it.

There might be parts of the college educated white voter, the metro vote in some of these states that exceptionally open to Republicans, where there is potential for improvement. With enough research, I think those things can be found. I think

they can be built on. But what will not work is, as Ron is pointing out, to go for the real Republicans. We know what will happen then. So let's just take one more question?

Karlynn Bowman: Well, Ruy, I think we'll end with a comment from Bill Bishop, but I want to tell you that we'll try to put all of these PowerPoint slides up today on both the AEI and the Brookings website and any of the other think-tanks that are represented here today that want them and we'll also try to have a transcript up on our website available at some point as quickly as we can. And Bill, we'll let you have the last word.

Bill Bishop: Just a quick point, after 2004, when Democrats were looking for their way back, they didn't look at demographics. That was not what they looked at. They looked at lifestyle segments. They created ten lifestyle segments across the country, and this gets back to the difference between Wyoming and Vermont. It tells you why strictly demographic views of the electorate don't tell you enough. Nike doesn't look at demographics. Apple doesn't look at demographics. And in 2004, the Democrats decided they wouldn't look at demographics and they found two segments that they could push that were related to geography and they began to look finally, after 20 or 30 years of lifestyle segmentation work in the world of marketing that was brought fully into the world of politics and it works. It worked for the Republicans

in '04 and it worked for the Democrats in '08. The problem is lifestyle segmentation politics is all about polarization and moving people apart and not finding some common language with which the country can go forward.

Ruy Teixeira: Well, thanks, Bill. That's another lens on things. I think we have plenty to contemplate here moving forward, in terms of how these trends are going to work themselves out, moving into 2010 and 2012. As people have repeatedly emphasized, demographics is not, by itself, destiny but it does kind of set the stage, concentrates the mind, just like hanging for what parties need to do.

So it will be very interesting to see how this plays out over the next few years, how the parties do respond to this change situation, how these trends keep gathering steam or do they falter and some of them move the other way, as we were talking about with the Hispanic immigration. There's lots to contemplate here and of course, we hope, a subject for further research, which we'd love to do so we can reconvene people maybe before the 2010 election and also before 2012 and keep the party going.

Meanwhile, I just want to thank everybody for coming today. I want to thank all our panelists, who I thought were fabulous, and see you next time, I guess.

[End of transcript]