A new report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) argues that one of the greatest mistakes the United States can make is to imagine that Iranian activities in a given arena--the nuclear program, for example--are isolated from Iranian undertakings in another. The report examines those other areas

The United States and its allies and partners must not only understand Iran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own with which to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power of the two sides, it is unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran even such progress as it has made in these realms.

The United States must condition the continuation of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship as it begins its exit from Iraq on the willingness of the Iraqi leadership to guide their country in the direction of greater stability, inclusivity and effective governance.

An Obama policy that continues the withdrawal of U.S. forces down to zero in Iraq would unquestionably strengthen Iran.

The question of the moment is not “Who lost Iraq?” but rather “Is Iraq definitely lost?”

Coalition detention of insurgents in Iraq has been reformed to the benefit of the mission there, anddetention should begin the process of transition tothe Iraqis.

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on U.S. policy options in Iraq.

The end of American military presence in Iraq is not the end of Iraq or the end of America’s interests in Iraq.  The worst manifestation of the Vietnam complex that has informed so many decisions about American policy in Iraq is the inherent conviction that Iraq will disappear into the dustbin of history once America leaves, as Vietnam did.