Loan Pricing and the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act

Since the adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which eliminated Glass-Steagall limits on affiliations between banks and securities firms, there have been renewed allegations that banks are discounting their loans in order to capture underwriting business for their securities affiliates. This conference will consider an important study by AEI visiting scholar Charles W. Calomiris and Thanavut Pornrojnangkool that throws new light on bank pricing practices when affiliates act as underwriters for securities offerings by commercial borrowers.

About the Author

 

Charles W.
Calomiris
  • Charles W. Calomiris, who codirected AEI's Financial Deregulation Project until 2007, is concurrently the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions at Columbia Business School. He is also a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, a member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee and the Financial Economists Roundtable, and the coordinator of the "Bank Performance and the Economy" program at the Center for Financial Research at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. His research at AEI spans several areas, from banking and corporate finance to financial history and monetary economics. Mr. Calomiris also served on the 2000 International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Known as the Meltzer Commission, this congressionally mandated group recommended specific reforms of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the regional development banks, and the World Trade Organization to the U.S. government.
  • Phone: 2128548748
    Email: ccalomiris@aei.org

 

Peter J.
Wallison
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