Iran could offer to halt production of 20% enriched uranium in upcoming negotiations. This “concession” would have limited impact on Iran’s ability to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear warhead, however. Iran would still retain the ability to resume 20% enrichment and to produce weapons-grade uranium at a time of its choosing.

The Obama administration’s recent focus on finding a compromise to allow the Iranian regime to maintain some enrichment capabilities “for peaceful purposes” distracts from the underlying nuclear threat at hand.

Iran is at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Sanctions, direct action, and diplomatic tools have neither changed Iran’s nuclear policy nor had a visible effect on the enrichment program, including the growing stockpile of 19.75% LEU.

Sanctions, diplomatic tools, and other measures have neither changed Iran’s nuclear policy, nor had a visible impact on Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, some in the United States and the international community still dismiss the looming reality of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Iran is at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. AEI's Critical Threats Project has produced a capabilities assessment of the time required for Iran to acquire enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel one nuclear weapon if it proceeds to break out in 2012.

Calling the Fordow enrichment plant a 'Potemkin' plant is grossly misleading. Unfortunately, the reality that must be confronted is much more complicated and dangerous.

The prospect of Iran achieving nuclear breakout capability is becoming more imminent. Reports this past weekend indicate that Iran has built the infrastructure needed for operating more efficient and advanced centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.

AEI report finds that Iran can acquire the fuel needed for a nuclear weapon by mid-August 2012.