A recent FDIC report on Lehman Brothers’s financial condition before its failure puts in doubt the Federal Reserve’s account of its decision- making, and raises significant questions about the nature of the financial crisis.

One year later, the causes of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy are still widely misunderstood.

In a new book entitled “Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts,” Vern McKinley provides the most detailed account yet of the government’s decision-making process during these momentous events.

Secretary Geithner argued that we have forgotten the reasons that the Dodd-Frank Act was necessary, and that's why the act has become so controversial. What the secretary seems to have missed is that we have learned a lot in the intervening years. The administration's rush to judgment on the financial crisis is a case study in why it would have been worthwhile to wait for the facts.

On the third anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the U.S. economy continues to disappoint, and the U.S. labor market has hardly made any progress at all.

Under the Dodd-Frank financial-reform law, large nonbank firms may be declared systemically important because their failure will cause a systemic breakdown. In effect, this amounts to a government statement that these firms are too big to fail.

Instead of placing undue reliance on all-too-fallible bank supervisors and regulators, should we not now be considering doing something serious about the perverse incentives to overly risky bank lending, as well as to the ‘too big to fail’ problem in the US and global banking systems.

At this AEI event, Wharton professor Joseph Gyourko discusses the implications of his research on the Federal Housing Administration. Edward Pinto, AEI scholar and housing finance expert, will respond.