Ever since its founding in 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has maintained an aggressive and bellicose international security posture. Today, fully two decades after the end of the Cold War, North Korea's external defense and security policies look arguably more extreme and anomalous than ever.

The United States and its allies and partners must not only understand Iran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own with which to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power of the two sides, it is unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran even such progress as it has made in these realms.

At the NATO summit in Chicago, the much hoped-for deal between the United States and Pakistan to reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistan did not materialize. The experience of the closure and the negotiations has laid bare the changed relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.

Iran could offer to halt production of 20% enriched uranium in upcoming negotiations. This “concession” would have limited impact on Iran’s ability to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear warhead, however. Iran would still retain the ability to resume 20% enrichment and to produce weapons-grade uranium at a time of its choosing.

AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies will host Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter for a timely discussion of U.S. defense budgets, of the changing strategic landscape in the U.S. and the force that this landscape demands.

2012 looks to be an interesting year for the already complex political triangle among the United States, Taiwan and China, what with each country undergoing political transitions. Should we expect policy continuity from President Ma Ying-jeou and the likely new Chinese leader Xi Jinping? What about continuity in the United States?