Can we be spared a Lehman-style crisis when Greece’s hard default occurs?

We need good economics over politics, now more than ever. That means sensible tax reform, a Fed focus on maintaining liquidity, and rationalization of the European monetary system.

A recent FDIC report on Lehman Brothers’s financial condition before its failure puts in doubt the Federal Reserve’s account of its decision- making, and raises significant questions about the nature of the financial crisis.

One year later, the causes of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy are still widely misunderstood.

Secretary Geithner argued that we have forgotten the reasons that the Dodd-Frank Act was necessary, and that's why the act has become so controversial. What the secretary seems to have missed is that we have learned a lot in the intervening years. The administration's rush to judgment on the financial crisis is a case study in why it would have been worthwhile to wait for the facts.

The administration's rationale for setting up a government-run resolution authority--to the extent that it is based on the idea that the interconnectedness of Lehman caused the financial crisis--is not well founded.

In a new book entitled “Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts,” Vern McKinley provides the most detailed account yet of the government’s decision-making process during these momentous events.

Under the Dodd-Frank financial-reform law, large nonbank firms may be declared systemically important because their failure will cause a systemic breakdown. In effect, this amounts to a government statement that these firms are too big to fail.