David Adesnik is a visiting fellow at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he works on isolationism, national security strategy, and democracy promotion. He is part of AEI’s American Internationalism Project.
Before joining AEI, Adesnik was a research analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He has served as deputy director of Joint Data Support at the US Department of Defense, where he focused on the modeling and simulation of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. Earlier, he spent several months in Baghdad as an operations research and systems analyst for the Coalition Provisional Authority’s counter–improvised explosive device (IED) unit, Task Force Troy during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2008, he was part of John McCain’s presidential campaign national security staff. From 2002 to 2009, Adesnik was the coeditor of OxBlog, a blog started with a fellow Oxford University classmate.
A Rhodes scholar, Adesnik has a doctorate and master’s degree in international relations from Oxford University, where he wrote about the democracy promotion efforts of the Reagan administration. He received a bachelor’s degree in history from Yale University.
President Obama warned “there will be costs” for Russia if it invaded any part of Ukraine. Yet while in Europe, Obama has made it clear that there will only be meaningful costs for Russia if it launches a second invasion, targeting some other part of Ukraine.
President Viktor Yanukovych bought himself an insurance policy before all hell broke loose in Kiev. Last November, he outlawed the presidential candidacy of any individual who had the right of permanent residency in a foreign country and had not resided in Ukraine for the past 10 years.
The gains made at the cost of our troops’ sacrifice may evaporate as they did in Iraq after the president’s eager withdrawal. Let us hope for something better, so that we can honor our troops’ achievements and not just their sacrifice.
While realists are emphatic about the dangers of ideological thinking – especially the dangers of American Exceptionalism – the irony is that Mearsheimer’s own structural realism has fitted him with a set of ideological blinders.