A new report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) argues that one of the greatest mistakes the United States can make is to imagine that Iranian activities in a given arena--the nuclear program, for example--are isolated from Iranian undertakings in another. The report examines those other areas

The United States and its allies and partners must not only understand Iran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own with which to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power of the two sides, it is unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran even such progress as it has made in these realms.

This most recent incident illuminates the ongoing confusion in the White House and among the American political elite generally about how the president should take advice from his senior military commanders.

I wanted to be sure you saw the following two pieces by American Enterprise Institute (AEI) scholar Fred Kagan.In his Foreign Affairs Afghanistan piece, Kagan points out that:

The humiliation of Obama's retreat is compounded by the dishonesty of its presentation. The president has failed to achieve any of the objectives that he established as his own policy in February 2009 — apart, of course, from withdrawing U.S. military forces.

Success in war depends on more than equipment or well-trained personnel. It also depends upon a clear and well-articulated idea of why we fight. In Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (Encounter Books, 2006), AEI resident scholar Frederick W. Kagan makes clear that many of the problems...

The American withdrawal, which comes after the administration's failure to secure a new agreement that would have allowed troops to remain in Iraq, won't be good for ordinary Iraqis nor for the region. But it will unquestionably benefit Iran.

The end of American military presence in Iraq is not the end of Iraq or the end of America’s interests in Iraq.  The worst manifestation of the Vietnam complex that has informed so many decisions about American policy in Iraq is the inherent conviction that Iraq will disappear into the dustbin of history once America leaves, as Vietnam did.