The overall direction of the Commission majority's report was determined before the Commission started its work. Throughout its 18 month life, the Commission focused only on issues that the chairman wanted to cover, was more interested in publicity than in a thorough investigation, and never paid serious attention to other views. It was not in any sense an objective or thorough study, did not produce any facts or data that could aid scholars in the future.

The FCIC's report fails to address the cause of the deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards that led to the housing bubble widely accepted as the key factor in destabilizing the American economy.

No one wants to excuse the managers and regulators of financial companies from responsibility for the financial crisis. But it is too easy to assign blame and walk away, without doing the serious work of finding out what really happened.

The question the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission should have answered--and did not--was why there were so many bad mortgages outstanding in 2008?

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission only produced a narrative about the financial crisis, not a coherent description of what caused the financial crisis.

To avoid the next financial crisis, we must understand what caused the one from which we are now slowly emerging, and take action to avoid the same mistake in the future.

The $2 billion loss by JPMorgan Chase has reawakened debate about whether banks are taking excessive risks, but many facts have gotten lost in the breathless media coverage.

AEI scholars Bill Thomas and Peter Wallison have been appointed to the 10-member Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission--the financial equivalent of the 9/11 Commission.